TAMPA, FL ·
OSHA Inspection: CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION
Accident-driven inspection · Safety discipline
At a glance
On , OSHA opened an accident-driven safety inspection of CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION in 1700 HEMLOCK AVE.,, TAMPA, FL 33605 (NAICS 000000). OSHA activity number 17668401.
OSHA opens inspections for many reasons: routine scheduling under a national or local emphasis program, an employee complaint or referral, or a follow-up after a reported injury. Opening or conducting an inspection is not itself an allegation or a finding that this employer broke any rule; any findings appear as the citations listed below, and citations can be contested, reduced, or withdrawn.
Where did this inspection happen?
- Establishment
- CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION
- Site address
- 1700 HEMLOCK AVE.,
- City
- TAMPA
- State
- FL
- ZIP
- 33605
What kind of inspection was it?
- Inspection type
- Accident-driven (A)
- Scope
- Partial (B)
- Discipline
- Safety
- Advance notice
- No
- Union status
- Non-union (N)
When did the case open and close?
- Opened
- Closing conference
- Case closed
- Last modified
- Data loaded
Establishment context
- NAICS code
- 000000
- SIC code (legacy)
- 5171
- Employees
- 5
- Ownership type
- Private (A)
Citations
1 citation on file for this inspection.
5(a)(1)
- Issued
- Oct 3, 1990
- Abate by
- Oct 6, 1990
- Penalty
- Initial $10,000 · Current $5,000 Reduced
General-duty citation text
Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: The employer did not furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees from the recognized hazard of fire and explosion in that: 1a) The employer did not take adequate measures to implement commonly recognized management control systems and methods to prevent or minimize the loss from fire or explosion in a liquid process operation in that: a) The employer did not conduct internal audits that included such items as a process hazard review, a job safety analysis, and a human factors analysis of the tank truck loading rack operation and the operation of the John Zink Company, vapor recovery system, modified x unit, shop order rs x50585, at the Tampa Terminal. This condition could be corrected by addressing safety factors in, for example, a general hazard and operability study, a structured method of systematically investigating each element, of a process design to identify all the way in which deviations can occur from intended design parameters to create hazards or operability problems. for guidance in developing such an audit such recognized sources as follows may serve as valuable guides. 1) NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, 1987 chapter 5 "Operations" with special attention paid to chapter 5-5, "Fire Prevention and Control". 2) Citgo Petroleum Corporation Safety manual, August 1988, section 30 "Engineering Design" and section 33 "Safety Devices". 3) Loss prevention in the process industries, Frank P Lees, Butterworths, 1986, chapter 6, "Management Systems", and chapter B. "Hazard Identification and Safety Audit". 1b) The employer failed to locate and operate the rack loading and zink vapor processing systems so that they did not constitute a fire and explosion hazard in that: a) Vapor laden tank vehicles were filled at the loading rack and the displaced vapors were vented to the atmosphere when the vapor processing system was not in good working order, on or about 4/15/90. One method of abating this hazard, among others, would be to discontinue loading operations until the vapor processing system was restored to operation in good working order. For guidance see Florida Department of Environmental Regulations, Fac Rule 17-2.650(1)(f)(10). See also Florida Department of Environmental Regulation Permit/Certification, Permit No. A029-130199. b) Those areas, such as the diked area containing storage tank 211 and the zink vapor process system with its associated piping and underground condensate tank, where a potential existed for a flammable liquid spill were not monitored as appropriate, on or about 4/15/90. One method of correction, among others would include the provision of gas detectors where the facilities are unattended, for guidance see NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, 1987, chapter 5-5.5.2. c) The zink vapor processing system was situated in a diked area so that the pressure vacuum vent stack was located between the carbon tanks and the underground condensate tank resulting in the vent exhausting into an area of limited natural ventilation in the vicinity of potential sources of ignition such as hot surface, electrical sparks, or frictional sparks, on or about 4/15/90. One method, among others, of correcting this hazard would be to locate the pressure vacuum vent stack at an area of better ventilation remote from the vapor process system apparatus. for guidance see NFPA 30, chapter 5-3.3 and 5-5.2. d) The zink vapor processing system was not segregated from storage, but rather situated in a common diked area with gasoline, on or about 4/15/90. One method of correcting this hazard would be to segregate the storage operation from the process operation. For guidance see Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Frank P Lees, Butterworths 1986, chapter 10, "Plant Siting and Layout".
Recent events (2)
- · F (S) $5000.00
- · Z (W) $10000.00
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Source
This record is reproduced from the U.S. Department of Labor Open Data API (OSHA inspection dataset). OSHA publishes its own view of this case as inspection number 17668401.
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