OSHA Inspection: HUSSEY COPPER LTD.

Issued

Mar 4, 2011

Abate by

Mar 8, 2011

Penalty

Initial $7,000 · Current $7,000

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:  The
employer did not
furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from
recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
employees in that employees
were exposed to severe burns, traumatic injuries, and/or death due to the
reaction of water
mixing with molten metal:
(a) Facility, Casting Department:  On or about January 11, 2011, three
employees were exposed
to severe burns due to the reaction of water and molten metal when an
incorrect
hose, Ryco
T116A, with a maximum working pressure of 1,300 p.s.i. was installed on
the hydraulic ram
to DC-1 Casting Unit.  The operating pressure for the DC-1 Casting Unit
ram ranges from
1,000 to 1,900 p.s.i.  In addition, the hose fittings installed on the
Ryco T116A hose, were not
installed properly.  The correct hose and fittings required were those for
a T216A hose, with
a maximum working pressure of 2,450 p.s.i.  On January 11, 2011, the T116A
hose failed
under pressure at the area next to the coupling and caused the hydraulic
ram to fall to the bottom
of the 30 foot deep water pit which allowed molten copper to fall into the
water pit resulting in
a rapidly expanding steam vapor/molten metal explosion.
Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to
correct this hazard is
to determine system pressure and ensure that hose selection must be made
so that the
recommended maximum operating pressure is equal to or greater than the
system pressure;
ensure proper compatibility exists between the hose and coupling selected
upon the
manufacturer's recommendations; and develop a pre-installation inspection
procedure in
accordance with SAE J123 Sept. 79, "Selection, Installation, and
Maintenance of Hose and Hose
Assemblies.