OSHA Inspection: GENEVA WOOD FUELS, LLC

Issued

Feb 4, 2010

Abate by

Apr 23, 2010

Penalty

Initial $7,000 · Current $6,000 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The
employer did not furnish
employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized
hazards that were
causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm in that
employees were exposed to dust
explosion, deflagration and/or other fire hazards due to deficient
construction, design and/or
location of the wood pellet plant processing systems:
Location:  Wood Pellet Plant
a)Wood chips (for processing into wood pellets) were placed into and moved
along
in some pieces of processing equipment without inspection and prevention
methods to ensure that no potentially spark-producing tramp metal entered
into
or traveled through the processing equipment.
Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to
correct this hazard is
to comply with NFPA 664 (2007)  Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood
Processing and
Woodworking Facilities, including:
*section 7.12.1 (inspect wood stock for foreign materials such as nails
before
processing it);
*section 7.12.2  (prevent foreign materials - like tramp metal that can
ignite wood
waste and dust - from entering wood and dust process equipment);
*section 7.12.3  (prevent foreign materials from entering dust collection
systems,
and methods to do so);
*section 7.12.4 (prevent foreign materials from entering particulate size
reduction
equipment, and methods to do so; and
*section 8.4.2.2 (remove foreign material from the feed into all
particulate size
reduction equipment, and methods to do so).
b)The interior of the 12-foot-diameter, 50-foot-long Rotary Dryer for wood
Material (wood chips initially reduced to 3/8 inch pieces, combined with
wood
dust) was not inspected and/or cleaned to keep combustible deposits to a
minimum.
Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to
correct this hazard is
to comply with NFPA 664 (2007)  Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood
Processing and
Woodworking Facilities, section 8.6.2.3, which requires regular inspection
and, if necessary,
cleaning of rotary dryers.
c)The overhead Roof Cyclone system, which fed recycled wood dust fines
into the
Rotary Dryer, was altered by the employer to eliminate the manufacturer's
metering bin and rotary air lock. This permitted the continuous flow of
dry wood
dust fines into the Rotary Dryer, thereby contributing to a fire
/explosion hazard
in the Dryer.
Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to
correct this hazard is
to follow the Rotary Dryer manufacturer's safety instructions to refrain
from makingmodifications without its approval; or to refrain from making
modifications without the approval
of a knowledgeable expert in the industry.
d)The Rotary Dryer which posed a deflagration hazard was located in an
indoor
location that was neither a separate detached building nor a separate
cutoff room
with damage -limiting construction.
Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to
correct this hazard is
to comply with NFPA 664 (2007)  Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood
Processing and
Woodworking Facilities, section 8.6.2.1 by locating the dryer outdoors, or
in a separate
detached building, or in a separate cutoff room with damage-limiting
construction
e)When the spark detection system located on the downstream side of the
Rotary
Dryer activated multiple times per day, the employer failed to take
effective
action to determine and eliminate the cause.
Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to
correct this hazard is
to comply with NFPA 664 (2007)  Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood
Processing and
Woodworking Facilities, section 7.7.2 which requires burners to be
designed, installed and
operating in a manner that prevents the unintentional ignition of wood or
other cellulosic
material outside the combustion zone.
f)Explosion isolation devices (which in the event of an explosion, prevent
the
explosion from propagating to other areas) were not provided in all the
necessary
locations, such as the following:
*between the Baghouse (which stores dust outside) and equipment inside the
building, connected to it by ductwork (multiple ducts needing explosion
isolation for protection)
*between the Baghouse and all rooftop equipment connected to it by
ductwork
*between the Roof Cyclone (feeding dry dust fines to the Rotary Dryer)
and the Rotary Dryer, in the connecting ductwork
Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to
correct this hazard is
to comply with NFPA 664 (2007)  Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood
Processing and
Woodworking Facilities, section 8.2.2.1.1, which requires pneumatic
conveying systems to be
designed as per NFPA 654 (2006), Standard for the Prevention of Fire and
Dust Explosions
from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible
Particulate Solids.  Where
an explosion hazard exists, section 7.1.4.1 of NFPA 654 requires that
isolation devices be
provided to prevent deflagration propagation between pieces of equipment
connected by
ductwork.
g)Spark detection was not installed in all necessary locations, such as
the ductwork
connecting the Roof Cyclone (over the Dryer) with the Baghouse (which
stored
wood dust outside).
Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to
correct this hazard is
to comply with NFPA 664 (2007)  Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood
Processing and
Woodworking Facilities, section 8.2.2.2.2, which requires that ducts
conveying dry material
from equipment that can generate sparks be equipped with a spark detection
system.

Issued

Feb 4, 2010

Abate by

Apr 23, 2010

Penalty

Initial $2,500 · Current $2,500

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:  The
employer did not
furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from
recognized hazards that
were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
employees in that employees
were exposed to struck by or crushing hazards:
a)Pelletizer Area - The design and the load ratings for the three
"below-the-hook"
lifting devices used to lift sections of the pelletizers were not in
accordance with
ASME B30.20-2006, Below-the-Hook Lifting Devices.
One method among other feasible methods is to review the manufacturer's
recommendations and
prohibitions for designing a lifting device.
Abatement Note: See ASME B30.20-2006, Below-the-Hook Lifting Device for
guidelines.
b)Pelletizer Area - There were no indications that the support beams for
the three
one ton manual chain fall hoists were designed to withstand the loads and
forces
imposed by the hoists.
One method among other feasible methods is to properly assess the existing
structure in order
to determine an appropriate design for the support beams.
Abatement Note: See ASME B30.16-2007, Overhung Hoists (Underhung) for
guidelines.

Issued

Feb 4, 2010

Abate by

Feb 12, 2010

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $3,000 Reduced

Issued

Feb 4, 2010

Abate by

Apr 23, 2010

Penalty

Initial $2,500 · Current $1,000 Reduced

Issued

Feb 4, 2010

Abate by

Apr 23, 2010

Penalty

Initial $5,000 · Current $2,500 Reduced

Issued

Feb 4, 2010

Abate by

Apr 23, 2010