OSHA Inspection: EBY SAWMILL, LLC

Issued

Sep 6, 2019

Abate by

Sep 18, 2019

Penalty

Initial $6,630 · Current $0 Reduced

Hazardous substances 8111

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.95(c)(1): The employer did not administer a continuing, effective hearing conservation program as described in 29 CFR 1910.9(c) through (o) whenever employee noise exposures equal or exceed an 8-hour time-weighted average sound level of 85 decibels measured on the A scale, or equivalently a dose of fifty percent:  a) At the facility, on or about April 19, 2019 - The employer failed to administer a hearing conservation program including an audiometric testing program, a variety of suitable hearing protectors, and access to information and training materials when employees' noise exposures exceeded a dose of fifty percent.

Issued

Sep 6, 2019

Abate by

Sep 18, 2019

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

Hazardous substances 8111

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.95(i)(3): Employees were not given the opportunity to select their hearing protectors from a variety of suitable hearing protectors provided by the employer:  a) At the facility, on or about April 19, 2019 - The employer failed to give employees whose noise exposures exceeded a dose of fifty percent the opportunity to select hearing protectors from a variety of suitable hearing protectors.

Issued

Sep 6, 2019

Abate by

Oct 24, 2019

Penalty

Initial $9,282 · Current $0 Reduced

Hazardous substances E101M102

General-duty citation text

OSH ACT of 1970 Section (5)(a)(1): The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees:  a) In the Pellet Mill Area, on or about April 19, 2019 - Employees were exposed to fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards created from conveying combustible wood dust in ductwork that was not grounded between the diesel exhaust dryer and hammer mill, between the hammer mill and cyclone separator on top of the silo, and between the cooling cyclone and cyclone inside the storage shed.  Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2017) Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as 8.2.2.3.1.8, "Ductwork shall be bonded and grounded in accordance with 7.8.2(1)."  b) In the Pellet Mill Area, on or about April 19, 2019 - Employees were exposed to fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards created from conveying combustible wood dust in ductwork that had no spark detection, no fire suppression devices, nor other effective methods to prevent sparks, embers or fires from spreading between the diesel exhaust entry, the hammer mill, cyclone separator on top of the silo, and the silo.  Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2017) Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as 8.2.2.3.2, "Ducts conveying dry material released by equipment having a high frequency of generated sparks shall be designed and constructed in accordance with one of the following:     (1) Equipped with a listed spark detection and extinguishing system installed downstream from the last material entry point and upstream of any collection equipment     (2) Equipped with a listed spark detection system actuating a high-speed abort gate, provided the abort gate can operate fast enough to intercept and divert burning embers to atmosphere before they can enter any collection or storage equipment     (3) If conveying material to locations representing minimal exposure to personnel and the public at large, equipped without spark detecting and extinguishing systems but subject to a risk analysis acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction."  c) In the Pellet Mill Area, on or about April 19, 2019 - Employees were exposed to fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards created from conveying combustible wood dust in ductwork that was not of sufficient strength to withstand the maximum unvented deflagration pressure, had no effective means to suppress a deflagration, and no effective means to relieve a deflagration between the diesel exhaust dryer and hammer mill, between the hammer mill and cyclone separator on top of the silo, and between the cooling cyclone and cyclone inside the storage shed.  Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2017) Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as 8.2.2.3.3, "Ducts having a deflagration hazard shall be designed, constructed, and installed pursuant to one of the following:     (1) Ducts, including all access hatches, shall be constructed of metal of sufficient strength to withstand the maximum unvented deflagration pressure of the material being conveyed.     (2) Metal ducts shall be protected by a listed deflagration suppression system that has a design strength exceeding the maximum reduced deflagration pressure.     (3) Metal ducts located indoors shall be equipped with deflagration relief vents and vent ducts designed, installed, and maintained in accordance with NFPA 68 and shall have a design strength exceeding the maximum reduced deflagration pressure.     (4) Metal ducts located indoors shall be equipped with deflagration relief vents and vent ducts designed, installed, and maintained in accordance with NFPA 68 that exhaust through listed flame-quenching devices and shall have a design strength exceeding the maximum reduced deflagration pressure.     (5) Metal ducts located outdoors shall be equipped with deflagration relief vents designed, installed, and maintained in accordance with NFPA 68 and shall have a design strength exceeding the maximum reduced deflagration pressure.     (6) Metal ducts that are located outdoors and have a weaker construction shall be permitted to be used subject to a risk analysis acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction.  d) In the Pellet Mill Area, on or about April 19, 2019 - Employees were exposed to fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards created from conveying combustible wood dust through a fan upstream of the cyclone separator on top of the silo and downstream of the hammer mill and through a fan upstream of the cyclone inside the storage shed and downstream of the cooling cyclone.  Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2017) Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as 8.2.2.5.2, "Fans and blowers shall be permitted to be located in accordance with 8.2.2.5.2(1) through 8.2.2.5.2(6):     (1) On the clean air side of dust collectors, regardless of the moisture content or particle size of the material being conveyed     (2) Upstream of the dust collector when the material being conveyed has a moisture content in excess of 25 percent (wet basis)     (3) Upstream of the dust collector when the material being conveyed has a moisture content of less than 25 percent (wet basis) and the concentration of sub-500 micron particulate is less than 25 present of the MEC, and the duct downstream of the fan is equipped with a listed spark detection extinguishing system and/or abort system     (4) Upstream of the dust collector when the material being conveyed has a moisture content of less than 25 percent (wet basis) and the concentration of sub-500 micron particulate is in excess of 25 percent of the MEC, and the duct and dust collector are equipped with either deflagration relief venting or deflagration suppression systems     (5) Upstream of enclosureless dust collectors, in accordance with 8.2.2.5     (6) Upstream of outdoor cyclone collectors receiving knife planer shavings when the fan and the cyclone are located outdoors and exhaust to outdoor atmosphere"  e) In the Pellet Mill Area, on or about April 19, 2019 - Employees were exposed to fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards created from the cooling cyclone and storage shed cyclone handling combustible wood dust indoors.  Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2017) Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as 8.2.2.6.1.6, "Dust collectors shall be located in accordance with one of the following:     (1) Outside of buildings     (2) Indoors when deemed to have no fire or deflagration hazard     (3) Indoors for dust collectors with only fire hazard when protected in accordance with this standard     (4) Indoors when equipped with listed deflagration suppression system     (5) Indoors when equipped with deflagration relief vents with relief pipes extending to safe areas outside the building and the collector meets the strength requirements of this standard     (6) Indoors when equipped with deflagration relief vents exhausting through listed flame-quenching devices and the collector meets the strength requirements of this standard     (7) Indoors for enclosureless dust collectors meeting all of the following criteria:         (a) The collector is used only for dust pickup from wood processing machinery (i.e., no metal grinders and so forth)         (b) The collector is not used on sanders, molders, or abrasive planers having mechanical material feeds through the machine         (c) Each collector has a maximum air-handling capacity of 2.4 cubic meters per second (5000 cfm)         (d) The fan motor is of a totally enclosed, fan-cooled design         (e) The collected dust is removed daily or more frequently if necessary to ensure efficient operation         (f) The collector is located at least 6.1 m (20 ft) from any means of egress or area routinely occupied by personnel         (g) Multiple collectors in the same room are separated from each other by at least 6.1 m (20 ft)  f) In the Pellet Mill Area, on or about April 19, 2019 - Employees were exposed to fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards created from the cyclone on top of the silo, the cooling cyclone, and the storage shed cyclone handling combustible wood dust and not of sufficient strength to withstand the maximum unvented deflagration pressure, had no effective means to suppress a deflagration, and no effective means to relieve a deflagration.  Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2017) Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as 8.2.2.6.3, "Dust collectors with a deflagration hazard having a dirty side volume greater than 0.23 cubic meters (8 cubic feet) shall be designed and constructed in accordance with one of the following options:     (1) Dust collectors constructed of welded steel or other noncombustible material of sufficient strength to withstand the maximum unvented deflagration pressure of the material being collected     (2) Dust collectors protected by a listed deflagration suppression system in accordance with NFPA 69 with a design strength exceeding the maximum reduced deflagration pressure of the material being collected     (3) Dust collectors equipped with deflagration relief vents in accordance with NFPA 68 with a design strength exceeding the maximum reduced deflagration pressure of the material being collected     (4) Dust collectors located outdoors and representing minimal exposure to personnel and the public at large with weaker construction, subject to a risk analysis acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction     (5) Enclosureless dust collectors of any strength suitable for the use intended shall be permitted without any additional explosion protection requirements   g) In the Pellet Mill Area, on or about April 19, 2019 - Employees were exposed to fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards created from the cooling cyclone and storage shed cyclone handling combustible wood dust and exhausting the air indoors.  Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2017) Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as 8.2.2.7, "Recycling of air-material separator exhaust to building shall be permitted if the provisions of 8.2.2.7.1 through 8.2.2.7.4 are met."   h) In the Pellet Mill Area, on or about April 19, 2019 - Employees were exposed to fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards created from a screw conveyor transporting combustible wood dust from the silo to the pellet mill that was not of sufficient strength to withstand the maximum unvented deflagration pressure, had no effective means to suppress a deflagration, and no effective means to relieve a deflagration.  Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2017) Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as 8.2.3.3.1, "Enclosed conveyors with a deflagration hazard shall comply with the criteria in 8.2.2.3.3"  i) In the Pellet Mill Area, on or about April 19, 2019 - Employees were exposed to fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards created from a screw conveyor transporting combustible wood dust from the silo to the pellet mill that did not have an effective means to prevent fire or deflagration from spreading from the silo to the pellet mill or from the pellet mill to the silo.  Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2017) Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as 8.2.4.1, "Conveying systems with deflagration hazards shall be isolated to prevent propagation of fire and deflagration both upstream and downstream into occupied areas or other critical process equipment. (See Annex D.)   j) In the Pellet Mill Area, on or about April 19, 2019 - Employees were exposed to fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards created from the transport system that moved wood pellets and their associated combustible wood dust from the pellet mill to the cooling area without protection to prevent fire extension from the pellet mill to the cooling area.  Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2017) Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as 8.2.4.2, "Conveying systems with fire hazards shall be protected in accordance with Chapter 9 to prevent fire extension through the facility."  k) In the Pellet Mill Area, on or about April 19, 2019 - Employees were exposed to fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards created from conveying combustible wood dust in ductwork that did not prevent propagation of deflagration between the diesel exhaust dryer and hammer mill, between the hammer mill and cyclone separator on top of the silo, and between the cooling cyclone and cyclone inside the storage shed.  Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2017) Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as 8.2.4.4, "Ducts shall be isolated to prevent propagation of deflagration to other vessels."  l) In the Pellet Mill Area, on or about April 19, 2019 - Employees were exposed to fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards created from a hammer mill that was used to reduce the size of combustible wood dust and did not have an effective means to remove foreign material.  Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2017) Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as 8.4.2.2.2, "Foreign material shall be removed from the process material feed into all particulate size reduction equipment by permanent magnet or self-cleaning electromagnet-type magnetic separators, or by pneumatic, or by both."  m) In the Pellet Mill Area, on or about April 19, 2019 - Employees were exposed to fire, deflagration, and explosion hazards created from a hammer mill that was used to reduce the size of combustible wood dust and was not of sufficient strength to withstand the maximum unvented deflagration pressure, had no effective means to suppress a deflagration, and no effective means to relieve a deflagration.  Among other methods, one feasible and acceptable abatement method to correct this hazard is to comply with relevant provisions in NFPA 664 (2017) Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, such as 8.4.2.4.2, "Size reduction equipment shall be constructed in accordance with one of the following:     (1) An enclosure shall be constructed of welded steel or other noncombustible material of sufficient strength to withstand the maximum unvented explosion pressure of the processed material.     (2) An enclosure shall be constructed of noncombustible material, protected by a listed explosion suppression system with a design strength exceeding the maximum reduced explosion pressure of the processed material.     (3) An enclosure constructed of noncombustible material, equipped with adequate deflagration relief vents having relief pipes extending outdoors or discharging through listed flame-quenching devices, shall have a design strength exceeding the maximum reduced explosion pressure of the processed material.