OSHA Inspection: CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION-LCMC

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Mar 6, 1992

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:  The
employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were
free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death
or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to
the hazard of the hazard of fire and explosion:
a) The employer did not protect his employees from the recognized hazard
of fire and explosion in that all unnecessary windows were not closed
in on the Control Room of the FCC "A" Unit (K-4 Building).
NOTE: Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method
to correct this hazard is:
Close in the glass windows in the front and rear double doors of the
K-4 Unit Control Room with Acceptable materials to provide at least
the fire and explosion resistance of the existing building.
b) The employer did not protect his employees from the recognized hazard
of fire and explosion in that all unnecessary Unit (Day Foreman's
Office for C-4 Area).
NOTE: Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable method to
correct this problem is:
Close in the glass windows located on the west side, front (including
door), and east side of K-3 Building with acceptable materials to
provide at least the fire explosion resistance of the existing
building.
c) The employer did not protect his employees from the recognized hazard
of fire and explosion in that safety devices, such as governors and
overspeed trips, are not tested at frequent intervals as necessary
for safe operation of steam turbines for protection of personnel, in
areas such as, but not limited to, Power Area, Reformer Area, and Cat
Areas.
NOTE: Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method
to correct this hazard is:
1) Establish a definite schedule at frequent intervals (not to exceed
nine months) for testing and recalibration of turbine safety devices,
such as governors and overspeed trips.
2) Immediately remove from service any turbine that has defective or
inoperable governor or overspeed trips.
d) Relief valve on top of the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum was removed for
servicing or was blocked in for extended periods of time to
facilitate resetting without adequate precautions being taken to
reduce the hazards involved.
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a relief valve on all pressure vessels and/or
ensure that a qualified person is assigned with the primary
responsibility of monitoring and controlling the process variable
affecting the unprotected vessel.
e) On or about March 3, 1991, critical instruments and control systems,
i.e., but not limited to, flow control (FC-109) and J-12 pump(s)
speed controls for the CCU "A" unit were not working properly.
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and strictly enforce an inspection procedure that
ensures critical instruments and control systems are functional prior
to start-up.
f) Operators were not informed of charges and of the consequences of the
changes, i.e. but not limited to installation of a new 3 inch
diameter line from the output of the J-12A pump to the output of J-12
North pump and installation of a new stripper in the bottom of the
Reactor, which could affect the safe operation of the unit.
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to implement written procedures to communicate the changes and
modifications prior to initiating start-up of the CCU "A".
g) Pressure relief valve(s) were not regularly serviced and maintained
for the CCU "A" unit.
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to establish definite time intervals for inspection and
testing of pressure relief valve(s) in accordance with API 520.
h) Internal audits, such as general hazard and operability studies
(HAZOP) assuring that controls and instrumentation were in place for
automatic or manual shutdown durig emergency situations, had not been
conducted for the CCU "A" unit.
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to conduct HAZOP studies, job safety analysis and human factor
analysis.
i) Remotely operated emergency shut-off controls permitting the rapid
termination of hydrocarbon flow for the inlet line (0-156-4) to the
F-7 Slurry Settling Drum, were not provided.
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to install a remotely operated insolation valve on the inlet
line (0-156-4) to the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum and/or a remotely
operated shutdown of the steam turbines driving the J-12 pumps.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Mar 6, 1992

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:  The
%%
employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were
free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death
or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to
the hazard of asphyxia:
a) The employer did not protect his employees from the recognized
hazard of asphyxia in that the above ground (utility) piping systems
and station outlets for materials, such as, but not limited to, plant
air, steam, water, and nitrogen, located in the FCC "A" Unit, were
not marked for identification of contents in accordance with the
American National Standard Scheme for the identification of piping
systems, ANSI A-13.1.
NOTE: Among othe methods, a feasible and acceptable abatement method to
correct this hazard is:
1) Provide positive identification of the contents of the utility piping
system and station outlets by lettered legend (applied code to
valves) giving the name of the contents in full or abbreviated form.
2) Use color to identify the characteristic properties of the contents
in combination with legends.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Jan 6, 1992

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Jan 6, 1992

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Mar 6, 1992

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Nov 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Dec 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Dec 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Dec 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Dec 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Dec 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Jan 6, 1992

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Jan 6, 1992

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Mar 6, 1992

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Sep 6, 1992

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Jan 6, 1992

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Jan 6, 1992

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,900 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Jun 30, 1995

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place
of employment which was free from recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
a) On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out
of the CUU "A" during the start-up procedure. Consequently,
hot oil was mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum
for the CUU "A", thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the
slurry settling drum, releasing flammable and combustable
liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a detailed written
start-up procedure with signed and dated logs for specific task(s).
%%
b) Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the API
510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and IX
and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to perform and
interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are qualified to American
Society of Non-Destructive Testing (ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent
written requirements or written procedures in accordance with ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.
%%
c) On or about March 3, 1991, oil collected behind a re-enforcing pad
for a nozzle on the E-1 tower, the oil then contracted the atmosphere
and ignited. The E-1 Tower, the oil then contacted the atmosphere and
ignited. The E-1 Tower was not shutdown nor was it properly evaluated
to determine if it was safe to continue operation.
%%
NOTE: A feasible and useful method among others of correcting this
hazard is to develop and implement written operating procedures that
provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in
each process and address at least the following:  a) steps for each
operating phase,  b) operating limits, and  c) safety and health
considerations.  Such procedures may require that the vessel be shut
down until it has been properly repaired and re-inspected or that a
ualified engineer determine if it is safe to continue operations.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970:  The employer did not furnish employment and a
place of employment which was free from recognized hazards
that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to employees by exposing them to serious fire and
explosion hazards.
%%
(a)  On or about March 3, 1991, the main block valve at the bottom
of the F-7 was closed with prevented water from draining out of the
CUU "A" during the start-up procedure.  Consequently, hot oil was
mixed with water, in the F-7 Slurry Settling Drum for the CUU "A",
thereby causing a catastrophic failure of the slurry settling drum,
releasing flammable and combustable liquids, gases, and vapors.
%%
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to provide a strickly enforce the use of a
detailed written start-up procedure with signed and dated
logs for specific task(s).
%%
(b)  Employer did not comply with the applicable provisions of the
API 510, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section V, Vii, and
IX and American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Code for
Qualifications of Welders, Welding Inspectios, and Pressure Vessel
Inspectors including, but not limited to, API 510, Section 5,
Paragraph 5.2.1; ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications Section V, Paragraph 2.2 and
American Society for Nondestructive Testing, Parts 5 and 6, thereby
exposing employees to the hazard of inadequate welds on pressure
vessels.
NOTE:  A feasible and useful method among others of correcting
this hazard is to ensure that persons who are authorized to
perform and interpret Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) are
qualified to American Society of Non-Destructive Testing
(ASNT) SNT-TC-14 or equivalent written requirements or
written procedures in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section V, 1989.

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $25,000 · Current $17,750 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Issued

Aug 29, 1991

Abate by

Oct 6, 1991

Penalty

Initial $35,000 · Current $24,850 Reduced