OSHA Inspection: SILVER EAGLE REFINING INC

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Jun 1, 2014

Penalty

Initial $56,000 · Current $3,000 Reduced

General-duty citation text

Practices (RAGAGEP) when employees inside inadequately protected
structures were not
protected (i.e., not protected by adequate separation or building
construction).  At the time of
the inspection, November 2009 through March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South
110 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087, the facility's lab building was not
constructed to
withstand overpressures likely experienced in the event of a catastrophic
29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(ii)  The employer shall document that equipment
event.  Currently,
the lab building is occupied throughout the day, 5-7 days a week.
Upgrades were identified
in the December 12, 2008 facility siting study conducted by ABS
Consulting; a consulting
firm hired by Silver Eagle to assess facility siting and the associated
hazards.  At the time of
the opening conference, upgrades to the lab building had not yet been
started or completed.
The ABS report identified the need for critical strengthening/structural
complies with
retrofits to existing
structures to ensure overpressures could be withstood in the event of a
catastrophic event.
recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices.
A.  The employer did not comply with Recognized and Generally Accepted Good
engineering Practices (RAGAGEP)  when employees inside inadequately
protected structures
were not protected (i.e., not protected by adequate separation or building
construction).  At
the time of the inspection, November 2009 through March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc.,
The report stated the lab building would experience heavy damage stating:
"Onset of
structural collapse.  Space in and around damaged area is unusable."  As
provided by the
employer, such structural upgrades were not identified on the capital
improvements list dated
2006-2010.  No interim measures were put into place by the employer to
protect employees
until the retrofits could be completed.  As a result, employees were
2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087, the facility's control room
exposed to hazardous
conditions which could result in serious injury or death in the event of
an explosion.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of occupied
buildings and
temporary structures throughout the facility.
G.  The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
was not
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided
constructed to withstand overpressures likely experienced in the event of
a catastrophic event.
Currently, the control room is occupied 24hrs a day, 7 days a week.
Upgrades were
identified in the December 12, 2008 facility siting study conducted by ABS
Consulting; a
consulting firm hired by Silver Eagle to assess facility siting and the
associated hazards.  At
by the
employer did not identify or indicate that EXC-10207, built in 1963,
complies with a
RAGAGEP.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can
prevent theemployer from identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment
within safe limits.   In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
the time of the opening conference, upgrades to the control room had not
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
throughout the
facility.
H.  The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
yet been started or
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by the
employer did not identify or indicate that EXC-10209A, built in 1964,
complies
with a
RAGAGEP.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can
prevent the
employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment within
safe limits.    In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
throughout the
facility.
I.  The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by the
employer did not identify or indicate that EXC-10209B, built in 1979,
complies with a
RAGAGEP.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can
prevent the
employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment within
safe limits.    In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
throughout the
facility.
J.  The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by the
employer did not identify or indicate that EXC-10210, built in 1963,
complies with a
RAGAGEP.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can
prevent
the
employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment within
safe limits.    In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
throughout the
facility.
K.  The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by theemployer did not identify or indicate that TWR 10136
complies with a RAGAGEP.  Not
maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can prevent the
employer from
identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment within safe limits.  In
the
event of an
equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such
as fires,
explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious injury or
death.   This may
be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
throughout the facility.
L.  The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by the
employer did not identify or indicate that VES 10201, built in 1943,
complies with a
RAGAGEP.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can
prevent the
employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment within
safe limits.    In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations
such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
throughout the
facility.
M.  The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by the
employer did not identify or indicate that FAN 10214, built in 1977,
complies with a
RAGAGEP.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can
prevent the
employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment within
safe limits.    In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
throughout the
facility.
N.  The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by the
employer did not identify or indicate that FAN 10215, built in 1995,
complies with a
RAGAGEP.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can
prevent the
employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment within
safe limits.    In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury
or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
throughout the
facility.
O.  The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
recognized and
generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, WoodsCross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.
Documentation provided by the
employer did not demonstrate that pressure safety valves complied with
RAGAGEP.  The
inlet line pressure drop (ILPD) for valve PSV-19406 exceeds 3of the
opening set pressure
as described in both API and ASME RAGAGEPs.  As per RAGAGEPs, the inlet
line
pressure drop is associated with pressure losses as the relieving fluid;
vapor or two-phase
flow, passes through all the piping and fittings (ells, valves, etc.) from
the vessel to the PSV.
If relieving flow is choked by the inlet line losses, then the protected
vessel
could
catastrophically fail.  In addition, ILPD can cause chattering that may
result in the reduction
of the PSV's capacity.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment
records can
prevent the employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining
equipment within safe
limits.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed
to hazardous
completed.  The ABS report identified the need for critical
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result in serious
injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all
equipment throughout the facility.
P. The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
recognized and generally
accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation was
identified during
inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West,
strengthening/structural retrofits
Woods Cross, UT,
84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation provided by the
employer did
to existing structures to ensure overpressures could be withstood in the
event of a
catastrophic event.  The report stated the control room would experience
severe damage
stating: "Progressive collapse likely.  Space in and around damaged area
is unusable."  As
provided by the employer, such structural upgrades were not identified on
the capital
not demonstrate that pressure safety valves complied with RAGAGEP.  The
inlet line
pressure drop (ILPD) for valve PSV-39410 exceeds 3of the opening set
pressure as
described in both API and ASME RAGAGEPs.  As per RAGAGEPs, the inlet line
pressure
drop is associated with pressure losses as the relieving fluid; vapor or
two-phase flow, passes
through all the piping and fittings (ells, valves, etc.) from the vessel
improvements list dated 2006-2010.  In addition, the employer's 2009 PSM
to the PSV. If relieving
flow is choked by the inlet line losses, then the protected vessel could
catastrophically fail.
In addition, ILPD can cause chattering that may result in the reduction of
the PSV's
capacity.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can
prevent the
employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment within
safe limits.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
Compliance
throughout the
facility.
Q. The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
recognized
Audit, conducted 8/31/09 through 9/03/09, notes identified the control
room location as "red
flag issues for the NEP."  No interim measures were put into place by the
employer to
protect employees until the retrofits could be completed.  As a result,
employees were
exposed to hazardous conditions which could result in serious injury or
death in the event of
and
generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by the
employer did not demonstrate that pressure safety valves complied with
RAGAGEP.  The
an explosion.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
inlet line pressure drop (ILPD) for valve PSV-39420 exceeds 3of the
opening set pressure
as described in both API and ASME RAGAGEPs.  As per RAGAGEPs, the inlet
line
pressure drop is associated with pressure losses as the relieving fluid;
vapor or two-phase
flow, passes through all the piping and fittings (ells, valves, etc.) from
the vessel to the PSV.
If relieving flow is choked by the inlet line losses, then the protected
vessel could
evaluation of occupied
catastrophically fail.  In addition, ILPD can cause chattering that may
result in the reduction
of the PSV's capacity.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment
records can
buildings and temporary structures throughout the facility.
prevent the employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining
equipment within safe
limits.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed
to hazardous
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result in seriousinjury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence
that requires evaluation of all
equipment throughout the facility.
R. The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
recognized and
generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by the
employer did not demonstrate that pressure safety valves complied with
RAGAGEP.  The
inlet line pressure drop (ILPD) for valve PSV-19421 exceeds 3of the
opening set pressure
as described in both API and ASME RAGAGEPs.  As per RAGAGEPs, the inlet
line
pressure drop is associated with pressure losses as the relieving fluid;
vapor or two-phase
flow, passes through all the piping and fittings (ells, valves, etc.) from
the vessel to the PSV.
If relieving flow is choked by the inlet line losses, then the protected
vessel could
catastrophically fail.  In addition, ILPD can cause chattering that may
result in the reduction
of the PSV's capacity.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment
records can
prevent the employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining
equipment within safe
limits.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed
to hazardous
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result in serious
injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all
equipment throughout the facility.
S. The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
recognized and generally
accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation was
identified
during
inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT,
84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation provided by the
employer did
not demonstrate that pressure safety valves complied with RAGAGEP.  The
inlet line
pressure drop (ILPD) for valve PSV-99410 exceeds 3of the opening set
pressure as
described in both API and ASME RAGAGEPs.  As per RAGAGEPs, the inlet line
pressure
drop is associated with pressure losses as the relieving fluid; vapor or
two-phase flow, passes
through all the piping and fittings (ells, valves, etc.) from the vessel
to the PSV. If relieving
flow is choked by the inlet line losses, then the protected vessel could
catastrophically fail.
In addition, ILPD can cause chattering that may result in the reduction of
the PSV's
capacity.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can
prevent the
employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment within
safe limits.  In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
throughout the
facility.
T. The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
recognized and
generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by the
employer did not demonstrate that pressure safety valves complied with
RAGAGEP.  The
inlet line pressure drop (ILPD) for valve PSV-39411 exceeds 3of the
opening set pressure
as described in both API and ASME RAGAGEPs.  As per RAGAGEPs, the inlet
linepressure drop is associated with pressure losses as the relieving
fluid; vapor or two-phase
flow, passes through all the piping and fittings (ells, valves, etc.) from
the vessel to the PSV.
If relieving flow is choked by the inlet line losses, then the protected
vessel could
catastrophically fail.  In addition, ILPD can cause chattering that may
result in the reduction
of the PSV's capacity.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment
records can
prevent the employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining
equipment within safe
limits.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed
to hazardous
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result in serious
injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all
equipment throughout the facility.
U.  The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West,
Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by the
employer did not identify or indicate that EXC-10201A, in service since
1995, complies with
a RAGAGEP.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can
prevent the
employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment within
safe limits.    In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
throughout the
facility.
V.  The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by the
employer did not identify or indicate that EXC-10201B, in service since
1995, complies with
a RAGAGEP.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can
prevent the
employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment within
safe limits.    In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
throughout the
facility.
W.  The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided
by the
employer did not identify or indicate that EXC-10203, in service since
1953, complies with a
RAGAGEP.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can
prevent the
employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment within
safe limits.    In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
B.  The employer did not comply with Recognized and Generally Accepted
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
throughout the
facility.      X.  The employer did not document that all equipment
complies with Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Good engineering
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by the
employer did not identify or indicate that EXC-10206, built in 1960,
complies with a
Practices (RAGAGEP) when employees inside inadequately protected
structures were not
protected (i.e., not protected by adequate separation or building
construction).  At the time of
the inspection, November 2009 through March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South
110 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087, the facility's receiving building/pump
shop was not
RAGAGEP.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can
prevent the
employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment within
safe limits.    In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
constructed to withstand overpressures likely experienced in the event of
throughout the
facility.
Y.  The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by the
a catastrophic event.
employer did not identify or indicate that EXC-10204, built in 1960,
complies with a
RAGAGEP.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment records can
prevent
Currently, the receiving building and pump shop is occupied throughout the
day, 5-7 days a
week.  Upgrades were identified in the December 12, 2008 facility siting
study conducted by
ABS Consulting; a consulting firm hired by Silver Eagle to assess facility
siting and the
associated hazards. At the time of the opening conference, upgrades to the
receiving building
the
employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining equipment within
safe limits.  In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all equipment
throughout the
and pump shop had not yet been started or completed.  The ABS report
facility.
Z.  The employer did not document that all equipment complies with
Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).  This violation
was identified
during inspections onsite at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087, from November 2009 to March 2010.  Documentation
provided by the
employer did not identify or indicate that EXC-10205 (naphtha cooler) ,
identified the need
built in 1961,
complies with a RAGAGEP.  Not maintaining complete and accurate equipment
records can
prevent the employer from identifying, designing, and maintaining
equipment within safe
limits.   In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed
to hazardous
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result in serious
injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all
equipment throughout the facility.
for critical strengthening/structural retrofits to existing structures to
ensure overpressures
could be withstood in the event of a catastrophic event.  The report
stated the receiving
building and pump shop would experience severe damage stating:
"Progressive collapse
likely.  Space in and around damaged area is unusable."  As provided by
the employer, such
structural upgrades were not identified on the capital improvements list
dated 2006-2010.  No
interim measures were put into place by the employer to protect employees
until the retrofits
could be completed.  As a result, employees were exposed to hazardous
conditions which
could result in serious injury or death in the event of an explosion.
This may be a system-
wide occurrence that requires evaluation of occupied buildings and
temporary structuresthroughout the facility.
C.  The employer did not comply with Recognized and Generally Accepted Good
engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) when employees inside inadequately
protected structures
were not protected (i.e., not protected by adequate separation or building
construction).
At
the time of the inspection, November 2009 through March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc.,
2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087, the facility's warehouse
building was not
constructed to withstand overpressures likely experienced in the event of
a catastrophic event.
Currently, the warehouse building is occupied throughout the day, 5-7 days
a week.
Upgrades were identified in the December 12, 2008 facility siting study
conducted by ABS
Consulting; a consulting firm hired by Silver Eagle to assess facility
siting and the associated
hazards.  At the time of the opening conference, upgrades to the warehouse
building had not
yet been started or completed.  The ABS report identified the need for
critical
strengthening/structural retrofits to existing structures to ensure
overpressures could be
withstood in the event of a catastrophic event.  The report stated the
warehouse building
would experience severe damage stating: "Progressive collapse likely.
Space in and around
damaged area is unusable."  As provided by the employer, such structural
upgrades were not
identified on the capital improvements list dated 2006-2010.  No interim
measures were put
into place by the employer to protect employees until the retrofits could
be completed.  As a
result, employees were exposed to hazardous conditions which could result
in serious injury
or death in the event of an explosion.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires
evaluation of occupied buildings and temporary structures throughout the
facility.
D.  The employer did not comply with Recognized and Generally Accepted Good
engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) when employees inside inadequately
protected structures
were not protected (i.e., not protected by adequate separation or building
construction).  At
the time of the inspection, November 2009 through March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc.,
2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087, the facility's pour building
was not
constructed to withstand overpressures likely experienced in the event of
a
catastrophic event.
Currently, the pour building is occupied throughout the day, 5-7 days a
week.  Upgrades
were identified in the December 12, 2008 facility siting study conducted
by ABS Consulting;
a consulting firm hired by Silver Eagle to assess facility siting and the
associated hazards.
At the time of the opening conference, upgrades to the pour building had
not yet been started
or completed.  The ABS report identified the need for critical
strengthening/structural
retrofits to existing structures to ensure overpressures could be
withstood in the event of a
catastrophic event.  The report stated the pour building would experience
severe damage
stating: "Progressive collapse likely.  Space in and around damaged area
is unusable."  As
provided by the employer, such structural upgrades were not identified on
the capital
improvements list dated 2006-2010.  No interim measures were put into
place by the
employer to protect employees until the retrofits could be completed.  As
a result, employees
were exposed to hazardous conditions which could result in serious injury
or death in the
event of an explosion.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of
occupied buildings and temporary structures throughout the facility.
E.  The employer did not comply with Recognized and Generally Accepted
Good engineering
Practices (RAGAGEP) when employees inside inadequately protected
structures were notprotected (i.e., not protected by adequate separation
or building construction).  At the time of
the inspection, November 2009 through March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South
110 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087, the facility's insulation shop was not
constructed to
withstand overpressures likely experienced in the event of a catastrophic
event.  Currently,
the insulation shop is occupied throughout the day, 5-7 days a week.
Upgrades were
identified in the December 12, 2008 facility siting study conducted by ABS
Consulting; a
consulting firm hired by Silver Eagle to assess facility siting and the
associated hazards.   At
the time of the opening conference, upgrades to the insulation shop had
not yet been started
or completed.  The ABS report identified the need for critical
strengthening/structural
retrofits to existing structures to ensure overpressures could be
withstood in the event of a
catastrophic event.  The report stated the insulation shop would
experience heavy damage
stating: "Onset of structural collapse.  Space in and around damaged area
is unusable."  As
provided by the employer, such structural upgrades were not identified on
the capital
improvements list dated 2006-2010.  No interim measures were put into
place by the
employer to protect employees until the retrofits could be completed.  As
a result, employees
were exposed to hazardous conditions which could result in serious injury
or death in the
event of an explosion.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of
occupied buildings and temporary structures throughout the facility.
F. The employer did not comply with Recognized and Generally Accepted Good
engineering

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $56,000 · Current $3,000 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(v)  The process hazard analysis shall address:
Facility Siting
A.  The employer did not ensure the Process Hazards Analysis (PHA)
addressed facility
siting.  At the time of the inspection, November 2009 through March 2010,
Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087, review of the
#2 Crude Unit
2005 PHA, did not identify facility siting as being reviewed.  Documents
provided by the
employer did not demonstrate facility siting had been addressed in the #2
Crude Unit 2005
PHA.  As stated by Management, the employer uses software that guides
participants through
a checklist style audit.  If it was addressed, the checklist could be
printed.  Requests were
made for the facility siting checklists.  The employer was not able to
provide the completed
checklist.  In addition, both the employer's 2009 PSM Compliance Audit and
the 2008
Facility Siting Study performed by ABS Consulting identified major
deficiencies with facility
siting, yet facility siting had not been reviewed during PHA's.  In
November 2009, due to a
catastrophic failure in the MDDW Unit, buildings around the unit sustained
major damage
due to improper design and lack of protection for their location.  By not
addressing facility
siting in PHA's, employees were exposed to hazardous conditions by
occupying facilities that
may not withstand a blast.  Such blasts can expose employees to serious
injury or death.
This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all PHA's
and associated
facility siting throughout the facility.
B. The employer did not ensure the Process Hazards Analysis (PHA)
addressed facility
siting.  At the time of the inspection, November 2009 through March 2010,
Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087, review of the
#5
Naphtha/HDS 2008 PHA, did not identify facility siting as being reviewed.
Documents
provided by the employer did not demonstrate facility siting had been
addressed in the #5
Naphtha/HDS 2008 PHA.  As stated by Management, the employer uses software
that
guides
participants through a checklist style audit.  If it was addressed, the
checklist could be
printed.  Requests were made for the facility siting checklists.  The
employer was not able to
provide the completed checklist.  In addition, both the employer's 2009
PSM Compliance
Audit and the 2008 Facility Siting Study performed by ABS Consulting
identified major
deficiencies with facility siting, yet facility siting had not been
reviewed during PHA's.  In
November 2009, due to a catastrophic failure in the MDDW Unit, buildings
around the unit
sustained major damage due to improper design and lack of protection for
their location.  By
not addressing facility siting in PHA's, employees were exposed to
hazardous conditions by
occupying facilities that may not withstand a blast.  Such blasts can
expose employees to
serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of all
PHA's and associated facility siting throughout the facility.
C.  The employer did not ensure the Process Hazards Analysis (PHA)
addressed facility
siting.  At the time of the inspection, November 2009 through March 2010,
Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087, review of the
#3 MDDW
2009 PHA, did not identify facility siting as being reviewed.  Documents
provided by the
employer did not demonstrate facility siting had been addressed in the #3
MDDW 2009
PHA.  As stated by Management, the employer uses software that guides
participants through
a checklist style audit.  If it was addressed, the checklist could be
printed.  Requests were
made for the facility siting checklists.  The employer was not able to
provide the completedchecklist.  In addition, both the employer's 2009 PSM
Compliance Audit and the 2008
Facility Siting Study performed by ABS Consulting identified major
deficiencies with facility
siting, yet facility siting had not been reviewed during PHA's.  In
November 2009, due to a
catastrophic failure in the MDDW Unit, buildings around the unit sustained
major damage
due to improper design and lack of protection for their location.  By not
addressing facility
siting in PHA's, employees were exposed to hazardous conditions by
occupying facilities that
may not withstand a blast.  Such blasts can expose employees to serious
injury or death.
This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all PHA's
and associated
facility siting throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Jun 1, 2014

Penalty

Initial $56,000 · Current $3,000 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)  The employer shall develop and implement written
operating
procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting
activities involved in each
covered process consistent with the process safety information.
A.  The employer did not ensure written operating procedures related to
the facility's car
seal program were implemented.  This violation was identified during
onsite inspections from
November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087.  The employer developed a car seal program signed by
plant
management
on June 8, 2004, yet requirements of this policy to car seal or lock open
any intervening
valve were not carried out.  As part of the Owner-User Program, the
facility was required to
report to the Utah State Division of Boilers and Elevators they were
complying with their
internal car seal program.  Although the program and policy had been
developed, the
employer did not follow the requirements of car sealing or locking open
any intervening
valve.  During field inspections, more than 50 intervening valves were
noted not to be car
sealed or locked open.  Examples of such include, but not limited to,
Valve PF 14192
protecting Vessel Serial #15195.  By not implementing and following the
facility's internal
car seal program and procedure, valves could be inadvertently closed
isolating relief valves.
In the event of an equipment failure due to an intervening valve being
closed, employees
could be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires, explosions, and/or
chemical releases
which can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that
requires evaluation of all intervening valves throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $56,000 · Current $3,000 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(i)[C]  The employer shall develop and implement
written operating
procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting
activities involved in each
covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall
address at least the
following elements:  Temporary operations;
A.  The employer did not develop and implement written operating
procedures that provide
clear instructions for safely conducting activities, specifically
addressing temporary
operations.  This violation was identified during inspections of the
facility from November
2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  As per documents provided by the employer, the upper safe limit
for the MDDW
RTR-30101 feed is listed at 800 F, yet the temporary operating procedure
"Hot
Hydrogen
Strip", dated August 21, 2007, included in the operating manual, step
2.3.1.13, indicates that
this upper temperature limit of 800 F is routinely exceeded.  This
procedure states "Start
increasing the furnace outlet in 13 F increments every 15 minutes to 900
F", and step
2.3.1.15 states "Hold for 16 hours."  Feed from the furnace flows directly
into RTR-30101.
Operator interviews stated that temperatures above 800F were common as per
the procedure.
As provided, the Mobile Operating Guide did not instruct facilities to
exceed safe upper
operating limits during catalyst regeneration.  By not developing and
implementing operating
procedures that provide clear instructions for temporary operations,
employees were
increasing temperatures of process equipment above established safe upper
limits.
Operations outside safe upper limits can cause catastrophic failures which
can expose
employees to serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires
evaluation of all written operating procedures throughout the facility.
B.  The employer did not develop and implement written operating
procedures that provide
clear instructions for safely conducting activities, specifically
addressing temporary
operations.  This violation was identified during inspections of the
facility from November
2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  As per documents provided by the employer, the safe upper limit
for temperature of
the RTR-30103 inlet is exceeded in the 11/3/09 "Hot Hydrogen Strip"
procedure.  The safe
upper limit for RTR-30103 is 800F, yet through the 11/3/09 "Hot Hydrogen
Strip"
procedure, dated November 3, 2009, Step 12, states "Start increasing the
furnace outlet in 13
degree F increments every 15 minutes to 800 F".  The Step 13 instructions
acknowledge that
exothermic activity can result in temperature increases above 800 F as
noted by "Watch the
MDDW and HDS reactor bed temperatures for exothermic activity.  If
exotherm becomes
greater than 30 F, hold reactor inlet temp constant until exotherm reduces
to 20 F."  In
addition, the procedure states to "Observe safety precautions in the
Mobile Operating
Guide."  Through this procedure, temperatures can reach 830 F.  The Mobile
Operating
Guide does not instruct facilities to exceed safe upper operating limits
during catalyst
regeneration.  By not developing and implementing operating procedures
that provide clear
instructions for temporary operations, employees were increasing
temperatures of process
equipment above established safe upper limits.  Operations outside safe
upper limits can
cause catastrophic failures which can expose employees to serious injury
or death.  This may
be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all written
operating procedures
throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $56,000 · Current $56,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(1)(iii)[B]  The employer shall develop and implement
written operating
procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting
activities involved in each
covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall
address at least the
following elements; Safety and health considerations: Precautions
necessary to prevent
exposure, including engineering controls, administrative controls, and
personal protective
equipment;
A.  The employer did not take precautions necessary to prevent exposure
through the use of
personal protective equipment such as flame resistant clothing.  This
violation was identified
during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010,
Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  In the employer's
2008 and 2009
PPE Hazard Assessments, flame resistant coveralls were identified as part
of the basic PPE
required for working in the position of:  refinery operator, maintenance
mechanic, and/or
laboratory technician.  The PPE Written Hazard Assessment stated:  "Based
on
an
assessment of the workplace hazards to which Silver Eagle Refinery
Operators are exposed,
the equipment listed below is the basic PPE required for working in this
position."  Flame
resistant coveralls were identified as the basic requirement for working
as a refinery
operator, maintenance mechanic, or laboratory technician.  The employer
did not enforce the
use of flame resistant clothing but allowed cotton fabric clothing
throughout the covered
process areas of the refinery.   Although specifically identified in the
employer's 2008 and
2009 PPE hazard assessments, the employer chose not to enforce the
requirement of wearing
flame resistant coveralls in the covered units.  In addition, office staff
regularly enters and
works within the covered units without flame resistant coveralls.  In
addition, in January
2009, two Silver Eagle employees were severely burned in a flash fire.
Both employees
were not wearing flame resistant coveralls.  By not requiring and
enforcing the use of flame
resistant coveralls, employees were exposed to hazards such as fires,
which can result in
serious injury or death.  This is a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all PPE
throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $56,000 · Current $3,000 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(f)(4)  The employer shall develop and implement safe work
practices to
provide for the control of hazards during operations such as
lockout/tagout; confined space
entry; opening process equipment or piping; and control over entrance into
a facility by
maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or other support personnel. These
safe work practices
shall apply to employees and contractor employees.
A.  The employer did not ensure safe work practices were implemented for
controlling
contract employee's entrance and exit into covered process areas.  This
violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver
Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Both
the
employer's
2006 and 2009 PSM Compliance Audits identified vehicle access as a concern
and stated that
Silver Eagle should evaluate the procedures for controlling entrance into
the refinery units.
Review of site policy 6.15, Refinery Access, the employer stated:
"Contractors - Any
vehicle brought into the plant as part of the contractor's work must carry
a vehicle pass
while in the plant."  During onsite inspections, vehicles were noted to be
present in and
around covered process areas without a vehicle pass.  Both gasoline and
diesel vehicles were
permitted onsite in and around the processing units.  Interviews of
vehicle drivers
demonstrated that employees would just check in at the front desk and be
provided a gate
access card.  Review of prior instances showed cases where vehicles
entered electrically
classified areas without a vehicle permit or hot work permit.  By not
controlling access to
covered process areas and/or electrically classified areas, ignition
sources were introduced
into potentially hazardous environments.  Such sources of ignition can
cause catastrophic
events should flammable vapors be present.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence which
requires the evaluation of all refinery access.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Jun 1, 2014

Penalty

Initial $56,000 · Current $3,000 Reduced

General-duty citation text

process
equipment, specifically external inspections of pressure vessels.  This
violation was identified
during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010,
Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests
were not
performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity. The
employer historically
29 CFR 1910.119(j)(4)(i)  Inspection and testing:  Inspections and tests
did not perform external inspections of some pressure vessels,
specifically TWR-20250, for the
period between 1992 (promulgation of OSHA PSM Standard) and November 4,
2009 (opening
date of this inspection). Unless otherwise established by a risk-based
inspection (RBI)
assessment, Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices
(RAGAGEP)
require external inspection of pressure vessels at least every 5 years.
Policies and procedures
shall be performed on
provided by the employer as MDDW 1-UOSH-48, state: "Frequency - Each
vessel above ground
shall be given a visual external inspection, preferably while in
operation, at least every five
process equipment.
A. The employer did not adequately inspect and test the #2 Crude Unit
Crude Heater, FUR-
20250, following an incident on July 22, 2009 when oil was observed
spraying from a split tube.
This violation was identified during inspections of the facility from
November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT,
years or at the same interval as required internal or on-stream
inspection, which ever is less."
Without adequate external inspections to detect anomalous surface
conditions, the vessel could
fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In the event of an equipment
failure, employees could
be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires, explosions, and/or
chemical releases which can
result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence
84087.  At the
that requires evaluation
of all process equipment throughout the facility.
Note:  Per requirements established by the State of Utah, Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code,
R616-2-8 and associated Boiler and Pressure Vessel Compliance Manual,
Revision 8b, external
inspections of pressure vessels must be conducted and inspection intervals
may not exceed 60months.
G.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were
consistently performed on
time of the incident, the employer was required to make a decision to run,
process equipment, specifically external inspections of pressure vessels.
This violation was
repair, or replace the
failed tube.  Per the incident summary (MDDW 1-UOSH205 0002):
a. The furnace was taken off-line to assess problem
b. Employer found tube leak
c. Contractor (Mistras) performed NDE by ultra-sonic on lower half of
vertical tubes
d. Pressure tested tube bundle with steam
e. Found additional leaks
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections
and tests were
not performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.
The employer
historically did not perform external inspections of some pressure
vessels, specifically TWR-
30103.  External inspection and thickness measurements were taken in
f. Decision made to replace entire tube bundle
November 2007 but no
previous external inspections in 2002 and 1997 had been conducted.  Unless
otherwise
established by a risk-based inspection (RBI) assessment, Recognized and
Generally Accepted
Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) require external inspection of
pressure vessels at least
every 5 years.  Policies and procedures provided by the employer as MDDW
1-UOSH-48, state:
"Frequency - Each vessel above ground shall be given a visual external
inspection, preferably
while in operation, at least every five years or at the same interval as
required internal or on-
stream inspection, which ever is less."  Without adequate external
inspections
to detect
anomalous surface conditions, the vessel could fail resulting in a
catastrophic release.  In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as fires,
explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious injury or
death.  This may be
a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all process equipment
throughout the
facility.
Note:  Per requirements established by the State of Utah, Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code,
R616-2-8 and associated Boiler and Pressure Vessel Compliance Manual,
Revision 8b, external
inspections of pressure vessels must be conducted and inspection intervals
may not exceed 60
months.
H.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were
consistently performed on
process equipment, specifically external inspections of pressure vessels.
This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections
and tests were
not performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.
The employer
historically did not perform external inspections of some pressure
vessels, specifically TWR-
50102.  External inspection and thickness measurements were taken in
December 2008 but no
previous external inspections in 2003, 1998 and 1993 had been conducted.
Unless otherwise
established by a risk-based inspection (RBI) assessment, Recognized and
Generally Accepted
Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) require external inspection of
pressure vessels at least
every 5 years.  Policies and procedures provided by the employer as MDDW
1-UOSH-48, state:
"Frequency - Each vessel above ground shall be given a visual external
inspection, preferably
while in operation, at least every five years or at the same interval as
required internal or on-
stream inspection, which ever is less."  Without adequate external
inspections
to detect
anomalous surface conditions, the vessel could fail resulting in a
catastrophic release.  In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as fires,
explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious injury or
death.  This may be
a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all process equipment
throughout the
facility.     Note:  Per requirements established by the State of Utah,
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
R616-2-8 and associated Boiler and Pressure Vessel Compliance Manual,
Revision 8b, external
inspections of pressure vessels must be conducted and inspection intervals
may not exceed 60
months.
I.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process equipment,
specifically external inspections of pressure vessels.  This violation was
identified during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests were not
performed on
process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity. The employer
historically did not
perform external inspections of some pressure vessels, specifically
VES-50104, for the period
between 1992 (promulgation of OSHA PSM Standard) and November 4, 2009
(opening date of
this inspection). Unless otherwise established by a risk-based inspection
(RBI) assessment,
Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP)
require external
inspection of pressure vessels at least every 5 years.  Policies and
procedures provided by the
employer as MDDW 1-UOSH-48, state: "Frequency - Each vessel above ground
shall be given
a visual external inspection, preferably while in operation, at least
every five years or at the
same interval as required internal or on-stream inspection, which ever is
less."  Without
adequate external inspections to detect anomalous surface conditions, the
vessel could fail
resulting in a catastrophic release.  In the event of an equipment
failure,
employees could be
exposed to hazardous situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical
releases which can
result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence
that requires evaluation
of all process equipment throughout the facility.
Note:  Per requirements established by the State of Utah, Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code,
R616-2-8 and associated Boiler and Pressure Vessel Compliance Manual,
Revision 8b, external
inspections of pressure vessels must be conducted and inspection intervals
may not exceed 60
months.
J.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process equipment,
specifically internal or on-stream inspections of pressure vessels.  This
violation was identified
during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010,
Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests
were not
performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity. The
employer historically
did not perform internal or on-stream inspections of some pressure
vessels, specifically COL-
10201, for the period between 1992 (promulgation of OSHA PSM Standard) and
November 4,
2009 (opening date of this inspection).  Unless otherwise established by a
risk-based inspection
(RBI) assessment, Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering
Practices (RAGAGEP)
require internal inspections of pressure vessels be made at least every 10
years.  2006 API 510
Section 6.5.1.1 specifically requires a Risk Based Inspection Assessment
to be in place if
internal inspection intervals exceed 10 years regardless if the service is
corrosive or non-
corrosive.  Silver Eagle was not able to produce records indicating they
had substituted on-
stream inspections for internal inspections as allowed by API 510 Section
6.5.2.1.  Without an
adequate check of internal pressure boundary surfaces for damage, the
vessel could fail resulting
in a catastrophic release.  In the event of an equipment failure,
employees
could be exposed to
hazardous situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases
which can result inserious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all
process equipment throughout the facility.
Note:  Per requirements established by the State of Utah, Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code,
R616-2-8 and associated Boiler and Pressure Vessel Compliance Manual,
Revision 8b, external
inspections of pressure vessels must be conducted and inspection intervals
may not exceed 60
months.
K.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically internal or on-stream inspections of pressure
vessels.  This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections
and tests were
not performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.
The
employer
historically did not perform internal or on-stream inspections of some
pressure vessels,
specifically EXC-10202.  Thickness measurements were taken in December
2008, but no
corresponding internal or on-stream inspection records in 2008 or 1998
were found.  Unless
otherwise established by a risk-based inspection (RBI) assessment,
Recognized and Generally
Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP)
Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) require internal inspections
of pressure
vessels be made at least every 10 years.  2006 API 510 Section 6.5.1.1
specifically requires a
Risk Based Inspection Assessment to be in place if internal inspection
intervals exceed 10 years
regardless if the service is corrosive or non-corrosive.  Silver Eagle was
not able to produce
records indicating they had substituted on-stream inspections for internal
inspections as allowed
offer testing
by API 510 Section 6.5.2.1.  Without an adequate check of internal
pressure boundary surfaces
for damage, the vessel could fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In
the event of an
procedures and a basis for making such a decision.  Documents were
requested by UOSH for
any and all inspection reports associated with this incident. The
employer's submission for
Document Request MDDW 1-UOSH-205 did not include an inspection report even
though the
incident summary indicates that one was performed. Documents provided by
the employer did
equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such
as fires, explosions,
and/or chemical releases which can result in serious injury or death.
This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all process equipment throughout
the facility.
Note:  Per requirements established by the State of Utah, Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code,
R616-2-8 and associated Boiler and Pressure Vessel Compliance Manual,
not demonstrate that a RAGAGEP was used as a determination for returning
Revision 8b, external
inspections of pressure vessels must be conducted and inspection intervals
may not exceed 60
months.
L.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically internal or on-stream inspections of pressure
vessels.  This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle
the #2 Crude Unit
Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections
and tests were
Heater (FUR-20250) to service.  Without an adequate inspection, a crude
heater tube may leak
and then crude would fill the furnace box. A furnace fire or pool fire
might occur if containment
is lost exposing employees to hazardous conditions which can result in
serious injury or death.
This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all
inspection and testing
not performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.
The employer
historically did not perform internal or on-stream inspections of some
pressure vessels,
specifically TWR-20250, for the period between 1992 (promulgation of OSHA
PSM Standard)
and November 4, 2009 (opening date of this inspection).  Unless otherwise
established by a risk-
based inspection (RBI) assessment, Recognized and Generally Accepted Good
procedures throughout the facility.
Engineering
Practices (RAGAGEP) require internal inspections of pressure vessels be
made at least every 10
years.  2006 API 510 Section 6.5.1.1 specifically requires a Risk Based
Inspection Assessment
to be in place if internal inspection intervals exceed 10 years regardless
if the service is
corrosive or non-corrosive.  Silver Eagle was not able to produce records
indicating they hadsubstituted on-stream inspections for internal
inspections as allowed by API 510 Section 6.5.2.1.
Without an adequate check of internal pressure boundary surfaces for
damage, the vessel could
fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In the event of an equipment
failure, employees could
be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires, explosions, and/or
chemical releases which can
result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence
that requires evaluation
of all process equipment throughout the facility.
Note:  Per requirements established by the State of Utah, Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code,
R616-2-8 and associated Boiler and Pressure Vessel Compliance Manual,
Revision 8b, external
inspections of pressure vessels must be conducted and inspection intervals
may not exceed 60
months.
M.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically internal or on-stream inspections of pressure
vessels.  This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections
and tests were
not performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.
The
employer
historically did not perform internal or on-stream inspections of some
pressure vessels,
specifically TWR-30103.  Thickness measurements were taken in November
2007, but no
corresponding internal or on-stream inspection records in 2007 or 1997
were found.  Unless
otherwise established by a risk-based inspection (RBI) assessment,
Recognized and Generally
Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) require internal inspections
of pressure
vessels be made at least every 10 years.  2006 API 510 Section 6.5.1.1
specifically requires a
Risk Based Inspection Assessment to be in place if internal inspection
intervals exceed 10 years
regardless if the service is corrosive or non-corrosive.  Silver Eagle was
not able to produce
records indicating they had substituted on-stream inspections for internal
inspections as allowed
by API 510 Section 6.5.2.1.  Without an adequate check of internal
pressure boundary surfaces
for damage, the vessel could fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In
the event of an
equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such
as fires, explosions,
and/or chemical releases which can result in serious injury or death.
This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all process equipment throughout
the facility.
Note:  Per requirements established by the State of Utah, Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code,
R616-2-8 and associated Boiler and Pressure Vessel Compliance Manual,
Revision 8b, external
inspections of pressure vessels must be conducted and inspection intervals
may not exceed 60
months.
N.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically internal or on-stream inspections of pressure
vessels.  This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections
and tests were
not performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.
The employer
historically did not perform internal or on-stream inspections of some
pressure vessels,
specifically TWR-50102.  Thickness measurements were taken in December
2008, but no
corresponding internal or on-stream inspection records in 2008 or 1998
were found.  Unless
otherwise established by a risk-based inspection (RBI) assessment,
Recognized and GenerallyAccepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP)
require internal inspections of pressure
vessels be made at least every 10 years.  2006 API 510 Section 6.5.1.1
specifically requires a
Risk Based Inspection Assessment to be in place if internal inspection
intervals exceed 10 years
regardless if the service is corrosive or non-corrosive.  Silver Eagle was
not able to produce
records indicating they had substituted on-stream inspections for internal
inspections as allowed
by API 510 Section 6.5.2.1.  Without an adequate check of internal
pressure boundary surfaces
for damage, the vessel could fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In
the event of an
equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such
as fires, explosions,
and/or chemical releases which can result in serious injury or death.
This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all process equipment throughout
the facility.
Note:  Per requirements established by the State of Utah, Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code,
R616-2-8 and associated Boiler and Pressure Vessel Compliance Manual,
Revision 8b, external
inspections of pressure vessels must be conducted and inspection intervals
may not exceed 60
months.
O.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically internal or on-stream inspections of pressure
vessels.  This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections
and tests were
not performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.
The employer
historically did not perform internal or on-stream inspections of some
pressure vessels,
specifically VES-50104, for the period between 1992 (promulgation of OSHA
PSM Standard)
and November 4, 2009 (opening date of this inspection).  Unless otherwise
established by a risk-
based inspection (RBI) assessment, Recognized and Generally Accepted Good
Engineering
Practices (RAGAGEP) require internal inspections of pressure vessels be
made at least every 10
years.  2006 API 510 Section 6.5.1.1 specifically requires a Risk Based
Inspection Assessment
to be in place if internal inspection intervals exceed 10 years regardless
if the service is
corrosive or non-corrosive.  Silver Eagle was not able to produce records
indicating they had
substituted on-stream inspections for internal inspections as allowed by
API 510 Section 6.5.2.1.
Without an adequate check of internal pressure boundary surfaces for
damage, the vessel could
fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In the event of an equipment
failure,
employees could
be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires, explosions, and/or
chemical releases which can
result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence
that requires evaluation
of all process equipment throughout the facility.
Note:  Per requirements established by the State of Utah, Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code,
R616-2-8 and associated Boiler and Pressure Vessel Compliance Manual,
Revision 8b, external
inspections of pressure vessels must be conducted and inspection intervals
may not exceed 60
months.
P.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically visual external piping circuit inspections.  This
violation was identified
during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010,
Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests
were not
performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The
employer historicallydid not perform inspections of some piping circuits,
specifically #2 Crude Unit,  # 4"-BF-21055,
Mistras circuit No. 010 between FUR-20250 and COL-20250.  One visual
inspection and
thickness measurement was conducted in June 2009, but visual external
inspections were not
conducted in 2004, 1999, and 1994.  Unless otherwise established by a
risk-based inspection
B.  The employer did not adequately inspect and test pressure safety
(RBI) assessment, Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering
Practices (RAGAGEP)
require visual external inspection of Class 1 and Class 2 piping circuits
at least every 5 years.
Silver Eagle was not able to produce records indicating inspection of this
piping circuit had been
conducted.  Without adequate external inspections to detect anomalous
surface conditions, the
piping could fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In the event of an
equipment failure,
valves, specifically
employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires,
explosions, and/or chemical
releases which can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a
system-wide occurrence that
performing "as-received" pop pressure tests.  This violation was
identified during inspections
of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests were not performed on
process
equipment to maintain mechanical integrity of Pressure Safety Valves.  Per
API 510 Section 6
requires evaluation of all piping throughout the facility.
Q.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically visual external piping circuit inspections.  This
violation was identified
during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010,
Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests
were not
"pressure-relieving devices shall be tested and inspected at intervals
performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The
employer historically
did not perform inspections of some piping circuits, specifically #2 Crude
Unit,  # 6"-BO-21007,
Mistras circuit No. 35 between TWR-20250 and FF-20250.  One visual
inspection and thickness
measurement was conducted in June 2009, but visual external inspections
were not conducted
in 2004, 1999, and 1994.  Unless otherwise established by a risk-based
inspection (RBI)
that are frequent enough to
assessment, Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices
(RAGAGEP)
require visual external inspection of Class 1 and Class 2 piping circuits
at
verify that the valves perform reliably in the particular service
conditions."  API 576 Section
6, states "the pop pressure of the valve when removed from service should
be estimated...this
as-received test pressure should be recorded for review and facilitation
of any necessary
corrective action."  Valves, including, but not limited to PSV-29401
protecting TWR-20250
least every 5 years.
Silver Eagle was not able to produce records indicating inspection of this
piping circuit had been
conducted.  Without adequate external inspections to detect anomalous
surface conditions, the
piping could fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In the event of an
equipment failure,
employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires,
explosions, and/or chemical
(MDDW 1-UOSH36 0008), PSV-59139 protecting VES-50104 (MDDW 1-UOSH36 0010),
releases which can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a
system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of all piping throughout the facility.
R.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically visual external piping circuit inspections.  This
violation was identified
during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010,
Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests
and
were not
performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The
employer historically
PSV-39422 protecting TWR-30103 (MDDW 1-UOSH36 0011) did not receive an
"as-received"
did not perform inspections of some piping circuits, specifically #2 Crude
Unit,  # 6"-BO-21007,
Mistras circuit No. 125 between TWR-20250 and FF-20250.  One visual
inspection and
thickness measurement was conducted in June 2009, but visual external
inspections were not
conducted in 2004, 1999 and 1994.  Unless otherwise established by a
risk-based inspection
(RBI) assessment, Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering
Practices (RAGAGEP)
require visual external inspection of Class 1 and Class 2 piping circuits
at least every 5 years.
Silver Eagle was not able to produce records indicating inspection of this
piping circuit had been
conducted.  Without adequate external inspections to detect anomalous
surface conditions, the
piping could fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In the event of an
equipment failure,
employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires,
explosions, and/or chemicalreleases which can result in serious injury or
death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of all piping throughout the facility.
S.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically visual external piping circuit inspections.  This
violation was identified
during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010,
Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests
were not
performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The
employer historically
did not perform inspections of some piping circuits, specifically MDDW
Unit, Line # 8"-HS-
31045, Mistras circuit No. 112 between VES-30101 and the hydrogen recycle
compressor.  One
visual inspection and thickness measurement was conducted in May 2009, but
visual external
inspections were not conducted in 2004, and 1999.  Unless otherwise
established by a risk-based
inspection (RBI) assessment, Recognized and Generally Accepted Good
Engineering Practices
(RAGAGEP) require visual external inspection of Class 1 and Class 2 piping
circuits at least
every 5 years.  Silver Eagle was not able to produce records indicating
inspection
of this piping
circuit had been conducted.  Without adequate external inspections to
detect anomalous surface
conditions, the piping could fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In
the event of an equipment
failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires,
explosions, and/or
chemical releases which can result in serious injury or death.  This may
be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all piping throughout the facility.
T.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically visual external piping circuit inspections.  This
violation was identified
during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010,
Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests
were not
performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The
employer historically
did not perform inspections of some piping circuits, specifically MDDW
Unit,
Line # 8"-HS-
31045, Mistras circuit No. 113 between VES-30101 and the hydrogen recycle
compressor.  One
visual inspection and thickness measurement was conducted in May 2009, but
visual external
inspections were not conducted in 2004, and 1999.  Unless otherwise
established by a risk-based
inspection (RBI) assessment, Recognized and Generally Accepted Good
Engineering Practices
(RAGAGEP) require visual external inspection of Class 1 and Class 2 piping
circuits at least
every 5 years.  Silver Eagle was not able to produce records indicating
inspection of this piping
circuit had been conducted.  Without adequate external inspections to
detect anomalous surface
conditions, the piping could fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In
the event of an equipment
failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires,
explosions, and/or
chemical releases which can result in serious injury or death.  This may
be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all piping throughout the facility.
U.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically visual external piping circuit inspections.  This
violation was identified
during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010,
Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests
were not
performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The
employer historically
did not perform inspections of some piping circuits, specifically MDDW
Unit, line # 8"-WB-
31026, Mistras Circuit No. 29, between RTR30103 and EXC30101-B.  One
visual inspectionand thickness measurement was conducted in May 2009, but
visual external inspections were not
conducted in 2004, and 1999.  Unless otherwise established by a risk-based
inspection (RBI)
assessment, Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices
(RAGAGEP)
require visual external inspection of Class 1 and Class 2 piping circuits
at least every 5 years.
Silver Eagle was not able to produce records indicating inspection of this
piping
circuit had been
conducted.  Without adequate external inspections to detect anomalous
surface conditions, the
piping could fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In the event of an
equipment failure,
employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires,
explosions, and/or chemical
releases which can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a
system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of all piping throughout the facility.
V.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically visual external piping circuit inspections.  This
violation was identified
during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010,
Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests
were not
performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The
employer historically
did not perform inspections of some piping circuits, specifically #2 Crude
Unit,  # 4"-BF-21055,
Mistras circuit No. 010 between FUR-20250 and COL-20250.  One visual
inspection and
thickness measurement was conducted in June and September of 2009, but
visual external
inspections were not conducted in 2004, and 1999.  Unless otherwise
established by a risk-based
inspection (RBI) assessment, Recognized and Generally Accepted Good
Engineering Practices
(RAGAGEP) require visual external inspection of Class 1 and Class 2 piping
circuits at least
every 5 years.  Silver Eagle was not able to produce records indicating
inspection of this piping
circuit had been conducted.  Without adequate external inspections to
detect anomalous surface
conditions, the piping could fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In
the event of an equipment
failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires,
explosions, and/or
chemical releases which can result in serious injury or death.  This may
be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all piping throughout the facility.
W.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically visual external piping circuit inspections.  This
violation was identified
during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010,
Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests
were not
performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The
pop pressure test.  These 3 valves were removed from service and sent to
employer historically
did not perform inspections of some piping circuits, specifically HDS
Reformer Unit, Line # 3"-
RF-51116, Mistras circuit No. 004 between PMP-50101 and EXC-50102A.  One
visual
inspection and thickness measurement was conducted in June 2009, but
visual external
inspections were not conducted in 2004, and 1999.  Unless otherwise
established by a risk-based
inspection (RBI) assessment, Recognized and Generally Accepted Good
NEVCO, Inc. for
Engineering Practices
(RAGAGEP) require visual external inspection of Class 1 and Class 2 piping
circuits at least
every 5 years.  Silver Eagle was not able to produce records indicating
inspection
clean/repair/inspect services. The employer did not instruct NEVCO to
perform an as-received
pop pressure test. On the three Test Certificates from 2008 and 2009,
NEVCO Q.C. Supervisor
wrote in the Pre-Test Information box that only a "Standard Repair" was
requested and
performed. As-received, pop pressure test for pressure safety valves is
essential for the refineryinspector to know at what pressure the old valve
of this piping
circuit had been conducted.  Without adequate external inspections to
detect anomalous surface
conditions, the piping could fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In
the event of an equipment
failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires,
explosions, and/or
chemical releases which can result in serious injury or death.
This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all
would have relieved at, to assess risk, to form
piping throughout thefacility.
X.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically visual external piping circuit inspections.  This
violation was identified
during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010,
Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests
were not
performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The
an opinion regarding the next inspection date, or to recommend the
employer historically
did not perform inspections of some piping circuits, specifically Reformer
HDS Unit, Line # 4"-
installation of protective
rupture discs.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be
exposed to hazardous
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result in serious injury
or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation
of all pressure safety
valves throughout the facility.
HD-51125, Mistras circuit No. 057 between TWR-50102 and EXC-50111.  One
visual
inspection and thickness measurement was conducted in July 2009, but
visual external
inspections were not conducted in 2004, and 1999.  Unless otherwise
established by a risk-based
inspection (RBI) assessment, Recognized and Generally Accepted Good
Engineering Practices
(RAGAGEP) require visual external inspection of Class 1 and Class 2 piping
C.  The employer did not adequately inspect piping restraints on the
circuits at least
every 5 years.  Silver Eagle was not able to produce records indicating
inspection of this piping
circuit had been conducted.  Without adequate external inspections to
detect anomalous surface
conditions, the piping could fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In
the event of an equipment
failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires,
explosions, and/or
chemical releases which can result in serious injury or death.  This may
discharge
be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all piping throughout the facility.
Y.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically thickness testing of Class II piping.  This
violation was identified during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests were not
performed on
process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The employer
historically did not
perform thickness testing of Class II piping on the MDDW Unit, Line #
8"-HS-31045, Mistras
circuit No. 112 between VES-30101 and the hydrogen recycle compressor.
One thickness
measurement was conducted in May 2009, but thickness measurements were not
conducted in
1999.  Unless otherwise established by a risk-based inspection (RBI)
assessment, Recognized
and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) require piping
thickness
measurements of Class II piping circuits at least every 10 years. These
non destructive
examinations for piping thickness must be performed to assure that the
piping
has sufficient
thickness to provide both pressure containment and mechanical support.
Silver Eagle was not
able to produce records indicating historical piping thickness
measurements of this piping circuit
had been conducted.  Piping inspections should be frequent enough to
assure that all piping has
sufficient thickness to provide both pressure containment and mechanical
support. Without
adequate thickness inspections to detect anomalous conditions, the piping
could fail resulting in
a catastrophic release.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees
could be exposed to
hazardous situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases
which can result in
serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of all
piping throughout the facility.
Z.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically thickness testing of Class II piping.  This
violation was identified during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests were not
performed onprocess equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The
employer historically did not
perform thickness testing of Class II piping on the MDDW Unit, Line #
8"-HS-31045, Mistras
circuit No. 113 between VES-30101 and the hydrogen recycle compressor.
One thickness
measurement was conducted in May 2009, but thickness measurements were not
conducted in
1999.  Unless otherwise established by a risk-based inspection (RBI)
assessment, Recognized
and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) require piping
thickness
measurements of Class II piping circuits at least every 10 years. These
non destructive
examinations for piping thickness must be performed to assure that the
piping has sufficient
thickness to provide both pressure containment and mechanical support.
Silver Eagle was not
able to produce records indicating historical piping thickness
measurements of this piping circuit
had been conducted.  Piping inspections should be frequent enough to
assure that all piping has
sufficient thickness to provide both pressure containment and mechanical
support. Without
adequate thickness inspections to detect anomalous conditions, the piping
could fail resulting in
a catastrophic release.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees
could be exposed to
hazardous situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases
which can result in
serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of all
piping throughout the facility.
AA.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically thickness testing of Class II piping.  This
violation was identified during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests were not
performed on
process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The employer
historically
did not
perform thickness testing of Class II piping on the MDDW Unit, line #
8"-WB-31026, Mistras
Circuit No. 29, between RTR30103 and EXC30101-B.  One thickness
measurement was
conducted in May 2009, but thickness measurements were not conducted in
1999.  Unless
otherwise established by a risk-based inspection (RBI) assessment,
Recognized and Generally
Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) require piping thickness
measurements of
Class II piping circuits at least every 10 years. These non destructive
examinations for piping
thickness must be performed to assure that the piping has sufficient
thickness to provide both
pressure containment and mechanical support. Silver Eagle was not able to
produce records
indicating historical piping thickness measurements of this piping circuit
had been conducted.
Piping inspections should be frequent enough to assure that all piping has
sufficient thickness
to provide both pressure containment and mechanical support. Without
adequate thickness
inspections to detect anomalous conditions, the piping could fail
resulting in a catastrophic
release.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed
to hazardous
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result in serious injury
or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation
of all piping
throughout the facility.
BB.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically thickness testing of Class II piping.  This
violation was identified during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests were not
performed on
process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The employer
historically did not
perform thickness testing of Class II piping on the #2 Crude Unit,  #
4"-BF-21055, Mistrascircuit No. 010 between FUR-20250 and COL-20250.
Measurements were conducted in June
2009 and September 2009, but thickness measurements were not conducted in
1999.  Unless
otherwise established by a risk-based inspection (RBI) assessment,
Recognized and Generally
Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) require piping thickness
measurements of
Class II piping circuits at least every 10 years. These non destructive
examinations for piping
thickness must be performed to assure that the piping has sufficient
thickness to provide both
pressure containment and mechanical support. Silver Eagle was not able to
produce records
indicating historical piping thickness measurements of this piping circuit
had been conducted.
Piping inspections should be frequent enough to assure that all piping has
sufficient thickness
to provide both pressure containment and mechanical support. Without
adequate thickness
inspections to detect anomalous conditions, the piping could fail
resulting in a catastrophic
release.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed
to hazardous
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result
in serious injury
or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation
of all piping
throughout the facility.
CC.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically thickness testing of Class II piping.  This
violation was identified during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
piping from
Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests were not
performed on
process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The employer
historically did not
perform thickness testing of Class II piping on the HDS Reformer Unit,
Line # 3"-RF-51116,
Mistras circuit No. 004 between PMP-50101 and EXC-50102A.  One thickness
measurement
was conducted in June 2009, but thickness measurements were not conducted
pressure safety valves.  This violation was identified during inspections
in 1999.  Unless
otherwise established by a risk-based inspection (RBI) assessment,
Recognized and Generally
of the facility from
November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests were not performed on process
equipment to maintain
Mechanical Integrity.  Field observations identified multiple restraints
were disconnected and/or
corroded.  Examples include, but are not limited to, discharge piping from
Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) require piping thickness
measurements of
Class II piping circuits at least every 10 years. These non destructive
examinations for piping
thickness must be performed to assure that the piping has sufficient
thickness to provide both
pressure containment and mechanical support. Silver Eagle was not able to
produce records
indicating historical piping thickness measurements of this piping circuit
pressure safety valves
had been conducted.
Piping inspections should be frequent enough to assure that all piping has
sufficient thickness
to provide both pressure containment and mechanical support. Without
adequate thickness
inspections to detect anomalous conditions, the piping could fail
resulting in a catastrophic
release.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed
to hazardous
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
PSV 39410 and PSV 39421.  By not inspecting discharge piping from pressure
result in serious injury
or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation
of all piping
throughout the facility.
safety valves,
the disconnected/failed discharge piping restraint may allow the PSV and
its connected piping
to fail catastrophically from unrestrained reaction forces during a
release event.  In the event of
an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous situations
such as fires,
explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious injury or
DD.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically thickness testing of Class II piping.  This
violation was identified during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests were not
performed on
process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The employer
death.  This may be
historically did not
perform thickness testing of Class II piping on the Reformer HDS Unit,
Line # 4"-HD-51125,
Mistras circuit No. 057 between TWR-50102 and EXC-50111.  One thickness
measurement was
conducted in July 2009, but thickness measurements were not conducted in
1999.  Unlessotherwise established by a risk-based inspection (RBI)
assessment, Recognized and Generally
Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) require piping thickness
measurements of
a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all discharge piping
Class II piping circuits at least every 10 years. These non destructive
examinations for piping
thickness must be performed to assure that the piping has sufficient
thickness
from pressure safety
to provide both
pressure containment and mechanical support. Silver Eagle was not able to
produce records
indicating historical piping thickness measurements of this piping circuit
had been conducted.
Piping inspections should be frequent enough to assure that all piping has
sufficient thickness
to provide both pressure containment and mechanical support. Without
adequate thickness
inspections to detect anomalous conditions, the piping could fail
resulting in a catastrophic
release.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed
to hazardous
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result in serious injury
or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation
of all piping
throughout the facility.
EE.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically thickness testing of Class I piping.  This
violation was identified during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests were not
performed on
process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The employer
historically did not
perform thickness testing of Class I piping on the #2 Crude Unit,  #
6"-BO-21007, Mistras
circuit No. 35 between TWR-20250 and FF-20250.  One thickness measurement
was conducted
in June 2009, but visual external inspections were not conducted in 2004,
1999, and 1994.
Silver Eagle could not produce documents demonstrating inspections prior
to 2009 had been
conducted.  Unless otherwise established by a risk-based inspection (RBI)
assessment,
Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP)
require piping
thickness measurements of Class 1 piping circuits at least every 5 years.
These non destructive
examinations for piping thickness must be performed to assure that the
piping has sufficient
thickness to provide both pressure containment and mechanical support.
Piping
inspections
should be frequent enough to assure that all piping has sufficient
thickness to provide both
pressure containment and mechanical support. Without adequate thickness
inspections to detect
anomalous conditions, the piping could fail resulting in a catastrophic
release.  In the event of
an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous situations
such as fires,
explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious injury or
death.  This may be
a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all piping throughout
the facility.
FF.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically thickness testing of Class I piping.  This
violation was identified during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests were not
performed on
process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.  The employer
historically
did not
perform thickness testing of Class I piping on the #2 Crude Unit,  #
6"-BO-21007, Mistras
circuit No. 125 between TWR-20250 and FF-20250.  One thickness measurement
was conducted
in June 2009, but visual external inspections were not conducted in 2004,
1999 and 1994.  Silver
Eagle could not produce documents demonstrating inspections prior to 2009
had been conducted.
Unless otherwise established by a risk-based inspection (RBI) assessment,
Recognized and
Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) require piping
thicknessmeasurements of Class 1 piping circuits at least every 5 years.
These non destructive
examinations for piping thickness must be performed to assure that the
piping has sufficient
thickness to provide both pressure containment and mechanical support.
Piping inspections
should be frequent enough to assure that all piping has sufficient
thickness to provide both
pressure containment and mechanical support. Without adequate thickness
inspections to detect
anomalous conditions, the piping could fail resulting in a catastrophic
release.
In the event of
an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous situations
such as fires,
explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious injury or
death.   This may be
a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all piping throughout
the facility.
valves throughout the facility.
D.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on process
equipment, specifically external inspections of pressure vessels.  This
violation was identified
during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010,
Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections and tests
were not
performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity. The
employer historically
did not perform external inspections of some pressure vessels,
specifically COL-10201, for the
period between 1992 (promulgation of OSHA PSM Standard) and November 4,
2009 (opening
date of this inspection). Unless otherwise established by a risk-based
inspection (RBI)
assessment, Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices
(RAGAGEP)
require external inspection of pressure vessels at least every 5 years.
Policies and procedures
provided by the employer as MDDW 1-UOSH-48, state: "Frequency - Each
vessel
above ground
shall be given a visual external inspection, preferably while in
operation, at least every five
years or at the same interval as required internal or on-stream
inspection, which ever is less."
Without adequate external inspections to detect anomalous surface
conditions, the vessel could
fail resulting in a catastrophic release.  In the event of an equipment
failure, employees could
be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires, explosions, and/or
chemical releases which can
result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence
that requires evaluation
of all process equipment throughout the facility.
Note:  Per requirements established by the State of Utah, Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code,
R616-2-8 and associated Boiler and Pressure Vessel Compliance Manual,
Revision 8b, external
inspections of pressure vessels must be conducted and inspection intervals
may not exceed 60
months.
E.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were
consistently performed onprocess equipment, specifically external
inspections of pressure vessels.  This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Inspections
and tests were
not performed on process equipment to maintain its mechanical integrity.
The employer
historically did not perform external inspections of some pressure
vessels, specifically EXC-
10202.  External inspection and thickness measurements were taken in
December 2008 but no
previous external inspections in 2003, 1998 and 1993 had been conducted.
Unless otherwise
established by a risk-based inspection (RBI) assessment, Recognized and
Generally Accepted
Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) require external inspection of
pressure vessels at least
every 5 years.  Policies and procedures provided by the employer as MDDW
1-UOSH-48, state:
"Frequency - Each vessel above ground shall be given a visual external
inspection, preferably
while in operation, at least every five years or at the same interval as
required internal or on-
stream inspection, which ever is less."  Without adequate external
inspections to detect
anomalous surface conditions, the vessel could fail resulting in a
catastrophic release.  In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as fires,
explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious injury or
death.  This may be
a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all process equipment
throughout the
facility.
Note:  Per requirements established by the State of Utah, Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Code,
R616-2-8 and associated Boiler and Pressure Vessel Compliance Manual,
Revision 8b, external
inspections of pressure vessels must be conducted and inspection intervals
may not exceed 60
months.
F.  The employer did not ensure that inspections and tests were performed
on

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $56,000 · Current $3,000 Reduced

General-duty citation text

with no progress made on mitigation.  By not correcting deficiencies in a
timely manner,
equipment and the associated relief systems may potentially be compromised
and fail.  In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all pressure
29 CFR 1910.119(j)(5)  Equipment deficiencies. The employer shall correct
relief devices
throughout the facility.
H.  The employer did not correct an undercapacity deficiency identified
with pressure relief
valves in a timely manner.  This violation was identified during
inspections of the facility
from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South
1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  As part of the 2007 Silver Eagle Flare Study
conducted by
deficiencies in
VECO, PSV-39421 is undercapacity for fire scenario (MDDW 1-UOSH-81).  On
February
15, 2008, Silver Eagle met with VECO to review the results of the recently
completed
equipment that are outside acceptable limits (defined by the process
safety information in
paragraph (d) of this section) before further use or in a safe and timely
manner when
necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.
A.  The employer did not correct an undercapacity deficiency identified
with pressure relief
valves in a timely manner.  This violation was identified during
flare
study and to discuss corrective actions.  The required resolution included
replacing the PSV
to address the undercapacity issue.  Over twenty months lapsed between
employer
acknowledgement of the deficiency and the November 5, 2009 opening of this
inspection,
with no progress made on mitigation.   By not correcting deficiencies in a
timely manner,
inspections of the facility
equipment and the associated relief systems may potentially be compromised
and fail.  In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all pressure
relief devices
throughout the facility.
I.  The employer did not correct an undercapacity deficiency identified
from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South
with pressure relief
valves in a timely manner.  This violation was identified during
inspections of the facility
1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  As part of the 2007 Silver Eagle Flare Study
conducted by
VECO, PSV-19406 was identified as being undercapacity for blocked outlet
and automatic
control failure scenarios (MDDW 1-UOSH-81).  On February 15, 2008, Silver
Eagle met
with VECO to review the results of the recently completed flare study and
from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South
1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  As part of the 2007 Silver Eagle Flare Study
conducted byVECO, PSV-39422 is undercapacity for overfilling and auto
control failure scenarios
(MDDW 1-UOSH-81).  On February 15, 2008, Silver Eagle met with VECO to
review the
results of the recently completed flare study and to discuss corrective
actions.  The required
to discuss
resolution included replacing the PSV to address the undercapacity issue.
Over twenty
months lapsed between employer acknowledgement of the deficiency and the
date of this
inspection with no progress made on mitigation.  By not correcting
deficiencies in a timely
manner, equipment and the associated relief systems may potentially be
compromised and
fail.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to
hazardous
corrective actions.  The required resolution included replacing the PSV to
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result in serious
injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all
address
pressure relief devices throughout the facility.
J.  The employer did not correct an undercapacity deficiency identified
with pressure relief
valves in a timely manner.  This violation was identified during
inspections of the facility
from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South
1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  As part of the 2007 Silver Eagle Flare Study
conducted by
VECO,  PSV-59139 is undercapacity for exchanger tube rupture scenario
(MDDW 1-UOSH-
81).  On February 15, 2008, Silver Eagle met with VECO to review the
results of the
recently completed flare study and to discuss corrective actions.  The
required resolution
included replacing the PSV to address the undercapacity issue.  Over
twenty months lapsed
between employer acknowledgement of the deficiency and the November 5,
2009 opening of
this inspection, with no progress made on mitigation.  By not correcting
deficiencies in a
timely manner, equipment and the associated relief systems may potentially
be
compromised
and fail.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be
exposed to hazardous
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result in serious
injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all
pressure relief devices throughout the facility.
K.  The employer did not correct an undercapacity deficiency identified
with pressure relief
valves in a timely manner.  This violation was identified during
inspections of the facility
from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South
1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  As part of the 2007 Silver Eagle Flare Study
conducted by
VECO,  PSV-59233 is undercapacity for fire scenario (MDDW 1-UOSH-81).  On
February
15, 2008, Silver Eagle met with VECO to review the results of the recently
completed flare
study and to discuss corrective actions.  The required resolution included
replacing the PSV
to address the undercapacity issue.  Over twenty months lapsed between
employer
acknowledgement of the deficiency and the November 5, 2009 opening of this
inspection,
with no progress made on mitigation.  By not correcting deficiencies in a
timely manner,
equipment and the associated relief systems may potentially be compromised
and fail.  In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all pressure
relief devices
throughout the facility.
L.  The employer did not correct an inlet line pressure drop deficiency in
a timely manner.
This violation was identified during inspections on site at Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087 from November
2009 to March 2010.  Review
of records created as part of the employer's commissioned 2008 VECO Flare
Study for PSV-
19406, revealed that over twenty months lapsed between employer
acknowledgement of the
deficiency and the November 5, 2009 opening of this inspection, with no
progress made on
mitigation.  PSV-19406 was identified on the VECO Flare study as having an
ILPD greater
than 3 By not correcting equipment deficiencies in a timely manner,
equipment can fail
exposing employees to hazards which can result in serious injury or death.
This may be a
system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all pressure relieving
devices throughout
the facility.
M.  The employer did not correct an inlet line pressure drop deficiency in
a timely manner.
This violation was identified during inspections on site at Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.
Review
of records created as part of the employer's commissioned 2008 VECO Flare
Study for PSV-
39420, revealed that over twenty months lapsed between employer
acknowledgement
of the
deficiency and the November 5, 2009 opening of this inspection, with no
progress made on
mitigation.  PSV-39420 was identified on the VECO Flare study as having an
ILPD greater
than 3 By not correcting equipment deficiencies in a timely manner,
equipment can fail
exposing employees to hazards which can result in serious injury or death.
This may be a
system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all pressure relieving
devices throughout
the facility.
N.  The employer did not correct an inlet line pressure drop deficiency in
a timely manner.
This violation was identified during inspections on site at Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.
Review
of records created as part of the employer's commissioned 2008 VECO Flare
Study for PSV-
19421, revealed that over twenty months lapsed between employer
acknowledgement of the
deficiency and the November 5, 2009 opening of this inspection, with no
progress made on
mitigation.  PSV-19421 was identified on the VECO Flare study as having an
ILPD greater
than 3 By not correcting equipment deficiencies in a timely manner,
equipment can fail
exposing employees to hazards which can result in serious injury or death.
This may be a
system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all pressure relieving
devices throughout
the facility.
O.  The employer did not correct an inlet line pressure drop deficiency in
a timely manner.
This violation was identified during inspections on site at Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.
Review
of records created as part of the employer's commissioned 2008 VECO Flare
Study for PSV-
99410, revealed that over twenty months lapsed between employer
acknowledgement of the
deficiency and the November 5, 2009 opening of this inspection, with no
progress
made on
mitigation.  PSV-99410 was identified on the VECO Flare study as having an
ILPD greater
than 3 By not correcting equipment deficiencies in a timely manner,
equipment can fail
exposing employees to hazards which can result in serious injury or death.
This may be a
system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all pressure relieving
devices throughout
the facility.
P.  The employer did not correct an inlet line pressure drop deficiency in
a timely manner.
This violation was identified during inspections on site at Silver Eagle
Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.
Review
of records created as part of the employer's commissioned 2008 VECO Flare
Study for PSV-
39411, revealed that over twenty months lapsed between employer
acknowledgement of the
deficiency and the November 5, 2009 opening of this inspection, with no
progress made on
mitigation.  PSV-39411 was identified on the VECO Flare study as having an
ILPD
greater
than 3 By not correcting equipment deficiencies in a timely manner,
equipment can fail
exposing employees to hazards which can result in serious injury or death.
This may be a
system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all pressure relieving
devices throughout
the facility.
Q.  The employer did not ensure that equipment deficiencies were
the
identified and corrected in
equipment that is outside acceptable limits before further use or in a
safe and timely manner
when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.  This violation
was identified
during inspections on site at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.  UOSH inspection of
EXC-10201B
revealed the exchanger did not have a relief valve.  In addition, Silver
undercapacity issue.  Over twenty months lapsed between employer
Eagle's contractor,
Mistras, also identified the deficiency during inspections in January
2010.  Documents
acknowledgement of the
deficiency and the November 5, 2009 opening of this inspection, with no
progress made on
mitigation.  By not correcting deficiencies in a timely manner, equipment
and the associated
relief systems may potentially be compromised and fail.  In the event of
an equipment
failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires,
provided as MDDW-1-UOSH-134 contained notes stating to "Provide and
install relief
valve."  By not correcting equipment deficiencies, employees were exposed
to hazards which
can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires
evaluation of all pressurized equipment throughout the facility.
R.  The employer did not ensure that equipment deficiencies were
identified and corrected in
explosions, and/or
equipment that is outside acceptable limits before further use or in a
safe and timely manner
when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.  This violation
was identified
during inspections on site at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.  UOSH inspection of
EXC-10201A
revealed the exchanger did not have a relief valve.  In addition, Silver
Eagle's contractor,
chemical releases which can result in serious injury or death.  This may
Mistras, also identified the deficiency during inspections in January
2010.  Documents
provided as MDDW-1-UOSH-134 contained notes stating to "install pressure
relief
be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all pressure relief devices
throughout the facility.
B.  The employer did not correct an undercapacity deficiency identified
with pressure relief
valves in a timely manner.  This violation was identified during
inspections of the facility
from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South
valve."
By not correcting equipment deficiencies, employees were exposed to
hazards which can
result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence
that requires
evaluation of all pressurized equipment throughout the facility.
S.  The employer did not ensure that equipment deficiencies were
identified and corrected in
equipment that is outside acceptable limits before further use or in a
1100 West,
safe and timely manner
when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.  This violation
was identified
during inspections on site at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.  UOSH inspection of
EXC-10203
revealed the exchanger did not have a relief valve.  In addition, Silver
Eagle's contractor,
Mistras, also identified the deficiency during inspections in January
Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  As part of the 2007 Silver Eagle Flare Study
2010.  Documents
provided as MDDW-1-UOSH-134 contained notes stating to "Provide and
install relief
conducted
valve."  By not correcting equipment deficiencies, employees were exposed
to hazards which
can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requiresevaluation of all pressurized equipment throughout
the facility.
T.  The employer did not ensure that equipment deficiencies were
identified and corrected in
equipment that is outside acceptable limits before further use or in a
safe and timely manner
when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.  This violation
was identified
during inspections on site at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.  UOSH inspection of
EXC-10206
revealed the exchanger did not have a relief valve.  In addition, Silver
Eagle's contractor,
Mistras, also identified the deficiency during inspections in December
2009.   Documents
provided as MDDW-1-UOSH-134 contained notes stating to "install relief
valve."  By not
correcting equipment deficiencies, employees were exposed to hazards which
can
result in
serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of all
pressurized equipment throughout the facility.
U.  The employer did not ensure that equipment deficiencies were
identified and corrected in
equipment that is outside acceptable limits before further use or in a
safe and timely manner
when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.  This violation
was identified
during inspections on site at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.  UOSH inspection of
EXC-10204,
built in 1963, revealed the exchanger did not have a relief valve.  In
addition, Silver Eagle's
contractor, Mistras, also identified the deficiency during inspections in
January 2010.
Documents provided as MDDW-1-UOSH-134 contained notes identifying "The
exchanger is
not equipped with a relief valve."  By not correcting equipment
deficiencies, employees were
exposed to hazards which can result in serious injury or death.  This may
be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all pressurized equipment
throughout the facility.
V.  The employer did not ensure that equipment deficiencies were
identified and corrected in
equipment that is outside acceptable limits before further use or in a
safe and timely manner
when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.  This violation
was identified
during inspections on site at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.  UOSH inspection of
EXC-10205,
built in 1961, revealed the exchanger did not have a relief valve.  In
addition, Silver Eagle's
contractor, Mistras, also identified the deficiency during inspections in
January 2010.
Documents provided as MDDW-1-UOSH-134 remarked "ASME Section VIII
paragraph: UG
125 (no relief)."  By not correcting equipment deficiencies, employees
were exposed to
hazards which can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a
system-wide occurrence
that requires evaluation of all pressurized equipment throughout the
facility.
W.  The employer did not ensure that equipment deficiencies were
identified and corrected in
equipment that is outside acceptable limits before further use or in a
safe and timely manner
when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.  This violation
was identified
during inspections on site at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.  UOSH inspection of
EXC-10207,
built in 1963,  revealed the exchanger did not have a relief valve.  In
addition, Silver Eagle's
contractor, Mistras, also identified the deficiency during inspections in
January 2010.
Documents provided as MDDW-1-UOSH-134 remarked "ASME Section VIII
paragraph: UG125 (no relief)."  By not correcting equipment deficiencies,
employees were exposed to
hazards which can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a
system-wide
occurrence
that requires evaluation of all pressurized equipment throughout the
facility.
X.  The employer did not ensure that equipment deficiencies were
identified and corrected in
equipment that is outside acceptable limits before further use or in a
safe and timely manner
when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.  This violation
was identified
during inspections on site at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.  UOSH inspection of
EXC-10209A,
built in 1964, revealed the exchanger did not have a relief valve.  In
addition, Silver Eagle's
contractor, Mistras, also identified the deficiency during inspections in
January 2010.
Documents provided as MDDW-1-UOSH-134 contained notes stating "There is no
relief
valve."  By not correcting equipment deficiencies, employees were exposed
to hazards which
can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence
that requires
evaluation of all pressurized equipment throughout the facility.
Y.  The employer did not ensure that equipment deficiencies were
identified and corrected in
equipment that is outside acceptable limits before further use or in a
safe and timely manner
when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.  This violation
was identified
during inspections on site at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.  UOSH inspection of
EXC-10209B,
built in 1979, revealed the exchanger did not have a relief valve.  In
addition, Silver Eagle's
contractor, Mistras, also identified the deficiency during inspections in
January 2010.
Documents provided as MDDW-1-UOSH-134 contained notes stating "no relief
valve."  By
not correcting equipment deficiencies, employees were exposed to hazards
which can result
in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of
all pressurized equipment throughout the facility.
Z.  The employer did not ensure that equipment deficiencies were
identified and corrected in
equipment that is outside acceptable limits before further use or in a
safe and timely manner
when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.  This violation
was identified
during inspections on site at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.  UOSH inspection of
EXC-10210,
built in 1963, revealed the exchanger did not have a relief valve.  In
addition, Silver Eagle's
contractor, Mistras, also identified the deficiency during inspections in
January 2010.
Documents provided as MDDW-1-UOSH-134 remarked "ASME Section VIII
paragraph: UG
125 (no relief)."  By not correcting equipment deficiencies, employees
were exposed to
hazards which can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a
system-wide occurrence
that requires evaluation of all pressurized equipment throughout the
facility.
AA.  The employer did not ensure that equipment deficiencies were
identified and corrected
in equipment that is outside acceptable limits before further use or in a
safe and timely
manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.  This
violation was
identified during inspections on site at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.  UOSH inspection
by
of TWR
10136, built in 1943, revealed the vessel did not have a relief valve.  In
addition, SilverEagle's contractor, Mistras, also identified the
deficiency during inspections in December
2009.  Documents provided as MDDW-1-UOSH-134 remarked "ASME Section VIII
paragraph: UG 125 (no relief)."  By not correcting equipment deficiencies,
employees were
exposed to hazards which can result in serious injury or death.  This may
be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all pressurized equipment
VECO, PSV-29401 is undercapacity for blocked outlet, column reflux
throughout the facility.
failure, overfilling,
auto control failure, tube rupture and fire scenarios (MDDW 1-UOSH-81).
On February 15,
2008, Silver Eagle met with VECO to review the results of the recently
completed flare
study and to discuss corrective actions.  The required resolution included
replacing the PSV
to address the undercapacity issue.  Over twenty months lapsed between
BB.  The employer did not ensure that equipment deficiencies were
identified and corrected
in equipment that is outside acceptable limits before further use or in a
safe and timely
manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.  This
violation was
identified during inspections on site at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.  UOSH inspection
employer
of VES
10201, built in 1947, revealed the vessel did not have a relief valve.  In
addition, Silver
Eagle's contractor, Mistras, also identified the deficiency during
inspections in December
2009.  Documents provided as MDDW-1-UOSH-134 remarked "ASME Section VIII
paragraph: UG 125 (no relief)."  By not correcting equipment deficiencies,
employees were
exposed to hazards which can result in serious injury or death.  This may
be a system-wide
acknowledgement of the deficiency and the November 5, 2009 opening of this
occurrence that requires evaluation of all pressurized equipment
throughout the facility.
CC.  The employer did not ensure that equipment deficiencies were
identified
inspection,
with no progress made on mitigation.  By not correcting deficiencies in a
timely manner,
equipment and the associated relief systems may potentially be compromised
and fail.  In the
event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to hazardous
situations such as
fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in serious
and corrected
in equipment that is outside acceptable limits before further use or in a
safe and timely
manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.  This
violation was
identified during inspections on site at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.  Inspection of
FAN 10214,
injury or death.  This
built in 1977, revealed the fan did not have a relief valve.  In addition,
Silver Eagle's
contractor, Mistras, also identified the deficiency during inspections in
January 2010.
Documents provided as MDDW-1-UOSH-134 remarked "ASME Section VIII
paragraph: UG
125 (no relief)."  By not correcting equipment deficiencies, employees
were exposed to
hazards which can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a
system-wide occurrence
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all pressure
that requires evaluation of all pressurized equipment throughout the
facility.
DD.  The employer did not ensure that equipment deficiencies were
identified
relief devices
and corrected
in equipment that is outside acceptable limits before further use or in a
safe and timely
manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.  This
violation was
identified during inspections on site at Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355
South 1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT, 84087 from November 2009 to March 2010.  UOSH inspection
of FAN
10215, built in 1995, revealed the fan did not have a relief valve.  In
addition, Silver Eagle's
contractor, Mistras, also identified the deficiency during inspections in
December 2009.
Documents provided as MDDW-1-UOSH-134 remarked "ASME Section VIII
paragraph: UG
125 (no relief)."  By not correcting equipment deficiencies, employees
were exposed to
hazards which can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a
system-wide occurrence
that requires evaluation of all pressurized equipment throughout the
facility.
throughout the facility.
C.  The employer did not correct an undercapacity deficiency identified
with pressure relief
valves in a timely manner.  This violation was identified during
inspections of the facility
from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South
1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  As part of the 2007 Silver Eagle Flare Study
conducted by
VECO, PSV-39403 is undercapacity for blocked outlet failure scenario (MDDW
1-UOSH-
81).  On February 15, 2008, Silver Eagle met with VECO to review the
results of the
recently completed flare study and to discuss corrective actions.  The
required resolution
included replacing the PSV to address the undercapacity issue.  Over
twenty months lapsedbetween employer acknowledgement of the deficiency and
the November 5, 2009 opening of
this inspection, with no progress made on mitigation.  By not correcting
deficiencies in a
timely manner, equipment and the associated relief systems may potentially
be compromised
and fail.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be
exposed to hazardous
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result in serious
injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all
pressure relief devices throughout the facility.
D.  The employer did not correct an undercapacity deficiency identified
with pressure relief
valves in a timely manner.  This violation was identified during
inspections of the facility
from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South
1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  As part of the 2007 Silver Eagle Flare Study
conducted by
VECO, PSV-39409 is undercapacity for loss of cooling scenario (MDDW
1-UOSH-81).  On
February 15, 2008, Silver Eagle met with VECO to review the results of the
recently
completed flare study and to discuss corrective actions.  The required
resolution included
replacing the PSV to address the undercapacity issue.  Over twenty months
lapsed
between
employer acknowledgement of the deficiency and the November 5, 2009
opening of this
inspection, with no progress made on mitigation.   By not correcting
deficiencies in a timely
manner, equipment and the associated relief systems may potentially be
compromised and
fail.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to
hazardous
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result in serious
injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all
pressure relief devices throughout the facility.
E.  The employer did not correct an undercapacity deficiency identified
with pressure relief
valves in a timely manner.  This violation was identified during
inspections of the facility
from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South
1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  As part of the 2007 Silver Eagle Flare Study
conducted by
VECO, PSV-39410 is undercapacity for overfilling, auto control failure,
and fire scenarios
(MDDW 1-UOSH-81).  On February 15, 2008, Silver Eagle met with VECO to
review the
results of the recently completed flare study and to discuss corrective
actions.  The required
resolution included replacing the PSV to address the undercapacity issue.
Over twenty
months lapsed between employer acknowledgement of the deficiency and the
November 5,
2009 opening of this inspection, with no progress made on mitigation.   By
not correcting
deficiencies in a timely manner, equipment and the associated relief
systems may potentially
be compromised and fail.  In the event of an equipment failure, employees
could be exposed
to hazardous situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical
releases which can result in
serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of all
pressure relief devices throughout the facility.
F.  The employer did not correct an undercapacity deficiency identified
with
pressure relief
valves in a timely manner.  This violation was identified during
inspections of the facility
from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South
1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  As part of the 2007 Silver Eagle Flare Study
conducted by
VECO, PSV-39419 is undercapacity for loss of cooling, overfilling, and
auto control failure
scenarios (MDDW 1-UOSH-81).  On February 15, 2008, Silver Eagle met with
VECO toreview the results of the recently completed flare study and to
discuss corrective actions.
The required resolution included replacing the PSV to address the
undercapacity issue.  Over
twenty months lapsed between employer acknowledgement of the deficiency
and the
November 5, 2009 opening of this inspection, with no progress made on
mitigation.   By not
correcting deficiencies in a timely manner, equipment and the associated
relief systems may
potentially be compromised and fail.  In the event of an equipment
failure, employees could
be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires, explosions, and/or
chemical
releases which
can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires
evaluation of all pressure relief devices throughout the facility.
G.  The employer did not correct an undercapacity deficiency identified
with pressure relief
valves in a timely manner.  This violation was identified during
inspections of the facility
from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South
1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  As part of the 2007 Silver Eagle Flare Study
conducted by
VECO, PSV-39420 is undercapacity for fire scenario (MDDW 1-UOSH-81).  On
February
15, 2008, Silver Eagle met with VECO to review the results of the recently
completed flare
study and to discuss corrective actions.  The required resolution included
replacing the PSV
to address the undercapacity issue.  Over twenty months lapsed between
employer
acknowledgement of the deficiency and the November 5, 2009 opening of this
inspection,

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $56,000 · Current $3,000 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.147(c)(6)(i)  The employer shall conduct a periodic inspection
of the energy
control procedure at least annually to ensure that the procedure and the
requirements of this
standard are being followed.
A.  The employer did not ensure that the energy control procedure,
identified as the Lock-
Out Tag-Out (LOTO) procedure, was reviewed at least annually to ensure
that the procedure
and the requirements of this standard are being followed.  This violation
was identified
during onsite inspections, November 2009 through March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc.,
2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Review of the employer's LOTO
procedure did not demonstrate that the procedure had been reviewed
annually.  Documents
were requested demonstrating the program had been reviewed at least
annually.
The
employer responded stating: "Silver Eagle has been unable to locate any
responsive
documentation."  As identified in the employer's 2006 PSM Compliance
Audit, "Procedures
exist for employees and contractors to control hazards during operations
such as
Lockout/Tagout, Confined Space Entry, Opening of Process Equipment of
Piping", but,
"there is no evidence that audits of the Lock out/Tag out and Confined
Space programs have
occurred."  Throughout the facility evidence suggested the LOTO procedure
was not being
followed or understood.  Example of such include, but are not limited to,
multiple locks
were placed without identifying information pertaining to who placed the
lock.  Silver
Eagle's procedure, prepared and signed by the Plant Manager, updated Aug
2004, directly
requires all tags to be marked with information about who placed the lock.
In addition,
many locks were found to have French labeling.  By not conducting periodic
inspections of
the energy control procedure, the employer did not identify deficiencies.
Such deficiencies
can critically affect the process resulting in employee exposures to
hazards created by not
isolating equipment properly or having locks removed in error.  This may
be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of the energy control procedure and
its use throughout the
facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $8,400 · Current $1,500 Reduced

General-duty citation text

employees can
be exposed to serious injury or death should they not be able to locate
critical pieces of
equipment.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation
of all piping and
instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
H.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(i)[B]  Information pertaining to the equipment in
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, PSV-39406 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.
This valve was
symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0008 (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3
the process shall
0150).
This safety valve could not be located by tag number in the Unit. The
safety
include: Piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's);
A.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
valve was
eventually located by following the piping for the pressure vessel it
protected. The valve tag
was not stamped PSV-39406.  By not maintaining complete and accurate
P&ID's, in theevent of an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious
injury or death should they not
be able to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that
requires evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's)
84087.  On
throughout the facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
I.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
11/19/2009, P&ID Drawings for all Process Units were requested.  The
84087.  While
performing field verifications, PSV-39407 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.
This
employer
valve was
symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0008 (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3
0150).
This safety valve could not be located by tag number in the Unit. The
safety valve was
eventually located by following the piping for the pressure vessel it
protected. The valve tag
was not stamped PSV-39407.  By not maintaining complete and accurate
P&ID's, in the
event of an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious injury or death
should they not
be able to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that
requires evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's)
throughout the facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
J.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications PSV-39405 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.
This valve was
symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0007 (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3
0149).
This safety valve could not be located by tag number in the Unit. The
safety valve was
eventually located by following the piping for the pressure vessel it
protected. The valve tag
was not stamped PSV-39405. The valve tag was stamped with a different
identification
system as CRY-PSV-106.  By not maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's,
in the event of
an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious injury or death should
they not be able
to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires
evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the
facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
K.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, PSV-39411 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.
This valve was
symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0010 (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3
0152). This safety valve could not be located by tag number in the Unit.
The safety valve was
eventually located by following the piping for the pressure vessel it
protected. The valve tag
was not stamped PSV-39411. The valve tag was stamped with a different
identification
system as TAG-PSV-105.  By not maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's,
in the event of
an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious injury or death should
they
not be able
to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires
evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the
facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
L.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, PSV-39413 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.
This valve was
symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0012 (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3
0154).
When located, the valve bonnet had a tag identifying it as PSV-39413 while
the valve body
had a tag identifying it CRY-PSV-111.  By not maintaining complete and
accurate P&ID's,
in the event of an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious injury
or death should
they not be able to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a
system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams
(P&ID's)
throughout the facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
M.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, PSV-39414 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.
This valve
was symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0013 (MDDW CSB
1DOC4.3
0155).  This safety valve could not be located by tag number in the Unit.
The safety valve
was eventually located by following the piping for the pressure vessel it
protected. The valve
tag was not stamped PSV-39414. The valve tag was stamped with a different
identification
system as CRY-PSV-112.  By not maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's,
in the event of
an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious injury or death should
they not be able
to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires
evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the
facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
N.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.
Thisviolation was identified during inspections of the facility from
November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, PSV-39424 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.
This valve was
symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0022 (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3
0164).
This safety valve could not be located by tag number in the Unit. The
safety valve was
eventually located by following the piping for the pressure vessel it
protected. The valve tag
was not stamped PSV-39424. The valve tag was stamped with a different
identification
system as CRY-PSV-121.  By not maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's,
in the event of
an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious injury or death should
they not be able
to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires
evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the
facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
O.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, 3 salt towers in the MDDW Unit were
reviewed and
verification of the installation of a Pressure Safety Valve (PSV)
protecting each salt tower
was conducted.  Salt Tower VES #30600B was found on Drawing No.
03-PR-PID-0014
(MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3 0156) with no PSV number accompanying the PSV symbol on
the
drawing.  By not maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's, in the event of
an emergency,
employees can be exposed to serious injury or death should they not be
able to locate critical
pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all
piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
P.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
responded
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, 3 salt towers in the MDDW Unit were
reviewed and
verification of the installation of a Pressure Safety Valve (PSV)
protecting each salt tower
was conducted.  Salt Tower VES #30600C was found on Drawing No.
03-PR-PID-0015
by providing:
(MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3 0157) with no PSV number accompanying the PSV symbol on
the
i.P&IDs 03-PR-PID-0001 thru  03-PR-PID-0026 for the MDDW Unit (MDDW CSB
1DOCC4.3. 0143 thru  MDDW CSB 1DOCC4.3. 0167), and
ii.P&IDs 01-PR-PID-0001 thru  01-PR-PID-0031 for the #1 Crude Unit (MDDW 1-
UOSH21 0001 thru  MDDW 1-UOSH21 0026), and
iii.P&IDs 02-PR-PID-0001 thru  02-PR-PID-0018 for the #2 Crude Unit (MDDW
1-
UOSH21 0027 thru  MDDW 1-UOSH21 0043), and
iv.P&IDs 05-PR-PID-0001 thru 05-PR-PID-0040 for the Reformer Unit (MDDW 1-
drawing.  By not maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's, in the event of
an emergency,
employees can be exposed to serious injury or death should they not be
able to locate critical
pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all
piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item
UOSH 0044 thru MDDW 1-UOSH21 0076).
2.Q.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, 3 salt towers in the MDDW Unit were
reviewed and
Documents provided as 1-UOSH-21 did not include a legend explaining all
verification of the installation of a Pressure Safety Valve (PSV)
protecting each salt tower
was conducted.  Salt Tower VES #30600D was found on Drawing No.
03-PR-PID-0015
symbols used to
represent valves, controls, piping fittings, etc.  By not identifying
current symbols on the
P&ID's, employees may not be able to locate critical equipment in the
field.  In the event of
an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious injury or death should
they
(MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3 0157) with no PSV number accompanying the PSV symbol on
the
drawing.  By not maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's, in the event of
an emergency,
employees can be exposed to serious injury or death should they not be
able to locate critical
pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all
piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the facility
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
R.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, PSV-39402 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.
This
valve was
symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0005 (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3
0147).
This safety valve could not be located by tag number in the Unit. The
safety valve was
eventually located by following the piping for the pressure vessel it
protected. The valve tag
was not stamped PSV-39402. The valve tag was stamped with a different
identification
system as CRY-PSV-105.  By not maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's,
in the event of
an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious injury or death should
they not be able
to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires
evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the
facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
S.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, PSV-39403 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.
This valve was
symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0005 (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3
0147).
This safety valve could not be located by tag number in the Unit. The
safety valve was
eventually located by following the piping for the pressure vessel it
protected. The valve tag
was not stamped PSV-39403. The valve tag was stamped with a different
identification
system as CRY-PSV-104.  By not maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's,
in the event of
an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious injury or death should
they not be able
to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires
evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the
facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
T.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, PSV-39405 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.
This valve was
symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0007 (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3
0149).
This safety valve could not be located by tag number in the Unit. The
safety valve was
eventually located by following the piping for the pressure vessel it
protected. The valve tag
was not stamped PSV-39405.  By not maintaining complete and accurate
P&ID's, in the
event of an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious injury or death
should they not
be able to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that
requires evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's)
throughout the facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
U.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, PSV-39409 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.
This valve was
symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0011 (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3
0153).
This safety valve could not be located by tag number in the Unit. The
safety valve was
eventually located by following the piping for the pressure vessel it
protected.
The valve tag
was not stamped PSV-39409.  By not maintaining complete and accurate
P&ID's, in the
event of an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious injury or death
should they not
be able to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that
requires evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's)
throughout the facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
V.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, PSV-39410 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.
This valve
was symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0011 (MDDW CSB
1DOC4.3
0153).  This safety valve could not be located by tag number in the Unit.
The safety valve
was eventually located by following the piping for the pressure vessel it
protected. The valve
tag was not stamped PSV-39410.  By not maintaining complete and accurate
P&ID's, in the
event of an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious injury or death
should they not
be able to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence thatrequires evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams
(P&ID's) throughout the facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
W.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, PSV-39421 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.
This valve was
symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0018 (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3
0160).
This safety valve could not be located by tag number in the Unit. The
safety valve was
eventually located by following the piping for the pressure vessel it
protected. The valve tag
was not stamped PSV-39421. The valve tag was stamped with a different
identification
system as CRY-PSV-114.  By not maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's,
in the event of
an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious injury or death should
they not be able
to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires
evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the
facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
X.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, PSV-39420 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.
not be able
This valve
was symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0017 (MDDW CSB
1DOC4.3
0159).  This safety valve could not be located by tag number in the Unit.
The safety valve
was eventually located by following the piping for the pressure vessel it
protected. The valve
tag was not stamped PSV-39420. The valve tag was stamped with a different
identification
system as CRY-PSV-115.  By not maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's,
to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide
in the event of
an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious injury or death should
they not be able
occurrence that requires
evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the
facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
B.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires
evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the
facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, an isolation valve just downstream of PSV
39425 in the
MDDW Unit was not symbolically represented on  Drawing No.:
03-PR-PID-0004, (MDDW
CSB 1DOC4.3 0146).  In addition, the P&ID did not state that this valve
was to be car-
sealed open as it was downstream of a PSV that did not relieve to the
atmosphere.  By not
maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's, in the event of an emergency,
employees can be
exposed to serious injury or death should they not be able to locate
critical pieces of
equipment.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation
of all piping and
instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the facility.
Citation History:  Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09,
Citation 1, Item 2.
C.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, an isolation valve (#36092) and a check
valve (#36093)
upstream of PSV 39425 in the MDDW Unit were found that were symbolically
misrepresented on  Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0004, (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3 0146). The
schematic configuration on the P&ID showed the gate valve upstream of the
check valve.
The actual arrangement was the gate valve was downstream of the check
valve.  By not
maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's, in the event of an emergency,
employees can be
exposed to serious injury or death should they not be able to locate
critical pieces of
equipment.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation
of all piping and
instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
D.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, the valve tag on PSV 39412 in the MDDW
Unit protecting
VES-30105 was found stamped Pset = 250 psig. The same PSV is symbolically
represented
on Drawing No.: 03-PR-PID-0012, (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3 0154) as having Pset = 94
psig.  By not maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's, in the event of an
emergency,
employees can be exposed to serious injury or death should they not be
able to locate critical
pieces of equipment.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all
piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
E.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009
to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, an isolation valve (34567) between
TWR-30101 and fin-fan
cooler FAN-30201 in the MDDW Unit was reviewed.  The 6" valve is
approximately 25'
above grade and equipped with a chain operator at grade level. The chain
operator was not
symbolically represented on Drawing No.: 03-PR-PID-0016, (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3
0158).
By not maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's, in the event of an
emergency, employees
can be exposed to serious injury or death should they not be able to
locate critical pieces of
equipment.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation
of all piping and
instrument diagrams (P&ID's) throughout the facility.     Citation
History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
F.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, a manually operated volume damper in the
stack of Reactor
Feed Heater HTR-30104 in the MDDW unit was reviewed.  The stack gasses
volume damper
is equipped with a cable operator brought to grade level. The volume
damper appears
symbolically on Drawing No.: 03-PR-PID-0006, (MDDW CSB 1DOC4.3 0148) but
the
cable operator is not represented on the drawing.   By not maintaining
complete and accurate
P&ID's, in the event of an emergency, employees can be exposed to serious
injury or death
should they not be able to locate critical pieces of equipment.  This may
be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all piping and instrument diagrams
(P&ID's)
throughout the facility.
Citation History:
Inspection #312406986, Issued 7/09/09, Abated 8/11/09, Citation 1, Item 2.
G.  The employer did not ensure that information pertaining to equipment
in the process,
specifically piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's), was complete and
accurate.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 110 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  While
performing field verifications, vertical pressure vessel FIL-30103 was
reviewed.  This
pressure vessel was symbolically represented on Drawing No. 03-PR-PID-0008
(MDDW
CSB 1DOC4.3 0150). The vessel itself was identified by an adhesive label
with block
lettering designating it as vessel FIL-30103. In addition, the vessel was
also identified as
FIL-30104 by hand lettering with white paint.  The P&ID did not reflect
both numbers.  By
not maintaining complete and accurate P&ID's, in the event of an
emergency,

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $1,500 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.22(d)(1)  In every building or other structure, or part
thereof, used for
mercantile, business, industrial, or storage purposes, the loads approved
by the building
official shall be marked on plates of approved design which shall be
supplied and securely
affixed by the owner of the building, or his duly authorized agent, in a
conspicuous place in
each space to which they relate. Such plates shall not be removed or
defaced but, if lost,
removed, or defaced, shall be replaced by the owner or his agent.
A.  The employer did not ensure that in every building or other structure,
loads approved by
the building official were marked in a conspicuous place in each space to
which they relate.
This violation was identified during inspections of the facility from
November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.   At the
time of the inspection, Compliance Officers observed overhead storage
areas without load
limits marked.  In both the warehouse and the welding shop, overhead
storage areas were in
use without an indication to the maximum load limit.  By not identifying
load limits,
potential for structural failure and collapse can expose employees to
serious injury or death.
This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all
overhead storage areas
and load limits throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.23(a)(2) Every ladderway floor opening or platform shall be
guarded by a
standard railing with standard toeboard on all exposed sides (except at
entrance to opening),
with the passage through the railing either provided with a swinging gate
or so offset that a
person cannot walk directly into the opening.
A.  The employer did not ensure that every ladderway floor opening or
platform was
guarded by a standard railing with the passage through the railing either
provided with a
swinging gate or so offset that a person cannot walk directly into the
opening.  This violation
was identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to
March 2010, Silver
Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  An
access ladder
located on the Southeast side of TWR-30103 was not equipped with a swing
gate, chain, or
so offset to prevent personnel from falling through the opening.
Measurements onsite
showed an approximate distance of 15' from the platform to ground level.
By not ensuring
every ladderway opening was protected, employees were exposed to fall
hazards which can
result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence
that requires
evaluation of all platforms and fixed ladders throughout the facility.
B.  The employer did not ensure that every ladderway floor opening or
platform was guarded
by a standard railing with the passage through the railing either provided
with a swinging
gate or so offset that a person cannot walk directly into the opening.
This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver
Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  An
access ladder
located below FIL-30103 was not equipped with a swing gate, chain, or so
offset to prevent
personnel from falling through the opening.  Measurements onsite showed
the 30" wide
ladder had an approximate distance of 6' from the platform to ground
level.
By not ensuring
every ladderway opening was protected, employees were exposed to fall
hazards which can
result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence
that requires
evaluation of all platforms and fixed ladders throughout the facility.
C.  The employer did not ensure that every ladderway floor opening or
platform was
guarded by a standard railing with the passage through the railing either
provided with a
swinging gate or so offset that a person cannot walk directly into the
opening.  This violation
was identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to
March 2010, Silver
Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.   An
access ladder
located on the West side of the salt towers was not equipped with a swing
gate, chain, or so
offset to prevent personnel from falling through the opening.
Measurements onsite showed
the 16" wide ladder had an approximate distance of 21' from the platform
to ground level.
By not ensuring every ladderway opening was protected, employees were
exposed to fall
hazards which can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a
system-wide occurrence
that requires evaluation of all platforms and fixed ladders throughout the
facility.
D.  The employer did not ensure that every ladderway floor opening or
platform was
guarded by a standard railing with the passage through the railing either
provided with a
swinging gate or so offset that a person cannot walk directly into the
opening.  This violation
was identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to
March 2010, Silver
Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  An
access ladderlocated on the East side of HTR-30103 was not equipped with a
swing gate, chain, or so
offset to prevent personnel from falling through the opening.
Measurements onsite showed
an approximate distance of 30' from the platform to ground level.  By not
ensuring every
ladderway opening was protected, employees were exposed to fall hazards
which
can result
in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of
all platforms and fixed ladders throughout the facility.
E.  The employer did not ensure that every ladderway floor opening or
platform was guarded
by a standard railing with the passage through the railing either provided
with a swinging
gate or so offset that a person cannot walk directly into the opening.
This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver
Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  An
access ladder
located on the North side of TWR-30101 was not equipped with a swing gate,
chain, or so
offset to prevent personnel from falling through the opening.
Measurements onsite showed
an approximate distance of 14' from the first level platform to ground
level.  By not ensuring
every ladderway opening was protected, employees were exposed to fall
hazards which can
result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence
that requires
evaluation of all platforms and fixed ladders throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $1,500 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.23(c)(1)  Every open-sided floor or platform 4 feet or more
above adjacent
floor or ground level shall be guarded by a standard railing (or the
equivalent as specified in
paragraph (e)(3) of this section) on all open sides except where there is
entrance to a ramp,
stairway, or fixed ladder. The railing shall be provided with a toeboard
wherever, beneath
the open sides,
A.  The employer did not ensure that every open-sided floor or platform 4
feet or more
above adjacent floor or ground level was guarded by a standard railing (or
the equivalent as
specified in paragraph (e)(3) of this section).  This violation was
identified during inspections
of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South
1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  At the time of the inspection,
Compliance
Officers
observed two runways used for access to rail cars onsite were not guarded
by a standard
railing on all open sides 4 feet or more above ground level.  As measured
onsite, the
runways were 11'5" from ground level.  By not installing railings on
runways and platforms,
employees were exposed to fall hazards which can result in serious injury
or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all runways
and platforms
throughout the facility.
B.  The employer did not ensure that every open-sided floor or platform 4
feet or more
above adjacent floor or ground level was guarded by a standard railing (or
the equivalent as
specified in paragraph (e)(3) of this section).  This violation was
identified during inspections
of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South
1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  At the time of the inspection,
Compliance Officers
observed employees working on an unguarded piping platform that was not
equipped with a
standard railing or the equivalent.  The employee was performing
maintenance work at
heights greater than 12'.  By not installing railings on runways and
platforms, employees
were exposed to fall hazards which can result in serious injury or death.
This may be a
system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all runways and
platforms throughout the
facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Jun 1, 2014

Penalty

Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d)(2)(i)[D]  Information concerning the technology of the
process
shall
include at least the following:  Safe upper and lower limits for such
items as temperatures,
pressures, flows or compositions;
A.  The employer did not ensure that information concerning the technology
of the process
included safe upper and lower limits for such items as temperatures,
pressures, flows or
compositions.  This violation was identified during inspections of the
facility from November
2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  During the inspection, the safe upper limit (pressure) for the #1
Crude Unit, entitled
"Crude Unit #1 Operating Limits", was an undated document which listed the
maximum
"safe limit" for pressure for the COL- 10201 at 30 psig.  Noted was that
the above
mentioned safe limit was the setting at which the PSV relieves and not a
safe upper limit to
prevent PSV relief.  Furthermore, COL- 10201 was operated at 25 psi which
was above the
20 psi maximum allowable working pressure for the vessel as documented per
document
MDDW 1-UOSH-134.  By not developing and documenting safe upper and lower
limits,
information involved in critical decisions was not available to ensure the
operation was safely
operated within specified parameters.  In the event of an equipment
failure, employees could
be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires, explosions, and/or
chemical releases which
can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires
evaluation of all safe upper and lower limits for all equipment throughout
the facility.
B.  The employer did not ensure that information concerning the technology
of the process
included safe upper and lower limits for such items as temperatures,
pressures, flows or
compositions.  This violation was identified during inspections of the
facility from November
2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  During review of the Crude #2 Operating Manual, Operating Limits,
revision 2,
Nov. 17, 2005, Section 3. Normal Operating Limits, documents provided
indicated that two
different temperature maximums are measured by the same temperature sensor
(TE_29201)
located on the outlet of the furnace.  The maximum temperature for outlet
from the furnace
is listed as 650 F, whereas the maximum temperature for the feed to
COL-20250 measured
by the same sensor is listed at 630 F.  Clearly both temperature maximums
measured by the
same sensor cannot be valid.  By not developing and documenting safe upper
and lower
limits, information involved in critical decisions was not available to
ensure the operation
was safely operated within specified parameters.  In the event of an
equipment failure,
employees could be exposed to hazardous situations such as fires,
explosions, and/or
chemical releases which can result in serious injury or death.  This may
be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all safe upper and lower limits for
all
equipment
throughout the facility.
C.  The employer did not ensure that information concerning the technology
of the process
included safe upper and lower limits for such items as temperatures,
pressures, flows or
compositions.  This violation was identified during inspections of the
facility from November
2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West,
Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  During review of the Crude #2 Operating Manual, Operating Limits,
revision 2,
Nov. 17, 2005, documents provided list a maximum safe limit for pressure
on COL- 20250
at 30 psig, indicating that PSV-20250 will lift.  P&ID drawing
02-PR-PID-005 indicates thatthe PSV valve for this column is tagged as
29401 with a relief setting of 15 psig.  The upper
safe limit for pressure for the column must be less than the relief
setting, and this instance
the upper safe limit has been established at 30 psig, whereas the relief
valve is set at 15 psig.
By not developing and documenting safe upper and lower limits, information
involved
in
critical decisions was not available to ensure the operation was safely
operated within
specified parameters.    In the event of an equipment failure, employees
could be exposed to
hazardous situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases
which can result in
serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of all
safe upper and lower limits for all equipment throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Jun 1, 2014

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(d)(2)(i)[E]  Information concerning the technology of the
process shall
include at least the following:  An evaluation of the consequences of
deviations, including
those affecting the safety and health of employees.
A.  The employer did not ensure that information concerning the technology
of the process
included an evaluation of the consequences of deviations, including those
affecting the safety
and health of employees.  This violation was identified during inspections
of the facility from
November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087.   During review of the #2 Crude Operating Manual,
Operating Limits,
Revision 2, Nov. 17, 2005, Section 3. Normal Operating Limits, the
provided document did
not list safety and health consequences for deviations from the listed
limits.  For example,
the consequences listed include "products off specification", "no pump
suction", and
"operating problems", yet no safety and health consequences were listed.
By not fully
evaluating consequences of deviations, including those affecting the
safety and health of
employees, the employer was deprived of critical information used to
ensure employee safety
and health.    In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be
exposed to hazardous
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result in serious
injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires the
development and
evaluation of all consequences of deviations throughout the facility.
B.  The employer did not ensure that information concerning the technology
of the process
included an evaluation of the consequences of deviations, including those
affecting the safety
and health of employees.  This violation was identified during inspections
of the facility from
November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087.   During review of the Naphtha HDS Unit Operating
Guidelines, items
listed as consequences of deviation for exceeding the safe operating
limits are operational
issues.  No safety and health consequences are listed for exceeding these
safe limits.  By not
fully evaluating consequences of deviations, including those affecting the
safety and health of
employees, the employer was deprived of critical information used to
ensure employee safety
and health.  Exceeding safe operating limits without addressing safety and
health
consequences can result in equipment failure exposing employees to serious
injury or death.
In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to
hazardous situations
such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in
serious injury or
death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires the development
and evaluation
of all consequences of deviations throughout the facility.
C.  The employer did not ensure that information concerning the technology
of the process
included an evaluation of the consequences of deviations, including those
affecting the safety
and health of employees.  This violation was identified during inspections
of the facility from
November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087.   During review of the Reformer Unit Operating
Guidelines, items listed
as consequences of deviation for exceeding the safe operating limits are
operational issues.
No safety and health consequences are listed for exceeding these safe
limits.  By not fully
evaluating consequences of deviations, including those affecting the
safety
and health of
employees, the employer was deprived of critical information used to
ensure employee safety
and health.  Exceeding safe operating limits without addressing safety and
healthconsequences can result in equipment failure exposing employees to
serious injury or death.
In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be exposed to
hazardous situations
such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can result in
serious injury or
death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires the development
and evaluation
of all consequences of deviations throughout the facility.
D. The employer did not ensure that information concerning the technology
of the process
included an evaluation of the consequences of deviations, including those
affecting the safety
and health of employees.  This violation was identified during inspections
of the facility from
November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087.  As identified onsite, the upper safe temperature limit
for
MDDW reactor
30101 feed is listed at 800F, however the consequences of exceeding this
limit are
operational ("Increased coking in HDS bed, increased fuel gas
consumption") and do not
address safety and health concerns.  Likewise it is noted that this 800F
temperature limit for
RTR-30101 is not consistent with the original design temperature limit of
750 F as listed on
the manufacturer's U-1A form for the vessel constructed in 1966.  Derating
of the vessel to a
pressure of 1000 psi at 800F was performed by Moose's Construction.  The
temperature safe
limit for RTR-30101 of 800 F did not indicate that operating above this
temperature exceeded
the design limit for the vessel as determined in the re-rating for this
vessel. By not fully
evaluating consequences of deviations, including those affecting the
safety and health of
employees, the employer was deprived of critical information used to
ensure employee safety
and health.    In the event of an equipment failure, employees could be
exposed to hazardous
situations such as fires, explosions, and/or chemical releases which can
result in serious
injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires the
development and
evaluation of all consequences of deviations throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(i) The process hazard analysis shall address:  The
hazards of the
process;
A.  The employer did not ensure process hazard analysis (PHA's) addressed
hazards based
upon the process safety information for the equipment in the process.
This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver
Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  During
an
inspection of COL 10201 on December 22, 2009, inspection records verified
that this vessel
was operating at a pressure of 25 psi which exceeds the maximum allowable
working
pressure (MAWP).  As stated in document MDDW 1-UOSH-134, MAWP for COL
10201 is
20 psi.  Documents provided indicated that operation at 25 psi was common.
PHA's did not
identify equipment limitations in the process safety information which
should have resulted in
a change in operating conditions or a replacement of the equipment such
that the equipment
could be safely operated per industry good practice.  By not addressing
hazards based on
process safety information, employees may be exposed to serious injury or
death.  This may
be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all PSI and PHA's
facility wide.
B.  The employer did not ensure process hazard analysis (PHA's) addressed
hazards based
upon the process safety information for the equipment in the process.
This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver
Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  During
an
inspection of COL 10204 on December 22, 2009, inspection records verified
that the
equipment was operating at pressure and temperature (25 psi & 550 F) which
"exceeds
design temperature and pressure (20 psi & 490 F)".  PHA's did not identify
equipment
limitations in the process safety information which should have resulted
in a change in
operating conditions or a replacement of the equipment such that the
equipment could be
safely operated per industry good practice.  By not addressing hazards
based on process
safety information, employees may be exposed to serious injury or death.
This may be a
system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all PSI and PHA's
facility wide.
C.  The employer did not ensure process hazard analysis (PHA's) addressed
hazards based
upon the process safety information for the equipment in the process.
This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010,
Silver
Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  During
an
inspection of COL 10205 on December 11, 2009, inspection records verified
that the "vessel
has and (sic) design temperature of 490 F and operates at 550F without
documentation of a
rerate".  PHA's did not identify equipment limitations in the process
safety information
which should have resulted in a change in operating conditions, re-rating,
or a replacement
of the equipment such that the equipment could be safely operated per
industry good
practice.  By not addressing hazards based on process safety information,
employees may be
exposed to serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence
that requires
evaluation of all PSI and PHA's facility wide.
D.  The employer did not ensure process hazard analysis (PHA's) addressed
hazards based
upon the process safety information for the equipment in the process.
This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, SilverEagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  During an
inspection of EXC 10210 on January 8, 2010, inspection records verified
that the "Operating
pressure and temperature (180 psi & 450 F) exceeds design pressure and
temperature (75 psi
& 300 F)."  PHA's did not identify equipment limitations in the process
safety information
which should have resulted in a change in operating conditions, rerating,
or a replacement of
the equipment such that the equipment could be safely operated per
industry good practice.
By not addressing hazards based on process safety information, employees
may be exposed
to serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of
all PSI and PHA's facility wide.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Jun 1, 2014

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(vi)  The process hazard analysis shall address:
Human factors.
A.  The employer did not ensure the process hazard analysis (PHA)
addressed human factors
specifically considering the lack of clearly visible, understandable, exit
route signs and
instructions.  This violation was identified during inspections of the
facility from November
2009 to March 2010.  Review of the #2 Crude Unit 2005 PHA, #5 Reformer
Unit
2009
PHA, #5 Naphtha/HDS 2008 PHA, and #3 MDDW 2009 PHA did not indicate that
exit
signage and instructions were considered.  Onsite review of refining units
showed clearly
visible exit signs were not present.  Employee interviews stated that if
exit routes were
reviewed, it would be included on the PHA checklist.  Documents provided
by the employer
did not show the lack of clearly visible, understandable, exit route signs
and instructions was
assessed.  Silver Eagle's 2009 PSM Compliance Audit identified that human
factors were not
considered in the PHA's.  By not addressing clearly visible,
understandable exit signs,
employees and contractors may be unable to locate exit routes in the event
of an emergency.
Such oversight can lead to employees being exposed to hazardous situations
that can cause
serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of all
applicable areas throughout the facility.
B.  The employer did not ensure the process hazard analysis (PHA)
addressed human factors
specifically considering and evaluating all situations where field
employees must close
isolation valves during emergencies and where doing so would expose them
to hazardous
situations.  This violation was identified during inspections of the
facility from November
2009 to March 2010.  Review of the #2 Crude Unit 2005 PHA, #5 Reformer
Unit 2009
PHA, #5 Naphtha/HDS 2008 PHA, and #3 MDDW 2009 PHA did not indicate that
the PHA
team evaluated situations where field employees closing valves during an
emergency would
expose them to hazardous situations.   Documents provided by the employer
did not
demonstrate evaluation of closing valves during hazardous situations was
assessed.  In
addition, Silver Eagle's 2009 PSM Compliance Audit identified that human
factors were not
considered in the PHA's.  In the event of an upset, employees can be
required to enter
hazardous environments which can expose them to serious injury or death.
This
may be a
system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all applicable areas
throughout the
facility.
C.  The employer did not ensure the process hazard analysis (PHA)
addressed human factors
specifically considering the possibility of human error when equipment
described in a written
procedure is not labeled or marked with that same identifier in the field.
This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010.  Review of
the #2 Crude Unit 2005 PHA, #5 Reformer Unit 2009 PHA, #5 Naphtha/HDS 2008
PHA,
and #3 MDDW 2009 PHA did not indicate that the PHA team evaluated
differences and
scenarios where markings differed between written procedures and in the
field.  Noted during
onsite inspections were missing car seals & P&ID discrepancies which could
cause confusion
in the field.  Documents provided by the employer did not demonstrate
evaluation of human
error in the PHA.  By not ensuring markings are the same on paper as in
the field, confusion
could result and incorrect changes or adjustments can occur.  Such
oversight can lead to
employees being exposed to hazardous situations that can cause serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all applicable
areas throughoutthe facility.
D.  The employer did not ensure the process hazard analysis (PHA)
addressed human factors
specifically considering when control room operators perform calculations
during situations
such as upset conditions, system failures, or emergency conditions.  This
violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010.  Review of
the #2 Crude Unit 2005 PHA, #5 Reformer Unit 2009 PHA, #5 Naphtha/HDS 2008
PHA,
and #3 MDDW 2009 PHA did not indicate that the PHA team evaluated events
in which
calculations must be made by operators.  Operators stated that in some
cases, they are
required to perform manual calculations.  Documents provided by the
employer did not
demonstrate evaluation of manual calculations in the PHA.  Such oversight
can lead to
employees being exposed to hazardous situations that can cause serious
injury or death.  This
may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all applicable
areas throughout
the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Jun 1, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(e)(5)  The employer shall establish a system to promptly
address the
team's findings and recommendations; assure that the recommendations are
resolved in a
timely manner and that the resolution is documented; document what actions
are to be taken;
complete actions as soon as possible; develop a written schedule of when
these actions are to
be completed; communicate the actions to operating, maintenance and other
employees whose
work assignments are in the process and who may be affected by the
recommendations or
actions.
A.  The employer did not establish a system to promptly address the PHA
team's findings
and recommendations; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a
timely manner and
that the resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken;
complete actions as
soon as possible; and develop a written schedule of when these actions are
to be completed.
This violation was identified during inspections of the facility from
November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  During
review of the #1 Crude 2005 PHA, 215 recommendations were identified, yet
no
documentation as to the resolution status of these recommendations was
available.  In
addition, from a review of the 1998 #1 Crude Unit PHA, it appears that 207
of the 215 #1
Crude 2005 PHA recommendations were produced during the 1998 process
hazard review
and just carried over.  By not establishing a system to promptly address
findings and
recommendations, developing a written schedule, tracking status, and
ensuring completion,
the employer did not ensure recommendations were resolved as required by
the standard.  By
not promptly addressing findings and recommendations, employees can be
exposed to
hazardous situations that can lead to serious injury or death.  This may
be a system-wide
occurrence that requires evaluation of all PHA findings and
recommendations for all covered
processes throughout the facility.
B.  The employer did not establish a system to promptly address the PHA
team's findings
and recommendations; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a
timely manner and
that the resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken;
complete actions as
soon as possible; and develop a written schedule of when these actions are
to be completed.
This violation was identified during inspections of the facility from
November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.
During
review of the 2003-2004 MDDW-HDS PHA, the PHA includes 85 recommendations
of
which 36 indicate that they have been resolved.  The 2009 MDDW PHA
conducted during
four meetings held between 6/3/09 and 8/5/09 did not document the status
of the unresolved
PHA recommendations from the 2003-2004 MDDW-HDS PHA.  By not establishing a
system to promptly address findings and recommendations, developing a
written schedule,
tracking status, and ensuring completion, the employer did not ensure
recommendations were
resolved as required by the standard.  By not promptly addressing findings
and
recommendations, employees can be exposed to hazardous situations that can
lead to serious
injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all PHA
findings and recommendations for all covered processes throughout the
facility.
C.  The employer did not establish a system to promptly address the PHA
team's findings
and recommendations; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a
timely manner and
that the resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken;
complete actions assoon as possible; and develop a written schedule of
when these actions are to be completed.
This violation was identified during inspections of the facility from
November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  During
review of the 2004 Reformer PHA, no documentation regarding the status of
26 of 33
recommendations was produced.  Table 3: Analysis Recommendations lists 33
recommendations, with only one recommendation, # 10, indicating that it
had been
completed on 2/9/06.  Three other recommendations indicate that they are
resolved however
no date of resolution is recorded.  Three recommendations state under the
"status" column,
the word-"engineering" with no completion date recorded.  Of the remaining
26
recommendations, there is no documentation to indicate that these items
are being addressed.
The May 20, 2009 process hazard analysis for the Reformer Unit does not
include
any
documentation regarding the updated status of the 2004 recommendations.
By not
establishing a system to promptly address findings and recommendations,
developing a
written schedule, tracking status, and ensuring completion, the employer
did not ensure
recommendations were resolved as required by the standard.  By not
promptly addressing
findings and recommendations, employees can be exposed to hazardous
situations that can
lead to serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence
that requires
evaluation of all PHA findings and recommendations for all covered
processes throughout the
facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Jun 1, 2014

Penalty

Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(g)(3)  Training documentation. The employer shall
ascertain that each
employee involved in operating a process has received and understood the
training required
by this paragraph. The employer shall prepare a record which contains the
identity of the
employee, the date of training, and the means used to verify that the
employee understood
the training.
A.  The employer did not ensure that documentation demonstrating that
refresher training
had been provided at least every 3 years was developed and maintained.
This violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver
Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  As per
multiple
document requests, the employer was not able to provide a record which
contains the identity
of the employee, the date of training, and the means used to verify that
the employee
understood the training.  By not documenting training, employees may not
receive
all
training required for their jobs, thus exposing them to potential serious
injury or death.  This
occurrence may be system wide and would require evaluation in all
applicable areas of the
refinery.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(h)(2)(i)  The employer, when selecting a contractor, shall
obtain and
evaluate information regarding the contract employer's safety performance
and programs.
A.  The employer did not regularly obtain and evaluate information
regarding the contract
employer's safety performance and programs.  This violation was identified
during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc.,
2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  During review of refinery
documents,
documents requested as 1-UOSH-178 demonstrated that an evaluation of the
contract
employer's safety performance and programs was not being regularly
conducted.
Documents
provided in response to 1-UOSH-178 contained information for 5 contractors
which showed
only one employer provided the completed "Contractor Safety Data
Questionnaire".  The
other 4 contractors provided their certificate of liability insurance
generated by the Utah
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, and one employer
provided proof of
their workers' compensation insurance.  In addition, the employer's 2009
PSM Compliance
Audit identified that "The refinery is not routinely requiring contractors
to provide
information regarding the contract employer's safety performance and
program as part of the
contractor selection process."  By not regularly obtaining and evaluating
information
regarding the contract employer's safety performance and programs, the
employer was
deprived of critical safety history and performance information which if
left unaddressed can
result in employee exposures to hazardous conditions.  This occurrence may
be system wide
and would require evaluation in all contractors throughout the refinery.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Jun 1, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $1,500 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(l)(2)(iv)  The procedures shall assure that the following
considerations
are
addressed prior to any change:  Necessary time period for the change;
A.  The employer did not ensure that procedures addressed specific
considerations prior to
any change; specifically the necessary time period for the change.  This
violation was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver
Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Review
of the
Management of Change (MOC) policy provided no information on the necessary
time periods
for temporary changes.  MOC's including, but not limited to, MOC #153,
dated 3/7/08,
MOC #179, dated 5/1/08, MOC #278, dated 3/13/09, and MOC 321, dated
7/23/09 were all
identified as a temporary change.  Management of Change policy provided as
MDDW 1-
UOSH-60 0001-0003 did not identify the necessary time period for the
change.  By not
determining and documenting an appropriate time frame for temporary
changes, work may
potentially not be completed or become permanent without proper design.
Inadequately
design equipment can fail exposing employees to serious injury or death.
This may be a
system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of all MOC's, management
of change
policies, and procedures throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(m)(4)(v)  A report shall be prepared at the conclusion of
the investigation
which includes at a minimum:  Any recommendations resulting from the
investigation.
A.  The employer did not ensure that incident reports included
recommendations.  This
violation was identified during inspections of the facility from November
2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  During
a random selection of incident report, many were found to not include
recommendations. An
example of such, including, but not limited to, Incident Investigation
Report #67, Incident
Date/Time  2/11/2009  4:45:00pm.  By not including recommendations to
prevent future
occurrence, critical action items may not be addressed and corrected.
Lack of identifying
and addressing recommendations can result in continued employee exposure
to uncontrolled
hazards.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of
all incident
reports throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.119(m)(5)  The employer shall establish a system to promptly
address and
resolve the incident report findings and recommendations. Resolutions and
corrective actions
shall be documented.
A.  The employer did not establish and implement an incident investigation
system to
promptly address recommendations and resolve incident findings.  This
violation
was
identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March
2010, Silver
Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.
During a review of
incident reports dated 2006 to present (85+ incident investigation
reports), only 4 were
found to have any documentation indicating that the recommendation is
being addressed.
The employer did not demonstrate that a system has been established to
consistently ensure
that these recommendations are addressed.  By not establishing and
implementing a system to
promptly address and resolve incident report findings/recommendations,
critical causal
factors can be overlooked and left uncorrected, exposing employees to
serious injury or
death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires evaluation of
all incident reports
and recommendations throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.120(q)(6)(ii)[C]  First responder operations level. First
responders at the
operations level are individuals who respond to releases or potential
releases of hazardous
substances as part of the initial response to the site for the purpose of
protecting nearby
persons, property, or the environment from the effects of the release.
They are trained to
respond in a defensive fashion without actually trying to stop the
release.
Their function is to
contain the release from a safe distance, keep it from spreading, and
prevent exposures. First
responders at the operational level shall have received at least eight
hours of training or have
had sufficient experience to objectively demonstrate competency in the
following areas in
addition to those listed for the awareness level and the employer shall so
certify:  An
understanding of basic hazardous materials terms.
A.  The employer did not clearly demonstrate that operators have received
at least eight
hours of training or have had sufficient experience to objectively
demonstrate competency in
an understanding of basic hazardous materials terms in addition to those
listed for the
awareness level.  This violation was identified during inspection of the
facility from
November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087.  During interviews with operators who act as first
responders, they stated
that they commonly turn valves or shut down units during a release.
Actions during a
release including, but not limited to "turning valves", would place the
employee under the
first responder awareness level.  The employer was not able to provide
documentation
demonstrating these individuals had received the mandated eight hours of
training in the areas
identified.  By not properly identifying and training employees involved
in first responder
operations level activities, employees were deprived of critical training
and information used
to assess hazards during a release.  As a result, employees without proper
training may be
exposed to serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence
that requires
evaluation of all training schedules, policies, and procedures throughout
the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.120(q)(6)(ii)[E]  First responder operations level. Know how
to implement
basic decontamination procedures.
A.  The employer did not clearly demonstrate that operators have received
at least eight
hours of training or have had sufficient experience to objectively
demonstrate competency,
specifically in knowing how to implement basic decontamination procedures
in addition to
those listed for the awareness level.  This violation was identified
during inspection of the
facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc.,
2355 South 1100
West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  During interviews with operators acting as
first
responders, they stated that they commonly turn valves or shut down units
during a release.
Actions during a release including, but not limited to "turning valves",
would place the
employee under the first responder awareness level.  The employer was not
able to provide
documentation demonstrating these individuals had received training how to
implement basic
decontamination procedures.  By not properly identifying and training
employees involved in
first responder operations level activities, specifically basic
decontamination
procedures,
employees were deprived of critical training and information used to avoid
exposures during
the decontamination process.  Without such training, employees may not
select proper
equipment and be exposed to serious injury or death.  This may be a
system-wide occurrence
that requires evaluation of all training schedules, policies, and
procedures throughout the
facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.146(f)(4)  Entry permit. The entry permit that documents
compliance with this
section and authorizes entry to a permit space shall identify:  The
authorized entrants within
the permit space, by name or by such other means (for example, through the
use of rosters
or tracking systems) as will enable the attendant to determine quickly and
accurately, for the
duration of the permit, which authorized entrants are inside the permit
space;
NOTE: This requirement may be met by inserting a reference on the entry
permit
as to the
means used, such as a roster or tracking system, to keep track of the
authorized entrants
within the permit space.
A.  Silver Eagle Refinery (SER) did not list the authorized entrants with
the permit space, by
name or by other such means to enable the attendant to determine quickly
and accurately
which authorized entrants are inside the permit space.  This violation was
identified during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc.,
2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  During review of confined
space
permits, many permits were noted to be missing a list of authorized
entrants by name or by
other such means to enable the attendant to determine quickly and
accurately which
authorized entrants are inside the permit space.  By not completing a list
of authorized
entrants on every confined space permit, attendants may not be aware of
how many
individuals are in the confined space.  In the event of an emergency,
personnel could be left
behind inside a confined space leading to serious injury or death.  This
may be a system-
wide occurrence which would require the evaluation of all confined space
permits, policies,
and procedures throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.146(f)(5)  Entry permit. The entry permit that documents
compliance with this
section and authorizes entry to a permit space shall identify:  The
personnel, by name,
currently serving as attendants;
A.  The employer did not ensure the entry permit contained a completed
list of the
personnel, by name, currently serving as attendants.  This violation was
identified during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc.,
2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Review of 12 randomly
selected confined
space entry permits showed none had the names of the attendants listed.
Examples
of such
include, but are not limited to, 2-3-2010, #2 Tower, and 2-8-2010 "The New
Flare."  By not
following confined space requirements, employees may not be accounted for
and left behind,
resulting in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence which would
require the evaluation of all confined space permits, policies, and
procedures throughout the
facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.146(f)(13)  Entry permit. The entry permit that documents
compliance with
this section and authorizes entry to a permit space shall identify:
Equipment, such as
personal protective equipment, testing equipment, communications
equipment, alarm systems,
and rescue equipment, to be provided for compliance with this section;
A.  The employer did not ensure the entry permit contained a completed
list of equipment,
such as testing equipment, communications equipment, alarm systems, and
rescue equipment.
This violation was identified during inspections of the facility from
November 2009 to March
2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT,
84087.  None
of the 7 randomly selected confined space entry permits, provided as MDDW
1-UOSH-211,
showed a completed list of equipment, such as testing equipment,
communications
equipment, alarm systems, and rescue equipment.   Without identifying
equipment necessary,
safe entry may not take place, exposing employees to serious injury or
death.  This may be a
system-wide occurrence which would require the evaluation of all confined
space permits,
policies, and procedures throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Jun 1, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(B)  The procedures shall clearly and
specifically outline the
scope, purpose, authorization, rules, and techniques to be utilized for
the control of
hazardous energy, and the means to enforce compliance including, but not
limited to, the
following:  Specific procedural steps for shutting down, isolating,
blocking and securing
machines or equipment to control hazardous energy;
A.  The employer did not clearly identify specific procedural steps for
shutting down,
isolating, blocking and securing machines or equipment to control
hazardous energy
(lockout/tagout).  This violation was identified during inspections of the
facility from
November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100
West, Woods
Cross, UT, 84087.  During review of the Silver Eagle Lockout/Tagout (LOTO)
program and
associated procedures, it was identified that job specific LOTO procedures
have not been
developed as required by 29 CFR 1910.147(c)(4).  In addition, the lack of
job specific
LOTO procedures was identified in the employer's 2009 PSM Compliance
Audit.  Without
clear procedures, employees may be exposed to hazards of shutting down
machinery that can
cause serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence which
requires
the
evaluation of all Lockout/Tagout (LOTO) program, policies, and procedures.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.253(b)(4)(iii)  Oxygen cylinders in storage shall be separated
from fuel-gas
cylinders or combustible materials (especially oil or grease), a minimum
distance of 20 feet
(6.1 m) or by a noncombustible barrier at least 5 feet (1.5 m) high having
a fire-resistance
rating of at least one-half hour.
Note: 1910.253(b)(1)(i) All portable cylinders used for the storage and
shipment of
compressed gases shall be constructed and maintained in accordance with
the regulations of
the U.S. Department of Transportation, 49 CFR Parts 171-179.
A.  The employer did not ensure that Oxygen cylinders in storage were
separated from fuel-
gas cylinders or combustible materials (especially oil or grease), a
minimum distance of 20
feet (6.1 m) or by a noncombustible barrier.  This violation was
identified during inspections
of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining
Inc., 2355 South
1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  At the time of the inspection,
Compliance Officers
saw multiple Nitrogen, Oxygen, and Acetylene tanks were stored together
and not separated
by a noncombustible barrier with a fire-resistance rating of at least
one-half hour.  Tanks
were located on the North side of the warehouse/welding shop area.  By not
separating
tanks, potential for mixing and creating an explosive atmosphere which can
expose
employees to serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that requires
evaluation of all tank storage throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.303(b)(2)  Installation and use. Listed or labeled equipment
shall be installed
and used in accordance with any instructions included in the listing or
labeling.
A.  The employer did not ensure that listed or labeled equipment was used
in accordance
with any instructions included in the listing or labeling.  This violation
was identified during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc.,
2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  At the time of the
inspection, breakers
located in the warehouse were noted to have a nail used to connect breaker
switches.  Nails
were used to "gang" together multiple 110v circuit breakers.  Nails are
not UL listed or
approved as a method of connecting breakers by the NEC.  In addition, this
method does not
meet NFPA guidelines as a method of connecting breakers.  By not
connecting breakers with
an approved method, employees can be exposed to electrical hazards which
can result in
serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of all
electrical breakers throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.305(b)(2)(i)  All pull boxes, junction boxes, and fittings
shall
be provided with
covers identified for the purpose. If metal covers are used, they shall be
grounded. In
completed installations, each outlet box shall have a cover, faceplate, or
fixture canopy.
Covers of outlet boxes having holes through which flexible cord pendants
pass shall be
provided with bushings designed for the purpose or shall have smooth,
well-rounded surfaces
on which the cords may bear.
A.  The employer did not ensure that all pull boxes, junction boxes, and
fittings were
provided with covers identified for the purpose.  This violation was
identified during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc.,
2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  During inspection of the
lab building,
Compliance Officers identified junction boxes without covers or
faceplates.  Metal junction
boxes were seen in the facility to be without covers.  For example,
including, but not limited
to, a metal junction box located inside the main lab building on the wall
that had wiring
coming out of the box.  By not ensuring all pull boxes, junction boxes,
and fittings were
protected with an approved cover, employees were exposed to potential
electrical hazards
which can result in serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide
occurrence that
requires evaluation of all pull boxes, junction boxes, and fittings
throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.305(g)(1)(iv)(D)  Unless specifically permitted otherwise in
paragraph (g)(1)(ii)
of this section, flexible cords and cables may not be used: Where attached
to building
surfaces;
A.  The employer did not ensure that flexible cords and cables were not
used as permanent
wiring by being attached to building surfaces.  This violation was
identified during
inspections of the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle
Refining Inc.,
2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  At the time of the
inspection,
Compliance Officers observed flexible cords and cables in the welding shop
to run 110v
power to an air compressor.  The cord was attached to the building surface
by means of a
"zip tie."  As a result, employees were exposed to electrical hazards
which can result in
electric shock and/or fire hazards.  This may be a system-wide occurrence
that requires
evaluation of all wiring and power supply throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Jun 1, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $3,000

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.307(c)(1) Electrical installations. Equipment, wiring methods,
and installations
of equipment in hazardous (classified) locations shall be intrinsically
safe, approved for the
hazardous (classified) location, or safe for the hazardous (classified)
location. Requirements
for each of these options are as follows:  Intrinsically safe. Equipment
and associated wiring
approved as intrinsically safe is permitted in any hazardous (classified)
location for which it
is approved;
Note (c)(2)(i): NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code, lists or defines
hazardous gases,
vapors, and dusts by "Groups" characterized by their ignitable or
combustible properties.
A.  The employer did not ensure that equipment, wiring methods, and
installations of
equipment in hazardous (classified) locations were intrinsically safe,
approved for the
hazardous (classified) location, or safe for the hazardous (classified)
location.  This violation
was identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to
March 2010, Silver
Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.
Compliance
Officers observed an exposed light bulb in the railway load out shack that
was not for the
class of location and for the ignitable or combustible properties of the
specific gas, vapor,
dust, or fiber that will be present.  Per Silver Eagle site electrical
classification plans, this
area is classified as a Class 1, Division 2 area.  The light fixture was
missing
the approved
hazardous explosion cover and did not meet the requirements of NFPA 70.
As a result,
employees were exposed to potential serious injury or death should the
wiring ignite
flammable vapors.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all
electrical wiring throughout the facility.
B.  The employer did not ensure that equipment, wiring methods, and
installations of
equipment in hazardous (classified) locations were intrinsically safe,
approved for the
hazardous (classified) location, or safe for the hazardous (classified)
location.  This violation
was identified during inspections of the facility from November 2009 to
March 2010, Silver
Eagle Refining Inc., 2355 South 1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.
Compliance
Officers observed electrical wiring in the lab fume hood that was not for
the class of location
and for the ignitable or combustible properties of the specific gas,
vapor, dust, or fiber that
will be present.  As seen in the lab, was exposed wiring not enclosed in
an approved
hazardous explosion cover and did not meet the requirements of NFPA 70.
As a result,
employees were exposed to potential serious injury or death should the
wiring ignite
flammable vapors.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that requires
evaluation of all
electrical wiring throughout the facility.

Issued

Apr 28, 2010

Abate by

Feb 20, 2014

Penalty

Initial $3,000 · Current $1,500 Reduced

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.1200(f)(5)(ii)  Except as provided in paragraphs (f)(6) and
(f)(7) of this
section, the employer shall ensure that each container of hazardous
chemicals in the
workplace is labeled, tagged or marked with the following information:
Identity of the
hazardous chemical(s) contained therein; and, Appropriate hazard warnings,
or alternatively,
words, pictures, symbols, or combination thereof, which provide at least
general information
regarding the hazards of the chemicals, and which, in conjunction with the
other information
immediately available to employees under the hazard communication program,
will
provide
employees with the specific information regarding the physical and health
hazards of the
hazardous chemical.
A.  The employer did not ensure that containers of hazardous checmicals
used in the lab
were labeled, tagged or marked with the following information: Identity of
the hazardous
chemical(s) contained therein; and, Appropriate hazard warnings, or
alternatively, words,
pictures, symbols, or combination thereof, which provide at least general
information
regarding the hazards of the chemicals.  This violation was identified
during inspections of
the facility from November 2009 to March 2010, Silver Eagle Refining Inc.,
2355 South
1100 West, Woods Cross, UT, 84087.  Multiple glass bottles were located in
the lab
building that were not marked with identity of the hazardous chemical(s)
contained therein
and appropriate hazard warnings.  Chemicals including, but not limited to,
"Doctor Solution"
were marked with only a tag showing the contents.  No interaction warnings
or other
appropriate hazard warnings were identified.  By not fully labeling
containers and identifying
hazards, employees may accidentally mix chemicals creating a reaction,
exposing employees
to serious injury or death.  This may be a system-wide occurrence that
requires evaluation of
all stored chemicals and labels throughout the facility.