Safety Incidents OSHA Severe Injury Reports · 2015–2025
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OSHA Inspection: W R GRACE & COMPANY

Complaint inspection · Health discipline

On , OSHA opened a complaint health inspection of W R GRACE & COMPANY in 4000 N. HAWTHORNE STREET, CHATTANOOGA, TN 37406 (NAICS 325188). OSHA activity number 309632123.

What this inspection record means

OSHA opens inspections for many reasons — routine scheduling under a national or local emphasis program, an employee complaint or referral, or a follow-up after a reported injury. Opening or conducting an inspection is not itself an allegation or a finding that this employer broke any rule; any findings appear as the citations listed below, and citations can be contested, reduced, or withdrawn.

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Establishment
W R GRACE & COMPANY
Site address
4000 N. HAWTHORNE STREET
City
CHATTANOOGA
State
TN
ZIP
37406
Inspection type
Complaint (B)
Scope
Partial (B)
Discipline
Health
Advance notice
No
Union status
Y
Opened
Closing conference
Case closed
Last modified
Data loaded
NAICS code
325188
SIC code (legacy)
2819
Employees
80
Ownership type
A

3 citations on file for this inspection.

503010501

Serious 1 instance 3 exposed
Issued
Jun 28, 2007
Abate by
Aug 4, 2007
Penalty
Initial $4,000 · Current $3,000 Reduced

Hazardous substances 8880

T.C.A. 50-3-105(1):  The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment
which were free from recognized hazards that were likely to cause death or
serious physical
harm to employees, in that employees were exposed to fire and explosion
from use of
contaminated rare earth raw materials in their dissolving process in the
rare earth main
processing building on 2/9/07 and 2/11/07, without:
a.Adequate safe work practice procedures and/or without adhering to
procedures
necessary for safe operation in existing work practice procedures, with
respect to:
1.Work practice procedures to control unsafe raw material acquisition and
use;
2.Effective isolation of hazardous areas from employee exposure, due to
lack of
adherence to an existing safe work practice procedure on "Barricading
Hazardous Areas"; and
3.An effective safe work practice procedure to transfer information
concerning
incidents and hazards between the 2nd shift (after which the process was
shut
down) Friday night and the 3rd shift (which restarts the process) Sunday
night;
and
b.Performing an effective change and/or hazard analysis of the new
flammable/explosive materials introduced (inadvertently) to the rare earth
dissolving
process in tank PRE-138.  An effective, thorough change and/or hazard
analysis was
necessary after the flammability/explosivity hazard was evident on 2/9/07.
Safe work practice procedures, enforcement to ensure adherence to such
procedures, and
thorough change/hazard analysis (where new hazards have been introduced in
the workplace)
are all elements of an effective safety and health program.  Employers are
expected, with
reasonable diligence, to have such elements in an effective safety program.
In August of 2006, the employer took steps to receive 52 drums (55 gallon)
of rare earth raw
material (also termed Malaysian Chloride, Lanthanum Chloride, or Chinese
Cast)
from
another company (Remacor), free of charge (except shipping costs).  Drums
of this material
were mixed in batches of the employer's rare earth + water solutions.  On
2/9/07, the
Remacor material, when added to the batch in tank PRE-138, caused
sparking, flames, and
possible explosion.  Yellow barricade tape was installed, and left over
the weekend, around
the tank area.  After finding no reason for the yellow barricade tape, it
was removed at the
beginning of the 3rd shift Sunday night, 2/11/09.  Upon beginning transfer
of the batch in
tank PRE-138 to tank PRE-149 on the third shift on Sunday night, 2/11/07,
another
explosion occurred, with flames emanating from the tank PRE-138 feed
opening.  Chemical
Operators and a Supervisor were exposed to the fire/explosion hazards.
The following were findings, with respect to the above-listed safety
program deficiencies:
a.1.Although this particular raw material acquisition (at least one drum
of
which
was contaminated with material that was flammable and explosive) was
unusual for the employer, his "Raw Material Supplier List - Standard
Procedure," Document No. PU-SP-001, was predominantly not followed
(although receipt and analysis of a trial sample, one part of the
procedure, wasfollowed).  The procedure was not safe, as written, due to
the non-specific
requirements listed.  An example was paragraph 6.2: "[The Purchasing
Process Owner (PPO)] selects the appropriate method for supplier assessment
based on the nature of the raw material and GRACE Davison's end-use quality
requirements."  Of the methods listed from which to select, some that were
not selected (such as 6.2.1: "On-site quality audit of the supplier")
could have
stopped the acquisition;
2.The hazardous area, including tank PRE-138, was barricaded with yellow
tape
on 2/9/07, and it remained in place until the beginning of the 3rd shift on
2/11/07, when it was taken down.  Examples of where the employer's work
practice procedure on "Barricading Hazardous Areas," was not followed were:
i."Yellow tape will be used to give notice of hazards that can be seen by
personnel coming into the area.  These hazards are not to be considered
life threatening or disabling.  Yellow tape shall be used to denote
"Caution"";
ii."Red barricade tape will be used to give notice of areas where the
hazard is not readily apparent or where the situation could be life
threatening or disabling.  Red tape shall be used to denote "Danger"";
iii."A plastic tag will be attached to each taped area identifying the
person
who hung the tape, the date and the hazard in the taped area";
iv."When a hazardous situation is identified, the appropriate supervisor
shall be contacted and everyone working in the area shall be informed."
3rd shift personnel reopening the operation on 2/11/07 were not so
contacted or informed;
v."If a person needs to go into a yellow barricaded area, they will do this
only if necessary.  They must determine the reason for the barricade
before entering."  3rd shift personnel entered the yellow barricaded
area without adhering to the preconditions; and
vi."The employee(s) responsible for barricading an area or piece of
equipment shall make sure the barricade tape is removed after the
hazard has been corrected."  Management personnel installed the
yellow barricade tape on 2/9/07 and indicated that they felt "there was
no significant hazard remaining" (which was incorrect) by the end of
the 2nd shift on 2/9/07, but they did not then remove the barricade
tape;
3.Whereas there was an unwritten procedure (use of log books and e-mail
between shift foremen) for transferring hazard and incident information
between the two shifts, it was not followed during this incident.  One
complicating factor was that responsibilities were not clearly understood,
after
management personnel became involved in the handling of the incident; and
b.An effective change analysis and/or hazard analysis was not conducted
after it was
evident that there was a flammable/explosive contaminant introduced into
the rare
earth batch in PRE-138 on 2/9/07.
These hazards were reasonably foreseeable in that they were recognized by
employer
representatives, the industry, and common sense.Among other methods,
feasible and acceptable abatement methods for correcting these
hazards are to:
a.1.Develop and implement a safe work practice procedure for handling all
raw
material acquisitions, including those that may be unusual. Such a
procedure
could include:
i.Researching a potential raw material supplier company's historical
record.  In the above-mentioned case:
A.Brief internet research yielded information that Remacor had
several major explosions and/or fires in its 20 plus years of
production.  The last was in 2005, and it affected the bulk of its
operation;
B.The employer also found, after its fire/explosion incidents, that
Remacor was under an EPA-forced (ordered) cleanup of the
worksite, and that may presumably be why they were getting rid
of the rare earth materials;
C.The employer also found, after their incidents, that Remacor
was going out of business (and no longer existed after the
employer received the rare earth from them);
D.Internet research also found that Remacor made: magnesium (a
flammable solid) products from magnesium turnings (shavings);
and misch metals (flammable solids that are pyrophoric - they
ignite spontaneously in air or spark when slight friction is
applied), that are use in production of lighter flints) from rare
earth chlorides;
ii."On-site quality audit of the supplier," which was one of the potential
methods of supplier assessment in the employer's "Approved Raw
Material Supplier List - Standard Procedure."  When they received the
rare earth "lanthanum chlorides"-labeled materials from Remacor (the
tags on some of the 1992-labeled drums said the name of the company
was "Reactive Metals and Alloys Corp."), they came in rusty 55 gallon
drums that had dates of 4/18/92, 5/31/92, and 7/31/97 (10 to 15 years
old);
iii."Completion of self-assessment questionnaire by the supplier," which
was also one of the potential methods of supplier assessment in the
employer's "Approved Raw Material Supplier List - Standard
Procedure"; and
iv."Registration to ISO 9001/9002 Standard," which was also one of the
potential methods of supplier assessment in the employer's "Approved
Raw Material Supplier List - Standard Procedure";
2.Ensure adherence to the employer's "Barricading Hazardous Areas"
Operating
Procedure.  Such adherence can be ensured through consistent monitoring and
enforcement of safe work practice procedures;
3.Develop an effective shift change information transfer procedure, with
clearly
defined responsibilities, and ensure its consistent implementation through
monitoring and enforcement; andb.Conduct a thorough change analysis when a
new material, with potential hazards, is
added (inadvertently or not) to an operation.  Such a change analysis may
be
incorporated into a hazard analysis and/or a pre-startup safety review.
ABATEMENT VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED
Recent events (2)
  • — I (S) $3000.00
  • — Z (S) $4000.00

1910.1200 F05 II

Serious 1 instance 3 exposed
Issued
Jun 28, 2007
Abate by
Aug 4, 2007
Penalty
Initial $4,000 · Current $3,000 Reduced

Hazardous substances 8880

Recent events (2)
  • — I (S) $3000.00
  • — Z (S) $4000.00

1910.1200 H01

Serious 3 instances 3 exposed
Issued
Jun 28, 2007
Abate by
Aug 4, 2007
Penalty
Initial $4,000 · Current $3,000 Reduced

Hazardous substances 8880

Recent events (2)
  • — I (S) $3000.00
  • — Z (S) $4000.00

View W R Grace & Company's full OSHA safety record →

This record is reproduced from the U.S. Department of Labor Open Data API (OSHA inspection dataset). The original IMIS detail view is available at OSHA's Establishment Search for activity number 309632123.

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