OSHA Inspection: PROCHEMTECH INTERNATIONAL, INC.

Issued

Aug 18, 2006

Abate by

Sep 20, 2006

Penalty

Initial $4,900 · Current $2,100 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:  The
employer did not
furnish employmnent and a place of employment which were free from
recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
employees in that employees
were exposed to explosions from an accumulation of explosive gases, and
toxic gases from the
uncontrolled release of chlorine gas due to inadequate process hazard
evaluations of the mixing
process:
a.) ProChemTech International Inc., Chemical Batch Plant, High Bay,
Reactor #7, PCT 3026
stabilized bromine product - On or about May 18th, 2006, two company
employees were mixing
a batch of the company's PCT 3026 stabilized bromine product in Reactor
#7.  During the
addition of sodium hypochlorite to a sulfamic acid solution, the
unanticipated generation and
accumulation of explosive gases caused a detonation type explosion in the
reactor.  The
explosion shattered the reactor lid, which struck employee #1 in the head.
The explosion also
caused employee #1 to be exposed to an uncontrolled release of chlorine
gas which resulted in
hospitalization due to chemical burns to the respiratory system.
FEASIBLE ABATEMENT METHODS:
Among other methods, feasible and acceptable methods to correct the
condition include:
1.) Conduct comprehensive process hazard evaluations of the batch
processes for the
company's chemical products as described in the Center for Chemical
Process Safety
(CCPS), of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE),
publication
Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Second Edition with Worked
Examples,
2.) Develop detailed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the batch
mixing
processes.  Ensure the SOPs cover start up procedures, normal operating
procedures, and
emergency shutdown procedures with definitions of abnormal operating
conditions
requiring emergency shut down,
3.) Conduct thorough reviews of future changes made to batch mixing
equipment,
procedures, and/or chemicals,
4.) Conduct training with personnel covering the hazards of the chemicals
used in the
batch processes, process hazard evaluations, and SOPs.

Issued

Aug 18, 2006

Abate by

Sep 20, 2006

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:  The
employer did not
furnish employmnent and a place of employment which were free from
recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
employees in that employees
were exposed to explosions from an accumulation of explosive gases, and
toxic gases from the
uncontrolled release of chlorine gas due to an inadequate local exhaust
ventilation system for
Reactor #7:
a.) ProChemTech International Inc., Chemical Batch Plant, High Bay,
Reactor #7, PCT 3026
stabilized bromine product - On or about May 18th, 2006, two company
employees were mixing
a batch of the company's PCT 3026 stabilized bromine product in Reactor
#7.  During the
addition of sodium hypochlorite to a sulfamic acid solution, the
unanticipated generation and
accumulation of explosive gases was not exhausted properly due to an
inadequate local exhaust
ventilation system which then resulted in a detonation type explosion in
the reactor.  The
explosion shattered the reactor lid, which struck employee #1 in the head.
The explosion also
caused employee #1 to be exposed to an uncontrolled release of chlorine
gas which resulted in
hospitalization due to chemical burns to the respiratory system.
FEASIBLE ABATEMENT METHODS:
Among other methods, feasible and acceptable methods to correct the
condition
include:
1.) Following the guidelines established in ANSI/AIHA Z9.2-2001
Fundamentals
Governing the Design and Operation of Local Exhaust Ventilation Systems,
2.) Following the guidelines established in NFPA 91 Standard for Exhaust
Systems for
Air Conveying of Vapors, Gases, Mists, and Noncombustible Particulate
Solids.

Issued

Aug 18, 2006

Abate by

Sep 20, 2006

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:  The
employer did not
furnish employmnent and a place of employment which were free from
recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
employees in that employees
were exposed to explosions from an accumulation of explosive gases, and
toxic gases from the
uncontrolled release of chlorine gas due to a lack of effective controls
and safe work practices
for preventing the generation and discharge of static electricity:
a.) ProChemTech International Inc., Chemical Batch Plant, High Bay,
Reactor #7, PCT 3026
stabilized bromine product - On or about May 18th, 2006, two company
employees were mixing
a batch of the company's PCT 3026 stabilized bromine product in Reactor
#7.  During the
addition of sodium hypochlorite to a sulfamic acid solution, explosive
gases were generated and
accumulated in the reactor.  The lack of effective controls and safe work
practices for preventing
static electricity led to the generation and discharge of static
electricity in the reactor, resulting
in a detonation type explosion.  The explosion shattered the reactor lid,
which struck employee
#1 in the head.  The explosion also caused employee #1 to be exposed to an
uncontrolled release
of chlorine gas which resulted in hospitalization due to chemical burns to
the respiratory system.
The ineffective controls and unsafe work practices included, but were not
limited to:
(1) Bonding and grounding was not utilized for the metal components of the
reactor,
reactor stand and personnel mezzanine;
(2) Liquid and dry chemicals were added to the reactor from the top and
were allowed
to free fall approximately three to four feet into the reactor;
(3) A pH probe and wire were dipped into the solution from the top of the
vessel through
the man way where chemicals are added;
(4) pH reading was taken during addition of chemicals into the reactor
rather than
allowing an appropriate waiting period to allow built up static charge to
dissipate;
(5) Personnel were not grounded while taking pH readings in the reactor;
(6) Personnel working around the reactor were not using conductive
footwear, personal
grounding devices, or anti static or conductive clothing;
FEASIBLE ABATEMENT METHODS:
Among other methods, feasible and acceptable methods to correct the
condition include:
1.) Following the guidelines established in NFPA 77 Recommended Practice
on Static
Electricity.

Issued

Aug 18, 2006

Abate by

Sep 20, 2006

Penalty

Initial $4,200 · Current $2,100 Reduced

Issued

Aug 18, 2006

Abate by

Sep 20, 2006

Issued

Aug 18, 2006

Abate by

Sep 20, 2006

Penalty

Initial $2,100 · Current $1,050 Reduced

Issued

Aug 18, 2006

Abate by

Sep 20, 2006

Issued

Aug 18, 2006

Abate by

Sep 20, 2006

Issued

Aug 18, 2006

Abate by

Sep 20, 2006

Issued

Aug 18, 2006

Abate by

Sep 20, 2006

Penalty

Initial $4,200 · Current $2,100 Reduced

Issued

Aug 18, 2006

Abate by

Sep 20, 2006

Penalty

Initial $2,100 · Current $1,050 Reduced

Issued

Aug 18, 2006

Abate by

Sep 20, 2006