OSHA Inspection: SCHWAN'S GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN INC.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Nov 15, 2017

Penalty

Initial $5,975 · Current $3,585 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.37(b)(6): Each exit sign was not illuminated to a surface value of at least five foot-candles (54 lux) by a reliable light source and be distinctive in color:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment in the Engine Rooms were exposed to fire hazards or chemical hazards associated with a catastrophic release of Ammonia in case of emergency and power loss in that the following emergency exit signs were not self illuminating,  electroluminescent, or lit by emergency lighting:   (a) CP2 - Engine Room - Emergency exit sign in the engine room    (b) CP4 - Engine Room by the stairway of second floor    29 CFR 1903.19(c)(1) requires certification that the abatement of the above violations is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Feb 28, 2019

Penalty

Initial $7,967 · Current $4,780 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)(B): The employer's piping and instrument diagrams were not accurate and did not represent equipment that was existing and was part of the process:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment on the roof top of the West side of the Main Plant were exposed to chemical hazards associated with a catastrophic release of Ammonia in that the employer had not verified that all Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID's) were up to date and accurate for use by Schwan employees and contractors for the process hazard analysis, line breaks, equipment/piping replacement/repairs, and etc. The following was noted during the walk around:  (a) A safety valve label B10297 SV06 on the P&ID drawing No. R716 did not match with the label on the piping portal. The field setup has a wrong ID tag label comparing to the P&ID drawing.  (b) A check valve label B10297 CKV02 was observed to be in the wrong physical location comparing to the P&ID drawing No. R716.  (c) A hand valve label B10297 HV08 was observed in the field location but not drawn on the P&ID drawing No. R716.  29 CFR 1903.19(c)(1) requires certification that the abatement of the above violations is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Sep 19, 2018

Penalty

Initial $9,959 · Current $5,975 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(ii): The employer did not document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment on the roof top of the West side of the Main Plant and the engine rooms were exposed to catastrophic release of ammonia which results in asphyxiation, explosion and flash fire leading to death and injury to persons in and near the facility in that the employer failed to document and implement compliance with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices for the marking/labeling of Ammonia refrigeration piping and system components. The following was noted during the walk around:  (a) A valve for Low Temperature Suction Open Liquid to the Cross-Over was missing the Tag Identification.  (b) A valve for Low Temperature Recirculator Liquid - LTRL orange rubber Identification Tag with black marker was observed fading out and could not be read.  (c) A valve for LTSL15 light yellow rubber Identification Tag with black marker was observed fading out and could not be read.  (d) A valve for HTRL light yellow rubber Identification Tag with black marker was observed fading out and could not be read.  (e) An orange rubber Identification Tag with black marker was observed fading out, could not be read, and felt on the ground of the roof.  (f) A blue valve for suction line was missing the Identification Tag.  (g) A main pump-out valve for HTRS was missing the Identification Tag.  (h) A hand valve next to HTRL HV29 on the North West side of Tower #6 orange rubber Identification Tag with black marker was observed fading out and could not be read.  (i) A hand valve next to HTRL HV29 on the North West side of Tower #6 was missing the Identification Tag.  (j) The HPR - HV08 for the High Pressure Receiver Liquid Make-up valve was not labeled as the King valve on the second floor of the CP-4 Engine Room.    29 CFR 1903.19(c)(1) requires certification that the abatement of the above violations is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Nov 15, 2017

Penalty

Initial $7,967 · Current $4,780 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(i): The Process Hazard Analysis did not address the hazards of the process:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment on the roof top of the Main Plant and the engine rooms were exposed to catastrophic release of ammonia which results in asphyxiation, explosion and flash fire leading to death and injury to persons in and near the facility in that the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) study failed to address the quality of inbounding/receiving Ammonia. The 1996, 1999, 2005, 2006 PHA "What-If" questions under the Charging Ammonia to System PHA Notes section does not address this requirement. The 2007, and 2012 PHA did not include any revision about the Charging Ammonia to System.  29 CFR 1903.19(c)(1) requires certification that the abatement of the above violations is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Nov 15, 2017

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(iii)(D): The employer's written operating procedures covering operating limits did not address quality control for raw materials and control of hazardous chemical inventory levels:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment on the roof top of the Main Plant and the engine rooms were exposed to catastrophic release of ammonia which results in asphyxiation, explosion and flash fire leading to death and injury to persons in and near the facility in that the current written operating procedures - OP: Ammonia Charging (Transfer) Operation Initial Date: July 1, 2006 fails to address the quality control for raw materials and control of hazardous chemical inventory levels of the incoming Ammonia as how to receive fresh or make-up Ammonia. There was no revision, no step which requires someone to verify the quality of the incoming Ammonia to ensure that the quality of the Ammonia meets refrigeration grade.  29 CFR 1903.19(c)(1) requires certification that the abatement of the above violations is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Nov 15, 2017

Penalty

Initial $5,975 · Current $3,585 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(iii): The process hazard analysis did not address engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment in the CP-4 engine room were exposed to catastrophic release of ammonia which results in asphyxiation, explosion and flash fire leading to death and injury to persons in and near the facility in that the employer fails to verify that the engine room complied with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices such as but not limited to IIAR Bulletin #111 06/02; ASHRAE-15 2013; ANSI/IIAR 2-2012; 2006 IFC. Remote control of mechanical equipment in the refrigerating machinery room (Remote Emergency Stop Switches - E-Stops) was not installed immediately outside the machinery room door, but approximately 20 feet away.      29 CFR 1903.19(c)(1) requires certification that the abatement of the above violations is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Dec 31, 2018

Penalty

Initial $12,675 · Current $7,605 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(5): The employer did not establish a system to promptly address the team's findings and recommendations; assure that the recommendations were resolved in a timely manner and that the resolution was documented; document what actions were to be taken; complete actions as soon as possible; develop a written schedule of when these actions were to be completed; communicate the actions to operating, maintenance and other employees whose work assignments were in the process and who may have been affected by the recommendations or actions:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment on the roof top of the Main Plant and the engine rooms were exposed to catastrophic release of ammonia which results in asphyxiation, explosion and flash fire leading to death and injury to persons in and near the facility in that the findings and recommendations identified in the Process Hazard Analysis have not been implemented or resolved as below:  a) 1996 initial PHA study only contains 29 pages of What-If Work-Sheet - Team's findings and recommendations notes plus the action register forms were not available; the employer did not retain part of the required document for the life of the process.  b) 1999 PHA What-If Tracking Sheet - Several instances of team's findings and recommendations were not resolved in a timely manner. Status section stated In process. Some items have written notes but there was no indication of what the current status is, whether it is completed, done or not.   c) 2005 PHA What-If Tracking Sheet - PHA05-7.11. Status stated 80% completed as of 11/1/05.  d) 2007 PHA Action Register. Status stated either Capital request in progress or In progress.  e) 2012 CP-2/CP-4 5-Year Update - PHA Action Register - E/IM-007. Status stated 5/19/16, In-process.    29 CFR 1903.19(d)(1) requires certification and documentation that the abatement of the above violation is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Feb 28, 2019

Penalty

Initial $9,959 · Current $5,975 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(ii)(B): The employer did not develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for steps required to correct or avoid deviation from the operating limits in the covered process:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment in the roof top, the CP-2 and CP-4 engine rooms were exposed to catastrophic release of ammonia which results in asphyxiation, explosion and flash fire leading to death and injury to persons in and near the facility in that the steps required to correct or avoid the deviations listed within the operating procedures for Ammonia process equipment were inadequately documented, missing, unclear or incomplete. Identified operating procedures such as but not limited to the following:  a) Binder 1 - OP: Auto Purger AP001 - TOAP001 AP-1 CP-2 Initial Date: June 1, 2005 b) Binder 1 - OP: Auto Purger AP002 - TOAP002 AP-2 CP-2 c) Binder 1 - OP: Auto Purger AP002 - TOAP004 AP-2 CP-2 d) Binder 1 - OP: E11524 / EC-7NE E11524 / EC-7NE - EVAPCO CP-2 Initial Date: October 18, 2005 (all 16 SOPs for the Evaporative Condenser) e) Binder 3 - Book 1 - OP: Air Unit B10299, B10300 - B10299 Blast 2 Packaging (all 32 SOPs for the Air Unit) f) Binder 4 - Book 2 - OP: Air Unit B30103A - B30103A (Blast 6 Packaging) Initial Date: June 1, 2005 g) Binder 4 - Book 2 - OP: Air Unit B30104 - B30104 (Blast 6 Packaging) (all 48 SOPs for the Air Unit) h) Binder 5 - OP: Air Unit B10259, B10260, B10261 - B10256 (Blast 3 Freezer) WEST Initial Date: June 1, 2005 i) Binder 5 - OP: Air Unit B10297 - B10297 (Old Blast 2 East Freezer) j) Binder 5 - OP: Air Unit B10455 - B10455 (Blast 3 Freezer) SOUTH WATCO k) Binder 5 - OP: Air Unit B10576 Top, Middle, Bottom - B10576 Top, Middle, Bottom (Blast 7 Freezer) l) Binder 5 - OP: Air Unit B10592 East Top/Bottom - B10592 East, Top/Bottom (Blast 7 Freezer) m) Binder 5 - OP: Air Unit B30404 - B30404 (DOSCEL Freezer) YORK PENTHOUSE n) Binder 5 - OP: Air Unit E11300, East - E11300, (Blast 3 Freezer Racetrack) EAST o) Binder 5 - OP: Air Unit E11552B - E11552B (Blast 6 Freezer) SOUTH WEST BOTTOM UNIT p) Binder 5 - OP: Air Unit E11700 Top and Bottom - E11700 Top & Bottom (Blast 2 Freezer) WEST SPIRAL q) Binder 5 - OP: Air Unit E11750, Bottom South (6A) - E11750, (Blast 1 Freezer) BOTTOM SOUTH r) Binder 7 - OP: Air Unit B10391 - B10391 (Litton Dock) SOUTH UNIT Initial Date: June 1, 2005; OP: Air Unit B10392 - B10392 (Litton Dock) NORTH UNIT; OP: Air Unit B10393 - B10393 L-1 DOCK; OP: Air Unit B10560 - B10560 (Wholesale Dock); OP: Air Unit B10561 - B10561 (Wholesale Dock); OP: Air Unit B10562 - B10562 (Wholesale Dock); OP: Air Unit B10563 - B10563 (Wholesale Dock); OP: Air Unit B10564 - B10564 (Wholesale Dock); OP: Air Unit B10581 - B10581 (CSD Dock); OP: Air Unit B10582, B10583 - B10582, B10583 (CSD Dock); OP: Air Unit B30100 - B30100 (Blast 4 Packaging) NORTH EAST; OP: Air Unit B30101 - B30101 (Blast 4 Packaging) SOUTH EAST; OP: Air Unit B30102 - B30102 (Blast 4 Packaging) WEST. s) Binder 7 - OP: Screw Compressor K12805 / C-4 - K12805 / CP-4 C-4 Initial Date:  June 1, 2005  t) Binder 7 - OP: Evaporative Condenser EC-1 - E11544 EC-1 EVAPCO / CP-4 Initial Date: June 1, 2005; OP: EC-3 - E11560 EC-3 EVAPCO NORTH WEST; EC4000 EC-2 CP-4 Condenser - EC4000 CP-4 EC-2 BAC SOUTH. u) Binder 7 - OP: Air Unit E20014 - E20014 Bridge to DC CP-4 INTERMEDIATE SYSTEM Initial Date: January 17, 2005 v) Binder 8 - OP: Air Unit B10565 - B10565 (Wholesale Freezer) Initial Date: June 1, 2005 step 4; OP: Air Unit B10566 - B10566 (Wholesale Freezer) step 4; OP: Air Unit B10567 - B10567 (Wholesale Freezer) step 4; OP: Air Unit B10568 - B10568 (Wholesale Freezer) step 6; OP: Air Unit B30410 - B30410 (CSD Freezer) NORTH WEST PENTHOUSE step 6; OP: Air Unit B30411 - B30411 (CSD Freezer) SOUTH WEST PENTHOUSE step 6; OP: Air Unit B30412 - B30412 (CSD Freezer) NORTH EAST PENTHOUSE step 6; OP: Air Unit B30413 - B30413 (CSD Freezer) SOUTH EAST PENTHOUSE step 6.  29 CFR 1903.19(c)(1) requires certification that the abatement of the above violations is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Dec 31, 2017

Penalty

Initial $7,967 · Current $4,780 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(3): The operating procedures were not reviewed as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practice, including changes that result from changes in process chemicals, technology, and equipment, and changes to facilities. The employer did not certify annually that these operating procedures were current and accurate:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment in the roof top, the CP-2 and CP-4 engine rooms were exposed to catastrophic release of ammonia which results in asphyxiation, explosion and flash fire leading to death and injury to persons in and near the facility in that the current written operating procedures for the Ammonia process equipment including but not limited to the following were not reviewed and certified annually to assure that they reflected current and accurate operating practice. Identified operating procedures such as but not limited to the following:  a) Binder 2 - OP: Screw Compressor CP-2 / C-18 / K12841 b) Binder 2 - OP: Screw Compressor K12846 / B-16 CP-2 c) Binder 2 - OP: Screw Compressor K12847 / B-17 CP-2 d) Binder 8 - OP: Pump 1 +10 Accumulator (RP1+10) - CP-4 PUMP1, +10 Accumulator/Intercooler - P14822 RP1+10 SOUTH PUMP e) Binder 8 - OP: Pump 1 +10 Accumulator (RP1+10) - CP-4 PUMP, +10 Accumulator - P14824 RP1+10 NORTH PUMP  29 CFR 1903.19(c)(1) requires certification that the abatement of the above violations is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Nov 15, 2017

Penalty

Initial $7,967 · Current $4,780 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(h)(2)(i): The employer, when selecting a contractor, did not obtain and evaluate information regarding the contract employer's safety performance and program:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment in the CP-4 engine room were exposed to catastrophic release of ammonia which results in asphyxiation, explosion and flash fire leading to death and injury to persons in and near the facility in that the employer is failing to obtain and evaluate the safety and health performance and written programs of the contractor (Airgas Specialty Products) that delivers Ammonia to the facility.      29 CFR 1903.19(c)(1) requires certification that the abatement of the above violations is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Dec 31, 2017

Penalty

Initial $7,967 · Current $4,780 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(m)(4): A written incident report was not prepared at the conclusion of the investigation that included at a minimum: the date of the incident; date the investigation began; a description of the incident; the factors that resulted from the investigation; any recommendations resulting from the investigation; and the recommendation's resolutions:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment in the rooftop, and the CP-2 + CP-4 engine rooms were exposed to catastrophic release of ammonia which results in asphyxiation, explosion and flash fire leading to death and injury to persons in and near the facility in that the incident investigation reports were not prepared to its completeness.  a) Incident Investigation - Reference No.: K12806-06052016, The Copy Distribution block, Submitted By: Wayne Holub signed with the wrong date 4/5/16, and Received By: James Jackson signed with no date. The Close-Out section, same issue, Submitted By: Wayne Holub signed with the wrong date 4/5/16, and Received By: James Jackson signed with no date.  b) Incident Investigation - Reference No.: CP2-12102013 - Replace Hansen Motorized Valves with Danfoss Valves - There was no attached document within the report for indication that an MOC was initiated for this change of valves. There was no document indicating that the PSI and P&ID has been updated to reflect the new valves.  c) Ammonia Leak on 2/2/13 - Issues & Concerns regarding this Incident - There was 6 items addressing concerns; but there was no attached document in the report indicating these issues have been addressed.  d) Incident Investigation - Reference No.: 111312 - The date of the incident was not filled out on the form at the Date of Incident block. The Close-Out section did not have any management signed off to certify that it is complete and appropriate to close out the investigation. The form stated that Safety Director must sign when completed.  e) Incident Investigation - Reference No.: II-03092012 - The date of the incident was not filled out on the form at the Date of Incident block. The Close-Out section was missing from the provided document so OSHA is not able to confirm that there was any management signed off to certify that it is complete and appropriate to close out the investigation.  29 CFR 1903.19(c)(1) requires certification that the abatement of the above violations is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Dec 31, 2017

Penalty

Initial $5,975 · Current $3,585 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(n): The employer did not establish an emergency plan for the entire plant in accordance with the provisions of 29 CFR 1910.38:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment on the roof top of the Main Plant and the engine rooms were exposed to catastrophic release of ammonia which results in asphyxiation, explosion and flash fire leading to death and injury to persons in and near the facility in that the current Emergency Action and Response Plan - Salina Facility was not updated as the plan changes.  a) The "Purpose" section of the current Emergency Action and Response Plan - Salina Facility stated that it is to comply with OSHA Regulations 29 CFR 1926.35, while it is supposed to comply with 1910.38.  b) The listed contact personnel have been changed or no longer in that position, but the plan did not get updated to reflect the changes.     29 CFR 1903.19(c)(1) requires certification that the abatement of the above violations is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Feb 28, 2019

Penalty

Initial $12,675 · Current $7,605 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(o)(4): The employer did not promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, and document that deficiencies have been corrected:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment on the roof top of the Main Plant and the engine rooms were exposed to catastrophic release of ammonia which results in asphyxiation, explosion and flash fire leading to death and injury to persons in and near the facility in that the findings and recommendations identified in the Compliance Audits of the following appropriate responses were not promptly determined, corrected and documented:  a) The employer did not document the corrective actions pending or taken in relation to each of the deficiencies noted from the 2011 PSM Compliance Audit Action Register. There are still 4 items open/not done since 2011 such as findings #2, 4, No-Exc., and #7.  b) The employer did not document the corrected deficiencies from the 2014 PSM Compliance Audit Action Register. The audit has uncompleted findings, and the current status is unknown. There are still 18 items open/not done since 2014 such as findings #D, E, G, I, K, M, N, O, P, Q, S, X, Y, Z, AA, GG, HH, and #PP.     29 CFR 1903.19(d)(1) requires certification and documentation that the abatement of the above violation is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Sep 19, 2018

Penalty

Initial $5,975 · Current $3,585 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.147(c)(5)(ii)(A)(2): Tagout devices were not constructed so that exposure to weather conditions or wet and damp locations would not cause the tag to deteriorate or the message on the tag to become illegible:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment on the roof top of the West side of the Main Plant were exposed to electrical, struck-by and caught-between hazards in that the tagout devices were deteriorated and ripped by the weather such as wind and rain. The following was noted during the walk around:  (a) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to control the hand valve EC-5SE HV01 was ripped almost the entire tag.  (b) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to control the hand valve EC-5SE HV03 was ripped in more than half portion.  (c) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to control the hand valve EC-5SE HV09 was ripped in more than half portion.  (d) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to control the hand valve EC-5NW HV06 was ripped in more than half portion.  (e) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to control the safety valve EC-6NE SV02 was ripped in more than half portion.  29 CFR 1903.19(c)(1) requires certification that the abatement of the above violations is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Sep 19, 2018

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.147(c)(5)(ii)(D): Lockout devices and tagout devices did not indicate the identity of the employee applying the device(s):  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment on the roof top of the West side of the Main Plant and the CP2 engine room were exposed to electrical, struck-by and caught-between hazards in that the lockout and tagout devices did not indicate the identity of the employee applying the devices. The following was noted during the walk around:  (a) Roof top by the +10 Screw Compressor #18, a tagout device to isolate the compressor was observed not having any identity, date, department, remarks, reasons for applying the tag.  (b) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to isolate the hand valve EC-5SE HV01 was observed not having any identity.  (c) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to isolate the hand valve EC-5SE HV03 was observed not having any identity.  (d) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to isolate the hand valve EC-5SE HV09 was observed not having any identity.  (e) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to isolate the safety valve EC-5NE SV01 was observed not having any identity.  (f) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to isolate the hand valve EC-5NE HV08 was observed not having any identity.  (g) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to isolate the electrical ON/OFF switch box was observed not having any identity.  (h) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to isolate the safety valve EC-5NW SV01 was observed not having any identity.  (i) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to isolate the hand valve EC-5NW HV06 was observed not having any identity.  (j) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to isolate the hand valve EC-6SE was observed not having any identity.  (k) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to isolate the safety valve EC-6NE SV02 was observed not having any identity.  (l) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #5 and 6, a tagout device to isolate the Hubbell Disconnect Switch for the NW Fan D-2 was observed not having any identity.  (m) CP 2 Engine Room, a tagout device to isolate the hand valve B08-HV11 was observed not having any identity.  (n) CP 2 Engine Room, a tagout device to isolate the hand valve B08-HV02 was observed not having any identity.  (o) CP 2 Engine Room, a tagout device to isolate the control switch box Booster #8-K12758 was observed not having any identity.  (p) CP 2 Engine Room, a tagout device to isolate the control switch box Compressor #8-K12767 was observed not having any identity.  (q) CP 2 Engine Room, a DO NOT OPERATE tagout device to isolate the hand valve C-6-HV01 was observed not having any identity.  (r) CP 2 Engine Room, a DO NOT OPERATE tagout device to isolate the hand valve C-20-HV02 was observed not having any identity.  (s) CP 2 Engine Room, a DO NOT OPERATE tagout device to isolate the C-20-TSP01 was observed not having any identity.  29 CFR 1903.19(c)(1) requires certification that the abatement of the above violations is complete.

Issued

Aug 23, 2017

Abate by

Sep 19, 2017

Penalty

Initial $5,975 · Current $3,585 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.305(b)(2)(i): Pull boxes, junction boxes, and fittings were not provided with covers approved for the purpose:  Employees engaged in operating, inspecting, testing, and maintaining activities at the covered process equipment on the roof top of the West side of the Main Plant were exposed to electrical shock and fire hazards in that the company failed to ensure that the electrical box was equipped with a cover to prevent contact with the energized parts within:  (a) Roof top by the Condenser High side Tower #6, the Evapco #6 E11538, the EC-6NE conduit which control the water pump was open.  (b) Roof top by the North East Fan Tower #7, one side of the electrical control box was broken or missing.  29 CFR 1903.19(c)(1) requires certification that the abatement of the above violations is complete.