BRIDGETON, MO —
OSHA Inspection: JOHN F. BEASLEY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.
Referral inspection · Safety discipline
At a glance
On , OSHA opened a referral safety inspection of JOHN F. BEASLEY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. in RT. 115 BRIDGE OVER MO. RIVER, BRIDGETON, MO 63044 (NAICS 000000). OSHA activity number 106699770.
Where did this inspection happen?
- Establishment
- JOHN F. BEASLEY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.
- Site address
- RT. 115 BRIDGE OVER MO. RIVER
- City
- BRIDGETON
- State
- MO
- ZIP
- 63044
- Mailing
- 4001 JAFFEE ST., DALLAS, TX 75216
What kind of inspection was it?
- Inspection type
- Referral (C)
- Scope
- Complete (A)
- Discipline
- Safety
- Advance notice
- No
- Union status
- Y
When did the case open and close?
- Opened
- Closing conference
- Case closed
- Last modified
- Data loaded
Establishment context
- NAICS code
- 000000
- SIC code (legacy)
- 1622
- Employees
- 20
- Ownership type
- A
- Industry flags
- Construction safety.
Citations
3 citations on file for this inspection.
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Abate by
- Penalty
- Initial $500.00 · Current $3000.00
General-duty citation text
1 Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to a fall hazard due to improper ballasting procedures. (a) On November 6, 1991 while disengaging four "H"-towers from the bridge trusses, the east and west support barges were unevenly ballasted. Specifically, on the west barge one six inch pump was used in each compartment. However, on the east barge one three inch pump and one four inch pump was used in each of the north compartments while one six inch pump was used in each of the south compartments. During the ballasting operation all pumps were started simultaneously but were stopped after a lapse of about fifteen minutes. After the pumps were restarted the six inch pump on the southeast section on the east barge was observed not operating.This condition continued for approximately fifteen minutes while the other nine pumps continued to pump water. During this time the towers on the west barge cleared the bottom of the truss but the towers on the east barge remained in contact with the bottom chord of the truss. The west barge moved a few feet north and east, following which the south tower on the east barge collapsed. Subsequently the north tower on the east barge also fell. An ironworker was seriously injured when he fell with the north tower into the river. One feasible and acceptable abatement method, among others, to correct this hazard is to anticipate and prevent excessive displacement of the barge(s) due to potential failure, improper size and placement and or inadequate monitoring of ballast pumps. A minimally acceptable plan or procedure would consist of the following elements. (1) Calculation of the ballast required to unload the "H"-towers on each barge to allow safe and orderly disengagement from the trusses. (2) Calculation of the pumps placement, flow rate and running time to achieve needed ballast. (3) Close coordination, monitoring and control of pumps providing ballast to barge(s) with continual visual gauging of both ballast and freeboard to ensure uniform ballasting. Note: The employer is not limited to the abatement methods suggested above. 2 Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to the hazard of being struck or crushed by failure of the bridge section erection towers due to the lack of a contingency plan to safely accommodate failure modes that can reasonably be anticipated. (a) At least one of the two "H"-towers on the east barge were likely to collapse because of their inability to resist the forces imposed on them due to the movement of the west barge. The movement occurred after the towers on the west barge were cleared of the bridge trusses while the towers on the east barge remained in contact with the bridge trusses. The movement of the barge was caused by the employers failure to have a plan that required employees to take immediate, effective and corrective action following the failure of a ballast pump on the east barge to prevent uneven ballasting of the barges. One feasible and acceptable abatement method, among others, to correct this hazard is to anticipate emergencies and develop a contingency plan to avoid structural failures or other disasters in the event of ballast pump failure during disengagement operations, or loss of power etc. a minimally acceptable plan or procedure would consist of the following elements. (1) Develop a written plan that anticipates reasonably predictable emergencies that could have a significant negative effect on the safe flotation and bolt up of floated-in truss type construction. (2) Determine lines of authority, methods of communication that assures full transfer of critical information to competent person(s) who have the knowledge and authority to effect plan changes to assure a safe operation. (3) Ensure the competent person is fully knowledgeable of the plan that is in place and in command throughout all critical phases of the float in and ballasting operations. Note: The employer is not limited to the abatement methods suggested above. 3 Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to the potential hazards of being injured by accidents due to insufficient training to recognize and respond to hazards that could reasonably be anticipated to be generated, i.e., water pump failure in ballasting operations and or failure of anchor wench system, etc. (a) Employees engaged in ballasting operations did not recognize nor report concerns to management when uneven ballasting occurred during disengagement operations that subsequently resulted in structural failure of the south "H"-tower on the east barge. One feasible and acceptable abatement method, among others, to correct this hazard is to instruct employees on how to recognize, report and initiate actions to eliminate potentially hazardous conditions as they develop. A minimally acceptable abatement plan or procedure would consist of the following elements. (1) Train all employees in the operations plan prior to each phase of construction. (2) Train all employees in hazards of the operation and control methods used to control or eliminate the hazards. (3) Train field personnel in the plan emphasizing their role in observing, reporting and taking corrective action in a timely manner as any hazardous situations develop. (4) conduct training sessions such as mock/trial float-ins encouraging employee involvement and feedback to ensure all personnel know their duties and responsibilities for each float-in. (5) Adjust operation and contingency plans based on field input and actual experience and reinstruct field personnel as necessary. Note: The employer is not limited to the abatement methods suggested above.
Recent events (3)
- — F (S) $3000.00
- — A (S) $7000.00
- — Z (S) $500.00
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Abate by
- Penalty
- Initial $700.00
General-duty citation text
2 Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to the hazard of being struck or crushed by failure of the bridge section erection towers due to the lack of a contingency plan to safely accommodate failure modes that can reasonably be anticipated. (a) At least one of the two "H"-towers on the east barge were likely to collapse because of their inability to resist the forces imposed on them due to the movement of the west barge. The movement occurred after the towers on the west barge were cleared of the bridge trusses while the towers on the east barge remained in contact with the bridge trusses. The movement of the barge was caused by the employers failure to have a plan that required employees to take immediate, effective and corrective action following the failure of a ballast pump on the east barge to prevent uneven ballasting of the barges. One feasible and acceptable abatement method, among others, to correct this hazard is to anticipate emergencies and develop a contingency plan to avoid structural failures or other disasters in the event of ballast pump failure during disengagement operations, or loss of power etc. a minimally acceptable plan or procedure would consist of the following elements. (1) Develop a written plan that anticipates reasonably predictable emergencies that could have a significant negative effect on the safe flotation and bolt up of floated-in truss type con- struction. (2) Determine lines of authority, methods of communication that assures full transfer of critical information to competent person(s) who have the knowledge and authority to effect plan changes to assure a safe operation. (3) Ensure the competent person is fully knowledgeable of the plan that is in place and in command throughout all critical phases of the float in and ballasting operations. Note: The employer is not limited to the abatement methods suggested above. 3 Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to the potential hazards of being injured by accidents due to insufficient training to recognize and respond to hazards that could reasonably be anticipated to be generated, i.e., water pump failure in ballasting operations and or failure of anchor wench system, etc. (a) Employees engaged in ballasting operations did not recognize nor report concerns to management when uneven ballasting occurred during disengagement operations that subsequently resulted in structural failure of the south "H"-tower on the east barge. One feasible and acceptable abatement method, among others, to correct this hazard is to instruct employees on how to recognize, report and initiate actions to eliminate potentially hazardous conditions as they develop. A minimally acceptable abatement plan or procedure would consist of the following elements. (1) Train all employees in the operations plan prior to each phase of construction. (2) Train all employees in hazards of the operation and control methods used to control or eliminate the hazards. (3) Train field personnel in the plan emphasizing their role in observing, reporting and taking corrective action in a timely manner as any hazardous situations develop. (4) conduct training sessions such as mock/trial float-ins encouraging employee involvement and feedback to ensure all personnel know their duties and responsibilities for each float-in. (5) Adjust operation and contingency plans based on field input and actual experience and reinstruct field personnel as necessary. Note: The employer is not limited to the abatement methods suggested above.
Recent events (3)
- — F (S)
- — A (S) $7000.00
- — Z (S) $700.00
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Abate by
- Penalty
- Initial $5000.00
General-duty citation text
3 %% Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to the potential hazards of being injured by accidents due to insufficient training to recognize and respond to hazards that could reasonably be anticipated to be generated, i.e., water pump failure in ballasting operations and or failure of anchor wench system, etc. (a) Employees engaged in ballasting operations did not recognize nor report concerns to management when uneven ballasting occurred during disengagement operations that subsequently resulted in structural failure of the south "H"-tower on the east barge. One feasible and acceptable abatement method, among others, to correct this hazard is to instruct employees on how to recognize, report and initiate actions to eliminate potentially hazardous conditions as they develop. A minimally acceptable abatement plan or procedure would consist of the following elements. (1) Train all employees in the operations plan prior to each phase of construction. (2) Train all employees in hazards of the operation and control methods used to control or eliminate the hazards. (3) Train field personnel in the plan emphasizing their role in observing, reporting and taking corrective action in a timely manner as any hazardous situations develop. (4) Conduct training sessions such as mock/trial float-ins encouraging employee involvement and feedback to ensure all personnel know their duties and responsibilities for each float-in. (5) Adjust operation and contingency plans based on field input and actual experience and reinstruct field personnel as necessary. Note: The employer is not limited to the abatement methods suggested above.
Recent events (2)
- — F (S)
- — Z (S) $5000.00
More inspections at JOHN F. BEASLEY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.
CEDAR CITY, MO—1990-08-06 00:00:00
JOHN F. BEASLEY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.
SHREVEPORT, LA—1989-10-13 00:00:00
JOHN F. BEASLEY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.
View JOHN F. BEASLEY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.'s full OSHA safety record →
More inspections in this industry (NAICS 000000)
SCHENECTADY, NY—2012-01-05 00:00:00
BRUCE D. BOWMAN
BILLINGS, MT—2005-01-25 00:00:00
KGC, INC.
ROCKAWAY, NJ—2002-12-31 00:00:00
ROCKAWAY BOROUGH DPW
FOREST CITY, NC—2002-12-31 00:00:00
HARRY BRICKEY DBA A. BRICKEY CEILING COMPANY
EDGERTON, KS—2002-12-31 00:00:00
SUDDEN BOND INDUSTRIES
More inspections in MO
CLINTON, MO—2026-07-14
TORCHYLO BUILDERS, LLC.
KANSAS CITY, MO—2026-07-09
NIAGARA BOTTLING
MONETT, MO—2026-07-09
MONETT METALS INC.
PARKVILLE, MO—2026-07-08
SKY-TECH ROOFING, LLC.
SPRINGFIELD, MO—2026-07-07
D & C CONSTRUCTION, LLC.
Source
This record is reproduced from the U.S. Department of Labor Open Data API (OSHA inspection dataset). The original IMIS detail view is available at OSHA's Establishment Search for activity number 106699770.