Safety Incidents OSHA Severe Injury Reports · 2015–2025
5,189,214Inspections Most recent open 2026-07-16 Last loaded 2026-07-20

OSHA Inspection: JOHN F. BEASLEY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.

Referral inspection · Safety discipline

On , OSHA opened a referral safety inspection of JOHN F. BEASLEY CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. in RT. 115 BRIDGE OVER MO. RIVER, BRIDGETON, MO 63044 (NAICS 000000). OSHA activity number 106699770.

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Site address
RT. 115 BRIDGE OVER MO. RIVER
City
BRIDGETON
State
MO
ZIP
63044
Mailing
4001 JAFFEE ST., DALLAS, TX 75216
Inspection type
Referral (C)
Scope
Complete (A)
Discipline
Safety
Advance notice
No
Union status
Y
Opened
Closing conference
Case closed
Last modified
Data loaded
NAICS code
000000
SIC code (legacy)
1622
Employees
20
Ownership type
A
Industry flags
Construction safety.

3 citations on file for this inspection.

5(a)(1)

Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 10 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $500.00 · Current $3000.00
1
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which
were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were
exposed to a fall hazard  due to improper ballasting procedures.
(a)  On November 6, 1991 while disengaging four "H"-towers from
the bridge trusses, the east and west support barges were
unevenly ballasted. Specifically, on the west barge one six
inch pump was used in each compartment. However, on the east
barge one three inch pump and one four inch pump was used in
each of the north compartments while one six inch pump was
used in each of the south compartments. During the ballasting
operation all pumps were started simultaneously but were
stopped after a lapse of about fifteen minutes. After the
pumps were restarted the six inch pump on the southeast
section on the east barge was observed not operating.This
condition continued for approximately fifteen minutes while
the other nine pumps continued to pump water. During this
time the towers on the west barge cleared the bottom of the
truss but the towers on the east barge remained in contact
with the bottom chord of the truss. The west barge moved a
few feet north and east, following which the south tower on
the east barge collapsed. Subsequently the north tower on the
east barge also fell. An ironworker was seriously injured
when he fell with the north tower into the river.
One feasible and acceptable abatement method, among others, to correct
this hazard is to anticipate and prevent excessive displacement of the
barge(s) due to potential failure, improper size and placement and or
inadequate monitoring of ballast pumps. A minimally acceptable plan or
procedure would consist of the following elements.
(1)  Calculation of the ballast required to unload the "H"-towers on
each barge to allow safe and orderly disengagement from the
trusses.
(2)  Calculation of the pumps placement, flow rate and running time
to achieve needed ballast.
(3)  Close coordination, monitoring and control of pumps providing
ballast to barge(s) with continual visual gauging of both
ballast and freeboard to ensure  uniform ballasting.
Note: The employer is not limited to the abatement methods suggested above.
2
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:
The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment
which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to
cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees
were exposed to the hazard of being struck or crushed by failure of
the bridge section erection towers due to the lack of a contingency plan to
safely accommodate failure modes that can reasonably be anticipated.
(a) At least one of the two "H"-towers on the east barge were
likely to collapse because of their inability to resist the forces imposed
on them due to the movement of the west barge. The movement occurred after
the towers on the west barge were cleared of the bridge trusses while the
towers on the east barge remained in contact with the bridge trusses. The
movement of the barge was caused by the employers failure to have a plan
that required employees to take immediate, effective and corrective action
following the failure of a ballast pump on the east barge to prevent uneven
ballasting of the barges.
One feasible and acceptable abatement method, among others, to correct this
hazard is to anticipate emergencies and develop a contingency plan to avoid
structural failures or other disasters in the event of ballast pump failure
during disengagement operations, or loss of power etc. a minimally
acceptable plan or procedure would consist of the following elements.
(1)  Develop a written plan that anticipates reasonably predictable
emergencies that could have a significant negative effect on the
safe flotation and bolt up of floated-in truss type construction.
(2)  Determine lines of authority, methods of communication that assures
full transfer of critical information to competent person(s) who
have the knowledge and authority to effect plan changes to assure a
safe operation.
(3)  Ensure the competent person is fully knowledgeable of the plan that
is in place and in command throughout all critical phases of the
float in and ballasting operations.
Note: The employer is not limited to the abatement methods suggested above.
3
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:
The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment
which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to
cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees
were exposed to the potential hazards of being injured by accidents
due to insufficient training to recognize and respond to hazards that
could reasonably be anticipated to be generated, i.e., water pump failure
in ballasting operations and or failure of anchor wench system, etc.
(a)  Employees engaged in ballasting operations did not recognize
nor report concerns to management when uneven ballasting occurred during
disengagement operations that subsequently resulted in structural failure
of the south "H"-tower on the east barge.
One feasible and acceptable abatement method, among others, to correct this
hazard is to instruct employees on how to recognize, report and initiate
actions to eliminate potentially hazardous conditions as they develop.
A minimally acceptable abatement plan or procedure would consist of the
following elements.
(1) Train all employees in the operations plan prior to each phase
of construction.
(2) Train all employees in hazards of the operation and control
methods used to control or eliminate the hazards.
(3) Train field personnel in the plan emphasizing their role in
observing, reporting and taking corrective action in a timely
manner as any hazardous situations develop.
(4) conduct training sessions such as mock/trial float-ins encouraging
employee involvement and feedback to ensure all personnel know
their duties and responsibilities for each float-in.
(5) Adjust operation and contingency plans based on field input and
actual experience and reinstruct  field personnel as necessary.
Note: The employer is not limited to the abatement methods suggested above.
Recent events (3)
  • — F (S) $3000.00
  • — A (S) $7000.00
  • — Z (S) $500.00

5(a)(1)

Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 10 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $700.00
2
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which
were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were
exposed to the hazard of being struck or crushed by failure of the
bridge section erection towers due to the lack of a contingency plan to
safely accommodate failure modes that can reasonably be anticipated.
(a)  At least one of the two "H"-towers on the east barge were
likely to collapse because of their inability to resist the
forces imposed on them due to the movement of the west barge.
The movement occurred after the towers on the west barge were
cleared of the bridge trusses while the towers on the east
barge remained in contact with the bridge trusses. The
movement of the barge was caused by the employers failure to
have a plan that required employees to take immediate,
effective and corrective action following the failure of a
ballast pump on the east barge to prevent uneven ballasting
of the barges.
One feasible and acceptable abatement method, among others, to correct
this hazard is to anticipate emergencies and develop a contingency plan
to avoid structural failures or other disasters in the event of ballast
pump failure during disengagement operations, or loss of power etc. a
minimally acceptable plan or procedure would consist of the following
elements.
(1)  Develop a written plan that anticipates reasonably predictable
emergencies that could have a significant negative effect on the
safe flotation and bolt up of floated-in truss type con-
struction.
(2)  Determine lines of authority, methods of communication that
assures full transfer of critical information to competent
person(s) who have the knowledge and authority to effect plan
changes to assure a safe operation.
(3)  Ensure the competent person is fully knowledgeable of the plan
that is in place and in command throughout all critical phases
of the float in and ballasting operations.
Note: The employer is not limited to the abatement methods suggested above.
3
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:
The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment
which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to
cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees
were exposed to the potential hazards of being injured by accidents
due to insufficient training to recognize and respond to hazards that
could reasonably be anticipated to be generated, i.e., water pump failure
in ballasting operations and or failure of anchor wench system, etc.
(a)  Employees engaged in ballasting operations did not recognize
nor report concerns to management when uneven ballasting occurred during
disengagement operations that subsequently resulted in structural failure
of the south "H"-tower on the east barge.
One feasible and acceptable abatement method, among others, to correct this
hazard is to instruct employees on how to recognize, report and initiate
actions to eliminate potentially hazardous conditions as they develop.
A minimally acceptable abatement plan or procedure would consist of the
following elements.
(1) Train all employees in the operations plan prior to each phase
of construction.
(2) Train all employees in hazards of the operation and control
methods used to control or eliminate the hazards.
(3) Train field personnel in the plan emphasizing their role in
observing, reporting and taking corrective action in a timely
manner as any hazardous situations develop.
(4) conduct training sessions such as mock/trial float-ins encouraging
employee involvement and feedback to ensure all personnel know
their duties and responsibilities for each float-in.
(5) Adjust operation and contingency plans based on field input and
actual experience and reinstruct  field personnel as necessary.
Note: The employer is not limited to the abatement methods suggested above.
Recent events (3)
  • — F (S)
  • — A (S) $7000.00
  • — Z (S) $700.00

5(a)(1)

Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 10 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $5000.00
3
%%
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which
were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were
exposed to the potential hazards of being injured by accidents due to
insufficient training to recognize and respond to hazards that could
reasonably be anticipated to be generated, i.e., water pump failure
in ballasting operations and or failure of anchor wench system, etc.
(a)  Employees engaged in ballasting operations did not recognize
nor report concerns to management when uneven ballasting
occurred during disengagement operations that subsequently
resulted in structural failure of the south "H"-tower on the
east barge.
One feasible and acceptable abatement method, among others, to correct
this hazard is to instruct employees on how to recognize, report and
initiate actions to eliminate potentially hazardous conditions as they
develop.
A minimally acceptable abatement plan or procedure would consist of the
following elements.
(1)  Train all employees in the operations plan prior to each
phase of construction.
(2)  Train all employees in hazards of the operation and control
methods used to control or eliminate the hazards.
(3)  Train field personnel in the plan emphasizing their role in
observing, reporting and taking corrective action in a timely
manner as any hazardous situations develop.
(4)  Conduct training sessions such as mock/trial float-ins
encouraging employee involvement and feedback to ensure all
personnel know their duties and responsibilities for each
float-in.
(5)  Adjust operation and contingency plans based on field input
and actual experience and reinstruct  field personnel as
necessary.
Note: The employer is not limited to the abatement methods suggested above.
Recent events (2)
  • — F (S)
  • — Z (S) $5000.00

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This record is reproduced from the U.S. Department of Labor Open Data API (OSHA inspection dataset). The original IMIS detail view is available at OSHA's Establishment Search for activity number 106699770.