Safety Incidents OSHA Severe Injury Reports · 2015–2025
5,189,992Inspections Most recent open 2026-07-18 Last loaded 2026-07-22

OSHA Inspection: DELTIC TIMBER CORPORATION

Accident-driven inspection · Safety discipline

On , OSHA opened an accident-driven safety inspection of DELTIC TIMBER CORPORATION in 1720 HIGHWAY 82 WEST, WALDO, AR 71770 (NAICS 321912). OSHA activity number 311127906.

What this inspection record means

OSHA opens inspections for many reasons — routine scheduling under a national or local emphasis program, an employee complaint or referral, or a follow-up after a reported injury. Opening or conducting an inspection is not itself an allegation or a finding that this employer broke any rule; any findings appear as the citations listed below, and citations can be contested, reduced, or withdrawn.

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Site address
1720 HIGHWAY 82 WEST
City
WALDO
State
AR
ZIP
71770
Inspection type
Accident-driven (A)
Scope
Partial (B)
Discipline
Safety
Advance notice
No
Union status
N
Opened
Closing conference
Case closed
Last modified
Data loaded
NAICS code
321912
SIC code (legacy)
2421
Employees
175
Ownership type
A

5 citations on file for this inspection.

5(a)(1)

Deleted Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 12 exposed
Issued
Jan 18, 2008
Abate by
Feb 7, 2008
Penalty
Initial $4,500 · Current $4,500
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer did not furnish
employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized
hazards that were
causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in
that employees were
exposed to fire and deflagration hazards:
On or about August 9, 2007 employees were exposed to fire and deflagration
hazards in
and around the planer room enclosure where the planer room enclosure was
not built in
accordance to NFPA 664, Section 6.4.2.1 to prevent or relieve deflagration
pressures
from propagating into adjacent interior spaces.
Among other methods, the following are feasible and acceptable methods to
abate or
minimize the hazards:
Install pressure-relief vents in the exterior walls of the planer room
enclosure
constructed to prevent breach and propagation of a dust explosion into
adjacent
areas occupied by employees.
Recent events (2)
  • — F (S) $4500.00
  • — Z (S) $4500.00

5(a)(1)

Deleted Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 12 exposed
Issued
Jan 18, 2008
Abate by
Feb 7, 2008
Penalty
Initial $4,500 · Current $4,500
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer did not furnish
employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized
hazards that were
causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in
that employees were
exposed to fire and deflagration hazards:
On or about August 9, 2007 employees working in the planer mill were
exposed to fire
and deflagration hazards in the following instances:
a) the dust collection system ducts conveying wood material from the
planer was
not equipped with spark detection, extinguishing system, and abort gates in
accordance with NFPA 664, Section 8.2.2.2.2.
b) the cyclone separator use for dust collection possessed a
deflagration/explosion
hazard and was not constructed to withstand the maximum deflagration
pressure
of the material collected, was not equipped with deflagration relief
vents,
or a
deflagration suppression system in accordance with NFPA 664, Section
8.2.2.5.3.
c) the dust collection system was not designed with hoods having a rate of
airflow
capable of capturing the wood dust and particles to minimize fugitive dust
emissions in accordance with NFPA 664, Section 8.2.2.3.1 and 8.2.2.3.3.
d) the dust collection system equipped with floor sweeps inlets was not
designed
to prevent metal and foreign material from entering the wood and dust
process
equipment in accordance with NFPA 664, Section 7.12.2.
Among other methods, the following are feasible and acceptable methods to
abate or
minimize the hazards:
Design and construct the dust collection system and all process equipment
in
accordance with NFPA 664 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and
Explosions
in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities.
Recent events (2)
  • — F (S) $4500.00
  • — Z (S) $4500.00

1910.22 A01

Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 12 exposed
Issued
Jan 18, 2008
Abate by
Jan 31, 2008
Penalty
Initial $4,500 · Current $4,500
Recent events (2)
  • — F (S) $4500.00
  • — Z (S) $4500.00

5(a)(1)

Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 12 exposed
Issued
Jan 18, 2008
Abate by
Feb 7, 2008
Penalty
Initial $4,500 · Current $7,000
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer did not furnish
employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized
hazards that were
causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in
that employees were
exposed to fire and deflagration hazards:
On or about August 9, 2007 employees were exposed to fire and deflagration
hazards in
and around the planer room enclosure where the planer room enclosure was
not built in
accordance to NFPA 664, Section 6.4.2.1 to prevent or relieve deflagration
pressures
from propagating into adjacent interior spaces.
Among other methods, the following are feasible and acceptable methods to
abate or
minimize the hazards:
Install pressure-relief vents in the exterior walls of the planer room
enclosure
constructed to prevent breach and propagation of a dust explosion into
adjacent
areas occupied by employees.
Recent events (2)
  • — F (S) $7000.00
  • — Z (S) $4500.00

5(a)(1)

Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 12 exposed
Issued
Jan 18, 2008
Abate by
Feb 7, 2008
Penalty
Initial $4,500
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer did not furnish
employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized
hazards that were
causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in
that employees were
exposed to fire and deflagration hazards:
On or about August 9, 2007 employees working in the planer mill were
exposed to fire
and deflagration hazards in the following instances:
a) the planer room enclosure was not built to prevent or relieve
deflagration
pressures from propagating into adjacent interior spaces.
b) the dust collection system ducts conveying wood material from the
planer was
not equipped with spark detection, extinguishing system, and abort gates;
c) the cyclone separator use for dust collection possessed a
deflagration/explosion
hazard and was not constructed to withstand the maximum deflagration
pressure
of the material collected, was not equipped with deflagration relief
vents, or a
deflagration suppression system.
d) the dust collection system was not designed with hoods having a rate of
airflow
capable of capturing the wood dust and particles to minimize fugitive dust
emissions in accordance.
e) the dust collection system equipped with floor sweeps inlets was not
designed
to prevent metal and foreign material from entering the wood and dust
process
equipment.
Among other methods, the following are feasible and acceptable methods to
abate or
minimize the hazards:
Design and construct the dust collection system and all process equipment
in
accordance with NFPA 664 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and
Explosions
in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities.
Recent events (2)
  • — F (S)
  • — Z (S) $4500.00

View Deltic Timber Corporation's full OSHA safety record →

This record is reproduced from the U.S. Department of Labor Open Data API (OSHA inspection dataset). The original IMIS detail view is available at OSHA's Establishment Search for activity number 311127906.

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