OSHA Inspection: NEW ENGLAND WOOD PELLET, LLC

Issued

Mar 5, 2013

Penalty

Initial $3,080 · Current $2,350 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.212(a)(1): One or more methods of machine guarding was not provided to protect the operator and other employees in the machine area from hazards such as those created by point of operation, ingoing nip points, rotating parts, flying chips and sparks:    a)  Maintenance, on or about 9/7/12:  Buffalo drill press was not provided with a chuck guard.    b)  Maintenance, on or about 9/7/12:  Acer horizontal band saw was not provided with an adjustable guard.

Issued

Mar 5, 2013

Abate by

Apr 7, 2013

Penalty

Initial $3,850 · Current $2,940 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.307(b):  Documentation for areas designated as hazardous (classified) locations under the Class and Zone system and areas designated under the Class and Division system established after August 13, 2007 was not available to those authorized to design, install, inspect, maintain, or operate electric equipment at the location:      a)  New England Wood Pellet, Deposit Facility, on or about 9/20/2012:  The Employer was unable to produce electrical classification drawings of the facility which are required to be available to those authorzied to design, install, inspect, maintain, or operate electric equipment in hazardous locations.

Issued

Mar 5, 2013

Abate by

Aug 15, 2013

Penalty

Initial $10,780 · Current $8,235 Reduced

General-duty citation text

OSH ACT of 1970 Section (5)(a)(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to wood dust explosions, deflagrations, and fire hazards due to deficient design and/or implementation of preventive and/or protective measures in its wood pellet processing system and related equipment, such as the following:    A)  Dry Hammer Mill, on or about 9/20/12:  Isolation devices were not provided at the connecting path between the following components to prevent or mediate the transmission of a flame front or deflagration between them:    1.  The infeed conveyor from cyclones to the oscillating screener;  2.  The oscillating screener from the hammer mill;  3.  The hammer mill plenum from the dust collector;  4.  The hammer mill plenum from the screw conveyor;  5.  The screw conveyor from the silos.     Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2012) Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as:    Section 8.2.4.1 of 2012 NFPA 664 requires that conveying systems with fire and deflagration hazards shall be isolated to prevent propagation of fire and deflagration both upstream and downstream critical process equipment.    Feasible isolation devices include but are not limited to, rated rotary feeder valves, high-speed actuated slide gates, pant leg gates, material chokes, suppression, etc.      B)  Dry Hammer Mill, on or about 9/20/12:  There is no bonding and grounding of the oscillating screener providing in-feed to the dry hammer mill.  While mechanically connecting, the universal joints electrically isolate the screener from its support.        Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2012) Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as:      Section 7.9.2 of 2012 NFPA 664 requires that static electric charge shall be controlled by one of the following:    1)	Permanent grounding and bonding of production equipment;  2)	Grounded metal comb to provide discharge paths;  3)	Other means shown to be effective and acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction.     Flexible cables bonding the screener to its support which is grounded would be feasible mitigation.      C)  Pellet Mill Coolers and Cyclones, on or about 9/20/12:  Three pellet coolers and their associated cyclones were not provided with isolation devices at the connection paths between:    1.  The cyclone and the pellet cooler;  2.  The pelletizer and the pellet cooler;  3.  The cyclone and the conveyor connecting the distribution bin to the metering bin;  4.  The pellet cooler and pellet silo;  5.  The pellet cooler and outside.    Section 8.2.4.1 of 2012 NFPA 664 requires that conveying systems with fire and deflagration hazards shall be isolated to prevent propagation of fire and deflagration both upstream and downstream critical process equipment.    Feasible isolation devices include but are not limited to, rated rotary feeder valves, high-speed actuated slide gates, pant leg gates, material chokes, suppression, etc.      D)  Pellet Coolers, Cyclones and Distributiuon Bin, on or about 9/20/12:  Three pellet coolers, their associated cyclones and the distribution bin were not provided with any protective controls to mitigate deflagration hazards presented while filling.      Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2012) Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as:    Section 8.2.2.5.1.4 and Section 8.2.2.5.3 of the 2012 NFPA 664 offers containment, explosion venting and suppression as feasible controls to mitigate deflagrations hazards of indoor cyclones;    Section 8.2.2.2.3 of 2012 NFPA 664 offers containment, explosion venting and suppression as feasible controls to mitigate deflagratiojn hazards of indoor pellet coolers;    Section 8.10.3.2 of 2012 NFPA 664 offiers explosion venting and suppression as feasible controls to mitigate deflagration hazards of silos.        E)  Packaging Screener Dust Collector, on or about 9/20/12:  The pellet screener and dust collector with deflagration hazards were not provided with isolating devices at the connecting paths between the:    1.  Pellet screener and the pellet screener dust collector;  2.  Pellet screener dust collector hopper and the distribution bin.    Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2012) Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as:    Section 8.2.4.1 of 2012 NFPA 664 requires that conveying systems with fire and deflagration hazards shall be isolated to prevent propagation of fire and deflagration both upstream and downstream critical process equipment.    Feasible isolation devices include but are not limited to, rated rotary feeder valves, high-speed actuated slide gates, pant leg gates, material chokes, suppression, etc.           NEW ENGLAND WOOD PELLET, LLC. WAS PREVIOUSLY CITED FOR A VIOLATION OF THIS OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARD, SECTION 5(a)(1) WHICH WAS CONTAINED IN OSHA INSPECTION NUMBER 311584213, CITATION NUMBER 2, ITEM NUMBER 1, ISSUED ON JULY 22, 2008, WITH RESPECT TO A WORKPLACE LOCATED AT  141 OLD SHARON ROAD, JAFFREY, NEW HAMPSHIRE, 03452. THE FINAL ORDER DATE FOR THE CITATION WAS ON AUGUST 5, 2008 UPON SIGNING AN INFORMAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.