Safety Incidents OSHA Severe Injury Reports · 2015–2025
5,194,531Inspections Most recent open 2026-08-11 Last loaded 2026-08-14

OSHA Inspection: GOODWAY REFINING, LLC

Complaint inspection · Safety discipline

On , OSHA opened a complaint safety inspection of GOODWAY REFINING, LLC in 4745 ROSS RD., ATMORE, AL 36502 (NAICS 000000). OSHA activity number 302618012.

What this inspection record means

OSHA opens inspections for many reasons: routine scheduling under a national or local emphasis program, an employee complaint or referral, or a follow-up after a reported injury. Opening or conducting an inspection is not itself an allegation or a finding that this employer broke any rule; any findings appear as the citations listed below, and citations can be contested, reduced, or withdrawn.

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Site address
4745 ROSS RD.
City
ATMORE
State
AL
ZIP
36502
Inspection type
Complaint (B)
Scope
Complete (A)
Discipline
Safety
Advance notice
No
Union status
N
Opened
Closing conference
Case closed
Data loaded
NAICS code
000000
SIC code (legacy)
2911
Employees
16
Ownership type
A

11 citations on file for this inspection.

5(a)(1)

Serious Gravity 10 2 instances 2 exposed
Issued
Jul 25, 2000
Abate by
Aug 2, 2000
Penalty
Initial $1,500 · Current $1,500
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:  The
employer did not
furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from
recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
employees in that operators
and maintenance employees are exposed to fire and/or explosion hazards
while working around
the SMACKO crude oil processing equipment.  Among others, one feasible and
acceptable
methods to correct this hazard is to comply with ASME Section VIII
Paragraph UG-134 (e).
There shall be no intervening stop valves between the vessel and its
protective device or devices,
or between the protective device or devices and the point of discharge:
a)The suction scrubber, which is a pressure vessel, was not protected from
over
pressurization by a pressure relieving device.  The over pressure discharge
pipeline connected to the safety valve was not capable of relieving the
over
pressurization of the vessel because a flange had been placed on the
discharge
pipeline.
b)Pressure vessels such as the sideline scrubber and the Murphy well three
phase
separator, were not protected from over pressurization by a pressure
relieving
device.  The sideline scrubber and the Murphy well three phase separator
had a
safety valve, but it was not capable of relieving the over pressurization
of the
vessel when a valve down stream from the safety valve was in the closed
position.ation

5(a)(1)

Serious Gravity 05 2 instances 2 exposed
Issued
Jul 25, 2000
Abate by
Aug 2, 2000
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:  The
employer did not
furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from
recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
employees in that operators
and maintenance employees are exposed to fire and/or explosion hazards
while working around
the natural gas expansion chamber in the Goodway process area.  Among
others, one feasible
and acceptable methods to correct this hazard is to comply with ASME
Section
VIII UG-98(a).
The maximum allowable working pressure for a vessel is the maximum
pressure permissible at
the top of the vessel in its normal operating position at the operating
temperature specified for
that pressure.
a)The natural gas expansion chamber in the Goodway process area was being
operated at 140 psi which above its maximum allowable working pressure of
120
psi.sure

5(a)(1)

Serious Gravity 05 1 instance
Issued
Jul 25, 2000
Abate by
Aug 2, 2000
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:  The
employer did not
furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from
recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
employees in that welders and
fitters are exposed to a fire and explosion hazard while operating a hot
oil heater.
a)The heater was designed to operate at atmospheric conditions but was
being
subjected to pressures of up to 15 psi and temperatures of 275 degrees F.
Among
other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this
hazard is for the employer to develop and maintain on site design
documentation
that verify the operation of the hot oil heater is with-in the
manufacturer's design
limitations or to obtain prior approval from the manufacturer before
operating
equipment outside its design limitation.r

5(a)(1)

Serious Gravity 05 1 instance
Issued
Jul 25, 2000
Abate by
Aug 2, 2000
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer did not furnish
to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which were
free from
recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious
physical harm to
employees in that employees were exposed to a fire and explosion hazard
while operating a hot
oil heater:
(a)The hot oil heater was designed to operate at atmospheric conditions
but was
subjected to pressures of up to 15 psi and temperatures of 275 degrees F.
The hot
oil heater was design to operate at atmospheric pressure but is now
operated
using
fuel gas assisted circulation. A pressure relief device was not installed
to protect
the vessel from over pressurization. Among other methods, one feasible and
acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is for the employer to
install
a pressure relief device in accordance with the American Society of
Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code-1992, Section VII,
paragraph
UG-125(a).

5(a)(1)

Serious Gravity 05 1 instance
Issued
Jul 25, 2000
Abate by
Aug 14, 2000
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer did not
furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which were free
from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or
serious physical harm
to employees in that employees were exposed to a fire and explosion hazard:
(a)The SMACKO Oil Production Facility was operated without a complete set
of
up-to-date Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) of equipment and
pipe lines with sizes and specifications.  Among other methods, one
feasible
and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is for the employer
to
develop accurate and up-to-date P&IDs based on an actual survey of the as-
built condition of the production facility in accordance with ASME
A13.1.ance

1910.24 C

Serious Gravity 02 1 instance 1 exposed
Issued
Jul 25, 2000
Abate by
Aug 2, 2000
Penalty
Initial $300 · Current $300

1910.24 H

Serious Gravity 01 1 instance 1 exposed
Issued
Jul 25, 2000
Abate by
Aug 4, 2000

1910.147 C04 I

Serious Gravity 02 1 instance 2 exposed
Issued
Jul 25, 2000
Abate by
Oct 13, 2000
Penalty
Initial $300 · Current $300
Recent events (2)
  • · P (S) $300.00
  • · Z (S) $300.00

1910.147 C06 I

Serious Gravity 02 1 instance 2 exposed
Issued
Jul 25, 2000
Abate by
Jul 31, 2000

1910.307 B

Serious Gravity 03 1 instance
Issued
Jul 25, 2000
Abate by
Aug 2, 2000
Penalty
Initial $375 · Current $375

1910.24 H

Other-than-serious Gravity 01 1 instance 1 exposed
Issued
Jul 25, 2000
Abate by
Jul 31, 2000

View Goodway Refining, LLC's full OSHA safety record →

This record is reproduced from the U.S. Department of Labor Open Data API (OSHA inspection dataset). The original IMIS detail view is available at OSHA's Establishment Search for activity number 302618012.

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