OSHA Inspection: CRAFCO, INC.

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Dec 2, 1991

Penalty

Initial $2,450 · Current $2,075 Reduced

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Feb 21, 1992

Penalty

Initial $2,450 · Current $1,225 Reduced

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Feb 21, 1992

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Feb 28, 1992

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Dec 26, 1991

Penalty

Initial $1,400 · Current $700 Reduced

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Dec 26, 1991

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Apr 28, 1992

Penalty

Initial $1,750 · Current $875 Reduced

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Dec 11, 1991

Penalty

Initial $1,050 · Current $525 Reduced

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Dec 2, 1991

Penalty

Initial $1,750 · Current $875 Reduced

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Feb 28, 1992

Penalty

Initial $2,450 · Current $1,225 Reduced

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Dec 26, 1991

Penalty

Initial $12,250 · Current $5,000 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:  The
employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which
were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were
exposed to the hazard of fire or explosion.
a)  The employer did not protect their employees from the
recognized hazard of fire or explosion as the classifier
subsystem of the cellulose insulation manufacturing process
was inoperable.  The purpose of this classifier was to filter
heavy objects (e.g. metal objects) out of the paper - fire
retardant stream downstream of the Williams hammer mill.
This resulted in the accumulation of potentially spark-
producing metal in the hammer mill rotor component which can
cause combustible materials to ignite.
b)  The employer did not provide an adequate fire retardant
chemical warning device or alarm for the chemical feed anger
component to detect a potentially hazardous condition of
running the cellulose process without the application of fire
retardant chemical into the paper stream.
c)  The cyclone collector subsystem of this process was not
installed with a safety device(s) to prevent its blockage
with raw materials.  This ommission resulted in blockage of
the bottom section of the cyclone which caused the pneumatic
conveying subsystem to recirculate the cellulose containing
feed, via ductwork, back to the shreader and to the baghouse.
The recirculation of the cellulose feed and the fact that
paper remained in the hammer mill longer than expected caused
the granulation of finer than normal dust particles and heat
accumulation in the system.  The condition of fine dust, heat
generation and/or the introduction of ferric, spark producing
metal into the hammer mill created a hazardous condition that
resulted in a fire-explosion in the system on 8/22/91.
d)  The employer did not maintain their ventilation system
inside of the building housing the cellulose insulation
manufacturing process to protect their employees against a
dust fire - explosion hazard.  The poor housekeeping con-
ditions inside the building together with six overhead fans
that were not functioned caused dust-air borne concentrations
to be in an explosive range.  All of the above conditions
caused the fire-explosion in the cellulose insulation pro-
cess, on August 22, 1991 to further propogate throughout the
room and set off approximately forty-two sprinklers.
Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method
to correct this hazard is:
Instance (a):  Operate the cellulose insulation process with the
classifier subsystem properly functioning as a
prefilter for the remaining portions of the system.
Instance (b):  Installation of a properly designed warning or alarm
system to notify operating personnel of fire retardant
chemical feed problems.  Procedures should be developed
and utilized to assure fire retardant chemical is
applied to the paper feed during the manufacturing
process.
Instance (c):  Installation of a properly designed plug indicating
warning or alarm system to notify operating personnel
of a cyclone blockage condition.  Procedures should be
developed and utilized to assure raw materials are
safely cleared from the cyclone in the event of
blockage.  It is further recommended that a systems
safety analysis of the entire cellulose insulation
manufacturing process to determine whether additional
engineering or administrative control are feasible to
control this fire-explosion hazard (e.g., cyclone
mechanism or total system shutdown, etc).
Instance (d):  Operation of a properly designed ventilation system
together with good dust housekeeping practices to
prevent the air-borne dust concentrations form reaching
a hazardous level.

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Feb 28, 1992

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Dec 26, 1991

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Dec 26, 1991

Issued

Nov 26, 1991

Abate by

Feb 21, 1992