Safety Incidents OSHA Severe Injury Reports · 2015–2025
5,189,992Inspections Most recent open 2026-07-18 Last loaded 2026-07-22

OSHA Inspection: JACKSON DAIRY

Planned inspection · Safety discipline

On , OSHA opened a planned safety inspection of JACKSON DAIRY in 2600 E. 4TH AVE., HUTCHINSON, KS 67504 (NAICS 311512). OSHA activity number 346394828.

What this inspection record means

OSHA opens inspections for many reasons — routine scheduling under a national or local emphasis program, an employee complaint or referral, or a follow-up after a reported injury. Opening or conducting an inspection is not itself an allegation or a finding that this employer broke any rule; any findings appear as the citations listed below, and citations can be contested, reduced, or withdrawn.

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Establishment
JACKSON DAIRY
Site address
2600 E. 4TH AVE.
City
HUTCHINSON
State
KS
ZIP
67504
Mailing
P.O. BOX 429, HUTCHINSON, KS 67504
Inspection type
Planned (H)
Scope
Partial (B)
Discipline
Safety
Advance notice
No
Union status
A
Opened
Closing conference
Case closed
Last modified
Data loaded
NAICS code
311512
Employees
120
Ownership type
A

5 citations on file for this inspection.

1910.119 D03 I B

Serious Gravity 10 2 instances 11 exposed
Issued
May 15, 2023
Abate by
Jun 9, 2023
Penalty
Initial $15,625 · Current $9,375 Reduced
29 CFR  1910.119(d)(3)(i)(B): The employer's piping and instrument diagrams were not accurate and did not represent equipment that was existing and was part of the process:  On or about December 13, 2022, and at times prior thereto, the employer failed to verify that all piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs) were up to date and accurate for use by Jackson Dairy employees and contractors to work on the covered process equipment. Employees were potentially exposed to a release of ammonia which could result in serious injury or death.  During the walk around, CSHO verified the P&ID Drawing with the actual as-built field layout of the High Stage RC-20 Frick RWF11-177 Screw Compressor inside the 87-engine room, and observed following deficiencies: a) The metering valve C20-33 was installed on the Compressor but was not drawn on the P&ID. b) The as-built field setup had missing valve ID tags when compared to the P&ID for valve C20-11.
Recent events (2)
  • — I (S) $9375
  • — Z (S) $15625

1910.119 D03 II

Serious Gravity 10 39 instances 11 exposed
Issued
May 15, 2023
Abate by
Aug 9, 2023
Penalty
Initial $15,625 · Current $0 Reduced
29 CFR  1910.119(d)(3)(ii): The employer did not document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices:  Employees were exposed to chemical hazards related to Ammonia exposure. On or about December 13,2022, the employer had not document compliance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (REGAGEP) for ANSI/ASHRAE-15 -2010 (American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc. and ANSI/IIAR-2 - 2008 (American National Standard for Equipment, Design, and Installation of Ammonia Mechanical Refrigeration System) in the following instances:   I) ANSI/ASHRAE-15 -2010 Section 9.12.6 page 22, and Section 11.2.2.b page 23.  34 valves were missing or inadequate identification tags. 1. On the rooftop: a) one Globe HSS EV-23Roof Valve,  b) one EV23-12 High Stage Suction Valve,  c) one EV23-4 High Pressure Liquid Valve, d) one PT 19-21 HSS High Stage Suction Valve, e) 6 valves of the Pasteurized Tank #3427, 3420, f) 6 valves of the Orange Silo #3441, 3444, g) a group of valves of the Raw Tank RT-4, including the two globe valves, the regulator, and the relief legislator, h) a group of valves of the Raw Tank RT-5, including the two globe valves, the regulator, and the relief legislator, i) one High-Pressure Liquid (HPL) Globe valve of the Raw Tank RT-6, j) one High-Pressure Liquid (HPL) Isolation valve of the Raw Tank RT-6. 2. At the exterior of the Tank area: a) two oil drain valves of the RT-5 50,000-gallon Raw Tank, b) 6 valves of the 8,000-gallon Orange Juice Silo.  II) ANSI/ASHRAE-15 -2010 Section 8.11.2.1 page 10; and ANSI/IIAR-2 - 2008 Section 13.1.1.2 page 28 and Section 13.2.1.3 page 28 as it failed to install visual and audible alarms outside each entrance to the 87-engine room.  III) ANSI/ASHRAE-15 - 2010 Section 8.11.8, page 11, and Section 11.2.4 page 23 when it failed to post an authorized personnel sign on the entrance door of the 87-engine room.  IV) ANSI/ASHRAE-15 -2010 Section 11.2.1, page 23, and Section 11.7 page 24 when it failed to post a sign in machinery room prominently displays the following: i. Name, address, and telephone number of installing/servicing contractor ii. Approximate quantity of Ammonia iii. Lubricant identity and amount iv. At least one sign posted in a conspicuous location provides emergency instructions and phone numbers of emergency safety and operating personnel v. A written evacuation plan prominently displayed in a conspicuous location.  V) ANSI/IIAR-2 - 2008 Section 13.3.1.4 page 30 when it failed to install an accessible eyewash and body shower station outside of the 87-engine room exit.  VI) ANSI/ASHRAE-15 -2010 Section 8.12.i page 11, and ANSI/IIAR-2 - 2008 Section 13.2.1.4 page 29, and Section 13.3.1.6 page 30 in that employer did not install emergency stops located immediately outside principal entrance to 87-engine room.
Recent events (2)
  • — I (S) $0
  • — Z (S) $15625

1910.119 E05

Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 10 exposed
Issued
May 15, 2023
Abate by
Jun 9, 2023
Penalty
Initial $15,625 · Current $9,375 Reduced
29 CFR  1910.119(e)(5): The employer did not establish a system to communicate the actions to be taken, as a result of the process hazard analysis team's recommendations, to operating, maintenance and other employees whose work assignments are in the process and who could be affected by the recommendations actions:  On or about December 13, 2022, and at times prior thereto, the employer failed to communicate the actions of the process hazard analysis team's recommendations to the operating, maintenance and other employees whose work assignments are in the process and who could be affected by the recommendations actions after the conduct of the process hazards analysis revaluations. Employees were potentially exposed to a release of ammonia which could result in serious injury or death.
Recent events (2)
  • — I (S) $9375
  • — Z (S) $15625

1910.119 H02 I

Serious Gravity 10 1 instance 11 exposed
Issued
May 15, 2023
Abate by
Jun 9, 2023
Penalty
Initial $15,625 · Current $9,375 Reduced
29 CFR  1910.119(h)(2)(i): The employer, when selecting a contractor , did not obtain and evaluate information regarding the contract employer's safety performance and program:   On or about December 13, 2022, and at times prior thereto, the employer failed to obtain and adequately evaluate the written safety and health programs of the contractor (Tanner Industries, Inc.) that delivers or unloads ammonia from a tank truck to the ammonia refrigeration system at the Hutchinson facility. The driver of a contractor performed work at the facility by participating several tasks in the unloading of ammonia into the process tanks (receiver). Employees and delivery employees working at the receiver pressured tank during the unloading of the ammonia into the process tank were potentially exposed to a release of ammonia which could result in serious injury or death.
Recent events (2)
  • — I (S) $9375
  • — Z (S) $15625

1910.119 L05

Other-than-serious Gravity 10 1 instance 11 exposed
Issued
May 15, 2023
Abate by
Jun 9, 2023
Penalty
Initial $15,625 · Current $9,375 Reduced
29 CFR  1910.119(l)(5): A change covered by this paragraph resulted in a change in the operating procedures or practices required by paragraph (f) of this section, and such procedures or practices were not updated accordingly:  On or about December 13, 2022, and at times prior thereto, the employer failed to adequately update the changes in the current standard operating procedures (SOP) and practices related to the installation and intended use of the emergency shutdown devices (emergency stop buttons) located outside of the engine room by the crash gate. All the current emergency shutdown procedures within the standard operating procedures such as, but not limited to, the Vilter Compressor C2 (Model 448), C3, C9, C10, C11, the Vilter Compressor C 12 (Model 4416D), and the Vilter Compressor C 13 (Model 4416D), did not reflect any provision, discussion about the emergency shutdown devices. Employees were potentially exposed to a release of ammonia which could result in serious injury or death.
Recent events (2)
  • — I (O) $9375
  • — Z (S) $15625

View Jackson Dairy's full OSHA safety record →

This record is reproduced from the U.S. Department of Labor Open Data API (OSHA inspection dataset). The original IMIS detail view is available at OSHA's Establishment Search for activity number 346394828.

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