OSHA Inspection: SWAGGER FOODS CORPORATION

Issued

Mar 29, 2019

Abate by

May 24, 2021

Penalty

Initial $3,789 · Current $1,900 Reduced

General-duty citation text

OSH Act of 1970 Section (5)(a)(1):  The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm in that employees were exposed to combustible agricultural food ingredients dust deflagration, explosion, and other fire hazards while working inside a facility containing an indoor dust collection system that was not designed, selected, installed, etc. to prevent or minimize employee exposure in the event of an internal combustible dust deflagration or fire:    (a)    Swagger Foods Corporation: On November 7, 2018 the employer operated the Dust Collector in the production department (Optiflo Pulse-Jet Cylindrical Cartridge Dust Collector) inside the facility without means to protect employees from the hazards associated with (1) a dust collector explosion resulting from the pressures associated with an internal deflagration in the dust collector, (2) propagation of a deflagration through vessel openings such as the dirty air inlet ducting connected to upstream equipment and workstations, the exhaust air outlet discharging into the room, and the unit?s material discharge hopper outlet opening into the room, and (3) transmission of the hazardous byproducts of a fire (smoke, toxic gas, sparks, embers, etc.) directly into the room.   Among other methods, feasible and acceptable means of abatement would be to follow the guidance in the National Fire Protection Association's (NFPA) "Standard 61 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Dust Explosions in Agricultural and Food Processing Facilities, 2017 ed." - Sections 8.3.4.2 (dust collector location and protection including allowable indoor protection), 8.8.4 (equipment explosion protection), 8.8.5 (equipment isolation for deflagration propagation protection), and 8.3.5.2.1 (dust collector filtered air for fire protection). This standard outlines provisions such as, but not limited to, providing the dust collector with recognized means of both explosion protection and deflagration propagation protection (isolation) to protect against explosion and deflagration propagation hazards.  In addition, the standard outlines provision prohibiting the return of exhaust air into the building unless actions are taken to protect the building occupants from the hazards associated with flame front propagation from an internal deflagration and transmission of the hazardous byproducts of a fire in the event of an internal fire event.    In general and amongst other methods, dust collectors can be protected from explosion hazards through either deflagration venting provided in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 68 "Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting" or through the use of a deflagration detection and chemical suppression system provided in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 69 "Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems". Deflagration propagation protection (isolation) methods include both passive and active isolation technologies as outlined in NFPA 69.  An example of a passive isolation system technology that could be used on the upstream (dirty-air / inlet) side of a vented, indoor dust collector includes the use of a flow-actuated flap valve designed in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 69.  An example of a passive isolation system technology that could be used on the material discharge of a dust collector's hopper include a rotary valve (material choke) designed in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 69.  An example of an active isolation system that could be used to protect a dust collectors upstream ducting inlet and a dust collector?s material discharge hopper outlet include the use of a deflagration detection and chemical suppression system provided in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 69.     Common approaches for abatement include, but are not limited to:    A.    (1) Protection from explosion hazards through deflagration venting (either terminating to a safe outdoor location through a short, engineered duct or terminating indoors when equipped with a listed dust retention and flame-arresting device); & (2) protection from deflagration propagation hazards through the use of isolation techniques including a passive flow-actuated flap valve on the dirty air inlet ducting to protect upstream process, a passive rotary airlock isolation device to protect the unit?s material discharge hopper opening, and a passive float valve isolation device on the return air ducting (if choosing to return air); & (3) protection from fire hazards through a spark detection and water extinguishment/abort/interlock system (if choosing to return air).  If exhaust air is ultimately discharged to a safe outdoor location, then deflagration isolation for the exhaust side and inclusion of a spark detection and extinguishment/abort/interlock system may not be necessary.    B.    Protection from both (1) explosion hazards and (2) deflagration propagation hazards through the use of a deflagration detection and chemical suppression system on the unit?s dirty air volume, material hopper outlet, dirty air inlet, and clean air outlet (if choosing to return air); & (3) protection from fire hazards through a spark detection and water extinguishment/abort/interlock system (if choosing to return air). If exhaust air is ultimately discharged to a safe outdoor location, then deflagration isolation for the exhaust side and inclusion of a spark detection and extinguishment/abort/interlock system may not be necessary.

Issued

Mar 29, 2019

Abate by

May 15, 2019

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.1200(h)(3)(ii): Employees were not trained on the physical, health, simple asphyxiation, combustible dust, and pyrophoric gas hazards, as well as hazards not otherwise classified, of the chemicals in the work area:    a) Swagger Foods Corporation. - On November 6, 2018, the employer did not ensure that employees in the production area were provided with training on the hazards of combustible agriculture dusts (flour).