OSHA Inspection: JOHN BROWN, INC., POWER DIVISION

Issued

Jun 30, 1993

Abate by

Jul 30, 1993

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $4,000 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:
The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment
which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to
cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees
were exposed to burns, miltiple traumatic injuries and/or death from
smoke and fire while performing their duties in and around the Main
Turbine hall:
a- Employees were exposed in and around the area of the
lubrication oil expansion joints which were not installed and
maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's requirements.
Among other method, some feasible and acceptable abatement
methods to correct this hazard is:
1- Review expansion joint manufacture data (Kleber
Industries) to ensure that all expansion joints are within
recommended tolerances.
2- Develop written Standard Operating Procedures as outlined
in the technical handbook from the "Rubber Expansion Joint
Division of the Fluid Sealing Association" and train all
operators on the procedures to properly periodically maintain
the securing methods of all expansion joints.
3- Provide proper anchorage to all expansion joints.

Issued

Jun 30, 1993

Abate by

Jul 30, 1993

Penalty

Initial $2,500 · Current $2,000 Reduced

Issued

Jun 30, 1993

Abate by

Jul 30, 1993

Penalty

Initial $2,500 · Current $2,000 Reduced

Issued

Jun 30, 1993

Abate by

Jul 5, 1993

Penalty

Initial $2,000 · Current $1,600 Reduced

Issued

Jun 30, 1993

Abate by

Jul 5, 1993

Penalty

Initial $2,000 · Current $1,600 Reduced

Issued

Jun 30, 1993

Abate by

Jul 30, 1993

Penalty

Initial $2,000 · Current $1,600 Reduced

Issued

Jun 30, 1993

Abate by

Jul 30, 1993

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $5,000 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:
The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment
which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to
cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees
were exposed to burns, multiple traumatic injuries and/or death from
explosion and fire during the "blow-down" operation on the gas
filter/separators (Scrubebrs), which allowed methane gas to escape
and enter the main turbine building:
a- Employees opening the drain valve(s) on the gas scrubber(s)
and allow methane gas vapors to escape and enter the main
turbine building through the drainage system and intake vents.
Among other methods, some feasible and acceptable abatement
methods to correct this hazard is:
1- Close off in-take vents located 15' from scrubbers to
prevent methane gas from entering the turbine hall during
"blow-down".
2- Provide all drains, pipes, and related equipment of the
oily/water separator system with traps to prevent any methane
gas from re-entering the main turbine hall after the
"blow-down" is completed.  (See API chapter XVII-1975, Guide
for Inspection of Refinery Equipment)
3- Develop written Standard Operating Procedures and train
all operators in the procedures for the "blow-down" operation
to prevent natural gas (methane) from escaping from the
Refinery/gas scrubbers during "blow-down" procedure.  (See
manufacturing Chemists Association publication SG-15; API
750-1990, Management of Process Hazars; NFPA 850-1986,
Chapter 2 - Administrative Controls)