OSHA Inspection: UFP VENTURES II, INC

Issued

Jun 14, 2013

Abate by

Apr 15, 2015

Penalty

Initial $4,900 · Current $3,430 Reduced

Hazardous substances W103

General-duty citation text

OSH ACT of 1970 Section 5(a)(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm in that employees were exposed to combustible dust (wood flour, HDPE, wood flour/HDPE, and wood flour/PVC) deflagration, explosion or other fire hazards while working at or near processing, material conveying, and material collection equipment that was not adequately designed to prevent or minimize employee exposure; and while performing cleaning tasks in a manner capable of creating dust clouds:      Wood Flour Receiving Area ? such as, but not limited to:      (a)   Multiple pieces of equipment handling combustible wood flour lacked means of explosion protection.  Examples include, but are not limited to:                         i.        The indoor wood flour silo hopper with associated indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-7).                        ii.        The wood flour dump hopper enclosure with associated indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-15).                       iii.        Outdoor wood flour silos #1, #2, and #3.                       iv.        The indoor drag conveyor located between the wood flour silo hopper and wood flour dump hopper.   (b)   Multiple indoor air/material separators recycled air directly into the receiving area and lacked provisions to prevent the transmission of smoke and flame from an internal fire and flame and pressure effects from a deflagration back into the work area.  Examples include, but are not limited to:                         i.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU -15) located on top of the wood flour dump hopper.                        ii.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-7) located on top of the wood flour silo hopper.   (c)   The rotary feeder/air lock (V-37) associated with the wood flour silo hopper lacked the recognized elements to be considered a reliable fire and deflagration isolation device.   (d)   Fugitive dust accumulated within the receiving area as a result of insufficient dust containment/capture from material transfer points.  Examples included:                         i.        The location where wood flour was unloaded from the trailer conveyors into the wood flour dump hopper.                        ii.        The location where wood flour was unloaded from the drag conveyor into the wood flour silo hopper.  (e)   Compressed air with a line pressure between (90-120 psi) was utilized as a method of removing combustible wood flour from surfaces.    Wood Flour System 1 & 2 Areas ? such as, but not limited to:      (a)   Multiple pieces of equipment handling combustible wood flour, HDPE, or wood flour/HDPE dust lacked means of explosion protection.  Examples include, but are not limited to:                         i.        The indoor wood flour storage bins #1, #2, and #3.  Chemical deflagration suppression system bottles mounted on the bins were not charged.                        ii.        The indoor wood flour/HDPE/minor ingredients compound mixer (M-32) with associated the indoor air/material separator (dust collector) and collection hopper.                       iii.        The indoor wood flour/HDPE/minor ingredients compound mixer (M-82) with associated the indoor air/material separator (dust collector) and collection hopper.                       iv.        The indoor wood flour/HDPE/minor ingredients scale hopper with associated indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-2) upstream of compound mixer (M-32).                        v.        The HDPE/minor ingredient scale hopper with associated indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-18) upstream of compound mixer (M-82).                       vi.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-36) associated with the pellet mill (M-149) for system #1.                      vii.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-46) associated with the pellet mill (M-199) for system #2.                     viii.        The indoor pellet mill hopper with associated indoor/air material separator (dust collector PU-35) for system #1.                       ix.        The indoor pellet mill hopper with associated indoor/air material separator (dust collector PU-45) for system #2.                        x.        The indoor drag conveyor (M-77) connecting and the indoor finished wood flour/HDPE/minor ingredients hopper downstream of the indoor mixer (M-82) for system #2.  (b)   Multiple pieces of equipment contained explosion venting that terminated within the production area.  Examples include, but are not limited to:                         i.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-1) associated with wood flour storage bin #1.                        ii.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-20) associated with wood flour storage bin #2.                       iii.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-22) associated with wood flour storage bin #3.                       iv.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-17) associated with wood flour scale hopper upstream of compound mixer (M-82).                        v.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-146) associated with the pellet dryer.                       vi.        The finished wood flour/HDPE compound storage bin #1.                      vii.        The finished wood flour/HDPE compound storage bin #2.                     viii.        The pellet dryer vessel.   (c)   Multiple indoor air/material separators (dust collectors) recycled air directly back into the receiving area and lacked provisions to prevent the transmission of smoke and flame from an internal fire and flame and pressure effects from a deflagration back into the work area.  Examples include, but are not limited to:                         i.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-1) associated with wood flour storage bin #1.                        ii.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-20) associated with wood flour storage bin #2.                       iii.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-22) associated with wood flour storage bin #3.                        iv.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-17) associated with the wood flour scale hopper upstream of compound mixer (M-82).                        v.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-18) associated with the HDPE/minor ingredients scale hopper upstream of compound mixer (M-82).                       vi.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-2) associated with the wood/ flour/HDPE/minor ingredients scale hopper upstream of compound mixer (M-32).                      vii.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-146) associated with the pellet dryer.                     viii.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector M-11) associated with finished wood flour/HDPE compound storage bin #1.                       ix.        The indoor air/material separator (dust collector M-85) associated with finished wood flour/HDPE compound storage bin #2.                        x.        The (2) indoor air/material separators (dust collectors PU-35 and PU-36) associated with the pellet mill for system #1.                       xi.        The (2) indoor air/material separators (dust collectors PU-45 and PU-46) associated with the pellet mill for system #2.   (d)   Deflagration propagation isolation was not provided between the multiple groups of process equipment.  Examples include, but are not limited to:                         i.        The indoor wood flour storage bins #1, #2, #3 and the wood flour scale hopper connected by pneumatic conveying ducts.  Chemical deflagration suppression system bottles were not charged.   Wood Flour / PVC System Area ? such as, but not limited to:      (a)   Multiple pieces equipment handling combustible wood flour or wood flour/PVC dust lacked means of explosion protection.  Examples include, but are not limited to:                         i.        The indoor wood flour/PVC compound hopper with associated indoor air/material separator (dust collector) upstream of the pellet mill.                          ii.        The indoor wood flour hopper with associated indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-1) upstream of the mixer.    (b)   Multiple indoor air/material separators (dust collectors) recycled air directly back into the receiving area and lacked provisions to prevent the transmission of smoke and flame from an internal fire and flame and pressure effects from a deflagration back into the work area.  Examples included, but are not limited to:                       i.          The indoor air/material separator (dust collector) associated with the wood flour/PVC compound hopper for the pellet mill.                      ii.          The indoor air/material separator (dust collector PU-1) associated with the wood flour hopper.  Among other methods, a feasible method to correct these hazards would be to comply with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 664 ?Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, 2012 Ed.? Sections 8.2.2.5.1.4, 8.2.2.5.3, 8.2.2.6, 8.2.3.1.2, 8.2.3.3.1, 8.2.4, 8.10.3.2, 11.1.2.1, 11.1.7 and 11.2.1.1; and The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) ?Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids, 2013 Ed.?  Sections 7.1.4.1, 7.1.6.1, 7.13.1.1.1, 7.13.1.6.1, and 7.17.3      Specifically for air/material separators (dust collectors), silos, storage bins, and enclosed conveying systems, provide a method of explosion protection such as a chemical deflagration suppression installed in accordance with NFPA 69 ?Standard on Explosion Prevention System? or provide deflagration relief vents that discharge to a safe outdoor location in accordance with NFPA 68 ?Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting?.  Ensure that air from air/material separator exhaust is discharged to a safe outdoor location or that provisions are implemented to prevent the transmission of hazards related to internal fires or deflagration.  Ensure that deflagration venting installed on indoor air/material separators, indoor storage bins, and other indoor equipment is exhausted to safe areas outside of the building in accordance with NFPA 68 or that listed dust retention and flame arresting devices are installed in accordance with NFPA 68.        Specifically for ensuring that rotary feeders/air locks can be relied upon as isolation devices, ensure that the rotary valve design criteria in NFPA 69 is met (flame quenching through close-clearance valve techniques or material blocking by ensuring a minimum product layer above the valve at all times).      Specifically for deflagration isolation on mechanical conveyors, utilize a properly maintained and serviced chemical deflagration suppression isolation system in accordance with NFPA 69.      Specifically for ensuring that equipment does not generate fugitive dust emissions, maintain or develop equipment designs that minimize fugitive dust emissions and provide continuous suction capable of capturing and containing the dust.      Specifically for ensuring that dust clouds are not generated during cleanup, minimize fugitive dust accumulations through engineering controls and when cleaning is necessary, non-vigorous sweeping and/or vacuuming methods should be used.  If blow-down with compressed air is still necessary after sweeping and/or vacuuming, ensure that the operation is shutdown, all ignition sources are eliminated / controlled, and a low-gauge pressure of compressed air (15 psi or less) is utilized.

Issued

Jun 14, 2013

Abate by

Dec 9, 2013

Penalty

Initial $4,900 · Current $3,430 Reduced

Hazardous substances W103

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.22(a)(1):  All places of employment, passageways, storerooms, and service rooms were not kept clean and orderly and in a sanitary condition:     a.  Wood Dump Area - Accumulations of wood flour, a Class II Group G combustible dust, generated during delivery and conveying processes was allowed to collect on the walls, ceiling, electrical conduit, pneumatic conveying tubes, fluorescent light fixtures.        b.  Silo No. 1 - Accumulations of wood flour, a Class II Group G combustible dust, generated due to the leaking Ladig cone bottom unloader was allowed to collect on the floor and equipment below the silo.

Issued

Jun 14, 2013

Abate by

Dec 9, 2013

Penalty

Initial $4,900 · Current $0 Reduced

Hazardous substances W103

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.307(c):  Equipment, wiring methods, and installations of equipment in hazardous (classified) locations were not intrinsically safe, approved for the hazardous (classified) location, or safe for the hazardous (classified) location:    Wood Dump Area - On or about February 12, 2013, electrical equipment including, but not limited to, overhead fluorescent lights and disconnect switches in Class II, Division II locations, was not intrinsically safe, approved for a Class II, Division II, or safe for a Class II, Division II location.