DAYTON, TN —
OSHA Inspection: FUJIFILM HUNT CHEMICALS USA INC
Accident-driven inspection · Health discipline
At a glance
On , OSHA opened an accident-driven health inspection of FUJIFILM HUNT CHEMICALS USA INC in 411 MANUFACTURERS ROAD, DAYTON, TN 37321 (NAICS 325110). OSHA activity number 309632040.
OSHA opens inspections for many reasons — routine scheduling under a national or local emphasis program, an employee complaint or referral, or a follow-up after a reported injury. Opening or conducting an inspection is not itself an allegation or a finding that this employer broke any rule; any findings appear as the citations listed below, and citations can be contested, reduced, or withdrawn.
Where did this inspection happen?
- Establishment
- FUJIFILM HUNT CHEMICALS USA INC
- Site address
- 411 MANUFACTURERS ROAD
- City
- DAYTON
- State
- TN
- ZIP
- 37321
What kind of inspection was it?
- Inspection type
- Accident-driven (A)
- Scope
- Partial (B)
- Discipline
- Health
- Advance notice
- No
- Union status
- N
When did the case open and close?
- Opened
- Closing conference
- Case closed
- Last modified
- Data loaded
Establishment context
- NAICS code
- 325110
- SIC code (legacy)
- 2869
- Employees
- 78
- Ownership type
- A
Citations
46 citations on file for this inspection.
1910.119 D01 IV
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
- Penalty
- Initial $7,000 · Current $7,000
8880
1910.119 D01 VI
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
1910.119 D02 ID
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
1910.119 D02 IE
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
1910.119 D03 II
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
- Penalty
- Initial $7,000 · Current $7,000
8880
503010501
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
General-duty citation text
T.C.A. 50-3-105(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees, in that employees were exposed to fire and explosion from use of flammable and combustible materials in an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process on August 2 and 3, 2006, without equipment having recognized and generally accepted engineering controls to avert and/or abate a runaway reaction, and to alert potentially exposed employees that action, including controls and evacuation, was necessary. On August 2 and 3, 2006, the employer ran an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process in tank T-644, in line 3 of building 6. There was a reported 3,451 pounds of flammable liquid (methanol) in tank T-644 at the beginning of the distillation. (There were more flammable liquids in tanks in the same line and in the building that could have also been involved in a fire or explosion.) Employees such as Operators, Shift Leaders, a Process Engineer, and an Operations Manager, were potentially exposed to a fire and/or explosion when working on the process. An explosion and fire did occur on 8/3/06. This hazard was reasonably foreseeable in that it was recognized by employer representatives and the industry. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method for correcting this hazard is to have electronic monitoring of heating jacket vs. batch temperatures that automatically initiates control actions when an (unwanted or unexpected) exothermic reaction occurs. Such control actions might include cooling jacket activation, dumping batch contents to an unheated tank, a form of quenching (when possible), or a combination of such controls. A necessary element of the control system would be automatic alarm activation to notify exposed employees of necessary control actions and evacuation. ABATEMENT VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 E01
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
- Penalty
- Initial $7,000 · Current $7,000
8880
503010501
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
General-duty citation text
T.C.A. 50-3-105(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees, in that employees were exposed to fire and explosion from use of flammable liquids in an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process on August 2 and 3, 2006, before job and expert hazard analyses were conducted to identify and control hazards in the process. On August 2 and 3, 2006, the employer ran an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process in tank T-644, in line 3 of building 6. There was a reported 3,451 pounds of flammable liquid (methanol) in tank T-644 at the beginning of the distillation. (There were more flammable liquids in tanks in the same line and in the building that could have also been involved in a fire or explosion.) Employees such as Operators, Shift Leaders, a Process Engineer, and an Operations Manager, were potentially exposed to a fire and/or explosion when working on the process. An explosion and fire did occur on 8/3/06. No job or expert hazard analysis was performed before the distillation to identify and control the potential hazards in the OXAD ML distillation process. Such hazard analyses are elements of an effective safety and health program. This hazard was reasonably foreseeable in that it was recognized by employer representatives, the industry, and common sense. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method for correcting this hazard is to perform a hazard analysis that is adequate for the complexity of the process. The hazard analysis would include differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) or similar tests, on all mixtures in the distillation. In an OXAD ML distillation operation the hazard analyses would include analyses of: 1.PYM, 2. OXAD Mother liquor, and 3. OXAD Mother liquor after the methyl alcohol distillation removed most of the methyl alcohol. A DSC on the Mother liquor before and after the methyl alcohol was distilled off would help the employer develop the temperature parameters under which it must operate. A DSC on the Mother liquor after the methyl alcohol distillation is necessary because there are many compounds in the Mother liquor which may undergo thermal decomposition at the temperatures used for the methyl alcohol distillation, and their breakdown products may affect the temperatures at which the PYM is distilled. The company must define the temperature limitations of such a distillation before performing it, including boiling points at the pressure of the vacuum, and DSC test exotherm points with respect to the pressure of the vacuum, to avoid thermal decomposition. ABATEMENT VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 E03 I
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 E03 III
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 E03 IV
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 E03 V
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 E03 VI
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 E03 VII
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 E04
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 F01
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
- Penalty
- Initial $7,000 · Current $7,000
8880
503010501
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
General-duty citation text
T.C.A. 50-3-105(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees, in that employees were exposed to fire and explosion from use of flammable liquids in an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process on August 2 and 3, 2006, without an effective safe work practice (which is an element of an effective safety and health program) in place. On August 2 and 3, 2006, the employer ran an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process in tank T-644, in line 3 of building 6. (OXAD was 3-(4-nitrophenyl)-5-(2-oxo-3,3-dimethyl butyl)-1,2,4-oxadiazole.) There was a reported 3,451 pounds of flammable liquid (methanol) in tank T-644 at the beginning of the distillation. (There were more flammable liquids in tanks in the same line and in the building that could have also been involved in a fire or explosion.) The written work practice for the distillation, which was the "Plant Operating Standard for OXAD Mother Liquor Distillation in T-644," was not effectively safe. For example, no safe upper temperature limit for the OXAD ML was provided in the procedure for the last phase of the distillation. Employees such as Operators, Shift Leaders, a Process Engineer, and an Operations Manager, were potentially exposed to a fire and/or explosion when working on the process. An explosion and fire did occur on 8/3/06. This hazard was reasonably foreseeable in that it was recognized by employer representatives, the industry, and common sense. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method for correcting this hazard is to develop an effectively safe work practice for the OXAD ML distillation procedure, with upper batch temperature limits (and limits on the length of time that the batch can be held at elevated temperatures). ABATEMENT VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 F01 IB
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 F01 II
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 F01 IIA
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 F01 IIB
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 F01 IIIA
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 F01 IIIB
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 F01 IIID
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 F01 IIIE
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 F01 IV
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 F01 ID
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
- Penalty
- Initial $7,000 · Current $7,000
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S) $7000.00
- — Z (S) $7000.00
503010501
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
General-duty citation text
T.C.A. 50-3-105(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees, in that employees were exposed to fire and explosion from use of flammable liquids in an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process on August 2 and 3, 2006, without proper preparation for emergency situations (which is an element of an effective safety and health program) in place. On August 2 and 3, 2006, the employer ran an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process in tank T-644, in line 3 of building 6. (OXAD was 3-(4-nitrophenyl)-5-(2-oxo-3,3-dimethyl butyl)-1,2,4-oxadiazole.) There was a reported 3,451 pounds of flammable liquid (methanol) in tank T-644 at the beginning of the distillation. (There were more flammable liquids in tanks in the same line and in the building that could have also been involved in a fire or explosion.) The written work practice for the distillation, which was the "Plant Operating Standard for OXAD Mother Liquor Distillation in T-644," did not have instructions for dealing with emergency situations. Such an emergency situation was the development of a runaway exothermic reaction in the distillation tank. Employees such as Operators, Shift Leaders, a Process Engineer, and an Operations Manager, were potentially exposed to a fire and/or explosion when working on the process. An explosion and fire did occur on 8/3/06. This hazard was reasonably foreseeable in that it was recognized by employer representatives, the industry, and common sense. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method for correcting this hazard is to develop proper emergency procedures for the OXAD ML distillation procedure. The emergency preparation would include instructions for dealing with emergency situations, such as the development of a runaway exothermic reaction in the distillation tank. ABATEMENT VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 F01 IV
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 G01 I
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
- Penalty
- Initial $7,000 · Current $7,000
8880
503010501
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
General-duty citation text
T.C.A. 50-3-105(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees, in that employees were exposed to fire and explosion from use of flammable liquids in an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process on August 2 and 3, 2006, without appropriate safety training in the "Plant Operating Standard for OXAD Mother Liquor Distillation in T-644." Such appropriate safety training is an element of an effective safety and health program. On August 2 and 3, 2006, the employer ran an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process in tank T-644, in line 3 of building 6. (OXAD was 3-(4-nitrophenyl)-5-(2-oxo-3,3-dimethyl butyl)-1,2,4-oxadiazole.) There was a reported 3,451 pounds of flammable liquid (methanol) in tank T-644 at the beginning of the distillation. (There were more flammable liquids in tanks in the same line and in the building that could have also been involved in a fire or explosion.) The Operators and Shift Leaders of the distillation process had not received training in the procedure before it was utilized on August 2 and 3, 2006. The procedure was reportedly composed on 7/31/06 and signed for approval on 8/1/06. Employees such as Operators, Shift Leaders, a Process Engineer, and an Operations Manager, were potentially exposed to a fire and/or explosion when working on the process. An explosion and fire did occur on 8/3/06. This hazard was reasonably foreseeable in that it was recognized by employer representatives, the industry, and common sense. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method for correcting this hazard is to ensure that all employees operating a procedure are trained on the procedure and its safety aspects before it is used. ABATEMENT VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 G03
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
1910.119 I02 II
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
- Penalty
- Initial $7,000 · Current $7,000
8880
503010501
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
General-duty citation text
T.C.A. 50-3-105(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees, in that employees were exposed to fire and explosion from use of flammable liquids in an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process on August 2 and 3, 2006, without effective safety change analysis of the newly-developed process, including its operating procedures, before the distillation process was conducted. Such change analysis for new processes would be a necessary sub-element of an effective safety and health program's hazard anticipation and detection element. On August 2 and 3, 2006, the employer ran an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process in tank T-644, in line 3 of building 6. (OXAD was 3-(4-nitrophenyl)-5-(2-oxo-3,3-dimethyl butyl)-1,2,4-oxadiazole.) There was a reported 3,451 pounds of flammable liquid (methanol) in tank T-644 at the beginning of the distillation. (There were more flammable liquids in tanks in the same line and in the building that could have also been involved in a fire or explosion.) The written work practice for the distillation, which was the "Plant Operating Standard for OXAD Mother Liquor Distillation in T-644," was not effectively safe. For example, no safe upper temperature limit for the OXAD ML was provided in the procedure for the last phase of the distillation. The OXAD ML distillation procedure was reportedly composed on 7/31/06, signed for approval on 8/1/06, and used on 8/2/06. No effective safety change analysis of the newly-developed process, including its operating procedures, was conducted before the distillation process was performed. Employees such as Operators, Shift Leaders, a Process Engineer, and an Operations Manager, were potentially exposed to a fire and/or explosion when working on the process. An explosion and fire did occur on 8/3/06. This hazard was reasonably foreseeable in that it was recognized by employer representatives, the industry, and common sense. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method for correcting this hazard is to conduct effective safety change analysis of a newly-developed process, including its operating procedures, before the process is performed. ABATEMENT VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 I02 IV
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
1910.119 L01
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
- Penalty
- Initial $7,000 · Current $7,000
8880
503010501
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
General-duty citation text
T.C.A. 50-3-105(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees, in that employees were exposed to fire and explosion from use of flammable liquids in an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process on August 2 and 3, 2006, without change analysis being performed whenever a change in process procedures occurred that could have an effect on safety. Such change analysis is an element of an effective safety and health program. On August 2 and 3, 2006, the employer ran an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process in tank T-644, in line 3 of building 6. (OXAD was 3-(4-nitrophenyl)-5-(2-oxo-3,3-dimethyl butyl)-1,2,4-oxadiazole.) There was a reported 3,451 pounds of flammable liquid (methanol) in tank T-644 at the beginning of the distillation. (There were more flammable liquids in tanks in the same line and in the building that could have also been involved in a fire or explosion.) The written distillation process procedure, which was the "Plant Operating Standard for OXAD Mother Liquor Distillation in T-644," was deviated from in that the temperature was raised beyond any temperature listed in the procedure (and beyond a safe temperature level). No change analysis was performed when temperatures in the distillation were raised to unsafe levels. Employees such as Operators, Shift Leaders, a Process Engineer, and an Operations Manager, were potentially exposed to a fire and/or explosion when working on the process. An explosion and fire did occur on 8/3/06. This hazard was reasonably foreseeable in that it was recognized by employer representatives, the industry, and common sense. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method for correcting this hazard is to perform change analysis whenever a change in facilities, equipment, materials, or processes procedures occurs. ABATEMENT VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.119 C02
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
- Penalty
- Initial $7,000 · Current $7,000
8880
503010501
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
General-duty citation text
T.C.A. 50-3-105(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees, in that employees were exposed to fire and explosion from use of flammable liquids in an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process on August 2 and 3, 2006, without having employee participation, including Operators and/or Operator/Shift Leaders, in the development of work practice procedures and in any hazard analysis for the process. Such employee participation is an element of an effective safety and health program. On August 2 and 3, 2006, the employer ran an OXAD Mother Liquor (ML) distillation process in tank T-644, in line 3 of building 6. (OXAD was 3-(4-nitrophenyl)-5-(2-oxo-3,3-dimethyl butyl)-1,2,4-oxadiazole.) There was a reported 3,451 pounds of flammable liquid (methanol) in tank T-644 at the beginning of the distillation. (There were more flammable liquids in tanks in the same line and in the building that could have also been involved in a fire or explosion.) The written work practice for the distillation, which was the "Plant Operating Standard for OXAD Mother Liquor Distillation in T-644," was reportedly developed by one person, a Process Engineer, on 7/31/06, signed for approval by several management personnel on 8/1/06, and used on 8/2/06. No Operators or Operator/Shift Leaders were consulted in the development of the OXAD ML distillation procedure. Operators or Operator/Shift Leaders also were not consulted on the development of any hazard analysis for the operation. Employees such as Operators, Shift Leaders, a Process Engineer, and an Operations Manager, were potentially exposed to a fire and/or explosion when working on the process. An explosion and fire did occur on 8/3/06. This hazard was reasonably foreseeable in that it was recognized by employer representatives, the industry, and common sense. Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method for correcting this hazard is to ensure employee participation, including Operators and/or Operator/Shift Leader participation, in the development of work practice procedures for processes and in any hazard analysis for the processes. Such employee participation is an element of an effective safety and health program. ABATEMENT VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.106 H04 IC
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
- Penalty
- Initial $7,000 · Current $7,000
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S) $7000.00
- — Z (S) $7000.00
1910.132 A
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Apr 17, 2007
- Penalty
- Initial $7,000 · Current $7,000
8880
Recent events (2)
- — P (S) $7000.00
- — Z (S) $7000.00
1910.132 D01
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Apr 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — P (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.1200 G01
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
- Penalty
- Initial $7,000 · Current $7,000
8880
1910.1200 H01
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
- Penalty
- Initial $7,000 · Current $7,000
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S) $7000.00
- — Z (S) $7000.00
1910.1200 H03 II
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
1910.1200 H03 III
- Issued
- Jan 26, 2007
- Abate by
- Mar 17, 2007
8880
Recent events (2)
- — I (S)
- — Z (S)
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Source
This record is reproduced from the U.S. Department of Labor Open Data API (OSHA inspection dataset). The original IMIS detail view is available at OSHA's Establishment Search for activity number 309632040.
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