ATMORE, AL ·
OSHA Inspection: GOODWAY REFINING, LLC
Complaint inspection · Safety discipline
At a glance
On , OSHA opened a complaint safety inspection of GOODWAY REFINING, LLC in 4745 ROSS RD., ATMORE, AL 36502 (NAICS 000000). OSHA activity number 302618012.
OSHA opens inspections for many reasons: routine scheduling under a national or local emphasis program, an employee complaint or referral, or a follow-up after a reported injury. Opening or conducting an inspection is not itself an allegation or a finding that this employer broke any rule; any findings appear as the citations listed below, and citations can be contested, reduced, or withdrawn.
Where did this inspection happen?
- Establishment
- GOODWAY REFINING, LLC
- Site address
- 4745 ROSS RD.
- City
- ATMORE
- State
- AL
- ZIP
- 36502
What kind of inspection was it?
- Inspection type
- Complaint (B)
- Scope
- Complete (A)
- Discipline
- Safety
- Advance notice
- No
- Union status
- N
When did the case open and close?
- Opened
- Closing conference
- Case closed
- Data loaded
Establishment context
- NAICS code
- 000000
- SIC code (legacy)
- 2911
- Employees
- 16
- Ownership type
- A
Citations
11 citations on file for this inspection.
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Jul 25, 2000
- Abate by
- Aug 2, 2000
- Penalty
- Initial $1,500 · Current $1,500
General-duty citation text
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that operators and maintenance employees are exposed to fire and/or explosion hazards while working around the SMACKO crude oil processing equipment. Among others, one feasible and acceptable methods to correct this hazard is to comply with ASME Section VIII Paragraph UG-134 (e). There shall be no intervening stop valves between the vessel and its protective device or devices, or between the protective device or devices and the point of discharge: a)The suction scrubber, which is a pressure vessel, was not protected from over pressurization by a pressure relieving device. The over pressure discharge pipeline connected to the safety valve was not capable of relieving the over pressurization of the vessel because a flange had been placed on the discharge pipeline. b)Pressure vessels such as the sideline scrubber and the Murphy well three phase separator, were not protected from over pressurization by a pressure relieving device. The sideline scrubber and the Murphy well three phase separator had a safety valve, but it was not capable of relieving the over pressurization of the vessel when a valve down stream from the safety valve was in the closed position.ation
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Jul 25, 2000
- Abate by
- Aug 2, 2000
General-duty citation text
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that operators and maintenance employees are exposed to fire and/or explosion hazards while working around the natural gas expansion chamber in the Goodway process area. Among others, one feasible and acceptable methods to correct this hazard is to comply with ASME Section VIII UG-98(a). The maximum allowable working pressure for a vessel is the maximum pressure permissible at the top of the vessel in its normal operating position at the operating temperature specified for that pressure. a)The natural gas expansion chamber in the Goodway process area was being operated at 140 psi which above its maximum allowable working pressure of 120 psi.sure
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Jul 25, 2000
- Abate by
- Aug 2, 2000
General-duty citation text
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that welders and fitters are exposed to a fire and explosion hazard while operating a hot oil heater. a)The heater was designed to operate at atmospheric conditions but was being subjected to pressures of up to 15 psi and temperatures of 275 degrees F. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is for the employer to develop and maintain on site design documentation that verify the operation of the hot oil heater is with-in the manufacturer's design limitations or to obtain prior approval from the manufacturer before operating equipment outside its design limitation.r
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Jul 25, 2000
- Abate by
- Aug 2, 2000
General-duty citation text
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to a fire and explosion hazard while operating a hot oil heater: (a)The hot oil heater was designed to operate at atmospheric conditions but was subjected to pressures of up to 15 psi and temperatures of 275 degrees F. The hot oil heater was design to operate at atmospheric pressure but is now operated using fuel gas assisted circulation. A pressure relief device was not installed to protect the vessel from over pressurization. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is for the employer to install a pressure relief device in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code-1992, Section VII, paragraph UG-125(a).
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Jul 25, 2000
- Abate by
- Aug 14, 2000
General-duty citation text
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to a fire and explosion hazard: (a)The SMACKO Oil Production Facility was operated without a complete set of up-to-date Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) of equipment and pipe lines with sizes and specifications. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is for the employer to develop accurate and up-to-date P&IDs based on an actual survey of the as- built condition of the production facility in accordance with ASME A13.1.ance
1910.24 C
- Issued
- Jul 25, 2000
- Abate by
- Aug 2, 2000
- Penalty
- Initial $300 · Current $300
1910.24 H
- Issued
- Jul 25, 2000
- Abate by
- Aug 4, 2000
1910.147 C04 I
- Issued
- Jul 25, 2000
- Abate by
- Oct 13, 2000
- Penalty
- Initial $300 · Current $300
Recent events (2)
- · P (S) $300.00
- · Z (S) $300.00
1910.147 C06 I
- Issued
- Jul 25, 2000
- Abate by
- Jul 31, 2000
1910.307 B
- Issued
- Jul 25, 2000
- Abate by
- Aug 2, 2000
- Penalty
- Initial $375 · Current $375
1910.24 H
- Issued
- Jul 25, 2000
- Abate by
- Jul 31, 2000
More inspections at Goodway Refining, LLC
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Source
This record is reproduced from the U.S. Department of Labor Open Data API (OSHA inspection dataset). The original IMIS detail view is available at OSHA's Establishment Search for activity number 302618012.
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