Safety Incidents OSHA Severe Injury Reports · 2015–2025
2,004,209Inspections Most recent open 2026-07-13 Last loaded 2026-07-17

OSHA Inspection: TOLL COMPACTION GROUP, LLC

Complaint inspection · Health discipline

On , OSHA opened a complaint health inspection of TOLL COMPACTION GROUP, LLC in 721 FARSON STREET, BELPRE, OH 45714 (NAICS 325998). OSHA activity number 338583032.

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Site address
721 FARSON STREET
City
BELPRE
State
OH
ZIP
45714
Mailing
721 FARSON STREET, BELPRE, OH 45714
Inspection type
Complaint (B)
Scope
Partial (B)
Discipline
Health
Advance notice
No
Union status
B
Opened
Closing conference
Case closed
Last modified
Data loaded
NAICS code
325998
Employees
30
Ownership type
A

3 citations on file for this inspection.

1910.23 C01

Serious Gravity 5 1 instance 3 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $3850.00 · Current $1925.00 Reduced
29 CFR 1910.23(c)(1):     Every open-sided floor or platform 4 feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level shall be guarded by a standard railing (or the equivalent as specified in paragraph (e)(3) of this section) on all open sides except where there is entrance to a ramp, stairway, or fixed ladder. The railing shall be provided with a toeboard wherever, beneath the open sides,    a) At the facility, in blending room #3, a work platform, 10 feet above the floor, that provided access to the Aarons Brothers ribbon blender was not equipped with standard railing exposing employees to a fall hazard.
Recent events (3)
  • — F (S) $1925
  • — C (S) $3850
  • — Z (S) $3850

1910.23 E01

Serious Gravity 5 1 instance 3 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $0.00 · Current $0.00
29 CFR 1910.23(e)(1):   A standard railing shall consist of top rail, intermediate rail, and posts, and shall have a vertical height of 42 inches nominal from upper surface of top rail to floor, platform, runway, or ramp level. The top rail shall be smooth-surfaced throughout the length of the railing. The intermediate rail shall be approximately halfway between the top rail and the floor, platform, runway, or ramp. The ends of the rails shall not overhang the terminal posts except where such overhang does not constitute a projection hazard.  a) At the facility, in blending room #3, a work platform, 10 feet above the floor, that provided access to the Aarons Brothers ribbon blender was not equipped with standard railing exposing employees to a fall hazard.
Recent events (3)
  • — F (S) $0
  • — C (S) $0
  • — Z (S) $0

5(a)(1)

Repeat Gravity 10 8 instances 30 exposed
Issued
Abate by
Penalty
Initial $10780.00 · Current $6468.00 Reduced
OSH ACT of 1970 Section 5(a)(1):  The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees while working at or near a combustible chemical dust collection system and associated upstream blending and conveying equipment which were not adequately designed to prevent or minimize employee exposure in the event of an internal deflagration within equipment such as but not limited to filter media dust collectors and associated ducting, bucket elevators, and a ribbon blender:       PROCESS/ROOM #3     (a)   The indoor Arrestall AR-15 filter media dust collector associated with process room #3, (that included an upstream ribbon blender) was noted to have the following deficiencies:           i. Contained an in-house fabricated deflagration venting system that was not designed and constructed in accordance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice.  The deflagration venting system was not designed upon principles such as enclosure construction, enclosure volume, vent area, static burst pressure of the vent, reduced pressure after deflagration venting, and properties of the dust being handled (maximum pressure of a deflagration and maximum rate of pressure rise of a deflagration).             ii. Contained deflagration venting that in the event of rupture from an internal deflagration may discharge an unburned dust cloud and a flame front (with associated pressures) within the manufacturing building.  The deflagration venting originally contained ducting that terminated in an outdoor location.  That ducting had been removed and the opening in the outer wall of the building had been resealed.          iii. Exhaust air was discharged indoors without provisions to prevent transmission of flame and pressure effects from an internal deflagratin into the manufacturing building.                                      iv. Lacked a means of deflagration propagation isolation to the upstream ribbon blender, the downstream exhaust duct, and the dust discharge collection drum located beneath the collector?s hopper.                                 v. Lacked a means of fire protection.         (b) Flexible aluminum exhaust ducting connecting the Arrestall AR-15 media dust collector and the upstream ribbon blender both associated with process room #3 did not incorporate a reliable electric bonding system in accordance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice.  One end of the ducting system was loosely placed into an outlet port on top of the ribbon blender and affixed with duct tape.  The other end of the ducting system was aligned with a more permanent section of aluminum ducting on the dust collector inlet and affixed with duct tape.         (c) The ribbon blender in process room #3 lacked a means of explosion protection.      PROCESS ROOM #2     (d) The indoor Torit TB573  filter media dust collector associated with process room #2 (that included an upstream sieve, granulator, and bucket elevator equipment) was noted to have the following deficiencies:               i. Contained an in-house fabricated deflagration venting system that was not designed and constructed in accordance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice.  The deflagration venting system was not designed upon principles such as enclosure construction, enclosure volume, vent area, static burst pressure of the vent, reduced pressure after deflagration venting, and properties of the dust being handled (maximum pressure of a deflagration and maximum rate of pressure rise of a deflagration).             ii. Exhaust air was discharged indoors without provisions to prevent transmission of flame and pressure effects from an internal deflagration into the manufacturing building.               iii. Lacked a means of deflagration propagation isolation to the upstream separator, the downstream exhaust duct, and the dust discharge collection drum located beneath the collector?s hopper.         (e) Flexible aluminum exhaust ducting connecting the Torit TB573 media dust collector and the upstream sieve both associated with process room #2 did not incorporate a reliable electric bonding system in accordance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice.  One end of the ducting system was loosely placed into an outlet port on top of the separator and affixed with duct tape.  The other end of the ducting system was aligned with a more permanent section of aluminum ducting on the dust collector inlet and affixed with duct tape -      (f) The indoor bucket elevator in process room #2 lacked a means of explosion protection.     PROCESS/ROOM #1     (g)   The indoor Donaldson Torit  filter media dust collector associated with process room #1 (that included an upstream sieve, granulator, and bucket elevator equipment) was noted to have the following deficiencies:               i. Contained an in-house fabricated deflagration venting system that was not designed and constructed in accordance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice.  The deflagration venting system was not designed upon principles such as enclosure construction, enclosure volume, vent area, static burst pressure of the vent, reduced pressure after deflagration venting, and properties of the dust being handled (maximum pressure of a deflagration and maximum rate of pressure rise of a deflagration).                                      ii. Exhaust air was discharged indoors without provisions to prevent transmission of flame and pressure effects from an internal deflagration into the manufacturing building.                                  iii. Lacked a means of deflagration propagation isolation to the upstream separator, the downstream exhaust duct, and the dust discharge collection drum located beneath the collector?s hopper.         (h)  The indoor bucket elevator in process room #1 lacked a means of explosion protection.      Among other methods, feasible and acceptable methods to correct this hazard includes following the applicable guidelines in the National Fire Protection Association?s (NFPA) 654 "Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids, 2013 Ed." Sections 6.1.7, 7.1.4, 7.1.6, 7.1.7, 7.6.3, 7.10.1.1, 7.13.1.1, 7.13.1.6.1, 7.17.3, 9.3.2.1, 9.3.2.3;  NFPA 68 "Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting, 2013 Ed."; NFPA 69 "Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems, 2008 Ed."; and NFPA 77 "Recommended Practice on Static Electricity, 2007 Ed.".       Specifically, for indoor dust collectors:  Install listed active or passive propagation isolation devices (such as chemical suppression barrier, fast acting mechanical valve, actuated pinch valve, back-blast damper, etc.) in accordance with NFPA 69 between the dust collector and the last material entry point of the upstream process.  Limit the amount of flexible ducting to the bare minimum needed.  Install listed active or passive propagation isolation devices (such as chemical suppression barrier or a rotary valve material choke) in accordance with NFPA 69 on the material discharge of the collector (hopper).  Discharge exhausted air to a safe outdoor location in accordance with NFPA 654.  Install appropriately designed deflagration venting that terminates to a safe outdoor location in accordance with NFPA 68.  Ensure sections of ducting are appropriately bonded to conductive, grounded equipment through the use of a reliable bonding method in accordance with the recommendations in NFPA 77.  Provide automatic water protection in the bag section, the clean air plenum, and the material discharge of the collector (hopper).       Specifically, for the ribbon blender and bucket elevators: Provide a method of explosion protection such as chemical deflagration suppression or deflagration venting to a safe outdoor location in accordance with NFPA 69 or 68, respectively.    The Toll Compaction Group, LLC was previously cited for a violation of this occupational safety and health standard or its equivalent standard OSH Act of 1970 Section 5(a)(1), which was contained in OSHA inspection number 313152365, citation number 1, item number 1 and was affirmed as a final order on February 12, 2010, with respect to a workplace located at 1405 Green Street, Marietta, Ohio  45750.
Recent events (3)
  • — F (R) $6468
  • — C (R) $10780
  • — Z (R) $10780

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This record is reproduced from the U.S. Department of Labor Open Data API (OSHA inspection dataset). The original IMIS detail view is available at OSHA's Establishment Search for activity number 338583032.