OSHA Inspection: BAZE CHEMICAL, INC.

Issued

Apr 14, 2021

Abate by

May 10, 2021

Penalty

Initial $9,557 · Current $9,557

Hazardous substances 1190

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(5): The employer did not assure that Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) recommendations were resolved in a timely manner:  This violation occurred on or about October 16, 2020 and at times prior thereto in the alkoxylation unit where employees were exposed to fire and explosion hazards from  ethylene oxide and other flammable chemicals without ensuring 2015 PHA recommendations were resolved in a timely manner such as  but not limited to:   (a)  2015 PHA recommendation #1, install blind flange on open end of all drain valves (including at least GL-500-5; GL-600-9), (BAZE-0000899); (b)  2015 PHA recommendation #2, evaluate replacing P-500 with a lower capacity pump so as to avoid potential to activate rail car internal excess flow valve, (BAZE-0000900); (c) 2015 PHA recommendation #3, Interlock BV-500 to close when P-500 is not running. (A timer will be required when BV-500 is first opened to allow P-500 to be started; e.g., 60 seconds - TBC during commissioning, (BAZE-0000901). (d) 2015 PHA recommendation #4, amend procedure to include requirement to cool down ethylene oxide tanks prior to arrival of rail car, so that tank pressure can be lowered to expected rail car pressure and vapor space will still remain in the non-decomposable zone, (BAZE-0000902); (e) 2015 PHA recommendation #5, include requirement in procedures to set ethylene oxide tank padding pressure to at least 5 psi greater than decomposable/non-decomposable limit, (BAZE-0000903); (f) 2015 PHA recommendation #6, reset low pressure alarms on ethylene oxide storage tanks to plus 5 psig above decomposable zone, and LL pressure to plus 0 psig above decomposable zone. (This will keep storage tanks with safe level of nitrogen padding, and above rupture disc set point on reactors.), (BAZE-0000904); (g)  2015 PHA recommendation #7, evaluate adding interlock to stop P-100 on high-high level in T-100 when FRV-101 open (T-101 circulating), or in T-101 when FRV-100 open (T- 100 circulating. (Protects against inadvertent transfer from one tank to the other.), (BAZE-0000905); (h) 2015 PHA recommendation #8,  evaluate replacing P-100 with a magnetic drive (seal-less) pump, similar to P-500, P-600, (BAZE-0000906);  (i) 2015 PHA recommendation #9,  provide chart for minimum required total tank pressure vs. tank temperature in order to keep vapor space in safe region (i.e., nondecomposable). (Include chart in appropriate procedures.), (BAZE-0000907); (j) 2015 PHA recommendation #10,  provide catwalk with stairway access to top of tanks to allow for safe access and operation of valves; secondary egress will also be required (stair or ladder), (BAZE-0000908); (k) 2015 PHA recommendation #11, install a minimum flow line from discharge side of P-600 back to T-102 so that P-600 minimum flow is satisfied when there is no flow through mass transmitter to reactors, (BAZE-0000909); (l) 2015 PHA recommendation #13, revise operating procedures to include step to purge / blow hoses prior to connecting to process, to remove air/water/debris, (BAZE-0000911).

Issued

Apr 14, 2021

Abate by

May 10, 2021

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

Hazardous substances 1190

General-duty citation text

29 CFR  1910.119(e)(6):The employer did not update and revalidate by a team meeting the requirements in paragraph (e)(4) of this section, to assure that the process hazard analysis is consistent with the current process, at least every five (5) years after the completion of the initial process hazard analysis:   (a) On or about October 16, 2020 , and at times thereafter, the employer did not revalidate the process hazard analysis for the evaluation and control of the hazards involved in the process, exposing employees to inhalation, fire, and explosion hazards.

Issued

Apr 14, 2021

Abate by

May 10, 2021

Penalty

Initial $9,557 · Current $6,690 Reduced

Hazardous substances 1190

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(j)(4)(ii): The employer failed to ensure that mechanical integrity inspections and tests followed recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP).  The employer did not follow RAGAGEP, such as but not limited to National Board Inspection Code (NBIC) Part 2- Inspection (2015),  API Standard 653 (2009), Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction, Sections 6 and 12, API Standard 510 (2009), Pressure Vessel Code: In-service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration, Sections 5  and  6. and API 570 (2016), Piping Inspection Code: In-service Inspection, Rating, Testing,  Repair, and Alteration of Piping Systems, Sections 5 and 6  when pressure vessels and piping inspections were conducted that did not follow RAGAGEP. This condition exposed employees to the hazard(s) of ethylene oxide and isobutyryl chloride explosion and fire, overpressure, struck by ruptured vessel parts, toxic release, inhalation. The pressure vessel  and tank inspections did not follow RAGAGEP include at least the following:  (a) Reactor R-200 and all associated piping and instrumentation, the employer failed to conduct on-stream inspections, external inspection, thickness inspection, corrosion under insulation (CUI) inspection (i.e. nondestructive examinations, corrosion allowance, and thickness measurements)  in accordance with a written inspection procedure/plan NBIC Part 2 (2015), API 510 (2006) Section 5 and 6 and API 570 Section 5 and 6 (2016);  (b) Reactor R-600 and all associated piping and instrumentation; the employer failed to conduct failed to conduct  internal, on-stream inspections, external inspection, thickness inspection, corrosion under insulation (CUI) inspection (i.e. nondestructive examinations, corrosion allowance, and thickness measurements)  in accordance with a written inspection procedure/plan  NBIC Part 2 (2015), API 510 (2006) Section 5 and 6 and API 570 Section 5 and 6 (2016);  (c) Reactor R-700 and all associated piping and instrumentation; the employer failed to conduct failed to conduct  internal, on-stream inspections, external inspection, thickness inspection, corrosion under insulation (CUI) inspection (i.e. nondestructive examinations, corrosion allowance, and thickness measurements)  in accordance with a written inspection procedure/plan  NBIC Part 2 (2015), API 510 (2006) Section 5 and 6 and API 570 Section 5 and 6 (2016);  (d) Ethylene oxide storage tank T-100 and all piping and instrumentation; the employer failed to conduct external  and internal inspections an  in accordance with a written inspection procedure/plan NBIC Part 2 (2015),  API 653 (2006) Section 6 and 12;   (e) Ethylene oxide storage tank T-101 and piping and instrumentation; the employer failed to conduct external  and internal inspections an  in accordance with a written inspection procedure/plan NBIC Part 2 (2015),  API 653 (2006) Section 6 and 12;   (f) Benko Steam Hot Box Model S24 (hotbox) and all piping and instrumentation; the employer failed to conduct on-stream inspections, external inspection, thickness inspection, corrosion under insulation (CUI) inspection (i.e. nondestructive examinations, corrosion allowance, and thickness measurements)  in accordance with a written inspection procedure/plan NBIC Part 2 (2015), API 510 (2006) Section 5 and 6 and API 570 Section 5 and 6 (2016).  On or about October 16, 2020 and times prior thereto this condition exposed employees to the hazard(s) of explosion/fire, overpressure, struck by ruptured vessel parts, toxic release, inhalation, to the above process equipment containing ethylene oxide and isobutyryl alcohol.

Issued

Apr 14, 2021

Abate by

May 10, 2021

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

Hazardous substances 1190

General-duty citation text

29 CFR  1910.119(j)(4)(iii): The frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers' recommendations and good engineering practices, and more frequently if determined to be necessary by prior operating experience.  The employer did not follow RAGAGEP, such as but not limited to National Board Inspection Code (NBIC) Part 2- Inspection (2015), API Standard 653 (2009), Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction, Sections 6 and 12, API Standard 510 (2009), Pressure Vessel Code: In-service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration, Sections 5  and  6. and API 570 (2016), Piping Inspection Code: In-service Inspection, Rating, Testing,  Repair, and Alteration of Piping Systems, Sections 5 and 6  when pressure vessels and piping inspections were conducted that did not follow RAGAGEP. This condition exposed employees to the hazard(s) of ethylene oxide explosion and fire, overpressure, struck by ruptured vessel parts, toxic release, inhalation. The pressure vessel  and tanks inspection and tests frequency that did not follow RAGAGEP include at least the following:  (a) Reactor R-200 and all associated piping and instrumentation, the employer failed to conduct  on-stream inspections, external inspection, thickness inspection, corrosion under insulation (CUI) inspection (i.e. nondestructive examinations, corrosion allowance, and thickness measurements)  in accordance with a written inspection procedure/plan NBIC Part 2 (2015), API 510 (2006) Section 5 and 6 and API 570 Section 5 and 6 (2016);  (b) Reactor R-600 and all associated piping and instrumentation; the employer failed to conduct internal, on-stream inspections, external inspection, thickness inspection, corrosion under insulation (CUI) inspection (i.e. nondestructive examinations, corrosion allowance, and thickness measurements)  in accordance with a written inspection procedure/plan  NBIC Part 2 (2015), API 510 (2006) Section 5 and 6 and API 570 Section 5 and 6 (2016);  (c) Reactor R-700 and all associated piping and instrumentation; the employer failed to conduct internal, on-stream inspections, external inspection, thickness inspection, corrosion under insulation (CUI) inspection (i.e. nondestructive examinations, corrosion allowance, and thickness measurements)  in accordance with a written inspection procedure/plan  NBIC Part 2 (2015), API 510 (2006) Section 5 and 6 and API 570 Section 5 and 6 (2016);  (d) Ethylene oxide storage tank T-100; the employer failed to conduct external  and internal inspections an  in accordance with a written inspection procedure/plan NBIC Part 2 (2015),  API 653 (2006) Section 6 and 12;   (e) Ethylene oxide storage tank T-101; the employer failed to conduct external  and internal inspections an  in accordance with a written inspection procedure/plan NBIC Part 2 (2015),  API 653 (2006) Section 6 and 12;   (f) Benko Steam Hot Box Model S24 (hotbox) and all piping and instrumentation; the employer failed to conduct on-stream inspections, external inspection, thickness inspection, corrosion under insulation (CUI) inspection (i.e. nondestructive examinations, corrosion allowance, and thickness measurements)  in accordance with a written inspection procedure/plan NBIC Part 2 (2015), API 510 (2006) Section 5 and 6 and API 570 Section 5 and 6 (2016).  On or about October 16, 2020 and times prior thereto this condition exposed employees to the hazard(s) of explosion/fire, overpressure, struck by ruptured vessel parts, toxic release, inhalation, to the above process equipment containing ethylene oxide and isobutyryl alcohol.

Issued

Apr 14, 2021

Abate by

May 10, 2021

Penalty

Initial $9,557 · Current $6,690 Reduced

Hazardous substances 1190

General-duty citation text

29 CFR  1910.119(m)(4): An incident investigation report was not prepared at the conclusion of the investigation to include at a minimum: the date of the incident; the date the investigation began; the factors that contributed to the incident; and any recommendations resulting from the investigation:  (a) On or about October 24, 2020 a fire occurred in the Benko hotbox that had the potential to spread to various process equipment containing ethylene oxide including but not limited to reactors, storage tanks, process piping, and all associated piping and instrumentation exposing employees to inhalation, fire and explosion hazards associated with ethylene oxide.

Issued

Apr 14, 2021

Abate by

May 10, 2021

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

Hazardous substances 1190

General-duty citation text

29 CFR  1910.119(m)(6):The report was not reviewed with all affected personnel whose job tasks are relevant to the incident findings including contract employees where applicable:  (a) On or about October 24, 2020 a fire occurred in the Benko hotbox that had the potential to spread to various process equipment containing ethylene oxide including but not limited to reactors, storage tanks, process piping, and all associated piping and instrumentation exposing employees to inhalation, fire and explosion hazards associated with ethylene oxide.

Issued

Apr 14, 2021

Abate by

May 10, 2021

Penalty

Initial $9,557 · Current $9,557

Hazardous substances 1190

General-duty citation text

29 CFR  1910.1047(h)(1)(iii):The ethylene oxide emergency plan did not include the elements prescribed in 29 CFR 1910.39 fire prevention plans:  (a) On or about October 24, 2020  a fire occurred  in the Benko hotbox that had the potential to spread to various process equipment containing ethylene oxide including but not limited to reactors, storage tanks, process piping, and all associated piping and instrumentation which potentially exposed employee to inhalation, fire and explosion hazards associated with ethylene oxide. The employers ethylene emergency action plan did not include  the minimal elements of a written fire prevention plan.

Issued

Apr 14, 2021

Abate by

May 10, 2021

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

Hazardous substances 1190

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.39(c)(1): A fire prevention plan was not implemented, which was to include, a list of all major fire hazards, proper handling and storage procedures for hazardous materials, potential ignition sources and their control, and the type of fire protection equipment necessary to control each major hazard:   (a) On or about October 24, 2020  a fire occurred  in the Benko hotbox that had the potential to spread to various process equipment containing ethylene oxide including but not limited to reactors, storage tanks, process piping, and all associated piping and instrumentation which potentially exposed employee to inhalation, fire and explosion hazards associated with ethylene oxide. The employers ethylene emergency action plan did not include  the minimal elements of a written fire prevention plan.

Issued

Apr 14, 2021

Abate by

May 10, 2021

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

Hazardous substances 1190

General-duty citation text

29 CFR  1910.39(c)(2):A fire prevention plan did not include procedures to control accumulations of flammable and combustible waste materials:  (a) On or about October 24, 2020  a fire occurred  in the Benko hotbox that had the potential to spread to various process equipment containing ethylene oxide including but not limited to reactors, storage tanks, process piping, and all associated piping and instrumentation which potentially exposed employee to inhalation, fire and explosion hazards associated with ethylene oxide. The employers ethylene emergency action plan did not include  the minimal elements of a written fire prevention plan.

Issued

Apr 14, 2021

Abate by

May 10, 2021

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

Hazardous substances 1190

General-duty citation text

29 CFR  1910.39(c)(3):A fire prevention plan did not include procedures for regular maintenance of safeguards installed on heat-producing equipment to prevent the accidental ignition of combustible materials:  (a) On or about October 24, 2020  a fire occurred  in the Benko hotbox that had the potential to spread to various process equipment containing ethylene oxide including but not limited to reactors, storage tanks, process piping, and all associated piping and instrumentation which potentially exposed employee to inhalation, fire and explosion hazards associated with ethylene oxide. The employers ethylene emergency action plan did not include  the minimal elements of a written fire prevention plan.

Issued

Apr 14, 2021

Abate by

May 10, 2021

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $4,779

General-duty citation text

29 CFR  1910.1200(g)(11):  Safety data sheets were not made readily available, upon request, to designated representatives, the Assistant Secretary, and the Director, in accordance with the requirements of 29 CFR 1910.1020(e):   Employer failed to produce safety data sheet for INC 2395, which was being used in the Benko Box.

Issued

Apr 14, 2021

Abate by

May 10, 2021

Penalty

Initial $19,114 · Current $13,653 Reduced

Hazardous substances 1190

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(F): Information pertaining to the equipment in the process did not include design codes and standards employed:  On or about October 16 , 2020, and at times thereafter, the employer exposed employees to inhalation, fire, and explosion hazards when it did not include design codes and standards employed in the information pertaining to the ethylene oxide process equipment. Design codes and standards include, but are not limited to NFPA 15 (Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection), NEC (National Electrical Code), API 537 (Flare Details for General Refinery and Petrochem Service), ANSI (American National Standards Institute), ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code.  The equipment includes but are not limited to:  (a)  Deluge system T-100, T-101, and T102  (P&ID: Deluge dated 12/1/20); (b) Benko Steam Hot Box Model S24 ( Baze-0001010-Electrical classification dated 5/7/17 and  Baze-0000597-Operation-Model dated 5/7/17).  Baze Chemical Inc. was previously cited for a violation of this occupational safety and health standard or its equivalent standard 29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(F), which was contained in OSHA inspection number 1051164, citation number 1, item number 9 and was affirmed as a final order on April 4, 2016, with respect to a workplace located at 2187 East FM 323 Palestine, TX 75801.