PAULSBORO, NJ —
OSHA Inspection: VALERO REFINING COMPANY
Planned inspection · Safety discipline
At a glance
On , OSHA opened a planned safety inspection of VALERO REFINING COMPANY in 800 BILLINGSPORT ROAD, PAULSBORO, NJ 08066 (NAICS 000000). OSHA activity number 106891989.
OSHA opens inspections for many reasons — routine scheduling under a national or local emphasis program, an employee complaint or referral, or a follow-up after a reported injury. Opening or conducting an inspection is not itself an allegation or a finding that this employer broke any rule; any findings appear as the citations listed below, and citations can be contested, reduced, or withdrawn.
Where did this inspection happen?
- Establishment
- VALERO REFINING COMPANY
- Site address
- 800 BILLINGSPORT ROAD
- City
- PAULSBORO
- State
- NJ
- ZIP
- 08066
What kind of inspection was it?
- Inspection type
- Planned (H)
- Scope
- Complete (A)
- Discipline
- Safety
- Advance notice
- No
- Union status
- Y
When did the case open and close?
- Opened
- Closing conference
- Case closed
- Last modified
- Data loaded
Establishment context
- NAICS code
- 000000
- SIC code (legacy)
- 2911
- Employees
- 868
- Ownership type
- A
Citations
28 citations on file for this inspection.
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 5, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $1,000 · Current $1,000
General-duty citation text
SECTION 5(A)(1) OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970: THE EMPLOYER DID NOT FURNISH EMPLOYMENT AND A PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT WHICH WERE FREE FROM RECOGNIZED HAZARDS THAT WERE CAUSING OR LIKELY TO CAUSE DEATH OR SERIOUS PHYSICAL HARM TO EMPLOYEES IN THAT EMPLOYEES WERE EXPOSED TO A FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD AS FOLLOWS: A) THE S.R.U COMPLEX CONTROL ROOM PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM WAS NOT IN OPERATION, EXPOSING EMPLOYEES TO THE HAZARD OF FIRE/EXPLOSION IN THE EVENT OF A RELEASE OF HYDROGEN SULFIDE INTO A NON-CLASSIFIED LOCATION. CONDITION OBSERVED ON OR ABOUT 12/6/90. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO ENSURE THOROUGH AND PROPER MAINTENANCE OF THE SYSTEM AND OPERATOR TRAINING SO THAT THE POSITIVE PRESSURE AIR SYSTEM IS IN OPERATION AT ALL TIMES AS REFERENCED IN NFPA 496, CHAPTER 3.
Recent events (2)
- — I (S) $1000.00
- — Z (S) $1000.00
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Sep 19, 1991
- Penalty
- Current $1,000
General-duty citation text
SECTION 5(A)(1) OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970: THE EMPLOYER DID NOT FURNISH EMPLOYMENT AND A PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT WHICH WERE FREE FROM RECOGNIZED HAZARDS THAT WERE CAUSING OR LIKELY TO CAUSE DEATH OR SERIOUS PHYSICAL HARM TO EMPLOYEES IN THAT EMPLOYEES WERE EXPOSED TO A FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD AS FOLLOWS; A) EMPLOYEES EXPOSED TO THE HAZARD OF FIRE/EXPLOSION IN THAT CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM AIR INTAKES DID NOT PREVENT THE ENTRANCE OF FLAMMABLE VAPORS/GASES SUCH AS, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, HYDROGEN SULFIDE AND HYDROCARBONS INTO THE CONTRO ROOMS (S.R.U., SULFER COMPLEX, HIGH PRESSURE REFORMER, HPR, FLUID CATALYTIC CRACKING/ALKYLIZATION, FCC/ALKY; AND COKER CONTROL ROOMS) IN THE EVENT OF A RELEASE. CONDITION OBSERVED ON OR ABOUT 12/6/90 AND 12/18/90. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO PROVIDE MONITORING DEVICE(S) AT THE AIR INTAKE TO DETECT FLAMMABLE VAPORS OR GASES, GIVE SUITABLE WARNING AND TO HAVE THE DEVICE(S) INTERLOCKED SO AS TO AUTOMATICALLY SHUT DOWN THE AIR INTAKE AS REFERENCED IN NFPA 496, CHAPTER 3.
Recent events (2)
- — I (S) $1000.00
- — Z (S)
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 19, 1991
General-duty citation text
SECTION 5(A)(1) OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970: THE EMPLOYER DID NOT FURNISH EMPLOYMENT AND A PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT WHICH WERE FREE FROM RECOGNIZED HAZARDS THAT WERE CAUSING OR LIKELY TO CAUSE DEATH OR SERIOUS PHYSICAL HARM TO EMPLOYEES IN THAT EMPLOYEES WERE EXPOSED TO A FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD AS FOLLOWS: A) EMPLOYEES EXPOSED TO THE HAZARDS OF FIRE/EXPLOSION BECAUSE OF THE INABILITY TO QUICKLY, SAFELY AND EFFECTIVELY ISOLATE PRODUCTION UNITS IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR RELEASE OF FLAMMABLE VAPORS/GASES, DUE TO THE LACK OF PROPER ACCESSABILITY AND/OR IDENTIFICATION OF THE BATTERY LIMIT ISOLATION VALVES: 1) SULFUR COMPLEX - SULFUR UNITS AND TAIL GAS UNITS ISOLATION VALVES WERE NOT ACCESSIBLE AND COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED FROM GROUND LEVEL. CONDITION OBSERVED ON OR ABOUT 12/6/90. 2) ALKY UNIT AND UNSATURATED GAS PLANT - ISOLATION VALVES COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED FROM GROUND LEVEL. CONDITION OBSERVED ON OR ABOUT 12/18/90. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO PROVIDE PLATFORM WITH PROPER ACCESSIBILITY TO ISOLATION VALVES AS WELL AS MARKING VALVES SO THAT THEY CAN BE READILY IDENTIFIED FROM THE GROUND LEVEL. AS REFERENCED BY MOBIL'S "BATTERY LIMIT ISOLATION VALVE PROCEDURES", REVIEWED JUNE 1990.
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Sep 19, 1991
General-duty citation text
SECTION 5(A)(1) OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970: THE EMPLOYER DID NOT FURNISH EMPLOYMENT AND A PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT WHICH WERE FREE FROM RECOGNIZED HAZARDS THAT WERE CAUSING OR LIKELY TO CAUSE DEATH OR SERIOUS PHYSICAL HARM TO EMPLOYEES IN THAT EMPLOYEES WERE EXPOSED TO A FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD AS FOLLOWS; A) SULFUR RECOVERY COMPLEX - CRITICAL INTERLOCKS WERE NOT PART OF A PERIODIC TESTING PROGRAM SO AS TO ENSURE THEIR RELIABILITY AND ACHIEVE PROPER EMPLOYEE PROTECTION IN THE EVENT OF A PROCESS UPSET TO PREVENT THE RELEASE OF FLAMMABLE VAPORS/GASES. CONDITION OBSERVED ON OR ABOUT 12/6/90. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO ESTABLISH A CRITICAL INTERLOCK TESTING PROGRAM TO ENSURE RELIABILITY AND PROPER OPERATION OF THE EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM, AS REFERENCED BY THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE'S RECOMMENDED PRACTICE 550.
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 19, 1991
General-duty citation text
SECTION 5(A)(1) OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH AT OF 1970: THE EMPLOYER DID NOT FURNISH EMPLOYMENT AND A PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT WHICH WERE FREE FROM RECOGNIZED HAZARDS THAT WERE CAUSING OR LIKELY TO CAUSE DEATH OR SERIOUS PHYSICAL HARM TO EMPLOYEES IN THAT EMPLOYEES WERE EXPOSED TO A FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD AS FOLLOWS: A) THE EMPLOYER'S EMPLOYEES WERE EXPOSED TO THE HAZARD OF FIRE/EXPLOSION AS THE EMPLOYER DID NOT ENSURE THAT CONTRACTORS PERFORMING WELDING/ CUTTING/BURNING ACTIVITIES IN HAZARDOUS LOCATIONS AT THE EMPLOYER'S FACILITY HAD BEEN ADEQUATELY TRAINED IN THE HAZARDS OF SUCH WORK IN SUCH LOCATIONS IN THAT WORK PERMITS WERE NOT PROPERLY COMPLETED FOR THE ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED. CONDITION OBSERVED ON OR ABOUT 12/10/90. AMONG OTHER METHODS, ONE FEASIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE METHOD TO CORRECT THIS HAZARD IS TO INSTRUCT AND/OR RE-TRAIN THE APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL TO ENSURE THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF MOBIL'S HOT WORK, SAFE WORK AND ENTRY PERMIT SYSTEM ARE MET BEFORE ALLOWING CONTRACTORS TO PROCEED WITH SUCH WORK AS REFERENCED BY MOBIL'S SAFETY MANUAL - TAB 5.1
1910.22 A01
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 5, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $800 · Current $800
1910.22 A02
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 5, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $1,000 · Current $1,000
1910.23 A02
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 5, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $800 · Current $800
1910.23 C01
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 12, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $800 · Current $800
1910.27 D03
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 5, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $600 · Current $600
1910.132 A
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 12, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $600 · Current $600
1910.147 C05 II
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 19, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $900
Recent events (2)
- — I (O)
- — Z (S) $900.00
1910.147 C05 IID
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Feb 23, 1991
Recent events (2)
- — I (O)
- — Z (S)
1910.147 C06 II
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 19, 1991
Recent events (2)
- — I (O)
- — Z (S)
1910.156 C01
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Apr 19, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $800 · Current $800
Recent events (2)
- — I (S) $800.00
- — Z (S) $800.00
1910.303 F
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Feb 26, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $600 · Current $600
1910.303 G01 I
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 5, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $600 · Current $600
1910.305 B02
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 5, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $600 · Current $600
1910.305 G01 III
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Feb 23, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $800 · Current $800
1910.307 B
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 5, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $1,000 · Current $1,000
1910.1200 H01
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 19, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $600 · Current $600
Recent events (2)
- — I (S) $600.00
- — Z (S) $600.00
1910.1200 H02 II
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Apr 19, 1991
Recent events (2)
- — I (O)
- — Z (S)
1904.2 A
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Feb 23, 1991
- Penalty
- Initial $300 · Current $300
1910.1001 J02 I
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 6, 1991
9020
1910.1001 K01
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 5, 1991
9020
1910.1200 F05 I
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 5, 1991
1910.1200 F05 II
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 5, 1991
1910.1200 F09
- Issued
- Feb 19, 1991
- Abate by
- Mar 5, 1991
More inspections at Valero Refining Company
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Source
This record is reproduced from the U.S. Department of Labor Open Data API (OSHA inspection dataset). The original IMIS detail view is available at OSHA's Establishment Search for activity number 106891989.
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