OSHA Inspection: TOMOEGAWA (U.S.A.) INC.

Issued

May 19, 2014

Abate by

Apr 1, 2019

Penalty

Initial $6,300 · Current $6,300

Hazardous substances M102M104M110

General-duty citation text

Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees in that employees were exposed to dust deflagration, explosion, or other fire hazards as the result of working at or near dust collection systems handling combustible toner compound/additive dust which were not designed/installed/located to prevent or minimize exposure in the event of a deflagration, explosion, or other uncontrolled fire event:       Tomoegawa (U.S.A.) Inc.: On or about November 20, 2013 employees were exposed to combustible dust deflagration, explosion, and fire hazards associated with dust collection systems such as, but not limited to, the following:         (a) Outdoor fabric filter media dust collector MAC D/C#1 and #2 associated with the aspiration system, was used to collect excess combustible toner compound/additive dust from the production department.  The dust collector: 1) lacked a means of explosion protection, 2) lacked a means of deflagration propagation protection (isolation) between the collector and the upstream process and between the collector and the return air system, and 3) lacked provisions to prevent transmission of smoke and flame from a  fire back into the facility through the exhaust air return system.       (b) Outdoor fabric filter media dust collectors D/C/E#3 and Donaldson D/#4, and Donaldson D/C#8 associated with the aspiration system, were used to collect excess combustible toner compound/additive dust from the production department. The dust collectors: 1) lacked a means of deflagration propagation protection (isolation) between the collector and the upstream process and between the collector and the return air system and 2) lacked provisions to prevent transmission of smoke and flame from a fire back into the facility through the exhaust air return system.       (c) Indoor fabric filter media dust collectors NPK Nippon Pneumatic Mfg. J/M-1 BF1, NPK Nippon Pneumatic Mfg. J/M-1 BF2, and Hosokawa Micron Corp. J/M-1 BF3, were used to collect, and when needed, return excess combustible toner compound/additive dust to Jet Mill 1.  The dust collectors: 1) contained deflagration venting that discharged directly inside the employee occupied facility and 2) lacked a means of deflagration propagation protection (isolation) to protect connected equipment and processes.       (d) Indoor fabric filter media dust collectors NPK Nippon Pneumatic Mfg. J/M-2 BF1, NPK Nippon Pneumatic Mfg. J/M-2 BF2, NPK PUL J/M-2 BF3, and Hosokawa Micron Corp. J/M-2 BF4, were used to collect, and when needed, return excess combustible toner compound/additive dust to Jet Mill 2.  The dust collectors: 1) contained deflagration venting that discharged directly inside the employee occupied facility, and 2) lacked a means of deflagration propagation protection (isolation) to protect connected equipment and processes.       (e) Indoor fabric filter media dust collectors NPK Nippon Pneumatic Mfg. J/M-3 BF1, NPK Nippon Pneumatic Mfg. J/M-3 BF2, and Hosokawa/Mikro J/M-3 BF3, were used to collect, and when needed, return excess combustible toner compound/additive dust to Jet Mill 3.  The dust collectors: 1) contained deflagration venting that discharged directly inside the employee occupied facility and 2) lacked a means of deflagration propagation protection (isolation) to protect connected equipment and processes.       (f) Indoor fabric filter media dust collectors NPK Nippon Pneumatic Mfg. J/M-4 BF1, NPK Nippon Pneumatic Mfg. J/M-4 BF2, and NPK Excel Filter J/M-4 BF3, were used to collect, and when needed, return excess combustible toner compound additive/dust to Jet Mill 4.  The dust collectors: 1) contained deflagration venting that discharged directly inside the employee occupied facility and 2) lacked a means of deflagration propagation protection (isolation) to protect connected equipment and processes.       (g) Indoor fabric filter media dust collectors Hosokawa Mikro J/M-5 BF1, Horizon Systems J/M-5 BF2, Horizon Systems J/M-5 BF3, and GD Invisible J/M-5 were used to collect, and when needed, return excess combustible toner compound additive/dust to Jet Mill 5.  The dust collectors: 1) contained deflagration venting that discharged directly inside the employee occupied facility and 2) lacked a means of deflagration propagation protection (isolation) to protect connected equipment and processes.       (h) Indoor fabric filter media dust collectors MAC J/M-6 BF1, MAC J/M-6 BF2, and MAC  J/M-6 BF3 were used to collect, and when needed, return excess combustible toner compound/additive dust to Jet Mill 6.  The dust collectors: 1) contained deflagration venting that discharged directly inside the employee occupied facility and 2) lacked a means of deflagration propagation protection (isolation) to protect connected equipment and processes.       (i) Indoor fabric filter media dust collector/filter receiver STH 7 was used to collect, and when needed, return excess combustible toner compound/additive dust to Aftertreatment #7 straight toner hopper.  The dust collector: 1) contained deflagration venting that discharged directly inside the employee occupied facility, 2) lacked a means of deflagration propagation protection (isolation) to protect connected equipment and processes, and 3) lacked means to prevent transmission of flame/pressure effects from a deflagration and well as smoke/flame from a fire back into the facility through the exhaust air system which discharged directly into the facility.       (j) Indoor fabric filter media dust collector/filter receiver MAC STH 11 was used to collect, and when needed, return excess combustible toner compound/additive dust to Aftertreatment #11 straight toner hopper.  The dust collector: 1) contained deflagration venting that discharged directly inside the employee occupied facility, 2) lacked a means of deflagration propagation protection (isolation) to protect connected equipment and processes, and 3) lacked means to prevent transmission of flame/pressure effects from a deflagration and well as smoke/flame from a fire back into the facility through the exhaust air system which discharged directly into the facility.       (k) Indoor fabric filter media dust collector/filter receiver MAC STH 13 was used to collect, and when needed, return excess combustible toner compound/additive dust to Aftertreatment #13 straight toner hopper.  The dust collector: 1) contained deflagration venting that discharged directly inside the employee occupied facility, 2) lacked a means of deflagration propagation protection (isolation) to protect connected equipment and processes, and 3) lacked means to prevent transmission of flame/pressure effects from a deflagration and well as smoke/flame from a fire back into the facility through the exhaust air system which discharged directly into the facility.       (l) Indoor fabric filter media dust collector/filter receiver MAC STH 15 was used to collect, and when needed, return excess combustible toner compound/additive dust to Aftertreatment #15 straight toner hopper.  The dust collector: 1) contained deflagration venting that discharged directly inside the employee occupied facility, 2) lacked a means of deflagration propagation protection (isolation) to protect connected equipment and processes, and 3) lacked means to prevent transmission of flame/pressure effects from a deflagration and well as smoke/flame from a fire back into the facility through the exhaust air system which discharged directly into the facility.       (m) Indoor fabric filter media dust collector/filter receiver MAC STH 14 was used to collect, and when needed, return excess combustible toner compound/additive dust to Aftertreatment #14 straight toner hopper.  The dust collector: 1) lacked a means of explosion protection, 2) lacked a means of deflagration propagation protection (isolation) to protect connected equipment and processes, and 3) lacked means to prevent transmission of flame/pressure effects from a deflagration and well as smoke/flame from a fire back into the facility through the exhaust air system which discharged directly into the facility.    Among other methods, feasible and acceptable means of abatement include following the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 654 "Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids, 2013 ed." � Sections 4.2.1, 7.1.4.1*, 7.1.6.1, 7.1.7, 7.13.1.1.1, 7.13.1.2.2, 7.13.1.4, 7.13.1.6, 9.1.2, and 9.3.  *Note: NFPA Standard 654 Section 7.1.4.1(2) and NFPA Standard 68 "Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting" Sections 4.2.1.3, 6.6.1 and A.6.6 recognize that the material discharged from the venting of a deflagration shall be directed to a safe location.       Specifically:       1)    Provide deflagration venting that discharges to an outdoor safe location or discharges indoors in a recognized safe manner as deemed appropriate through a credible process hazard analysis/risk evaluation.  NFPA Standard 68 "Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting" provides specific guidance on the safe venting of deflagrations on both indoor and outdoor enclosed process equipment.  Deflagrations may be safely discharged to outdoor location through relief ducting provided that consideration is given to the reduction in deflagration venting efficiency caused by the ducts, that the ducting is restricted to no more than 20 ft, and the ducting is able to withstand the maximum pressure developed in the vented enclosure (Pred).  If deflagration venting through relief ducting is not feasible due to the proximity of the indoor vented enclosure to an outdoor wall, deflagration venting through a listed dust retention and flame-arresting device is a suitable alternative.        2)    Install listed passive or active isolation devices between connected pieces of process equipment (upstream and downstream of dust collectors) to prevent deflagration propagation as deemed appropriate through a credible process hazard analysis/risk evaluation.  NFPA Standard 69 "Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems" provides specific guidance on the appropriate selection, design, installation, maintenance, and limitations of multiple types of passive and active isolation device technologies.       3)    Where exhaust air from outdoor dust collectors is being returned back to the facility or where exhaust air from indoor dust collectors is being discharged directly into the facility, (1) include provisions in the system to prevent the transmission of flame and pressure effects from a deflagration (deflagration isolation) into the facility and (2) include provisions to prevent the transmission of smoke and flame from a fire into the facility (fire detection and suppression, fire detection and fan interlock, etc.) as deemed appropriate though a credible process hazard analysis/risk evaluation.

Issued

May 19, 2014

Abate by

Jul 31, 2014

Penalty

Initial $2,700 · Current $2,700

Hazardous substances 9135

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.134 (c)(1): In any workplace where respirators are necessary to protect the health of the employee or whenever respirators are required by the employer, the employer did not establish and implement a written respiratory protection program.           a) Tomoegawa (U.S.A.) Inc. - The employer did not ensure that a written respiratory protection was established and implemented for employees required to use respiratory protection, including 3M N95 8210 filtering facepiece respirators. The employees wore 3M N95 8210 respirators during toner compound production and manufacturing operations.     The respiratory protection program shall include, at a minimum, procedures for selecting respirators; medical evaluations; fit testing; procedures for proper use in routine and reasonably foreseeable emergency situations; procedures for cleaning, storing, inspecting, repairing and discarding respirators; employee training regarding respiratory hazards they are exposed to, proper uses and limitations of respirators; and procedures for regularly evaluating the effectiveness of the respirator program.       In accordance with 29 CFR 1903.19(d), abatement certification is required for this violation (using the CERTIFIICATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION WORKSHEET).

Issued

May 19, 2014

Abate by

Jul 31, 2014

Penalty

Initial $2,700 · Current $0 Reduced

Hazardous substances 9135

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.134(e)(1):  The employer did not provide a medical evaluation to determine the employee's ability to use a respirator, before the employee was fit tested or required to use the respirator in the workplace:         a) Tomoegawa (U.S.A.) Inc. - The employer did not ensure did not ensure that employees required to wear respiratory protection, including 3M N95 8210 filtering facepiece respirators, were provided with a medical evaluation to determine their ability to use a respirator. The employees wore 3M N95 8210 respirators during toner compound production and manufacturing operations.      In accordance with 29 CFR 1903.19(d), abatement certification is required for this violation (using the CERTIFIICATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION WORKSHEET).

Issued

May 19, 2014

Abate by

Jul 31, 2014

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

Hazardous substances 9135

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.134(f)(2):  The employer did not ensure that employees using a tight-fitting facepiece respirator were fit tested prior to the initial use of the respirator, whenever a different respirator facepiece (size, style, model or make) is used, and at least annually thereafter.          a) Tomoegawa (U.S.A.) Inc.- The employer did not ensure that employees required to wear respiratory protection, including 3M N95 8210 filtering facepiece respirator, were fit tested prior to the initial use of the respirator. The employees wore 3M N95 8210 respirators during toner compound production and manufacturing operations.      In accordance with 29 CFR 1903.19(d), abatement certification is required for this violation (using the CERTIFIICATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION WORKSHEET).

Issued

May 19, 2014

Abate by

Jul 31, 2014

Penalty

Initial $2,700 · Current $2,700

Hazardous substances 9135

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.134(k)(1): The employer did not provide respirator training that would ensure that each employee could demonstrate knowledge of items in section (i)-(vii).      a) Tomoegawa (U.S.A.) Inc. - The employer did not ensure that employees required to use respiratory protection, including 3M N95 8210 filtering facepiece respirators, were provided appropriate training. The employees wore 3M N95 8210 respirators during toner compound production and manufacturing operations.    In accordance with 29 CFR 1903.19(d), abatement certification is required for this violation (using the CERTIFIICATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION WORKSHEET).