OSHA Inspection: CONOCOPHILLIPS BILLINGS REFINERY

Issued

Jul 17, 2009

Abate by

Jul 22, 2009

Penalty

Initial $1,300 · Current $650 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.23(a)(2): Ladderway floor openings or platforms were not
guarded by a
standard railing with passage through the railing provided with either a
swing gate or so
offset that a person cannot walk directly into the opening:
a) On or about March 16, 2009 and at prior times thereto, employees were
exposed to fall
hazards over 20 feet at the barrel ladder access on W-58, reached from the
4th level of the
FCC, and extending down the side of the column to the lower level. The
safety chains
installed at the top level opening were consistently left unchained.

Issued

Jul 17, 2009

Abate by

Jul 17, 2009

Penalty

Initial $975 · Current $488 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 119(d)(3)(ii):  The employer did not comply with RAGAGEP when it
failed to
provide adequate controls to ensure that intervening valves on the
upstream lines to relief
devices(s) remained in the open position during operation when a pressure
vessel was the
possible source of a relieving event. (AMSE Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code, Division 1
(BPVC), Section VIII, UG-135d and appendix M are examples of RAGAGEP for
controlling
intervening stop valves on relief lines;
a) The two 4 inch block valves on the discharge side of the FCC Gas Oil
Preheat Exchangers
(X-1, X-2, X-3, X-4, X-5, X-6)  were not locked open thereby ensuring
unrestricted flow to
RV 405 which is listed in the Process Safety Management Process Technology
Relief Design
as the Thermal Relief for those exchangers.

Issued

Jul 17, 2009

Abate by

Aug 19, 2009

Penalty

Initial $1,625 · Current $813 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(m)(5):  The employer did not establish a system to
promptly
address and
resolve the incident investigation report findings and recommendations
from the Tank 12 overfill
incident:
a) Employees were exposed to a potential fire or explosion due to
flammable product that was
transferred without being continuously monitored at the ConocoPhillips
Refinery in Billings,
Montana. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable method to
correct this hazard
would be to follow API 2350 paragraph 4.6.1.1.
Abatement Note: Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Abatement
Certification Letter").

Issued

Jul 17, 2009

Abate by

Jul 22, 2009

Penalty

Initial $1,625 · Current $813 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.305(b)(2)(i):  Pull boxes, junction boxes, and fittings were
not provided with
covers approved for the purpose:
a)  On or about February 24, 2009 and at times prior ConocoPhillips
Billings Refinery as the
exposing/creating contractor did not ensure that employees/workers of
ConocoPhillips
and
Energy & Environmental Measurement Corporation were protected from
electrical hazards.
Employees installing and monitoring probes in the stack penthouse of the
FCC Unit were
exposed to J boxes with live conductors and no covers.

Issued

Jul 17, 2009

Abate by

Jul 22, 2009

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(B) The employer did not compile process safety
information which
included accurate piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs).
a) No gauge as listed on P&ID 34A-004-D on the line from X-29 to the
orifice chamber
prior to X-353. The gauge (PG 120) had been removed and the 3/4" line had
been capped.
b) As listed on P&ID 34A-004-D at the bottom of the cone for X-353 the 3"
y'ed stub line
that should have been blind-flanged actually had a flange and reducer with
a pipe extension
and connector to a 3/4" open ended pipe.
c) P&ID 34A-004-D: two 3/4" bypass level transmitter lines were not shown
that were
physically located on the south end of D-10.
d) Valve 34-01 not shown as "LO" on P&ID 34A-005-D.