OSHA Inspection: ANHEUSER BUSCH

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Sep 19, 2016

Penalty

Initial $3,300 · Current $2,300 Reduced

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d): Process safety information. In accordance with the schedule set forth in paragraph (e)(1) of this section, the employer shall complete a compilation of written process safety information before conducting any process hazard analysis required by the standard. The compilation of written process safety information is to enable the employer and the employees involved in operating the process to identify and understand the hazards posed by those processes involving highly hazardous chemicals. This process safety information shall include information pertaining to the hazards of the highly hazardous chemicals used or produced by the process, information pertaining to the technology of the process, and information pertaining to the equipment in the process:    29 CFR 1910.119(d)(2)(i): Information concerning the technology of the process shall include at least the following:    29 CFR 1910.119(d)(2)(i)(D): Safe upper and lower limits for such items as temperatures, pressures, flows or compositions; and,    a. On or about February 4, 2014, the employer had not documented, compiled and maintained process safety information for safe upper and lower limits for the ammonia refrigeration system. Due to the lack of this information having been compiled, safe upper and lower limits are not available for use in process safety management activities, such as but not limited to process hazard analysis.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Sep 19, 2016

Penalty

Initial $5,500 · Current $6,000

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d): Process safety information. In accordance with the schedule set forth in paragraph (e)(1) of this section, the employer shall complete a compilation of written process safety information before conducting any process hazard analysis required by the standard. The compilation of written process safety information is to enable the employer and the employees involved in operating the process to identify and understand the hazards posed by those processes involving highly hazardous chemicals. This process safety information shall include information pertaining to the hazards of the highly hazardous chemicals used or produced by the process, information pertaining to the technology of the process, and information pertaining to the equipment in the process:    29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3): Information pertaining to the equipment in the process:    29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(F): Design codes and standards employed;    a. Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, the ammonia refrigeration system design codes and standards employed for the 2000 brewery expansion project (Project 0104) were not documented, compiled and maintained for the Powerhouse ammonia refrigeration system portion of the expansion. The design codes and standards used in this project were not available for use in documenting refrigeration system compliance with RAGEGEP, in performing compliance audits and for activities associated with process hazard analysis.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Sep 19, 2016

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $6,000

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d): Process safety information. In accordance with the schedule set forth in paragraph (e)(1) of this section, the employer shall complete a compilation of written process safety information before conducting any process hazard analysis required by the standard. The compilation of written process safety information is to enable the employer and the employees involved in operating the process to identify and understand the hazards posed by those processes involving highly hazardous chemicals. This process safety information shall include information pertaining to the hazards of the highly hazardous chemicals used or produced by the process, information pertaining to the technology of the process, and information pertaining to the equipment in the process:    29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3): Information pertaining to the equipment in the process:    29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(ii): The employer shall document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices.    Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, the employer had not documented equipment compliance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP):      a. For the Powerhouse ammonia refrigeration system equipment, the employer had not installed systems and equipment to comply with RAGAGEP that protect employees from ammonia exposure and prevent the accumulation of explosive concentrations of ammonia vapor in the event of a catastrophic event. RAGAGEP compliant systems and equipment for this purpose, include, an ammonia detection system that is alarmed and initiates mechanical ventilation system(s) to an appropriate protective level, remote emergency ammonia refrigeration system shutdown at locations proximate to exit doors and continuous emergency level mechanical ventilation that is alarmed when turned off or in the event of failure.       b. For the Powerhouse mechanical ventilation system, the employer had not documented the rate that exhaust ventilation was capable of removing accumulations of ammonia vapor (from leaks or rupture of the system) from the Powerhouse compliant with RAGAGEP.      An applicable RAGAGEP at the time of the 2000 Brewery expansion project for the ammonia refrigeration system includes, but is not limited to ASHRAE 15-1994, Safety Code for Mechanical Ventilation.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Mar 13, 2017

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $5,000

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.307(c): Electrical installations. Equipment, wiring methods, and installations of equipment in hazardous (classified) locations shall be intrinsically safe, approved for the hazardous (classified) location, or safe for the hazardous (classified) location. Requirements for each of these options are as follows:    a. Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, electrical equipment installed in the ammonia refrigeration system Powerhouse was not rated for a hazardous location.  Due to the lack of either an alarmed continuously operated mechanical ventilation system (at the emergency rate) or an alarmed ammonia detection system to automatically actuate emergency level ventilation, the Powerhouse is designated as a Class 1 Division 2 location. Due to this condition, in the event of an ammonia leak or catastrophic release, unclassified electrical equipment is an ignition source and poses an increased risk for explosion of ammonia vapor.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Sep 19, 2016

Penalty

Initial $5,500 · Current $2,300 Reduced

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d): Process safety information. In accordance with the schedule set forth in paragraph (e)(1) of this section, the employer shall complete a compilation of written process safety information before conducting any process hazard analysis required by the standard. The compilation of written process safety information is to enable the employer and the employees involved in operating the process to identify and understand the hazards posed by those processes involving highly hazardous chemicals. This process safety information shall include information pertaining to the hazards of the highly hazardous chemicals used or produced by the process, information pertaining to the technology of the process, and information pertaining to the equipment in the process:    29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i): Information pertaining to the equipment in the process shall include:    29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(H): Safety systems (e.g. interlocks, detection or suppression systems):    a. Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, the employer had not documented, compiled and maintained process safety information regarding the safety systems used in the ammonia refrigeration system to prevent ammonia release, leaks and covered process equipment loss of containment. Safety systems utilized in the ammonia refrigeration covered process include the automatics that involve components such as, instrumentation, valves, control devices, software, control/operating system hardware and electronic switches.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Mar 13, 2017

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $5,000

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1): Operating procedures. The employer shall develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall address at least the following elements:    29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(iv): Safety systems and their functions:    Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, the employer had not documented and included safety systems and their functions in the following operating procedures:      a. Operating procedure SOP 4.1, Alarm Response, does not adequately address safety systems. The information on alarms does not include any additional safety systems, such as automatics, and compressor shutdowns. Additionally in SOP 4.1 Tab H. an ammonia compressor number 6 alarm 5th floor regenerator shutdown alarm is mentioned but function is not adequately described and in Tab M the       b. Operating procedure SOP 5.1, Emergency Shutdown of Equipment, does not address safety systems beyond the inclusion the emergency stop for compressor shutdown. This procedure is intended for isolating equipment during malfunction or major ammonia leaks, but does not address safety systems and their function.      c. Operating procedure SOP 5.4, Screw Compressor Operation, does not address any safety systems, such as any compressor automatics which include, but are not limited to, high discharge pressure shutdown.      d. Operating procedure SOP 5.5, Clark Compressor Operation, does not adequately address safety systems and their function. A low oil pressure cutoff switch is the only safety system mentioned and the function of that system is not adequately addressed.      e. Operating procedure SOP 5.17, Operator Response to Extended Plant Power Outage, does not adequately address safety systems, safety system functions and lacks specificity. The procedure does not address all safety systems such as those to control liquid ammonia carryover from suction traps, lacks specificity when discussing relief valve settings (such as identifying a device to a setting, i.e. provide a location) and discussing a specific relief valve setting without providing the pressure setpoint.    f. Operating procedure SOP 4.0, Normal Operations, does not adequately address safety systems and their function for each type of ammonia refrigeration equipment in the procedure, in that all safety systems are not addressed. Safety systems not addressed include, but is not limited to, the controls for protecting against liquid carryover into compressors (from suction trap liquid ammonia high levels.) Additionally the procedures lack specificity, such as not addressing the function of anti-recycle timers in Appendix 1 and not specifying which load units have automatics for temperature valve closure with high level indication in SOP 4.0, Normal Operations, appendix 4.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Nov 10, 2016

Penalty

Initial $5,500 · Current $2,300 Reduced

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3): Process hazard analysis. The process hazard analysis shall address:    29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(i): The hazards of the process;    Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, ammonia refrigeration process hazards were not addressed during process hazard analysis (PHA), such as, but not limited to:      a. For the 1993 PHA, items 7.1 ? 7.4 related to Ammonia Liquid Pumps 28-200-1 and 28-200-2 did not adequately address ammonia release hazards associated with liquid ammonia carryover.      b. For the 1993 PHA, item 9.1 related to the four inch equalization line between suction traps did not adequately address ammonia release hazards associated with liquid ammonia carryover.      c. For the 1993 PHA, item 14.6 related Compressor oil lubrication systems did not adequately address ammonia release hazards associated with water infiltration.      d. For the 1993 PHA, items 28.1 and 28.2 related to Knock-Out Drum protections did not adequately address ammonia release hazards associated with liquid ammonia carryover.      e. For the 1993 PHA, item 39.1 related to tube leaks in the Carbon Dioxide condenser system during pump out activities did not adequately address ammonia release hazards associated with carbon dioxide contamination of ammonia refrigerant.      f. For the 1993 PHA, item 46 related to Frick Compressor 28-203-6 and piping line AMS-800 does not adequately address the hazards related to ammonia release. The item does not consider ammonia release scenarios arising from deviations such as, but not limited to, ammonia contamination, high pressure, component failure and liquid ammonia carryover.      g. For the 1993 PHA, item 49.4 related to Glycol Cooler 28-402-3 does not adequately address the hazards related to ammonia release associated with ammonia refrigerant contamination. The item does not adequately address the introduction of glycol, water and other contaminants from the glycol stream with the associated hazards.      h. For the 1993 PHA, item 55.2 related to the Kathene Heat Exchanger 21-300-5 does not address the hazards associated with ammonia contamination with Kathene.      i. For the 2000 PHA, item 101.2 related to the New Ammonia Suction Trap 28-200-003 for the listed deviation of ?more flow to suction trap? does not adequately address the ammonia release hazards associated with liquid carryover to compressors as a result of high levels in the suction trap. The item has nothing listed for ?consequence? in the report.      j. For the 2000 PHA, item 101.4 related to the New Ammonia Suction Trap 28-200-003 for the listed deviation cause of an open pressure relief valve does not adequately address the ammonia release hazard associated with an open valve to the atmosphere or refrigeration system.      k. For the 2000 PHA, item 101.7 related to the New Ammonia Suction Trap 28-200-003 for the listed deviation of ?other than flow to suction trap? does not address the ammonia release hazard associated with liquid carryover to compressors as a result of high liquid levels in the suction trap. The item lists ?loss of cooling capacity? for ?consequence? in the report.      l. For the 2000 PHA, item 102.1 related to the New Ammonia Suction Trap 28-200-003 for the listed deviation of ?No ?liquid? flow out of suction trap? does not adequately address the ammonia release hazard associated with liquid carryover to compressors as a result of high liquid levels in the suction trap.      m. For the 2000 PHA, items 102.1 and 102.3 related to the New Ammonia Suction Trap 28-200-003 for the listed deviations of ?No gas flow out of suction trap? and ?less flow out of suction trap? do not adequately address the ammonia release hazards associated to pressure buildup in and out of the vessel through other openings.      n. For the 2000 PHA, item 102.4 related to the failed open condition for the New Ammonia Suction Trap pressure relief valve PSV-07-7602 does not address hazards associated with air/moisture infiltration and/or incorrect flow in system.      o. For the 2000 PHA, item 102.6 related to reversed flow into the New Ammonia Suction Trap 28-200-003 does not adequately address the hazards associated with liquid flow into the trap and subsequent liquid ammonia carryover to compressors.      p. For the 2000 PHA, items 105.1 and 105.3 related to no flow and less flow into the Ammonia Thermosiphon Receiver 28-208-001 do not address the ammonia release hazards associated with high temperature damage to compressors.      q. For the 2000 PHA, items 106.1 and 106.3 related to no flow and less flow out of the Ammonia Thermosiphon Receiver 29-208-001 do not address the ammonia release hazards associated with high temperature damage to compressors.      r. For the 2000 PHA, items 109.1 and 109.3 related to no ammonia flow and less ammonia flow into Evaporative Ammonia Condensers 28-205-012A, B, C and D do not adequately address the ammonia release hazards associated with high discharge pressure.      s. For the 2000 PHA, items 110.1 and 110.3 related to no ammonia flow and less ammonia flow out of the Evaporative Ammonia Condensers 28-205-012A, B, C and D do not adequately address the ammonia release hazards associated with high discharge pressure.      t. For the 2000 PHA, item 113.1 did not adequately address the ammonia release hazard in that the failure of Ammonia Thermosiphon Liquid Transfer Pumps 28-202-005 and 006 was not considered. Ammonia release hazards include high temperature compressor failure which could be caused from Thermosiphon pump failure and the subsequent loss of cooling.      u. For the 2000 PHA, item 116.4 related to tube failure in the New Adjusted Water Precoolers 28-530-001 and 002 did not address ammonia release hazards associated with water infiltration into ammonia refrigerant.      v. For the 2000 PHA, item 119.2 related to more liquid flow into transfer pumps and suction traps for the Existing Liquid Transfer Pumps 28-202-001, 002, 003, 004 and the Suction Traps 28-200-001 and 002 does not identify and adequately address the ammonia release hazard associated with high liquid levels in suction traps and liquid carryover to compressors.      w. For the 2000 PHA, items 200.2 and 200.7 related to ?more ammonia flow in? and ?other than ammonia vapor to suction? related to the Cascade Suction Trap 28-416-001 do not identify and address ammonia release hazards associated with liquid carryover to compressors. Item 200.2 simply states ?ammonia trap designed to handle capacity,? while item 200.7 lists ?N/A.?      x. For the 2000 PHA, item 201.4 related to an open pressure relief valve for the Cascade Suction Trap 28-416-001 does not address the hazard of ammonia release due to  infiltration of contaminants or incorrect, unintended flow into the vessel.      y. For the 2000 PHA, items 202.1 and 202.6 related to the Cascade Liquid Transfer Vessels 28-414-001 and 002 have consequences listed as ?unable to transfer liquid ammonia from suction trap? and ?unable to drain liquid ammonia from suction trap to transfer vessel.? Neither item addresses the ammonia release hazard associated with liquid ammonia carryover to compressors for the PHA item consequence.      z. For the 2000 PHA, items 203.1, 203.3 and 203.6 related to Cascade Liquid Transfer Vessels 28-414-001 and 002 do not adequately address the ammonia release hazard associated with liquid ammonia carryover to compressors. All three items involve a reduction in flow, or stoppage of flow, out of the transfer vessel which would result in high levels of liquid ammonia in the associated suction trap and cause liquid carryover through the suction outlet.      aa. For the 2000 PHA, item 204.7 related to ?other than ammonia vapor to suction? for the New Cascade Ammonia Compressors 28-414-001 and 002 does not address the ammonia release hazard from the condition of liquid ammonia carryover, or from other ?noncondensible? contamination of ammonia. The only PHA work product information for this item deviation states ?N/A.?      bb. For the 2000 PHA, items 205.1 and 205.3 related to ?no ammonia flow out? and ?less ammonia flow out? for the New Cascade Ammonia Compressors 28-414-001 and 002 do not address the ammonia release hazard from increasing temperature and pressure related to operating an ammonia compressor with a stopped, blocked or limited outlet flow.      cc. For the 2000 PHA, items 205.4 and 205.7 related to ?ammonia flow as well as? and ?other than ammonia in feed lines? for the New Cascade Ammonia Compressors 28-414-001 and 002 do not address potential ammonia release hazards associated with contaminated ammonia.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Nov 10, 2016

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3): Process hazard analysis. The process hazard analysis shall address:    29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(iii): Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases. (Acceptable detection methods might include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarms, and detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors.);    Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, ammonia refrigeration process engineering and administrative controls applicable to the process hazards were not addressed during process hazard analysis (PHA), such as, but not limited to:      a. For the 1993 PHA, item 12.3 related to Ammonia Compressor 28-203-1 did not address any engineering and/or administrative controls associated with high temperature.      b. For the 1993 PHA, item 32.1 related to pressure relief line piping for receivers did not address and identify any engineering controls associated with "leak detection,? such as rupture disk installation along with detection or pressure sensing instrumentation.      c. For the 1993 PHA, item 41.4 related to Booster Compressor 28-414-1 with the deviation noted as ?loss of containment? did not address and identify any potential engineering controls associated with ammonia leak detection systems.      d. For the 1993 PHA, item 46 related to Frick Compressor 28-203-6 and piping line AMS-800 does not adequately address engineering and administrative controls for the hazards related to ammonia release. The item does not consider existing engineering controls such as, but not limited to, temperature and pressure instrumentation, ?automatics,? existing administrative tools such as operator monitoring of the computerized controls system, or potential engineering controls such as ammonia detection systems.      e. For the 2000 PHA, item 101.2 related to the New Ammonia Suction Trap 28-200-003 with the listed deviation of ?more flow to suction trap? does not address the engineering controls and administrative controls for the hazards related to ammonia release. The item does not contain, or consider engineering and administrative controls to protect against liquid carryover into compressors due to high levels in this suction trap.      f. For the 2000 PHA, item 101.7 related to the New Ammonia Suction Trap 28-200-003 for the listed deviation of ?other than flow to suction trap? does not address the ammonia release hazard prevention controls, such as but not limited to, shutdown due to operator system monitoring.      g. For the 2000 PHA, items 102.1 and 102.3 related to the New Ammonia Suction Trap 28-200-003 for the listed deviations of ?No gas flow out of suction trap? and ?less flow out of suction trap? do not address any engineering or administrative controls to prevent pressure buildup, pressure relief valve opening, potential backpressure effects and any ammonia release hazards associated with these potential conditions.      h. For the 2000 PHA, item 102.6 related to reversed flow into the New Ammonia Suction Trap 28-200-003 does not address engineering controls to prevent liquid carryover to compressors.      i. For the 2000 PHA, items 106.1 and 106.3 related to no flow and less flow out of the Ammonia Thermosiphon Receiver 29-208-001 do not address and identify engineering controls to prevent high temperature damage to compressors.      j. For the 2000 PHA, items 109.1, 109.3, 110.1 and 110.3 related to limited or stopped ammonia flow into or out of Evaporative Ammonia Condensers 28-25-012A, B, C and D do not adequately address and identify the administrative controls for operator monitoring of the system and related operator actions to correct monitored system parameters.      k. For the 2000 PHA, item 119.2 related to more liquid flow into transfer pumps and suction traps for the Existing Liquid Transfer Pumps 28-202-001, 002, 003, 004 and the Suction Traps 28-200-001 and 002 does not address and identify engineering controls related to preventing liquid ammonia carryover into compressors.      l. For the 2000 PHA, items 200.2 and 200.7 related to ?more ammonia flow in? and ?other than ammonia vapor to suction? related to the Cascade Suction Trap 28-416-001 does not address administrative and engineering controls to prevent ammonia release hazards associated with liquid carryover to compressors.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Nov 10, 2016

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3): Process hazard analysis. The process hazard analysis shall address:    29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(iv): Consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls;    Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: As of and prior to February 4, 2014, ammonia refrigeration process hazards were not addressed during process hazard analysis (PHA), such as, but not limited to:      a. For the 1993 PHA, items 7.1 and 7.2 related to Ammonia Liquid Pumps 28-200-1 and 28-200-2 failed to evaluate and address the failure of administrative and engineering controls, such as suction trap high level alarms.      b. For the 1993 PHA, items 13.1 ? 13.3 related Compressor Discharge Drum 28-203-1 and Lines AMD 6270 and 6277 did not adequately evaluate and address the failure of engineering controls, including the ?automatics,? or high pressure compressor shutdown and pressure relief valve protection for the compressor.      c. For the 1993 PHA, items 14.1 ? 14.4 related to Ammonia Compressor lubrication oil systems did not adequately evaluate and address the failure of engineering controls, including ?automatics? associated with compressor shutdown, such as high lube oil temperature shutdown.      d. For the 1993 PHA, items 15.1 - 15.4 related to cooling water lines for Ammonia Compressors and Ammonia Compressor lube oil coolers did not evaluate and address the failure of engineering and administrative controls, such as high temperature (discharge) shutdown, high lube oil temperature shutdown and monitoring of cooling water temperature by operators.      e. For the 1993 PHA, items 28.1 ? 28.2 related to Knock-Out Drum 28-212-1 used to protect the Pump-Out Compressor did not evaluate and address the failure of engineering controls, including ?automatics? associated with compressor shutdown, such as high pressure shutdown and high level shutdown.      f. For the 1993 PHA, items 38.1 ? 38.3 related to Condenser 28-407-1, piping line AML-6335 and piping line AMV-6536 did not evaluate and address the failure of engineering controls, such as such as but not limited to, suction trap high level alarms and the high level suction trap ?automatic.?      g. For the 1993 PHA, items 40.1 and 40.2 related to piping line AMS-6334, the ¾? AME piping line and the Booster Suction Trap 28-416-1 does not evaluate and address the failure of engineering controls, such as such as but not limited to, suction trap high level alarms and the high level suction trap ?automatic.?      h. For the 1993 PHA, item 46 related to Frick Compressor #6 does not evaluate and address the failure of administrative and engineering controls, such as but not limited to temperature and pressure instrumentation, cooling system failure, operator control of compressor loading and the various ?automatics? utilized for compressor shutdown.      i. For the 1993 PHA, item 47 related to the Frick Compressor #6 lubrication oil system does not evaluate and address the failure of administrative and engineering controls, such as but not limited to temperature and pressure instrumentation, operator control of compressor loading and the ?automatics? utilized for compressor shutdown.      j. For the 2000 PHA, item 101.2 related to the New Ammonia Suction Trap 28-200-003 with the listed deviation of ?more flow to suction trap? does not evaluate and address the failure of engineering controls and administrative controls for the hazards related to ammonia release. The item does not consider the failure of engineering and administrative controls, such as but not limited to the high level alarm and operator monitoring of the high level alarm, for this equipment.      k. For the 2000 PHA, item 101.7 related to the New Ammonia Suction Trap 28-200-003 for the listed deviation of ?other than flow to suction trap? does not evaluate and address the failure of engineering controls, such as but not limited to, high level alarm instrumentation.      l. For the 2000 PHA, item 102.1 related to the New Ammonia Suction Trap 28-200-003 for the listed deviation of ?No liquid flow out of suction trap? does not evaluate and address the failure of engineering controls, such as but not limited to, high level alarm instrumentation.       m. For the 2000 PHA, item 102.6 related to reversed flow into the New Ammonia Suction Trap 28-200-003 does not evaluate and address the failure of administrative and engineering controls to prevent liquid carryover to compressors.      n. For the 2000 PHA, items 103.1 and 103.3 related to no ammonia flow and less flow into the High Stage Ammonia Compressors 28-203-007 and 28-203-008 does not evaluate and address the failure of the engineering controls to alarm and perform low suction pressure shutdown.      o. For the 2000 PHA, items 104.1 and 104.3 related to no flow out and less flow out of the High Stage Ammonia Compressors 28-203-007 and 28-203-008 does not address the failure of the engineering controls to alarm and perform compressor shutdown.      p. For the 2000 PHA, items 106.1 and 106.3 related to no flow and less flow out of the Ammonia Thermosiphon Receiver 29-208-001 do not evaluate and address the failure of administrative and engineering controls used to prevent high temperature damage to compressors.      q. For the 2000 PHA, items 115.1 and 115.2 related to the New Adjusted Water Precoolers 28-530-001 and 002 do not evaluate and address the failure of engineering controls such as temperature instrumentation, level transmitters and automatic valve controls and the administrative control of operator monitoring related corrective actions.      r. For the 2000 PHA, item 119.2 related to more liquid flow into transfer pumps and suction traps for the Existing Liquid Transfer Pumps 28-202-001, 002, 003, 004 and the Suction Traps 28-200-001 and 002 does not evaluate and address the failure of administrative and engineering controls related to preventing liquid ammonia carryover into compressors, such as but not limited to high level alarms and operator monitoring.      s. For the 2000 PHA, items 200.2 and 200.7 related to ?more ammonia flow in? and ?other than ammonia vapor to suction? related to the Cascade Suction Trap 28-416-001 do not evaluate and address the failure of existing administrative and engineering controls used to prevent ammonia release hazards associated with liquid carryover to compressors.      t. For the 2000 PHA, item 201.1 related to the listed deviation of ?No liquid flow out of trap, no gas flow out of trap? for the Cascade Suction Trap 28-416-001 does not evaluate and address the failure of existing engineering controls, such as, but not limited to, high level alarms and compressor ?automatics?/shutdown for low pressure.      u. For the 2000 PHA, item 201.4 does not evaluate and address the failure of engineering controls for the Cascade Suction Trap 28-416-001, specifically for Pressure Relief Valve PRV 07-7635 failing open. The employer did not identify a monitored rupture disk installation upstream of the pressure relief valve which could be used to identify this type of control failure.      v. For the 2000 PHA, items 202.1 and 202.6 related to the Cascade Liquid Transfer Vessels 28-414-001 and 002 list as consequences ?unable to transfer liquid ammonia from suction trap? and ?unable to drain liquid ammonia from suction trap to transfer vessel? but do not evaluate and address the failure of existing engineering and administrative controls. Existing engineering and administrative controls used to prevent ammonia release due to liquid ammonia carryover to compressors include high level suction trap alarms and operator monitoring.      w. For the 2000 PHA, items 203.1, 203.3 and 203.6 related to Cascade Liquid Transfer Vessels 28-414-001 and 002 do not adequately evaluate and address the failure of engineering and administrative controls to prevent ammonia release associated with liquid ammonia carryover compressor damage. All three items involve a reduction in flow, or stoppage of flow, out of the transfer vessel which would result in high levels of liquid ammonia in the associated suction trap and cause liquid carryover through the suction outlet of the suction trap.      x. For the 2000 PHA, item 204.1 related to no ammonia flow into the New Cascade Ammonia Compressors 28-414-001 and 002 does not adequately evaluate and address the failure of engineering controls, specifically the low suction pressure shutdown for the compressors. The failure of this engineering control is only addressed by a PHA recommendation related to the initial startup operation of the pressure switch. The item does not address any mechanical integrity inspection, checks, calibration and tests to assure function on an ongoing basis, any evaluation related to the reliability or fail safe nature of the components comprising the low pressure shutdown, consider the application of other controls to monitor this control, or redundantly protect against the same condition, or a safety instrumented system evaluation for RAGAGEP compliance to protect against, or prevent, failure of this engineering control.      y. For the 2000 PHA, item 204.2 related to more ammonia flow into the New Cascade Ammonia Compressors 28-414-001 and 002 does not adequately evaluate and address the failure of engineering controls, particularly overpressure protection. The failure of overpressure devices is only addressed by a PHA recommendation to insure that ?PRVs and burst discs operate properly at startup.? The item does not address any review of process safety information to assure proper sizing of pressure relief valves, rupture disc protection, piping and structural support for the overpressure protection system; any monitoring equipment for the overpressure protection system and any mechanical integrity programs that could be used, or those that are in place, to protect against, or prevent, failure of this engineering control.      z. For the 2000 PHA, items 205.1 and 205.3 related to ?no ammonia flow out? and ?less ammonia flow out? for the New Cascade Ammonia Compressors 28-414-001 and 002 do not evaluate and address the failure of engineering controls. Existing engineering controls include pressure sensors, temperature sensors, alarms, ?automatics? (or shutdowns) and overpressure protection. The item does not address any mechanical integrity programs for instruments, devices and relief valves; does not address evaluating process safety information for reliability and adequate design of equipment; and does not address the appropriate location of installed equipment, such as sensors, in the event of closed or blocked flow, to protect against, or prevent, the failure of compressor system engineering controls.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

May 10, 2016

Penalty

Initial $3,300 · Current $2,300 Reduced

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3): Process hazard analysis. The process hazard analysis shall address:    29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(v): Facility siting;    a. Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, for the employers ammonia refrigeration process, facility siting was not addressed during process hazard analysis (PHA), including, the 1993 initial PHA, the 2000 PHA associated with the brewery expansion, and both subsequent revalidations (2005, 2009.)

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

May 10, 2016

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3): Process hazard analysis. The process hazard analysis shall address:    29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(vi): Human factors;    Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, for the employer?s ammonia refrigeration process, human factors were not addressed during process hazard analysis (PHA), including, but not limited to:      a. For the 1993 PHA, items 35.1 and 35.2 related to ammonia transfer into the Cascade system did not address human factors related to valve alignment.      b. For the 1993 PHA, item 36.1 related to surge capacity for the Carbon Dioxide system did not address human factors related to human observation of instrumentation.      c. For the 1993 PHA, item 47 related to the Frick Compressor, lube oil lines, pump and piping line AML-805 did not address human factors such as installation of an incorrect filter.      d. For the 2000 PHA, six items related to ?Displays/Controls? did not adequately address human factors. Items 1.1 ?Hard to Read/understand/interpret,? 1.11 ?Control/inaccessible,? 1.12 ?Display does not show device,? 1.13 ?Alarms confusing, irrelevant,? 1.14 ?Display is not representational? and 1.15 ?no immediate feedback? had no analytical information, work products or other demonstration that these elements were considered in the process hazard analysis.      e. For the 2000 PHA, four items related to ?Equipment? did not adequately address human factors. Items 1.2 ?Not labeled or mislabeled,? 1.21 ?Not easily accessed,? 1.22 ?Difficult to operate/change position? and 1.23 ?Several components look similar? had no analytical information, work products or other demonstration that these elements were considered in the process hazard analysis.      f. For the 2000 PHA, five items related to ?Procedures? did not adequately address human factors. Items 1.3 ?Unrealistic; not the way things are done,? 1.31 ?Not location of devices/action provided,?  1.32 ?Results in inappropriate diagnosis,? 1.33 ?confused, difficult to read,? and 1.34 ?Missing step in the procedure or wrong sequence? had no analytical information, work products or other demonstration that these elements were considered in the process hazard analysis.      g. For the 2000 PHA, four items related to ?Competence? did not adequately address human factors. Items 1.4 ?Operators not well trained in related procedures,? 1.41 ?Operators are novices,? 1.42 ?No peer review in certification? and 1.43 ?No feedback? had no analytical information, work products or other demonstration that these elements were considered in the process hazard analysis.      h. For the 2000 PHA, six items related to ?Stress? did not adequately address human factors. Items 1.5 ?Too little time available to complete action,? 1.51 ?Shift changes often occur in the middle of the week; double shifts often occur,? 1.52 ?Staff needed or some shifts are intentionally short-staffed,? 1.53 ?Operators are concerned about loss of production if plant inadvertently shut down for safety issue,? 1.54 ?Accountabilities are poorly defined? and 1.55 ?Operator must conduct diverse operations within same time period? had no analytical information, work products or other demonstration that these elements were considered in the process hazard analysis.      i. For the 2000 PHA, six items related to ?Environment/Workplace? did not adequately address human factors. Items 1.6 ?Inadequate lighting,? 1.61 ?High noise level,? 1.62 ?Extreme weather conditions,? 1.63 ?Extreme temperature/humidity,? 1.64 ?High vibration environment,? and 1.65 ?No memory support? had no analytical information, work products or other demonstration that these elements were considered in the process hazard analysis.      j. For the 2000 PHA, the human factors of ?fatigue? and ?error,? such as valve misalignment, were not considered. The human factors of ?fatigue? and ?error? are commonly included human factors and can lead to or increase the risk for ammonia release from ammonia refrigeration systems.      k. For the 2000 PHA specific to the 45# suction system, five items related to ?Procedures? did not adequately address human factors. Items 130.3 ?Unrealistic; not the way things are done,? 130.31 ?Not location of devices/action provided,?  130.32 ?Results in inappropriate diagnosis,? 130.33 ?confused, difficult to read,? and 130.34 ?Missing step in the procedure or wrong sequence? had no analytical information, work products or other demonstration that these elements were considered in the process hazard analysis.      l. For the 2000 PHA specific to the 45# suction system, five items related to ?Stress? did not adequately address human factors. Items 130.5 ?Too little time available to complete action,? 130.52 ?Staff needed or some shifts are intentionally short-staffed,? 130.53 ?Operators are concerned about loss of production if plant inadvertently shut down for safety issue? and 130.54 ?Accountabilities are poorly defined? had no analytical information, work products or other demonstration that these elements were considered in the process hazard analysis. Item 130.55 ?Operator must conduct diverse operations within same time period? lists ?prioritization of tasks? as the only information for the item which does not demonstrate any analysis consideration for process hazards.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Mar 13, 2017

Penalty

Initial $5,500 · Current $5,000 Reduced

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1): Operating procedures. The employer shall develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall address at least the following elements:    29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i): Steps for each operating phase:    29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i)(D): Emergency shutdown including the conditions under which emergency shutdown is required, and the assignment of shutdown responsibility to qualified operators to ensure that emergency shutdown is executed in a safe and timely manner:    Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, the employers SOP 5.1 Emergency Equipment Shutdown and SOP 5.17 Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage were not developed, documented and implemented as adequate written operating procedures for emergency shutdown, in that:      a. SOP 5.1 Emergency Equipment Shutdown fails specify the conditions under which the emergency shutdown of the system is required,      b. SOP 5.17 Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage lacks specificity as the length of power outage that would initiate emergency shutdown of the system,      c. SOP 5.1 Emergency Equipment Shutdown is inadequate as the SOP does not address shutdown of the entire system, is intended isolation of individual pieces of equipment and does not address sequence of equipment shutdown if modified for use as an emergency shutdown procedure for the entire ammonia refrigeration system.      d. SOP 5.17 Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage is inadequate as the SOP does not address shutdown of the entire system, having only addressed receivers and compressors. The procedure instructs closing king valves, closing Cascade receiver liquid supply valves, changing suction pressure control settings for compressors and closing compressor discharge valves.      e. SOP 5.1 Emergency Equipment Shutdown and SOP 5.17 Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage fail to provide clear instructions regarding the assignment of ammonia refrigeration system shutdown responsibilities to qualified operators.      f. SOP 5.1 Emergency Equipment Shutdown and SOP 5.17 Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage fail to adequately address the increase in temperature and pressure inherent to the lack of intended ammonia circulation in a closed system. System overpressure and equipment failure due to pressure and temperature increase from the inherent properties of ammonia and the routing of relief protection device back into this closed system increase the risk of system overpressure, equipment failure and ammonia release into the Powerhouse.      g. SOP 5.17 Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage lacks specificity and detail, in that step 3 Isolate high-pressure side of ammonia refrigeration system from low-pressure side of system does not provide any detail for the actions necessary to accomplish this isolation.      h. SOP 5.1 Emergency Equipment Shutdown and SOP 5.17 Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage fail to address removal of ammonia from the system.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Mar 13, 2017

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1): Operating procedures. The employer shall develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall address at least the following elements:    29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i): Steps for each operating phase:    29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i)(F): Normal shutdown;     a. Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, the employer did not have written operating procedures for normal shutdown.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Mar 13, 2017

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1): Operating procedures. The employer shall develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall address at least the following elements:    29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i): Steps for each operating phase:    29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i)(G): Startup following a turnaround, or after an emergency shutdown:    Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, the employer had not developed, documented and implemented adequate written operating procedures for startup following an emergency shutdown, in that:      a. The startup procedure contained in SOP 5.17 Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage does not address the evaluation of ammonia refrigeration equipment for safe operation prior to the initiation of startup.      b. The startup procedure contained in SOP 5.17 Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage does not address any equipment with known failures that occurred during the period of emergency shutdown or as a result of the shutdown initiating event(s).      c. The startup procedure contained in SOP 5.17 Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage does not address ammonia system refrigerant quantities, identifying and evaluating the location of ammonia in the system, the need for reintroduction of ammonia into the system prior to the initiation of startup.      d. The startup procedure contained in SOP 5.17 Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage does not address the Cascade system.      e. The startup procedure contained in SOP 5.17 Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage is inadequate, in that the Check Status of Ammonia Condensing System section of the procedure lacks specificity. The procedure written instructions for Restore operation of condensing equipment and Verify that all necessary condensing equipment is operational before starting compressors are made without any operational steps to provide guidance on valve positioning, quantity of equipment to be utilized, sequencing for the restoration and any monitoring necessary for parameter values (such as pressure, temperature, or flow rate) related to condensing related equipment being restored to operation.      f. The startup procedure contained in SOP 5.17 Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage does not address the operating system, operating system controls and safety systems for availability, damage or adjustments necessary to reflect current conditions.      g. The startup procedure contained in SOP 5.17 Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage in the Restore Ammonia Compressor Operation section does not address the number of compressors to start, define the condensing capability necessary  for compressor startup and any potential adjustments to compressor control parameters necessary for the initial compressor returned to operation.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Mar 13, 2017

Penalty

Initial $5,500 · Current $5,000 Reduced

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1): Operating procedures. The employer shall develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall address at least the following elements:    29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(ii): Operating limits:    29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(ii)(A): Consequences of deviation;    Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, the employer had not developed operating procedures that contained the consequences of deviation for the following operating procedures:      a. SOP 4.1 ?Alarm Response? (Tab A Cascade Ammonia Suction Trap High Level Alarm) does not address the consequences of deviation for high levels of liquid ammonia in the Cascade Suction Trap which can lead to liquid carryover to compressors and ammonia release to the Powerhouse.      b. SOP 4.1 ?Alarm Response? (Tab G Low Ammonia Suction Pressure Alarm) does not address the consequence of deviation for low suction pressure which can lead to ?freezing? equipment which can lead to equipment failure, such as tube or coil leaks, ammonia contamination with ?noncondensibles? and ammonia release.      c. SOP 4.1 ?Alarm Response? (Tab H High Ammonia Suction Pressure Alarm) does not address the consequence of deviation for high suction pressure which can lead to system overpressure and ammonia release.      d. SOP 4.1 ?Alarm Response? (Tab I 45# Suction Trap High Pressure Alarm) does not address the consequence of deviation for high pressure which can lead to system overpressure and ammonia release.      e. SOP 4.1 ?Alarm Response? (Tab K Ammonia Screw Compressor Alarm) does not address the consequences of deviation for high discharge temperature, low discharge temperature, high discharge pressure, low discharge pressure, excessive motor amperage draw, high oil temperature, low oil pressure and loss of cooling ammonia. These deviations include but are not limited to the consequence of system overpressure, compressor damage and subsequent ammonia release.      f. SOP 4.1 ?Alarm Response? (Tab L Ammonia Recip Compressors Pre-alarm) and SOP 4.1 ?Alarm Response? (Tab M Ammonia Recip Compressors Alarm) do not address the consequences of deviation that can result in ammonia release.      g. SOP 4.1 ?Alarm Response? (Tab N Lubricator Failure Alarm) does not address the consequences of deviation that can result in Clark compressor damage and ammonia release.      h. SOP 4.1 ?Alarm Response? (Tab R Evap Cond#12 Low Water Level Alarms) does not adequately address the consequences of deviation from low water level leading to the deviation of high discharge pressure, in that the consequence of overpressure and ammonia release is not addressed.      i. SOP 4.0 ?Monitoring Ammonia System Normal Operations? Appendix 1 Monitoring Refrigeration Status does not adequately address the consequences of deviation for low compressor suction pressure which can lead to ?freezing? equipment which can lead to equipment failure, such as tube or coil leaks, ammonia contamination with ?noncondensibles? and ammonia release.      j. SOP 4.0 ?Monitoring Ammonia System Normal Operations? Appendix 1 Monitoring Refrigeration Status does not adequately address the consequences of deviation for high compressor discharge pressure which can result in system overpressure conditions and ammonia release.      k. SOP 4.0 ?Monitoring Ammonia System Normal Operations? Appendix 1 Monitoring Refrigeration Status does not adequately address the consequences of deviation for loss of Purger operation which will cease the removal of ?noncondensibles? from the system and increase the potential for ammonia release.      l. SOP 4.0 ?Monitoring Ammonia System Normal Operations? Appendix 1 Monitoring Refrigeration Status does not adequately address the consequences of deviation for high screw compressor discharge temperature which can result in pressure increase, system overpressure and ammonia release.      m. SOP 4.0 ?Monitoring Ammonia System Normal Operations? Appendix 4 Typical Load Units does not adequately address consequences of deviation due to a lack of specificity. For the deviation of high liquid level the floodback deviation consequence is not specifically developed and addressed with details regarding equipment suffering floodback and the specific conditions the floodback would create that could increase potential for ammonia release.      n. SOP 4.0 ?Monitoring Ammonia System Normal Operations? Appendix 1 Monitoring Refrigeration Status does not address the consequences of deviation for high compressor suction pressure which can result in overpressure and ammonia release.      o. SOP 4.0 ?Monitoring Ammonia System Normal Operations? Appendix 1 Monitoring Refrigeration Status does not address the consequences of deviation for inability to operate pressure control valve PV 07-766A/S in diverting load to 30# system which can result in overpressure the 45# system and ammonia release.      p. SOP 4.0 ?Monitoring Ammonia System Normal Operations? Appendix 1 Monitoring Schoene Coolers does not address the consequences of deviation for low ammonia pressure which can lead to coil rupture and ammonia contamination, freezing of contaminant and ammonia release.      q. SOP 4.0 ?Monitoring Ammonia System Normal Operations? Appendix 6 Monitoring does not address consequences of deviation for Shell and Tube Condensers.      r. SOP 4.0 ?Monitoring Ammonia System Normal Operations? Appendix 9 Ammonia Purger System Operation does not address the consequences of deviation for the lack of ?frost? on the suction line or liquid level control valve outlet which indicates lack of ?noncondensibles? removal and increased potential for ammonia release.      s. SOP 4.0 ?Monitoring Ammonia System Normal Operations? Appendix 10 Cascade System does not address the consequences of deviation for high liquid ammonia level in the Cascade Suction Trap and Transfer Vessel which can lead to liquid carryover to compressors and ammonia release.      t. SOP 5.1 ?Emergency Shutdown of Equipment? Section EE Kathapac Coolers does not address the consequences of deviation for the backpressure control valve on work activities. In the event the valve cannot be closed, during work activities following pump out, employees would be at risk for ammonia exposure.      u. SOP 5.1 ?Emergency Shutdown of Equipment? Section HH Suction Trap does not address the consequences of deviation for ?running pumps dry? or sending ammonia gas to the pumps.       v. SOP 4.0 ?Monitoring Ammonia System Normal Operations? Appendix 9 Ammonia Purger System Operation does not address the consequences of deviation for high purger suction pressure which could lead to vessel or system overpressure, loss of ?noncondesible? removal and potential ammonia release.      w. SOP 5.17 ?Operator Response To Extended Plant Power Outage? Deactivate System section does not address consequences of deviation.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Sep 19, 2016

Penalty

Initial $27,500 · Current $7,000 Reduced

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d): Process safety information. In accordance with the schedule set forth in paragraph (e)(1) of this section, the employer shall complete a compilation of written process safety information before conducting any process hazard analysis required by the standard. The compilation of written process safety information is to enable the employer and the employees involved in operating the process to identify and understand the hazards posed by those processes involving highly hazardous chemicals. This process safety information shall include information pertaining to the hazards of the highly hazardous chemicals used or produced by the process, information pertaining to the technology of the process, and information pertaining to the equipment in the process:    29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i): Information pertaining to the equipment in the process shall include:    29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(D): Relief system design and design basis;    a. Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: As of and prior to February 4, 2014, the employer had not documented and compiled process safety information (PSI) for relief system design and design basis for the suction header (line 16374-E-10-AMS) relief system in a multiple relief scenario. For the multiple relief scenario, the employer had not documented, compiled and maintained design and design basis, such as but not limited to; the scenario, sizing information, and the associated calculations for the design;  to include backpressure effects/forces and the design requirements for structural supporting members for the header, relief device and any supporting piping.        Anheuser Busch, Inc. was previously cited for a violation of this occupational safety and health standard, which was contained in OSHA inspection number 312777618, citation number 1, item number 2 and was affirmed as a final order on July 7, 2011, with respect to a workplace located at Cartersville, Georgia.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Mar 10, 2018

Penalty

Initial $27,500 · Current $7,000 Reduced

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d): Process safety information. In accordance with the schedule set forth in paragraph (e)(1) of this section, the employer shall complete a compilation of written process safety information before conducting any process hazard analysis required by the standard. The compilation of written process safety information is to enable the employer and the employees involved in operating the process to identify and understand the hazards posed by those processes involving highly hazardous chemicals. This process safety information shall include information pertaining to the hazards of the highly hazardous chemicals used or produced by the process, information pertaining to the technology of the process, and information pertaining to the equipment in the process:    29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3): Information pertaining to the equipment in the process:    29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(E): Ventilation system design;    a. Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, the employer had not documented and compiled process safety information (PSI) for Powerhouse ventilation system design to assure adequate normal and emergency level ventilation for the ammonia refrigeration system.         Anheuser Busch, Inc. was previously cited for a violation of this occupational safety and health standard, which was contained in OSHA inspection number 312777618, citation number 1, item number 3 and was affirmed as a final order on July 7, 2011, with respect to a workplace located at Cartersville, Georgia.

Issued

Aug 1, 2014

Abate by

Mar 10, 2016

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

Hazardous substances 0170

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(j)(2): Mechanical integrity. Written procedures. The employer shall establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment:    a. Anheuser Busch, Inc., Columbus, Ohio brewery: On or about February 4, 2014, the employer had not documented and implemented written procedures for:          a. The compressor oil analysis program,      b. the corrosion coupon program, and      c. piping inspection procedures were inadequate: a specific retirement thickness was not included in the content.