ALGONQUIN, IL ·
OSHA Inspection: NEW PROCESS TANK SYSTEMS, INC.
Referral inspection · Safety discipline
At a glance
On , OSHA opened a referral safety inspection of NEW PROCESS TANK SYSTEMS, INC. in 1001 MAIN STREET, ALGONQUIN, IL 60102 (NAICS 000000). OSHA activity number 109638429.
OSHA opens inspections for many reasons: routine scheduling under a national or local emphasis program, an employee complaint or referral, or a follow-up after a reported injury. Opening or conducting an inspection is not itself an allegation or a finding that this employer broke any rule; any findings appear as the citations listed below, and citations can be contested, reduced, or withdrawn.
Where did this inspection happen?
- Establishment
- NEW PROCESS TANK SYSTEMS, INC.
- Site address
- 1001 MAIN STREET
- City
- ALGONQUIN
- State
- IL
- ZIP
- 60102
- Mailing
- 742 NORTH YALE, VILLA PARK, IL 60181
What kind of inspection was it?
- Inspection type
- Referral (C)
- Scope
- Complete (A)
- Discipline
- Safety
- Advance notice
- No
- Union status
- Non-union (N)
When did the case open and close?
- Opened
- Closing conference
- Case closed
- Data loaded
Establishment context
- NAICS code
- 000000
- SIC code (legacy)
- 1799
- Employees
- 3
- Ownership type
- Private (A)
- Industry flags
- Construction safety.
Citations
6 citations on file for this inspection.
1926.300 B01
- Issued
- Feb 11, 1992
- Abate by
- Feb 14, 1992
- Penalty
- Initial $1,000 · Current $250 Reduced
Recent events (2)
- · F (S) $250.00
- · Z (S) $1000.00
1926.302 B01
- Issued
- Feb 11, 1992
- Abate by
- Feb 14, 1992
- Penalty
- Initial $1,400
Recent events (2)
- · F (S)
- · Z (S) $1400.00
1926.404 B01 II
- Issued
- Feb 11, 1992
- Abate by
- Feb 14, 1992
- Penalty
- Initial $2,000 · Current $250 Reduced
Recent events (2)
- · F (S) $250.00
- · Z (S) $2000.00
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Feb 11, 1992
- Abate by
- Feb 14, 1992
- Penalty
- Initial $35,000 · Current $1,000 Reduced
General-duty citation text
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to the hazard of explosion/fire/asphyxiation while working in confined spaces: The alleged violations below have been grouped because they involve similar or related hazards that may increase the potential for injury resulting from an accident. Employee entered 6,000 gallon underground gasoline storage tank (8 feet diameter and 16 feet long) to clean, sandblast and patch the interior in preparation for relining. The atmosphere inside the tank was not properly tested to ensure a safe level of oxygen and flammable vapors and ventilation system was inadequate to achieve acceptable levels for employee entry. The employee only wore an air line respirator while sandblasting and was not wearing a safety harness and lifeline at all times. Entry permit was not properly completed, adequate lifting device was not readily available, and standby person was not properly trained in safe rescue procedures. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable method of abatement is to establish and enforce an adequate Confined Space Entry Program, such as that stipulated by ANSI Z1117.1 - 1989 Safety Requirements for Working in Tanks and Other Confined Spaces. Such a program shall include, as a minimum, the following elements: 1. Written procedures covering a permit system, ventilation, atmospheric testing, rescue procedures, and employee training. 2. The completion and posting of a warning sign and a confined space entry permit which requires authorization and approval in writing that specifies the location and type of work to be done and certifies that all existing and potential hazards have been evaluated by a qualified person designated by the employer, and necessary protective measures have been taken to ensure the safety of each worker. 3. Mechanical ventilation of the confined space prior to entry and continued ventilation to provide a safe atmosphere, when determined necessary as described in (2) above. 4. Testing the atmosphere of the confined space prior to entry and on a regular basis for presence of sufficient oxygen (19.5% to 25%) and absence of hazardous levels of toxic or combustible gases or vapors, when determined necessary as described in (2) above. 5. Emergency rescue procedures with a requirement that trained personnel are available and are stationed outside the confined space with proper equipment to provide for the rescue of persons entering the space as determined necessary as described in (2) above. Such equipment must include safety harness and life lines with provisions for hoisting employees from the confined space. If entry is required for rescue, the rescuing employee must be equipped with approved air supplied respirat- ory equipment and other appropriate personal protective equip- ment. NOTE: Under no circumstances is the standby person to enter the confined space until assured that adequate assistance is present. 6. Training of any and all employees required to enter the confined spaces. This training shall include procedures required prior to entry and the hazards associated with work in confined spaces.
Recent events (2)
- · F (W) $1000.00
- · Z (W) $35000.00
1926.21 B06 I
- Issued
- Feb 11, 1992
- Abate by
- Feb 18, 1992
Recent events (2)
- · F (W)
- · Z (W)
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Feb 11, 1992
- Abate by
- Feb 14, 1992
- Penalty
- Initial $35,000 · Current $1,000 Reduced
General-duty citation text
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to the hazard of explosion/fire due to the ignition of flammable vapors: While working in a 42 inches deep excavation on top of an underground gasoline storage tank, an employee cut an opening approximately 2-foot square without first ensuring that the gasoline vapors were below 10% on the LEL. The tank was not purged or properly ventilated to prevent ignition and proper training and adequate testing equipment was not provided. Lines leading from the tank to the gasoline pumps were not blocked to prevent feedback in the event of defective backflow valve(s). The morning of the second day the employee was unable to determine the per cent of flammable vapors throughout the tank due to ineffective testing equipment, proceeded to grind a weld at the edge of the opening made the preceding day, thereby igniting vapors built up in the lower level of the tank caused by bleed back of gasoline due to defective backflow valve(s). Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to: 1. Test for the presence of flammable vapors prior to cutting and grinding on the exterior of the tank prior to entry. 2. Maintain mechanical ventilation of the tank to retain levels of flammable vapors below 10% of the LEL. 3. Block any pipe lines that may allow bleedback of flammable liquids into the tank which could cause immediate build up of flammable vapors. 4. Train employees in the hazards associated with working in and around flammable vapors, and the use of atmospheric test equipment and ventilation equipment.
Recent events (2)
- · F (W) $1000.00
- · Z (W) $35000.00
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Source
This record is reproduced from the U.S. Department of Labor Open Data API (OSHA inspection dataset). OSHA publishes its own view of this case as inspection number 109638429.
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