OSHA Inspection: ALLIED SIGNAL CORP.

Issued

Nov 12, 1998

Abate by

Nov 30, 1999

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $4,000 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:  The
employer did not
furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from
recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
employees in that employees
were exposed on or about August 21, 1998 to the hazard of being covered by
hot (375 to 600
degree F) driveway sealer during the transfer of material from tank #24 to
tank #1600 (the pitch
melter), in the North Tank Farm and:
(a)The employer did not take adequate measures to prevent hazardous
releases of hot
materials such as driveway sealer, pitch and creosote oil in the North
Tank Farm due to contact
with water, steam, and/or condensation causing an eruption from the tanks,
in that:
A.The written standard operating procedures for clearing lines in areas
such as but not
limited to the North Tank Farm were inadequate, in that, the procedures
did not include;
instructions to employees to perform visual verification at the blowout
tank that the
pipeline has been cleared to each tank; when both lines are cleared
simultaneously,
ensuring through separate visual verification that both lines have been
cleared to the
blowout tank; opening the bleeder valve from the source tank and the
receiver tank after
clearing the lines to check for back pressure, water, and/or residual
condensation;
specifying which tank to use as a blowout tank when clearing the lines;
walking the
pipeline systems to check for plugs identified by cold spots in the lines,
ensuring that all
necessary valves are opened and/or closed prior to opening the main valves
to do the task
such as clearing lines
B.The written standard operating procedures for transfers of hot material
such as driveway
sealer, pitch, and/or creosote oil in areas such as but not limited to;
the North Tank
Farm were inadequate, in that, the procedures did not include:
instructions
to employees
to ensure that all necessary valves are open and/or closed to do the task,
such as material
transfer from tank to tank, to allow material to run off through a
check/throttle valve at
the pump before opening the main valve to the receiving tank.
C.There was no retraining of operators including supervisors who performed
job duties
under titles such as but not limited to; maintenance supervisor, tar
heater assistants and
boiler operators for three or more years, when their jobs changed to
perform the job
duties under titles such as but not limited to; shift foreman, pitch
filler, rod pitchman,
pitch melter, yard pumpman, and naphthalene operator in areas such as but
not limited
to the North Tank Farm, to ensure that the employees understood safe work
practices,
any changes in standard operation procedures, mechanical integrity changes
of
equipment, piping flow diagrams and piping and instrumention diagrams.
D.There was no refresher training conducted every 3 years for operators
including
supervisors working in areas such as but not limited to the North Tank
Farm to ensure
that the employees had adequate retention of the knowledge and skills
necessary to
continue to perform the job duties.
E.There were no piping and instrument diagrams layout of areas such as but
not limited tothe North Tank Farm within the facility, that showed the
layout of the river side pipes
and the street side pipes.
F.There were no flow diagrams that showed what lines that material
transfers were
occurring on to prevent other employees from using the same lines in areas
such as but
not limited to the North Tank Farm.
G.There was no method of identification for the piping systems including
the valves and
steam lines in areas such as but not limited to the North Tank Farm for
pipes such as the
river side pipes and the street side pipes.
H.The openings on top of tanks such as tank #24 used to transfer hot
materials was not
equipped to vent to a safe location, any eruption of hot material such as
the driveway
sealer, pitch, and creosote oil, and direct it away from employees
standing beneath the
openings in areas such as but not limited to the North Tank Farm.
I.There were no procedures to document, manage or evaluate the impact of
mechanical
changes and/or improvements to tanks in the North Tank Farm including but
not limited
to tank #24.
Among other methods, feasible and acceptable abatement methods to correct
these hazards would
include development of written standard operation procedures, management
of change
procedures, operators training including training verification procedures,
and procedures assuring
safe venting locations in accordance with recognized industry practices
such
as the American
Petroleum Institute (API 750), ANSI A13.1-1981 Scheme for the
Identification of Piping
Systems and OSHA's Process Safety Management Standard 29 CFR 1910.119.

Issued

Nov 12, 1998

Abate by

Dec 15, 1998

Penalty

Initial $3,150 · Current $2,500 Reduced

Issued

Nov 12, 1998

Abate by

Dec 31, 1998

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $3,500 Reduced

Issued

Nov 12, 1998

Abate by

Nov 30, 1998

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $4,000 Reduced

Issued

Nov 12, 1998

Abate by

Nov 30, 1999

Issued

Nov 12, 1998

Abate by

Nov 30, 1998

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $1,000 Reduced

Issued

Nov 12, 1998

Abate by

Jan 15, 1999

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $1,000 Reduced

Issued

Nov 9, 1998

Abate by

Dec 12, 1998

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $3,500 Reduced

Issued

Nov 9, 1998

Abate by

Dec 31, 1998

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $3,500 Reduced