OSHA Inspection: SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.), INC.

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Dec 12, 2009

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $1,500 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.23(a)(2)  Every ladderway floor opening or platform was not
guarded by a
standard railing with standard toeboard on all exposed sides (except at
entrance to opening),
with the passage through the railing either provided with a swinging gate
or so offset that a
person cannot walk directly into the opening:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about October 29, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer did
not guard
the passage through the railing of platforms at ladderway openings with
either an
adequate swinging gate or so offset that a person cannot walk directly
into the
opening in that many platforms throughout the refinery, including, but not
limited to,
the platforms for D-319 and X-159, the ladderway opening through railings
to
platforms was guarded by a single bar gate lacking a mid-rail.  Employees
were
subject to fall hazards in excess of 4 feet.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Sample
Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Dec 12, 2009

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d)(2)(i)(D) Information concerning the technology of the
process did not
include the safe upper and lower limits for such items as temperatures,
pressures, flows or
compositions:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce
City,Colorado:
On or about November 4, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the process
safety
information for the technology of the process for pressure vessel W-1 in
the #1 Crude
Unit contained inaccurate information on the safe upper operating limit
for pressure
(i.e., 45 psig).  Employees are exposed to fire and explosion related
hazards as a
result of the potential for overpressurizing pressure vessels such as W-1
and W-4.
One feasible means of abatement would be for the employer to ensure that
their
process safety information contains all information concerning the
technology of the
process, including the safe upper and lower limits for such items as
temperatures,
pressures, flows or compositions.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Sample
Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Dec 12, 2010

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(B).  The employer did not compile process safety
information
which included accurate piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs):
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about October 2, 2008, and at times prior thereto, P&ID DR-13-PI-030
incorrectly illustrates the pressure relief flow from RV829 (relieving
D-77) as from
"FROM D-77 RV-516" when RV-516 does not exist.  This does not appear to
present
a serious hazard for employees.
(b)On or about October 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, P&ID
DR-13-PI-010
illustrates the two 8-inch and two 6-inch isolation valves in the piping
between the
tube side outlet of X-338 and inlet of D-77 as being "LO" which means the
valves are
supposed to be "locked open." On October 8, 2008, and at prior times
thereto, these
valves were not locked open as illustrated on the P&ID.  Employees are
exposed to
hazards related to fires and explosions due to the potential for
overpressurization of
pressure vessels containing hydrocarbons such as X-338 due to these valves
not being
locked open as indicated on the P&ID.
(c)On or about November 4, 2008, and at times prior thereto, P&ID
DR-13-PI-020
illustrates that the 4-inch isolation valve on the outlet of X-16 shell
side is "LO"
which means the valve is supposed to be "locked open." On November 4,
2008, and
at prior times thereto, this valve was not locked open as illustrated on
the P&ID.
Employees are exposed to hazards related to fires and explosions due to
the potential
for overpressurization of pressure vessel X-16 due to these valves not
being locked
open as indicated on the P&ID.
(d)On or about November 4, 2008, and at times prior thereto, P&ID
DR-13-PI-020
illustrates numerous isolation valves as not being locked open when such
valves are
locked open.  On November 4, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the
following
isolation valves were observed as being locked open when the P&ID
illustrates
otherwise: on the inlet piping to X-327 shell side, outlet piping of X-328
shell side,
inlet and outlet piping of X-339 shell side, outlet piping of X-165 shell
side, outlet
piping of X-8 tube side, inlet and outlet piping of X-7 tube side, and
inlet and outlet
of X-16 tube side.  In the event of an emergency, employees are subject to
hazards
related to fire and explosion due to misinformation about the actuation
potential of
isolation valves.
(e)On or about September 25, 2008, and at times prior thereto, P&ID
DR-13-PI-020
wrongly identifies the outlet piping for crude from X-30 tube side as a
Cooling Water
Return pipe (WH) instead of as a crude oil pipe (HC).  Employees are
exposed to
hazards related to fires and explosions due to the potential for employees
to
misidentify the fluid in the piping.
(f)On or about September 25, 2008, and at times prior thereto, P&ID
DR-13-PI-020
wrongly identifies the inlet piping for crude into X-30 tube side as 8-
inch diameter
instead of 6-inch diameter.  Employees are potentially exposed to hazards
related tofires and explosions due to the potential for employees to
misidentify a piping circuit.
(g)On or about December 12, 2008, and at times prior thereto, P&ID
DR-13-PI-090
wrongly identifies the speed control inputs for P-188 and P-652 as "LP"
instead of
"LY".  LP is not listed in the legend shown on DR-00-LG-040.  There is no
readily
apparent employee hazard associated with this instance.
One feasible means of abatement would be for the Employer to ensure that
its P&IDs
in the process safety information are accurate and updated.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Sample
Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Nov 12, 2010

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(D)  The employer did not compile process safety
information
which included the relief system design and design basis for equipment in
the process:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about November 20, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did
not
compile process safety information which included the relief system design
for
pressure relief from those heat exchangers and strainers which are
pressure vessels
falling under the scope requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
Code
Section VIII, Division 1.  Pressure vessel types of heat exchangers and
strainers
throughout the refinery, including, but not limited to, the following heat
exchangers
and strainers in the #1 Crude Unit, did not include their relief system
design in the
process safety information: X-322 both sides, X-338 both sides, X-16 shell
side, X-
165 tube side, X-7 shell side, X-8 shell side, X-30 both sides, X-161 both
sides, X-
163 and 164 shell side, S-1, S-2, S-56 and S-57.  Employees are exposed to
hazards
associated with fires and explosions due to the potential release of
highly hazardous
chemicals.
One feasible means of abatement would be for the employer to compile
process safety
information which includes the relief system design and design basis for
all heat
exchangers and strainers within the refinery that fall under the pressure
vessel
requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII,
Division 1.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification and documentation are required
for this item
(see enclosed "Sample Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Jan 12, 2010

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(ii): The employer did not document that equipment
complies with
recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about October 29, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer did
not
document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted
good
engineering practices (RAGAGEP) in that throughout the refinery,
including, but not
limited to, the #1 Crude Unit, there were many pressure vessels, such as
heat
exchangers and strainers, falling under the scope of the ASME Boiler and
Pressure
Vessel Code Section VIII, Division 1 (BPVC), which were not provided with
pressure
relief devices. Minimally, but not limited to, the following heat
exchangers and
strainers, which are pressure vessels in the #1 Crude Unit, were not
provided with
pressure relief devices: X-338 shell side, X-322 shell side, X-324 shell
side, X-323
shell side, X-322 tube side, X-338 tube side, X-16 shell side, X-165 tube
side, S-56
and S-57.  Employees are potentially exposed to hazards related to fires
and
explosions caused by overpressurized pressure vessels containing highly
hazardous
chemicals such as flammable liquids.
One feasible means of abatement would be for the employer to design and
install
pressure relief devices in accordance with RAGAGEP, such as meeting the
requirements of BVPC UG-125 through UG-137 for all pressure vessels
falling under
the scope of BPVC Section VIII, Division 1.
(b)On or about October 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted
good
engineering practices (RAGAGEP) in that the pressure setting for pressure
relief
valves RV15 and RV874, which were  installed to protect pressure vessel
W-1 from
overpressure, were set higher than 100 percent and 105 percent,
respectively, of the
maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) of W-1. Employees are potentially
exposed to hazards associated with fires and explosions resulting from
overpressurized
pressure vessels, such as W-4, containing highly hazardous chemicals.
One feasible means of abatement would be for the employer to ensure
pressure
settings of pressure relief devices are in accordance with RAGAGEP, such
as BPVC
UG-134(a).
(c)On or about October 29, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted
good
engineering practices (RAGAGEP) in that a report, which addresses the
procedures,
results, recommendations, and conclusions for the 2004 PHA for the #1
Crude Unit
was not written.  Employees are exposed to hazards associated with fires
and
explosions as a result of inadequate documentation of the PHA review for
the Crude
Unit.
One feasible means of abatement would be for the employer to ensure that
PHA
review procedures, results,  recommendations, and conclusions are
documented inaccordance with RAGAGEP, such as Chapter 6.3 of Guidelines
for Process Safety
Documentation, Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American
Institute of
Chemical Engineers, 1995.
(d)On or about October 29, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted
good
engineering practices (RAGAGEP) in that the documentation of the 2004 PHA
for the
#1 Crude Unit did not include the majority of the process safety
information, such as
the complete process technology package which includes the equipment safe
operating
limits, for the #1 Crude Unit. Employees are exposed to hazards associated
with fires
and explosions as a result of inadequate documentation of the PHA review
for the
Crude Unit.
One feasible means of abatement would be to ensure that PHA reviews are
documented in accordance with RAGAGEP, such as Chapter 6.3 of Guidelines
for
Process Safety Documentation, Center for Chemical Process Safety of the
American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1995.  Such documentation shall include
the process
safety information reviewed to allow auditing of the PHA for technical
quality.
(e)On or about December 17, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted
good
engineering practices (RAGAGEP) in that the West Plant Main Control Room
and
Old Lab (CFT Offices) building was not designed and constructed to protect
the
shelter-in-place occupants from releases of toxic contaminants such as
hydrogen
sulfide and flammable vapors within the refinery.  Employees were exposed
to
hazards such as fires and explosions, as well as overexposure to hydrogen
sulfide.
One feasible means of abatement would be to ensure that all
shelter-in-place
buildings
are designed and constructed in accordance with API RP 752.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification and documentation are required
for this item
(see enclosed "Sample Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Jan 12, 2010

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(ii)  The employer's process hazard analysis did not
address the
identification of all previous incidents which had a likely potential for
catastrophic
consequences in the workplace:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about December 15, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer's
2004
process hazard analysis for the #1 Crude Unit did not address all
incidents since the
previous PHA, including, but not limited to, incident 145 and 146
involving a seal
leak of pump P-435 on 10/20/03.  Employees are exposed to hazards related
to fires
and explosions as a result of not addressing in the 2004 PHA all previous
incidents
since the last PHA.
One feasible means of abatement would be to ensure that PHAs address the
hazards
associated with all previous incidents since the last PHA.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification and documentation are required
for this item
(see enclosed "Sample Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Feb 12, 2010

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(v)  The employer did not perform a process hazard
analysis which
addresses facility siting:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about November 3, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer did
not
perform a process hazard analysis for the East Plant which addresses
facility siting to
ensure that employees in occupied buildings are protected from safety and
health
hazards caused by the release of highly hazardous chemicals in the
refinery.
Employees are exposed to hazards associated with the release of highly
hazardous
chemical releases within the refinery complex.  These hazards include, but
are not
limited to, building collapse/flying debris hazards due to
overpressurization of
building structures, and toxic contaminant overexposures, such as hydrogen
sulfide,
carbon monoxide, and ammonia.
One feasible means of abatement would be to perform a facility siting
analysis to
ensure employees in occupied buildings are adequately protected from
safety and
health hazards associated with the release of highly hazardous chemicals
within the
refinery.  One recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice
(RAGAGEP) for accomplishing this is presented in API RP 752.
(b)On or about November 3, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
perform a process hazard analysis for the West Plant and Asphalt Unit which
addresses facility siting to ensure that employees in occupied buildings
are protected
from safety and health hazards caused by the release of highly hazardous
chemicals in
the refinery.  Employees are exposed to hazards associated with the
release of highly
hazardous chemical releases within the refinery complex.  These hazards
include, but
are not limited to, toxic contaminant overexposures, such as hydrogen
sulfide, carbon
monoxide, and ammonia.
One feasible means of abatement would be to perform a facility siting
analysis to
ensure employees in occupied buildings are adequately protected from
safety and
health hazards associated with the release of highly hazardous chemicals
within the
refinery.  One recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice
(RAGAGEP) for accomplishing this is presented in API 752.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification and documentation are required
for this item
(see enclosed "Sample Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Dec 12, 2009

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(5)  The employer did not establish a system to promptly
address the
team's findings and recommendations; assure that the recommendations are
resolved in a
timely manner and that the resolution is documented; document what actions
are to be taken;
complete actions as soon as possible; and develop a written schedule of
when these actions
are to be completed:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about October 29, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer,
including the
2004 PHA review team for the #1 Crude Unit, did not adequately address the
team's
findings and recommendations for recommendation #13 of the 1999 PHA for
the #1
Crude Unit. Employees are exposed to fires and explosion hazards related to
overpressurized pressure vessels containing highly hazardous chemicals.
Among other methods, one feasible means of abatement would be for the
employer
to
provide relief protection for pressure vessels which is in accordance with
UG-125
through UG-137 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII,
Div. 1
(2001 ed.).  One means of accomplishing this is to ensure that a
positively controlled
relief system for all pressure vessels (e.g., lock open or car seal open
all isolation
valves to a relief device) is installed and maintained.
(b)On or about November 4, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer,
including
the 2004 PHA review team for the #1 Crude Unit, did not adequately address
the
team's findings and recommendations for recommendation #15 of the 1999 PHA
for
the #1 Crude Unit.  Employees are exposed to hazards from fires and
explosions due
to the potential for pressure vessel X-16 to become overpressurized and
lose
containment of hydrocarbons.
Among other methods, one feasible means of abatement would be for the
employer to
provide relief protection for pressure vessels which is in accordance with
UG-125
through UG-137 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII,
Div. 1
(2001 ed.).  One means of accomplishing this is to ensure that a
positively controlled
relief system for all pressure vessels (e.g., lock open or car seal open
all isolation
valves to a relief device) is installed and maintained.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification and documentation are required
for this item
(see enclosed "Sample Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Dec 12, 2009

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i)(E): The employer did not develop and implement
written operating
procedures that provided clear instructions for safely conducting
activities involved in each
covered process consistent with the process safety information and
addressing the steps for
emergency operations:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about October 7, 2008, and at times prior thereto, Emergency
Operating
Procedure OP 013 502, Loss of Crude Booster Charge Pumps, referenced
Section 1.4
of Crude PT Package Unit 103 which contained references to safe operating
limits
that were not included in the package. Employees are exposed to the
hazards of
exposure to hydrogen sulfide and fire and explosion hazards due to loss of
containment associated with operating outside of safe operating limits.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification and documentation are required
for this item
(see enclosed "Sample Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Dec 12, 2009

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(3) The employer did not review operating procedures as
often as
necessary to assure that they reflected current operating practice and did
not certify annually
that operating procedures were current and accurate:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about October 7, 2008, and at times prior thereto, The employer did
not
review operating procedure OP 013 502 to assure it reflects current
operating
practice. Emergency Operating Procedure OP 013 502, Loss of Crude Booster
Charge
Pumps, referenced section 1.4 of Crude PT Package Unit 103 which contained
references to safe operating limits that were not included in the package.
Employees
are exposed to the hazards of  exposure to hydrogen sulfide and fire and
explosion
hazards due to loss of containment.
(b)On or about October 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not certify
annually that operating procedure OP 013 601 was current and accurate.
Employees
are exposed to the hazards of  exposure to hydrogen sulfide and fire and
explosion
hazards due to loss of containment.
(c)On or about October 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did
not certify
annually that operating procedure OP 013 602 was current and accurate.
Employees
are exposed to the hazards of  exposure to hydrogen sulfide and fire and
explosion
hazards due to loss of containment.
(d)On or about October 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not certify
annually that operating procedure OP 013 603 was current and accurate.
Employees
are exposed to the hazards of  exposure to hydrogen sulfide and fire and
explosion
hazards due to loss of containment.
(e)On or about October 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not certify
annually that operating procedure OP 013 604 was current and accurate.
Employees
are exposed to the hazards of  exposure to hydrogen sulfide and fire and
explosion
hazards due to loss of containment.
(f)On or about October 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not certify
annually that operating procedure OP 013 605 was current and accurate.
Employees
are exposed to the hazards of  exposure to hydrogen sulfide and fire and
explosion
hazards due to loss of containment.
(g)On or about October 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not certify
annually that operating procedure OP 013 606 was current and accurate.
Employees
are exposed to the hazards of  exposure to hydrogen sulfide and fire and
explosion
hazards due to loss of containment.
(h)On or about October 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not certify
annually that operating procedure OP 013 301 was current and accurate.
Employees
are exposed to the hazards of  exposure to hydrogen sulfide and fire and
explosionhazards due to loss of containment.
(i)On or about October 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not certify
annually that operating procedure OP 013 602 was current and accurate.
Employees
are exposed to the hazards of  exposure to hydrogen sulfide and fire and
explosion
hazards due to loss of containment.
(j)On or about October 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not certify
annually that operating procedure OP 013 603 was current and accurate.
Employees
are exposed to the hazards of  exposure to hydrogen sulfide and fire and
explosion
hazards due to loss of containment.
(k)On or about October 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not certify
annually that operating procedure OP 013 604 was current and accurate.
Employees
are exposed to the hazards of  exposure to hydrogen sulfide and fire and
explosion
hazards due to loss of containment.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification and documentation are required
for this item
(see enclosed "Sample Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Mar 12, 2010

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(4): The employer did not develop and implement safe
work practice(s)
to provide for the control of hazards during operations:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about October 7, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer did
not
develop and implement an adequate safe work practice for hot work.  The
employer
did not evaluate all types of hot work to determine frequency of
atmospheric testing
and whether continuous monitoring is required.  The employer's hot work
permit has
a section on frequency of monitoring which was never completed by field
personnel.
Employees are exposed to fire and explosion hazards.
One feasible means of abatement is to follow API 2009, Safe Welding,
Cutting,
and
Hot Work Practices in the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries, which
states
permits should include information on frequency of testing and whether
continuous
monitoring is required.
(b)On or about October 7, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
develop and implement an adequate safe work practice for to control fire
or explosion
hazards when motorized equipment enters or travels on roadways adjacent to
operating units that contain flammable or combustible liquids. The
employer's policy
for vehicle entry was inadequate in that atmospheric testing for vehicle
entry was
done once at the beginning of the shift.  That test was considered valid
for the
remainder of the shift.  Employees are exposed to fire and explosion
hazards.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Sample
Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Dec 12, 2009

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(g)(2):  The employer did not determine an appropriate
frequency of
refresher training through consultation with employees:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about September 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
consult with Crude Unit Operators on the appropriate frequency of operating
procedures refresher training. Employees are exposed to the hazards of
exposure to
hydrogen sulfide and fire and explosion hazards due to loss of containment
associated
with operator training deficiencies.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Sample
Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Dec 12, 2009

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(g)(3):  The employer did not determine that operators
understood the
training received:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about September 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
determine that Crude Unit Operators understood the operating procedures
they were
trained on during refresher training.  Employees are exposed to the
hazards of
exposure to hydrogen sulfide and fire and explosion hazards due to loss of
containment associated with operator training deficiencies.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Sample
Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Mar 12, 2010

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(j)(2): The employer or  did not establish and implement
written procedures
to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about October 6, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer did
not
develop MI procedures for non-metallic lined pressure vessels.  This
exposes
employees to the hazards associated with hydrogen sulfide and  fire and
explosion due
to release of highly hazardous chemicals.
(b)On or about November 5, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
had
contradicting piping classification with respect to MI 306, Piping and
Components
Equipment Guideline and Standard A-22 Engineering Standard. This exposes
employees to the hazards associated with hydrogen sulfide and fire and
explosion due
to release of highly hazardous chemicals.
(c)On or about October 16, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
maintain written MI procedures for 13CAS301 (MI-611.04) to address the
addition of
13LC98 which replaced 13LC96 in 2004.  This exposes employees to the
hazards
associated with hydrogen sulfide and fire and explosion due to the release
of highly
hazardous chemicals.
(d)On or about December 17, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
establish and implement written procedures that include a means for
ensuring the
HVAC system for the West Plant Old Lab (CFT Office) and the lab vent hood
fans
shut off when high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide or hydrocarbons are
detected in
the HVAC intake for this building.  Employees inside the Wet Plant Old Lab
(CFT
offices) building are exposed to fire and explosion hazards and
overexposure to
hydrogen sulfide.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Sample
Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Aug 12, 2010

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(j)(4)(ii): Inspection and testing procedures did not
follow recognized and
generally accepted good engineering practices:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about November 6, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer's
inspections
of process piping for corrosion under insulation (CUI) were not in
accordance with
RAGAGEP, such as API 570, Table 6-2, Recommended Extent of CUI Inspection
Following Visual Inspection. Employees are exposed to the hazards of
exposure to
hydrogen sulfide and fire and explosion hazards due to loss of containment.
(b)On or about November 6, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the
employer's piping
inspection records for five process piping sections did not contain
original installation
dates in accordance with RAGAGEP, such as API 574, Inspection Practices for
Piping System Components, paragraph 12.1. Employees are exposed to the
hazards of
exposure to hydrogen sulfide and fire and explosion hazards due to loss of
containment.
(c)On or about November 6, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the
employer's piping
inspection records did not contain original thickness measurements in
accordance
with
RAGAGEP, such as API 574, Inspection Practices for Piping System
Components,
paragraph 12.1. Employees are exposed to the hazards of  exposure to
hydrogen
sulfide and fire and explosion hazards due to loss of containment.
(d)On or about October 6, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer's
inspection
and testing procedures for pressure vessels with integrally bonded liners
were not in
accordance with RAGAGEP, such as API 510.  After an on-stream (external)
inspection was performed, the next scheduled test was not an internal
inspection.
This exposes employees to the hazards associated with hydrogen sulfide and
fire and
explosion due to release of highly hazardous chemicals.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Sample
Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Dec 12, 2009

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(j)(6)(ii):  Appropriate checks and inspections were not
performed to assure
that equipment was installed properly and consistent with design
specifications and
manufacturer's instructions:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about December 17, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
perform an appropriate test and inspection of the gas (hydrogen sulfide
and flammable
vapors) detection and HVAC system for the Asphalt Unit Control Room
building to
assure it was installed to operate in accordance with its design and the
manufacturer's
instructions.  Employees were exposed to hazards associated with potential
overexposures to hydrogen sulfide and potentially explosive concentrations
of
flammable vapors in a non-classified electrical location.
One feasible means of abatement would be for the employer to institute a
management
system which ensures that appropriate tests and inspections of newly
installed
equipment are performed to ensure such equipment operates in accordance
with its
design specifications and the manufacturer's instructions.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification and documentation are required
for this item
(see enclosed "Sample Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Dec 12, 2009

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(l)(1): The employer did not implement written procedures
to manage
changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment, and procedures; and
changes to
facilities that affect a covered process:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about September 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
conduct a Management of Change to address the change in composition of the
Unit 74
Sour Water Stripper Effluent which was injected into the overhead piping
circuit
including D-37, X-159 and D319 of the #1 Crude Unit, West Plant.  Chemical
changes included but were not limited to decreases in the levels of
ammonia
and
MDEA in the sour water stripper effluent.  This change in chemical content
of the
SWS effluent can be tied to increased corrosion and pipe failures in the
referenced
piping circuit. Employees are exposed to the hazards of hydrogen sulfide,
and fire and
explosion hazards due to loss of containment.
(b)On or about December 17, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
conduct a Management of Change for the January 2008 installation of the gas
detection system for the Asphalt Unit Control Room. Employees in this
shelter-in-
place building are subject to hazards related to overexposure to hydrogen
sulfide and
explosions and fire from the ignition of flammable vapors.
(c)On or about December 17, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
conduct a Management of Change for the change of  ventilation system and
toxic
contaminant detection systems used to protect employees in the West Plant
Crude
Unit
control room and the construction of the CFT offices in the WP Old Lab.
The
conversion was completed on or about May 13, 2008. Employees in this
shelter-in-
place building are subject to hazards related to overexposures to hydrogen
sulfide and
explosions and fires from the ignition of flammable vapors.
(d)On or about August 18, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
conduct a Management of Change when the throughput in the #1 Crude Unit
changed.
Employees are exposed to the hazards of hydrogen sulfide and fire and
explosion
hazards due to loss of containment.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification and documentation are required
for this item
(see enclosed "Sample Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Dec 12, 2009

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(l)(4):  Where a change covered by this paragraph resulted
in a change in
the process safety information (PSI) required by paragraph (d) of this
section,
such
information was not updated:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about October 23, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the PSI
information in the
Process Technology Package for the #1 Crude Unit was not updated for
MOC/CAF
2002-013-0025 which was closed March 26, 2004. Employees are exposed to the
hazards associated with loss of containment and exposure to hydrogen
sulfide, fire and
explosion.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Sample
Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Apr 12, 2010

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $1,500 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(m)(1): The employer did not investigate each incident
which resulted in,
or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release of highly
hazardous chemical in
the workplace:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about December 16, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer
did not
investigate incidents including but not limited to pump cavitation in the
vacuum
distillation W-36 bottoms unit which could lead to loss of containment.
Employees are
exposed to the hazards of hydrogen sulfide, and fire and explosion hazards
due to loss
of containment.
(b)On or about September 17, 2008, and at times prior thereto, some
reported PSM
incidents were not investigated. The employer scheduled repair work without
investigating the cause of the incident, including but not limited to
piping failures in
the D-37, X-159, D-319 circuit which occurred within approximately 14
months prior
to our inspection,  were not investigated to determine causal factors
until the fourth
incident as follows;  7/16/2007,  Incident number 100000027212; 1/21/2008,
Incident
number 100000037788; 1/27/2008, Incident number 100000038120, and
8/20/2008,
Incident number 100000047494. Loss of containment due to piping failure
could lead
to fire or explosion. Employees are exposed to the hazards of hydrogen
sulfide, and
fire and explosion hazards due to loss of containment.
(c)On or about December 16, 2008, and at times prior thereto, failure of
the W-36
Bottoms level indicator, 13L98, was not investigated although it was known
to
malfunction for several months and was the replacement for 13L96 which was
listed
as a Critical Alarm System. Multiple failures of this equipment (i.e.,
level indicators
in the W-36 Bottoms), were not investigated despite numerous work
notifications
being submitted. Employees are exposed to the hazards of hydrogen sulfide,
and fire
and explosion hazards due to loss of containment.
(d)On or about December 16, 2008, and at times prior thereto,
pressurization
of the
West Plant flare line to 37 psi (which was identified as a factor in the
overflow of D-
73 and loss of control of the FCC) was not investigated as a PSM incident.
The
overpressurization of the flare line could release explosively and cause a
flash fire due
to the large amounts of flammable and combustible liquids which can be
present.
Operators and other employees in the West Plant are exposed to the hazards
of
hydrogen sulfide, and fire and explosion hazards due to loss of
containment.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification and documentation are required
for this item
(see enclosed "Sample Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Apr 12, 2010

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $1,400 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(m)(4)(iv):  The incident investigation reports did not
include the factors
that contributed to the incident:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about September 17, 2008 and at times prior thereto, incidents that
did not
identify the contributing factors include, but are not limited to, a
series of four related
incidents from 7/16/2007 to 8/20/2008.  The incidents (7/16/2007 Incident
number
100000027212; 1/21/2008 Incident number 100000037788; 1/27/2008 Incident
number 100000038120; and 8/20/2008 Incident number 100000047494 ) did not
identify factors that contributed to the incident until the fourth
incident on 8/20/2008.
Employees are exposed to the hazards of hydrogen sulfide, fire, and
explosion
hazards due to loss of containment.
(b)On or about September 17, 2008 and at times prior thereto, the
following incident
investigation reports did not include the contributing factors include,
but are not
limited to: 3/2/2007 Incident number 100000018768; 8/6/2007 Incident number
100000028310; 2/22/2008 Incident number 100000039285; and 8/6/2008 Incident
number 100000047284. Employees are exposed to the hazards of hydrogen
sulfide,
fire, and explosion hazards due to loss of containment.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Sample
Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Dec 12, 2009

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(m)(5): The employer did not establish a system to promptly
address and
resolve the incident report findings and recommendations and to document
resolutions and
corrective actions:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about November 4, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer did
not
promptly address and resolve incident report findings and recommendations
and did
not adequately document corrective actions in that:
(1)Some of the recommendations from PSM incident reports dated 2006 or
earlier
are still open and not resolved, including but not limited to REC
#R2005011-
006, initiated 6/24/2005.
(2)Some of the recommendations from PSM incident reports are closed without
adequate documention of completion, including but not limited to REC
#R2006013, initiated 2/8/2006.
Failure to resolve incident findings and recommendations promptly exposes
employees
to increased risk of hydrocarbon releases with fire and explosion hazards.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Sample
Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Dec 12, 2009

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(o)(4): The employer did not promptly determine and
document an
appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, and
document that
deficiencies have been corrected:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about October 21, 2008, only 13 of 39 audit findings from the
previous 2007
and 2005 audits had been corrected and documented. Employees have increased
exposure to the hazards of hydrogen sulfide, fire, and explosion due to
the employer's
failure to correct identified deficiencies in the PSM program.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Sample
Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

May 12, 2009

Penalty

Initial $4,500 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.120(q)(2)(iv):  The emergency response plan did not address,
to the extent not
addressed elsewhere, safe distances and places of refuge:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about November 13, 2008, and at times prior thereto, The employer's
emergency response plan did not include procedures for occupying safe
havens.
Operators are required to shelter in place in the control room during
emergency
evacuations.  Other buildings such as the Maintenance Shop are listed as
shelter in
place refuges in the employer's emergency response plan.
(b)On or about November 13, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the assembly
areas in the
employer's emergency response plan, the 4 Plex and the Warehouse, were not
located
at a safe distance.  The 1998 Building Siting Evaluation indicated that a
release from
the Fuel Gas Contactor Knockout Drum would result in H2S levels above 300
ppm
(IDLH is 100 ppm) up to 0.6 miles for a 1 in diameter release and up to 2
miles for a
3 inch diameter release.  The assembly areas are within these radii.  The
employer's
emergency response plan did not include evacuation contingency plans if an
H2S
release occurred from the Fuel Gas Contactor Knockout Drum.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification and documentation are required
for this item
(see enclosed "Sample Abatement-Certification Letter").

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Aug 12, 2010

Penalty

Initial $2,250 · Current $4,800

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.178(c)(2)(iv):  Power-operated industrial trucks were not
designated as DY,
EE, or EX while being used in locations where volatile flammable liquids
or
flammable
gases are handled, processed or used, but in which the hazardous liquids,
vapors or gases
will normally be confined within containers or closed systems from which
they can escape
only in case of accidental rupture or breakdown of such containers or
systems, or in case of
abnormal operation of equipment:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc, 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about October 14, 2008, and at prior times, Suncor, as the
controlling
employer, did not ensure that industrial trucks operated by contractors in
Class 1,
Division 2, Group D areas such as the #1 Crude Unit, the #3 HDS Unit, and
the #4
HDS Unit were classified for use in this type of location.  There were no
DY, EE,
EX, or DX rated industrial trucks available for use at the refinery. This
exposes
employees to fire and explosion hazards.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Sample
Abatement-Certification Letter").-Certification

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Apr 12, 2010

Penalty

Current $4,800

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Apr 12, 2010

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Dec 12, 2009

Penalty

Initial $49,500 · Current $7,000 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(j)(4)(iii): The frequency of inspections and tests of
process equipment was
not consistent with applicable manufacturers' recommendations and good
engineering
practices, and more frequently if determined to be necessary by operating
experience:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about December 17, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the hydrogen
sulfide
and/or combustible gas detection systems in HVAC systems for control room
buildings throughout the refinery, including, but not limited to the West
Plant Main
Control Room and Old Lab (CFT Offices) building and the Asphalt Unit
Control
Room, were not tested for calibration and operation in accordance with the
detector
manufacturers' recommendations and good engineering practice. Employees in
these
shelter-in-place buildings are subject to hazards related to overexposures
of
hydrogen
sulfide and explosions and fires from the ignition of flammable vapors.
One feasible means of abatement would be to implement a management system
which
would ensure that all detectors in HVAC systems for shelter-in-place
buildings are
checked for calibration and operability in accordance with their
manufacturers'
recommendations and good engineering practice.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification and documentation are required
for this item
(see enclosed "Sample Abatement-Certification Letter")

Issued

Mar 5, 2009

Abate by

Jan 12, 2010

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(n):  The employer did not include a procedure in its
emergency response
plan that instructs employees on how to distinguish between small releases
and spills and
large releases and spills and what employee actions are required in both
instances:
(a)Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., 5801 Brighton Blvd., Commerce City,
Colorado:
On or about September 8, 2008, and at times prior thereto, the employer's
emergency
response plan did not include a procedure on how to distinguish between
small
releases and spills and large releases and spills, and the employer did
not instruct
employees on how to distinguish between small releases and spills and
large releases
and spills.  This increases the likelihood that employees will respond to
releases
beyond their abilities and level of training and increases potential
exposure to fire and
explosion hazards.
Abatement Note:  Abatement certification is required for this item (see
enclosed "Sample
Abatement-Certification Letter").