Safety Incidents OSHA Severe Injury Reports · 2015–2025
2,004,209Inspections Most recent open 2026-07-13 Last loaded 2026-07-17

HOUSTON, TX —

OSHA Inspection: HOUSTON REFINING L.P.

Planned inspection · Health discipline

At a glance

On , OSHA opened a planned health inspection of HOUSTON REFINING L.P. in 12000 LAWNDALE, HOUSTON, TX 77017 (NAICS 324110). OSHA activity number 311962518.

Watch Houston Refining L.P. — free Get an email when a new federal OSHA severe-injury report for Houston Refining L.P. is published. One employer, no account, unsubscribe in one click.

Where did this inspection happen?

Establishment
HOUSTON REFINING L.P.
Site address
12000 LAWNDALE
City
HOUSTON
State
TX
ZIP
77017
Mailing
12000 LAWNDALE, HOUSTON, TX 77017

What kind of inspection was it?

Inspection type
Planned (H)
Scope
Partial (B)
Discipline
Health
Advance notice
No
Union status
Y

When did the case open and close?

Opened
Closing conference
Case closed
Last modified
Data loaded

Establishment context

NAICS code
324110
SIC code (legacy)
2911
Employees
500
Ownership type
A
Industry flags
Manufacturing health.

Citations

18 citations on file for this inspection.

1910.119 D03 IB

Serious Gravity 03 5 instances 8 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $1875.00 · Current $1875.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(B):  Process safety information pertaining to the
equipment in the
process did not include the piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs):
The following piping and instrument diagrams such as, but not limited to,
were inaccurate or
incomplete:
A.Drawing No. HT-0178, Sheet No. FP-0018, schematically represented there
are two
block valves on the discharge line from pressure safety valve 435PSV0228.
Field
observations on Thursday, May 14, 2009 found only one block valve in the
line.
B.Drawing No. HT-0178, Sheet No. FP-0021 failed to schematically represent
that there
were four, 1" diameter, capped, connections to Hydrocarbon Surge Drum
436D1207 in
the sidewall of the shell.  Field observations on Monday, May 18, 2009
noted the
connections.
C.Drawing No. HT-0000, Sheet No. FP-0206 titled, "Piping Symbology P & I
Diagram,
had no schematic symbol listed for an upside-down "Y".  This symbol was
found next
to 435PSV0228 on Drawing No. HT-0178, Sheet No. FP-0018.
D.Drawing No. HT-0178, Sheet No. FP-0018 schematically represented that
there were
two, 2" diameter instrument connections on the lower shell of Quench Tower
435T1101
for the lower end of the fluid level gage and the fluid level transmitter.
Field
observations on Monday, May 18, 2009 found one of the two nozzles was
inactive and
fitted with a flange cap not represented on the drawings.
E.Drawing No. HT-0178, Sheet No. FP-0021 schematically represented that
the
lower
instrument connection for Level Gage 0309 and Level Transmitter 0310 for
Hydrocarbon
Surge Drum 436D1207 was in the lower sidewall of the shell. Field
observations on
Monday, May 18, 2009 found the connection point was actually in the bottom
of the
vessel.
F.Drawing No. HT-0178, Sheet No. FP-0021 schematically showed 436PSV0308 as
connected but not in service. Field observations on Monday, May 18, 2009
noted the
discharge piping from the safety valve had been removed but not noted on
the drawing.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S) $1875.00
  • — Z (S) $1875.00

1910.119 E01

Other-than-serious Gravity 03 1 instance 8 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $1875.00 · Current $1875.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(1):  The process hazard analysis was not appropriate to
the complexity of
the process and did not identify, evaluate, and address the control of the
hazards involved in the
process:
During the 2007 PHA Redo the employer did not identify or control
hazardous discharges of
relief devices such as, but not limited to:
A.In Tail Gas Unit 435, PSV0266 and PSV0267 were installed on top of
Anhydrous
Ammonia Storage Tank 435D0007.  In the event of a relief incident, these
PSV's would
relieve anhydrous ammonia gas approximately 5-feet above grade which would
expose
any employees, in the area at the time, to inhalation hazards of anhydrous
ammonia.
B.In Unit 436, Fin-Fan Deck at Location 34413.  A steam vent pipe
installed with
#433PSV0077 to route discharges of steam to the atmosphere, relieved steam
to areas
located in close proximity to the walking deck and to a nearby ladder.
Employees were
exposed to a hazard of contact with steam if in the area when the relief
device activated.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (O) $1875.00
  • — Z (S) $1875.00

1910.119 E03 I

Deleted Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 8 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $4500.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(i):  The process hazard analysis did not address the
hazards of the
process:
A.No consideration of the potential for excessive movement of pipes in the
flare system was
documented in either the Plant Flare Revalidation done in 2006 or the 2007
Process
Hazard Analysis Revalidation/Redo for the Sulfur Recovery Complex.
Excessive
movement of pipes such as, but not limited to, an explosion or hammer
event could
result in a release of flammable and toxic gases if the system were torn
apart.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S)
  • — Z (S) $4500.00

1910.119 E03 V

Other-than-serious Gravity 03 1 instance 42 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $1875.00 · Current $1875.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(v):  The process hazard analysis did not address
facility siting:
A.The employer did not complete an evaluation of the toxic concerns
associated with the
release of gases such as hydrogen sulfide, sulfur dioxide, and ammonia for
buildings in
the Sulfur Recovery Complex.
B.Wind socks were not installed in accordance with the requirements of
Building Checklist
(Appendix D) of API Recommended Practice 752, Management of Hazards
Associated
with Location of Process Plant Buildings.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (O) $1875.00
  • — Z (S) $1875.00

1910.119 E05

Serious Gravity 10 3 instances 2 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $4500.00 · Current $4500.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(5): The employer did not promptly address the team's
findings and
recommendations; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a timely
manner and that
the resolution is documented:
A.The employer failed to ensure that 2007 PHA recommendation No. 5,  to
prevent a
catastrophic release of hydrogen sulfide, sulfur dioxide and ammonia gases
from
the
433 Claus unit was resolved and documented in a timely manner.
B.The employer failed to ensure that 2007 PHA recommendation No. 9, to
prevent a
catastrophic release of hydrogen sulfide, sulfur dioxide and ammonia gases
from the
434 Claus unit was resolved and documented in a timely manner.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S) $4500.00
  • — Z (S) $4500.00

1910.119 F01 IIA

Deleted Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 22 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $4500.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(ii)(A): The employer did not develop written
operating procedures
that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved
in each covered
process consistent with the process safety information, and, that
addressed operating limits
and the consequences of deviation.
A.Operating procedures for processes in the Sulfur Recovery Complex lacked
written
definitions for safe limits of operation, consequences of deviation, and
steps necessary
to avoid reaching unsafe limits.  This deficiency had been noted in the
2005
Compliance Audit and in the 2007 Revalidation (Redo) Process Hazard
Analysis for
the Sulfur Recovery Complex.  Employees could be exposed to inhalation
hazards of
process chemicals such as, but not limited to, hydrogen sulfide, sulfur
dioxide, and
ammonia in the event of a release incident due to an upset condition.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S)
  • — Z (S) $4500.00

1910.119 F04

Other-than-serious Gravity 03 5 instances 8 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $1875.00 · Current $1875.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(4):  The employer did not develop and implement safe
work practices for
employees and contractor employees to provide for the control of hazards
during operations such
as lockout/tagout; confined space entry; opening process equipment or
piping; and control over
entrance into a facility by maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or other
support personnel:
In the SRC Unit(s) the employer did not ensure that implementation of the
company
safe work
practices such as, but not limited to, Lockout/Tagout, Safe Work Permits
and Work Within Plant
procedures were followed:
A.On or about May 28, 2009, in Unit 436, on the PSV (436PSV0308)
protecting the HC
Separator had two block valves locked out with locks #2136, but the
lockout box had
been emptied and placed in the storage section of the lock box cabinet
indicating the
lockout had been completed and no longer in effect.  This practice also
did not comply
with the requirements of Houston Refining Procedure 6 - Lockout/Tagout.
B.On or about June 2, 2009, in Unit 439, the 480V Load Distribution Center
was being
utilized by contractors to energize the extension cords connected to a
portable hand
grinder.  Permit #268371 was issued on May 28, 2009 and last updated on
May 30,
2009.  It had not been updated during every shift as required by the
Houston Refining
Procedure 1 - Safe Work Permits (General Requirements).
C.On or about May 28, 2009, in Unit 436, catwalk on west side of Fin
Tubes, employee(s)
were exposed to tripping hazards from the old boards and plywood sheathing
that were
stacked in the passageway.  This condition did not follow the Houston
Refining HSE
Field Manual, Working Within the Plant, Housekeeping requirement.
D.On or about June 2, 2009, in Unit 439, Permit #244934 for
grinding/welding in the
Thermal Reactor was not kept in a separate holder/bag from the confined
space permit
#1014159 as required by the Houston Refining Procedure 1 - Safe Work
Permits
(General Requirements).
E.On or about June 2, 2009, in Unit 434, Permit #261446 had not been
posted at the
location of the work activity where employee(s) were installing new sulfur
pit piping.
Posting of the permit was required by the Houston Refining Procedure 1 -
Safe
Work
Permits (General Requirements).
Recent events (2)
  • — J (O) $1875.00
  • — Z (S) $1875.00

1910.119 J02

Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 8 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $4500.00 · Current $4500.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(j)(2):  The employer did not establish and implement
written procedures to
maintain the on-going mechanical integrity of process equipment:
The employer did not implement Lyondell Standard No. 860, Instrumentation,
Section 5.2 which
requires effective maintenance performance of the Instrument and Control
Systems.  The
following mechanical pressure gauges fitted to covered pressure vessels
were found inoperative:
A.A pressure gauge fitted to Quench Tower 435T1101, located at Tail Gas
Unit 13, was
maxed-out (i.e. needle fully clockwise to stop pin) while the pressure
vessel was
operating at 20-22 psig.
B.A pressure gauge fitted to Absorber Tower 435T1102, located at Tail Gas
Unit
13, read
1 psig while the pressure vessel was operating at 11 psig.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S) $4500.00
  • — Z (S) $4500.00

1910.119 J04 I

Deleted Serious Gravity 03 1 instance 8 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $1875.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(j)(4)(i):  Inspections and tests were not performed on
process equipment to
maintain its mechanical integrity:
The employer failed to inspect or test process equipment such as, but not
limited to:
A.The piping restraints on the discharge piping from pressure safety valve
435PSV228 in
Unit 435 had corroded and failed.  During a release event the unsupported
pressure
safety valve could fail catastrophically.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S)
  • — Z (S) $1875.00

1910.119 J04 II

Deleted Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 8 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $4500.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(j)(4)(ii):  Inspections and testing procedures performed
on process equipment
to maintain its mechanical integrity, did not follow recognized and
generally accepted good
engineering practices (RAGAGEP):
A.The employer did not perform an internal visual inspection of pressure
vessel 436D1207
Hydrocarbons Surge Drum, located at DEA Unit 14, in accordance with good
engineering practices as recommended by API 510, Section 6.5.1.1.  The
vessel had not
been inspected for 40 years, as reported in 2002 by a Mechanical Integrity
Recommendation.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S)
  • — Z (S) $4500.00

1910.119 J06 II

Deleted Serious Gravity 01 1 instance 8 exposed
Issued
Abate by

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(j)(6)(ii):  Appropriate checks and inspections were not
performed to assure
that equipment was installed properly and consistent with design
specifications and the
manufacturer's instructions:
A.The employer did not follow RAGAGEP for the installation and inspection
of pressure
safety valves on the Quench Tower 435T1101. The bonnet vent on pressure
safety valve
435PSV0228, located at Tail Gas Unit 13, Quench Tower 435T1101, was
installed
improperly.  The vent opening was pointing up rather than down.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S)
  • — Z (S)

1910.119 O01

Deleted Serious Gravity 01 1 instance 8 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $1125.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(o)(1):  The employer did not certify that they had
evaluated
compliance with
the provisions of 29 CFR 1910.119 at least every three years to verify
that the procedures and
practices developed under this standard were adequate and are being
followed:
A.The audit process failed to identify problems with the accuracy of the
process safety
information for pressure safety valve 436PSV308. This pressure safety
valve was
abandoned in 1994.  The following observations were noted:
1.Drawing No. HT-0178, Sheet No. FP-0021 schematically shows 436PSV0308 as
connected but was found to be not in service.
2.The vicinity of 436PSV0308 and its associated block valves were littered
with
tags from past LOTO efforts, turnarounds, etc.  The status of the safety
valve
could not be determined from the tags.
3.In 1994, written instructions contained in Project #C25 350746001 were
issued
for the removal of control valve PC0308 (a.k.a HC0308). The removal of
PC308
also resulted in the abandonment of 436PSV0308. No documentation (e.g.,
MOC)
was available for the abandonment of this equipment.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S)
  • — Z (S) $1125.00

1910.145 C02 I

Serious Gravity 01 1 instance 1 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $1125.00 · Current $1125.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.145(c)(2)(i):  Caution signs were not used  to warn against
potential hazards or
to caution against unsafe practices:
A.On or about May 13, 2009, in Unit 434, employee(s) working in the area
of the
Sulfur Pit (walking/working surface) were not warned by signage or marking
of the
potential hazard of a pipe cap hand bar that extended upward approximately
four
inches from the floor surface and outward four inches on either side of
the cap.  This
created a tripping hazard.
B.On or about May 13, 2009, in Unit 434, employee(s) working in the area
of the
Burner Platform were not warned by signage or marking of the potential
hazard of a
scaffold that had been erected in the pipe rack.  A low hanging support
crossbar
extended across the passageway approximately five feet above ground level.
This
created a strike-against hazard.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S) $1125.00
  • — Z (S) $1125.00

1910.303 B08 II

Deleted Serious Gravity 02 1 instance 8 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $1500.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.303(b)(8)(ii):  Equipment designed for floor mounting was not
provided with
clearance between top surfaces and adjacent surfaces to dissipate rising
warm air:
A.On or about June 17, 2009, at the SRC Control House, in the Rack Room,
the
electrical transformers had miscellaneous materials stacked/stored on the
top surface.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S)
  • — Z (S) $1500.00

1910.303 G01 II

Serious Gravity 02 1 instance 8 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Current $1500.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.303(g)(1)(ii):  Working space about electric equipment rated
600 volts, nominal,
or less was used for storage:
A.On or about June 17, 2009, at the SRC House, in the Rack Room where the
electrical
panel boards for the Control Room were located, the employer used the
working
space
in front of the panel boards for storage of old furniture, chairs, etc.rs,
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S) $1500.00
  • — Z (S)

1910.303 F02

Serious Gravity 02 10 instances 8 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $1500.00 · Current $1500.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.303(f)(2):  Each service, feeder and branch circuit, at its
disconnecting means or
overcurrent device, was not legibly marked to indicate its purpose, nor
located and arranged so
the purpose was evident:
In the SRC Unit, the following circuit breakers in electrical panel boards
were not
labeled/identified for their purpose:
A.Four circuit breakers (#1, 10, 11 & 12) in panel 434-1P-447-3003,
120/240V, in the
Control House, on wall left of main entrance.
B.One circuit breaker (#3), 480V, 100 amps, PRL3a Panel Board on wall in
east hallway
in the Control House.
C.In the Control House, 480V, Heavy Duty Safety Switch in middle hallway
off the
kitchen.
D.Twelve circuit breakers in the General Electric Panel Board with the
word "Microwave"
written on top of the outside panel, in the Control House, middle hallway
off the kitchen.
E.Two circuit breakers (#16 & 18), 208Y/120V GE Panel Board in the Control
House on
the wall in west hallway.
F.In the Control House, 480V, GE Heavy Duty Safety Switch on the wall in
the west
hallway.
G.Ten circuit breakers in 208Y/120V Panel Board 439-UPP-493-3007 in the
Control House
Rack Room.
H.Thirteen circuit breakers in 208Y/120V Panel Board 439-UPP-493-3008 in
the Control
House Rack Room.
I.Twenty-five circuit breakers in 208Y/120V Panel Board 439-UPP-916-3006,
in the
Control House, Rack Room.
J.Ten circuit breakers in electric lighting panel 434-LP-442-3001, Unit
434, Burner Area.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S) $1500.00
  • — Z (S) $1500.00

1910.305 B01 I

Serious Gravity 03 4 instances 8 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $1875.00 · Current $1875.00

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.305(b)(1)(i):  Openings through which conductors enter boxes,
cabinets, or fittings
were not effectively closed:
On or about June 17, 2009, in the SRC Control House, unused openings were
found on the
following panel boards:
A.The heavy duty safety switch located in the middle hallway, on the east
side of the
Kitchen had one unused opening where the knock-out was missing on the
bottom right
side of the box.
B.The electrical panel box with the word "Microwave" written across the
top located in the
middle hallway, on the east side of the Kitchen, there was one unused
opening on the left
side of the panel box and on the bottom of the box there were two unused
openings.
C.On the bottom of panel 439-UPP-915-3005 in the Rack Room, there were six
unused
openings where the knock-outs were missing.
D.On the bottom of panel 439-UPP-916-3006 in the Rack Room, there were
three unused
openings where the knock-outs were missing.ts
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S) $1875.00
  • — Z (S) $1875.00

1910.305 B01 II

Serious Gravity 03 1 instance 1 exposed
Issued
Abate by

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.305(b)(1)(ii): Unused openings in cabinets, boxes, and
fittings were not effectively
closed.
A.On or about 6/17/2009, in the SCR Control House, in the middle hallway
off of the
Kitchen area, the electrical panel with the word "Microwave" written
across the top had
two missing circuit breakers exposing the live conductors.
Recent events (2)
  • — J (S)
  • — Z (S)

More inspections at HOUSTON REFINING L.P.

View HOUSTON REFINING L.P.'s full OSHA safety record →

More inspections in this industry (NAICS 324110)

More inspections in TX

Source

This record is reproduced from the U.S. Department of Labor Open Data API (OSHA inspection dataset). The original IMIS detail view is available at OSHA's Establishment Search for activity number 311962518.