OSHA Inspection: GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. - SILICONE DIV.

Issued

Jan 28, 1992

Abate by

Jun 1, 1992

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $5,000

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:  The
employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which
were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were
exposed to: The hazard of exposure to unknown airborne concentrations
of hazardous materials including, but not limited to, hydrochloric acid
vapor, due to releases from process vessels:
(a)  Building 35, GDH area: ON July 30,1991 employees in
and around building 35 were exposed to unknown con-
centrations of anhydrous hydrochloric acid vapor
which was released from a secondary decanter.
(b)  Building 23,Transfer and Blending: On September 15,1991
employees in and around building 23 were expos e
unknown concentrations of hydrochloric acid vapors
when dimethyldichlorosilane was released from a wagh
tank.
The employer did not take adequate measures to prevent
employee exposure to releases of hazard materials in
that:
A) The rupture disc/pressure relief valve discharge
line for process vessels released into the atmos-
phere in areas where employees may be exposed.
B) Decanter and wagh tank were not equipped with
instrumentation to detect abnormal conditions
such as excessive temperature or pressure nor
were they equipped with high temperature or
pressure shutdown devices.
C) Operating procedures were inadequate in that
written instructions for shutdown did not
state conditions under which decanter must be
drained or the hazards associated with isolating
the decanter.  Also written instruction for
transfer and blending did not include steps to
be taken to perform transfer including procedures
to prevent releases.
Among other methods, feasible and acceptable abatement methods
to correct this hazard include:
1) Discharge of rupture disc/pressure relief valve lines to a safe
location such as a blowdown tank.
2) Provide process vessels with automatic and redundant control
systems to adjust operating parameters of the vessel, provide
audible or visual warnings of upset conditions such as high
pressure, temperature or liquid level and/or appropriate
interlocks.
3) Establish detailed written standard operating procedures for
Building 23, Transfer and Blending, highlighting potential hazards
of the operation which could result in a release.
4) Establish written standard operatingf procedures for start-up
normal operations, and shut down of Building 35 GDH.  Shutdown
procedures should cover full and partial shutdown of process.
SOP's should highlight potential hazards.
5) Training of personnel on SOP's developed per items 3 and 4.
6) Conduct Chemical Process Hazard Reviews to determine process
deficiencies and upsets conditions plus estimate their frequencies.
This review should be of the type generally recognized in the
chemical processing industry (What If, Cause/Consequence, FMEA,
Fault ties.
7) Redesign of rupture disc/pressure relief valve assembly to
prevent the pressure relief valve from being held open by fragments
of the rupture disc.

Issued

Jan 28, 1992

Abate by

Mar 1, 1992

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $5,000

Issued

Jan 28, 1992

Abate by

Aug 30, 1992

Penalty

Initial $17,500 · Current $17,500

Issued

Jan 28, 1992

Abate by

Mar 1, 1992

Penalty

Initial $12,500 · Current $12,500

Issued

Jan 28, 1992

Abate by

Mar 1, 1992

Issued

Jan 28, 1992

Abate by

Mar 1, 1992