TAMPA, FL —
OSHA Inspection: HARTE-HANKS FLYER, INC
Referral inspection · Safety discipline
At a glance
On , OSHA opened a referral safety inspection of HARTE-HANKS FLYER, INC in 201 KELSEY LANE, TAMPA, FL 33619 (NAICS 511110). OSHA activity number 316282441.
OSHA opens inspections for many reasons — routine scheduling under a national or local emphasis program, an employee complaint or referral, or a follow-up after a reported injury. Opening or conducting an inspection is not itself an allegation or a finding that this employer broke any rule; any findings appear as the citations listed below, and citations can be contested, reduced, or withdrawn.
Where did this inspection happen?
- Establishment
- HARTE-HANKS FLYER, INC
- Site address
- 201 KELSEY LANE
- City
- TAMPA
- State
- FL
- ZIP
- 33619
What kind of inspection was it?
- Inspection type
- Referral (C)
- Scope
- Partial (B)
- Discipline
- Safety
- Advance notice
- Yes
- Union status
- N
When did the case open and close?
- Opened
- Closing conference
- Case closed
- Last modified
- Data loaded
Establishment context
- NAICS code
- 511110
- SIC code (legacy)
- 2711
- Employees
- 203
- Ownership type
- A
Citations
1 citation on file for this inspection.
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Apr 18, 2012
- Abate by
- May 21, 2012
- Penalty
- Initial $4,250 · Current $2,125 Reduced
General-duty citation text
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that are likely to cause burns, serious injury or death in that employees are exposed to fire and explosion hazards associated with the paper dust collection system: For the AGET Filterkop baghouse and cyclone present in the bailing area as part of the paper scrap and dust collection system, as observed on 04/09/2012. The paper dust was analyzed to be combustible/explosive with a Kst of 31.68 bar*m/s and a pressure ratio of 8.31. The following deficiencies were noted with the collection system: a) There was no explosion protection or fire protection system for either the cyclone or the baghouse to protect employees in the event of a dust explosion or fire. The cyclone and baghouse were located inside the building at the bailer area where employees accessed and worked daily. b)There was no fire and/or explosion isolation system for the cyclone and baghouse to ensure that in the event of a fire or explosion, flames or other hazardous energy could not be propagated back into the building through the exhaust stream, or back up the duct work. c)Grounding and bonding were not in place to dissipate the buildup of static potential/electricity, a potential ignition source, by ensuring that the entire collection system was electrically conductive and grounded. This was due to the presence of non- grounded flexible ducts which were in place to convey dusty air between the cyclone and the baghouse, non-conductive/non- grounded plastic PVC ducts for the inlet dusty air stream that connected to the cyclone, and broken duct work joints in many sections on the metal pneumatic conveying ducts. The joints were taped together with duct tape, but no metallic jumper wire was installed to ensure that continuity and an adequate ground was achieved. d)Sources of paper dust had not been practically eliminated resulting in accumulations of paper dust on the bailer, on some electrical equipment, and on the ground. The motor for the exhaust system did not have sufficient capacity to eliminate the back pressure associated with poor suction from the fan between the cyclone and the baghouse. This prevented the dust from being properly exhausted, as well as created jams in the compactor resulting in dust emission from the process. e)Compressed air was used to blow off the dust from the bailer and the floor around the bailer. This practice resulted in combustible paper dust clouds that could potentially form a flammable/explosive concentration. ABATEMENT NOTE: Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable method to correct these hazards include complying with the National Fire Protection Agency NFPA 654 "Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids 2006 Edition" NFPA 68 "Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting" and NFPA 69 "Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems 2008 edition", which includes, but may not be limited to: a)Install explosion relief venting on the cyclone and baghouse vented to the outside and capable of directing fire and explosion energy outside to an unoccupied area as specified in NFPA 654 and NFPA 68. b)Route the exhaust air from the baghouse outside through duct capable of also transmitting any fire/explosion energy to a safe and unoccupied area as required by NFPA 654. c)Install fire/explosion isolation devices on the baghouse and cyclone as specified in NFPA 654 and NFPA 68 and 69. d)Safely exhaust the baghouse to outside and generate adequate air flow/suction to ensure that jams do not occur in the compactor resulting in minimized dust emission from the process as specified in NFPA 654. e)Comply with NFPA 654 by ensuring that all ductwork for the pneumatic conveying paper dust/paper scraps is conductive, grounded, and bonded to the rest of the dust collection system. f)Comply with NFPA 654 by using a combustible dust approved vacuum to clean up the dust or other means to avoid producing dust clouds.
Recent events (2)
- — J (S) $2125.00
- — Z (S) $4250.00
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Source
This record is reproduced from the U.S. Department of Labor Open Data API (OSHA inspection dataset). The original IMIS detail view is available at OSHA's Establishment Search for activity number 316282441.
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