MIDDLETOWN, CT — 2010-02-07 00:00:00

OSHA Inspection: KEYSTONE CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE

Accident-driven inspection · Safety discipline

At a glance

On 2010-02-07 00:00:00, OSHA opened an accident-driven safety inspection of KEYSTONE CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE in 1349 RIVER ROAD, MIDDLETOWN, CT 01969 (NAICS 238220). OSHA activity number 109179952.

What this inspection record means

OSHA opens inspections for many reasons — routine scheduling under a national or local emphasis program, an employee complaint or referral, or a follow-up after a reported injury. Opening or conducting an inspection is not itself an allegation or a finding that this employer broke any rule; any findings appear as the citations listed below, and citations can be contested, reduced, or withdrawn.

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Where did this inspection happen?

Establishment: KEYSTONE CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE
Site address: 1349 RIVER ROAD
City: MIDDLETOWN
State: CT
ZIP: 01969
Mailing: 62 FOREST RIDGE DRIVE, ROWLEY, MA 01969

What kind of inspection was it?

Inspection type: Accident-driven (A)
Scope: Complete (A)
Discipline: Safety
Advance notice: No
Union status: Y

When did the case open and close?

Opened: 2010-02-07 00:00:00
Closing conference: 2010-08-02 00:00:00
Last modified: 2015-03-11 00:00:00
Data loaded: 2015-03-17 01:01:16

Establishment context

NAICS code: 238220
SIC code (legacy): 1711
Employees: 60
Ownership type: A

Citations

104 citations on file for this inspection.

1926.24

Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 77 exposed

Issued: Aug 3, 2010
Abate by: Aug 9, 2010
Penalty: Initial $7,000 · Current $3,330 Reduced

Recent events (2)

2013-07-01 00:00:00 — F (S) $3330.00
2010-08-03 00:00:00 — Z (S) $7000.00

1926.65 Q01

Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 64 exposed

Issued: Aug 3, 2010
Abate by: Aug 9, 2010
Penalty: Initial $7,000 · Current $3,330 Reduced

Recent events (2)

2013-07-01 00:00:00 — F (S) $3330.00
2010-08-03 00:00:00 — Z (S) $7000.00

1926.150 E01

Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 64 exposed

Issued: Aug 3, 2010
Abate by: Aug 9, 2010
Penalty: Initial $7,000 · Current $3,330 Reduced

Recent events (2)

2013-07-01 00:00:00 — F (S) $3330.00
2010-08-03 00:00:00 — Z (S) $7000.00

1926.150 E02

Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 64 exposed

Issued: Aug 3, 2010
Abate by: Aug 9, 2010
Penalty: Initial $7,000 · Current $3,330 Reduced

Recent events (2)

2013-07-01 00:00:00 — F (S) $3330.00
2010-08-03 00:00:00 — Z (S) $7000.00

1926.153 J

Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 3 exposed

Issued: Aug 3, 2010
Abate by: Aug 9, 2010
Penalty: Initial $7,000 · Current $3,330 Reduced

Recent events (2)

2013-07-01 00:00:00 — F (S) $3330.00
2010-08-03 00:00:00 — Z (S) $7000.00

1926.501 B04 I

Serious Gravity 10 4 instances 3 exposed

Issued: Aug 3, 2010
Abate by: Aug 9, 2010
Penalty: Initial $7,000 · Current $3,330 Reduced

Recent events (2)

2013-07-01 00:00:00 — F (S) $3330.00
2010-08-03 00:00:00 — Z (S) $7000.00

1926.502 I03

Serious Gravity 10 2 instances 3 exposed

Issued: Aug 3, 2010
Abate by: Aug 9, 2010
Penalty: Initial $7,000 · Current $3,330 Reduced

Recent events (2)

2013-07-01 00:00:00 — F (S) $3330.00
2010-08-03 00:00:00 — Z (S) $7000.00

1926.502 I04

Serious Gravity 10 2 instances 3 exposed

Issued: Aug 3, 2010
Abate by: Aug 9, 2010
Penalty: Initial $7,000 · Current $3,330 Reduced

Recent events (2)

2013-07-01 00:00:00 — F (S) $3330.00
2010-08-03 00:00:00 — Z (S) $7000.00

5(a)(1)

Willful Gravity 10 3 instances 60 exposed

Issued: Aug 3, 2010
Abate by: Aug 9, 2010
Penalty: Initial $70,000 · Current $33,270 Reduced
Emphasis program: X

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer did not furnish
employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized
hazards that were
causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm in that the
method used to clean the
561 main fuel gas line pipes - blowing natural gas through them at high
velocity - was not
implemented in such a way as to protect employees from the hazard of an
explosion caused by
venting large amounts of natural gas into areas where it could accumulate
and where, or in close
proximity to where, ignition sources existed. The following conditions and
practices contributed
to the existence of this hazard: the vent pipe configured close to and
below scaffolding, in close
proximity to the Power Generation Building, in between two approximately
90 foot tall Heat
Recovery Steam Generators (HRSGs) and well below the tops of all of those
structures;
the
failure to eliminate open flame ignition sources, including but not
limited to propane heaters;
construction work occurring during the gas blow process; individuals other
than those essential
to conducting the gas blows working in the area during the gas blow
process; and the inability
to readily control the amount and pressure of gas  flowing through the
main gas fuel line.
On February 7, 2010, employees were exposed to serious or fatal impact and
other injuries from
an explosion hazard created when a large amount of natural gas was blown
at high velocity
through CT#1 Main Knockout Drum Vent Pipe (561-TNK-1002) into the area
between the two
HRSGs and close to buildings, scaffolding, partially enclosed work areas,
and other structures
that were adjacent to the Power Generation Building in which employees
worked and in or
around which open flame ignition sources, including but not limited to
propane heaters, existed,
construction work was occurring, and numerous employees non-essential to
conducting the gas
blow were working.
When natural gas is chosen for this method of cleaning gas line pipes,
feasible means of
abatement to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard are to ensure that
the vent pipe is
positioned vertically and above the Power Generation Building and all
other nearby structures,
or horizontally to a location away from structures that could inhibit the
adequate dispersal of the
gas; ensure that any and all ignition sources are eliminated; ensure that
any and all construction
activity ceases during the gas blow process; ensure that all workers other
than those essential
to conducting the gas blows are removed from the building and area around
which the gas blows
are occurring; and ensure the use of devices to control the amount and
pressure of gas vented,
such as a fast closing pipe shut-off valve and a gas pressure control
valve.

Recent events (2)

2013-07-01 00:00:00 — F (W) $33270.00
2010-08-03 00:00:00 — Z (W) $70000.00

5(a)(1)

Willful Gravity 10 3 instances 60 exposed

Issued: Aug 3, 2010
Abate by: Aug 9, 2010
Penalty: Initial $70,000 · Current $33,270 Reduced
Emphasis program: X

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer did not furnish
employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized
hazards that were
causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm in that the
method used to clean the
561 main fuel gas line pipes - blowing natural gas through them at high
velocity - was not
implemented in such a way as to protect employees from the hazard of an
explosion caused by
venting large amounts of natural gas into areas where it could accumulate
and where, or in close
proximity to where, ignition sources existed. The following conditions and
practices contributed
to the existence of this hazard: the vent pipe configured close to and
below scaffolding, in close
proximity to the Power Generation Building, in the area immediately east
of the two
approximately 115 foot tall Heat Recovery Steam Generators (HRSGs) and
well below the tops
of all of those structures; the failure to eliminate open flame ignition
sources, including but not
limited to propane heaters; construction work occurring during the gas
blow
process; individuals
other than those essential to conducting the gas blows working in the area
during the gas blow
process; and the inability to readily control the amount and pressure of
gas flowing through the
main gas fuel line.
On February 7, 2010, employees were exposed to serious or fatal impact and
other injuries from
an explosion hazard created when a large amount of natural gas was blown
at high velocity
through CT#2 Main Knockout Drum Vent Pipe (561-TNK-2002) into the area
immediately east
of HRSG number 2 and close to buildings, scaffolding, partially enclosed
work areas, and other
structures that were adjacent to the Power Generation Building in which
employees worked and
in or around in which open flame ignition sources, including but not
limited to propane heaters,
existed, construction work was occurring, and numerous employees
non-essential to conducting
the gas blow were working.
When natural gas is chosen for this method of cleaning gas line pipes,
feasible means of
abatement to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard are to ensure that
the vent pipe is
positioned vertically and above the Power Generation Building and all
other nearby structures,
or horizontally to a location away from structures that could inhibit the
adequate dispersal of the
gas; ensure that any and all ignition sources are eliminated; ensure that
any and all construction
activity ceases during the gas blow process; ensure that all workers other
than those essential
to conducting the gas blows are removed from the building and area around
which the gas blows
are occurring; and ensure the use of devices to control the amount and
pressure of gas vented,
such as a fast closing pipe shut-off valve and a gas pressure control
valve.

Recent events (2)

2013-07-01 00:00:00 — F (W) $33270.00
2010-08-03 00:00:00 — Z (W) $70000.00

5(a)(1)

Willful Gravity 10 3 instances 60 exposed

Issued: Aug 3, 2010
Abate by: Aug 9, 2010
Penalty: Initial $70,000 · Current $33,270 Reduced
Emphasis program: X

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer
did not furnish
employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized
hazards that were
causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm in that the
method used to clean the
561 main fuel gas line pipes - blowing natural gas through them at high
velocity - was not
implemented in such a way as to protect employees from the hazard of an
explosion caused by
venting large amounts of natural gas into areas where it could accumulate
and where, or in close
proximity to where, ignition sources existed. The following conditions and
practices contributed
to the existence of this hazard: the vent pipe configured close to and
below scaffolding, in close
proximity to the Power Generation Building, in the area immediately east
of the two
approximately 115 foot tall Heat Recovery Steam Generators (HRSGs) and
well below the tops
of all of those structures; the failure to eliminate open flame ignition
sources, including but not
limited to propane heaters; construction work occurring during the gas
blow process; individuals
other than those essential to conducting the gas blows working in the area
during the gas blow
process; and the inability to readily control the amount and pressure of
gas flowing through the
main gas fuel line.
On February 7, 2010, employees were exposed to serious or fatal impact and
other injuries from
an explosion hazard created when a large amount of natural gas was blown
at high velocity
through CT#2 Pilot Gas Filter Separator "A" Vent Pipe (561- SEP-2000A)
into the area
immediately east of HRSG number 2 and close to buildings, scaffolding,
partially enclosed work
areas, and other structures that were adjacent to the Power Generation
Building in which
employees worked and in or around in which open flame ignition sources,
including but not
limited to propane heaters, existed, construction work was occurring, and
numerous employees
non-essential to conducting the gas blow were working.
When natural gas is chosen for this method of cleaning gas line pipes,
feasible means of
abatement to eliminate or materially reduce the hazard are to ensure that
the vent pipe is
positioned vertically and above the Power Generation Building and all
other nearby structures,
or horizontally to a location away from structures that could inhibit the
adequate dispersal of the
gas; ensure that any and all ignition sources are eliminated; ensure that
any and all construction
activity ceases during the gas blow process; ensure that all workers other
than those essential
to conducting the gas blows are removed from the building and area around
which the gas blows
are occurring; and ensure the use of devices to control the amount and
pressure of gas vented,
such as a fast closing pipe shut-off valve and a gas pressure control
valve.

Recent events (2)

2013-07-01 00:00:00 — F (W) $33270.00
2010-08-03 00:00:00 — Z (W) $70000.00