OSHA Inspection: L.C.P. CHEMICAL INC.

Issued

Feb 11, 1988

Abate by

Feb 29, 1988

Penalty

Initial $1,000 · Current $500 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: the
employer did not furnish employment and a plce of employment which were
free from recognized hazrds that were causing or likely to cause death
or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to:
a) The hazard of explosion and subsequent breach of the carrier coolers
containing chlorine, hydrogen, and air in the liquifaction process,
which could result in being crushed or struck by flying objects or
being asphyiated by chlorine. Hydrogen levels were frequently
observed above the lower explosive limit for chlorine, hydrogen, and
air mixtures in the carrier liquifiers and tail gas stream.
One feasible and acceptable abatement method among others to correct
this hazard is to add carefully dried, compressed dilution air to the
C12 gas feed to the liquifiers to limit the hydrogen content to 4% v/v
in the gas leaving any stage of liquifaction as specified in the
Chlorine Institute, Member Information Report 121, "Explosvie Properties
of Gaseous Mixtures containing hydrogen and chlorine", section 2.4 and
section 2.5.
Violation observed on or about 10/21/87.

Issued

Feb 11, 1988

Abate by

Jul 1, 1988

Penalty

Initial $1,000 · Current $500 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were
free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death
or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed
to:
a) Hazard of breach of containment of liquid chlorine from the carrier
coolers (pressure vessels), containing chlorine, hydrogen and air
in the Liquifaction Process, which could result in chemical and
thermal burns or being asphyxiated by chlorine. Three carrier coolers
in the Liquefaction Building were not inspected and tested to
determine the ingegrity of the vessels.
One feasible and acceptable abatement method, among others, to correct
this hazard is to inspect and test the carrier coolers that the maximum
period between internal inspections or a complete on-stream evaluation
of pressure vessels shall not exceed one half of the estimated remaining
life of the vessels or ten years, whichever is less, except where the
remaining operating life is less than four years, the inspection
interval may be the full remaining safe operating life up to a maximum
of two years, as stipulated in American National Standard Institute
API-510, Pressure Vessel Code, Maintenance Inspection, Rating, Repair
and Alteration, Section 4.3, Inspection Intervals.
Violation observed on or about 10/21/87.

Issued

Feb 11, 1988

Abate by

May 1, 1988

Penalty

Initial $1,000 · Current $500 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
%%
employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were
free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death
or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to:
a) The hazard of breach of containment of liquid chlorine from safety
relief valves on the liquid chlorine receivers due to overfilling
which could result in asphyxiation. The 40 ton and one 90 ton liquid
CL2 receivers were not provided with an accurate means to determine
their contents of the receivers at all times.
1) 40 ton receivers #1 & 2 had weight scale of 0-25 tons.
2) 90 ton receiver #4 had weight scale of 0-50 tons.
One feasible and acceptable abatement method among others, to correct
this hazard is to provide weight scales equal to the capacity of the
tanks. Violation observed on or about 10/26/87.

Issued

Feb 11, 1988

Abate by

May 31, 1988

Penalty

Initial $1,000 · Current $500 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were
free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death
or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to:
a) The hazard of a catastrophic failure or piping and subsequent breach
of containment of liquid chlorine due to the trapping of liquid
chlorine between two closed valves without provisions for expansion
could result in being struck, crushed or burned by flying objects or
being asphyxiated by chlorine.
1) 54' of 2" liquid chlorine line between the #2 carrier liquifier and
the #3 seal.
2) 33' of 2" liquid chlorine line between the #1 carrier liquifier and
the #3 seal.
3) Up to 70' of 2" liquid chlorine line between the liquid chlorine
storage tanks and the #1 tank car loading plaform.
4) Up to 140' of 2" liquid chlorine line between the liquid chlorine
storage tanks and the #2 tank car loading platform.
One feasible and acceptable abatement methods among others, to correct
this hazard is to provide liquid chlorine expansion chambers of suitable
volume in the chlorine piping; as stipulated in Section 4.2 of the
Chlorine Institute Pamphlet #6, "Piping systems for Dry Chlorine".

Issued

Feb 11, 1988

Abate by

Jul 1, 1988

Penalty

Initial $900 · Current $450 Reduced

Issued

Feb 11, 1988

Abate by

Mar 15, 1988

Penalty

Initial $500 · Current $250 Reduced

Issued

Feb 11, 1988

Abate by

Mar 11, 1988

Penalty

Initial $700 · Current $350 Reduced

Issued

Feb 11, 1988

Abate by

Mar 7, 1988

Penalty

Initial $300 · Current $150 Reduced

Issued

Feb 11, 1988

Abate by

Mar 15, 1988

Issued

Feb 11, 1988

Abate by

Feb 16, 1988

Penalty

Initial $200 · Current $100 Reduced

Issued

Feb 11, 1988

Abate by

May 1, 1988

Penalty

Initial $500 · Current $250 Reduced

Issued

Feb 11, 1988

Abate by

Mar 11, 1988

Penalty

Initial $800 · Current $400 Reduced

Issued

Feb 11, 1988

Abate by

Feb 14, 1988

Issued

Feb 11, 1988

Abate by

Mar 7, 1988