OSHA Inspection: PACKERS SANITATION SERVICES INC. LTD

Issued

Jan 7, 2026

Abate by

Jan 22, 2026

Penalty

Initial $8,512 · Current $8,512

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.23(b)(11): The employer did not ensure that each employee faces the ladder when climbing up or down it.  On or about July 25, 2025, in the Pouch Room, the employer did not ensure that employees who utilized portable step ladders to disassemble line A's Prodo-Pak packaging machine piston feeder assembly faced the ladder as they climbed up or down. Employees were exposed to slip/trip hazards by failing to maintain effective footing and center of balance.

Issued

Jan 7, 2026

Abate by

Jan 22, 2026

Penalty

Initial $11,348 · Current $11,348

General-duty citation text

29 CFR  1910.28(b)(1)(i): Except as provided elsewhere in this section 29 CFR 1910.28, the employer did not ensure that each employee on a walking-working surface with an unprotected side or edge that is 4 feet (1.2 m) or more above a lower level is protected from falling by one or more of the systems described in 29 CFR 1910.28(b)(1)(i):   On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, the employer did not ensure that sanitation employees engaged in disassembly and sanitation activities on Line A's Prodo-Pak packaging machine piston feeder assembly were protected from a fall hazard greater than 4ft. Employees were exposed to bodily injury as they stood on top of the Prodo-Pak packaging machine during disassembly and were in close proximity to the unprotected sides. Sanitation employees were exposed to a fall hazard approximately 5ft 8in above the lower level.

Issued

Jan 7, 2026

Abate by

Jan 22, 2026

Penalty

Initial $11,348 · Current $11,348

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.133(a)(1): The employer did not ensure that each affected employee uses appropriate eye or face protection when exposed to eye or face hazards from flying particles, molten metal, liquid chemicals, acids or caustic liquids, chemical gases or vapors, or potentially injurious light radiation:  a) On or about July 25, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, the employer did not ensure that sanitation employees utilizing sanitation chemicals were protected by protective eye equipment where their eyes may be exposed to corrosive liquid chemicals such as but not limited to KC-243, KC-545, and KC-615.  b) On or about July 14 through 16, 2025, in the Retort Grind Cook Room, the employer did not ensure that sanitation employees utilizing sanitation chemicals were protected by protective eye equipment where their eyes may be exposed to corrosive liquid chemicals such as but not limited to KC-243, KC-545, and KC-615.  c) b) On or about July 14 through 16, 2025, in the Retort Grind Fill Room, the employer did not ensure that sanitation employees utilizing sanitation chemicals were protected by protective eye equipment where their eyes may be exposed to corrosive liquid chemicals such as but not limited to KC-243, KC-545, and KC-615.

Issued

Jan 7, 2026

Abate by

Jan 29, 2026

Penalty

Initial $16,550 · Current $16,550

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.147(c)(4)(i): Procedures were not developed, documented and utilized for the control of potentially hazardous energy when employees were engaged in activities covered by this section:  a) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, the employer failed to develop a hazardous energy control procedure for servicing activities on the Lee Industries, Inc. Kettle (Model 200D D7S). Servicing activities included but were not limited to disassembly and sanitation of the equipment. Sanitation employees were not protected against hazards associated with the unexpected re-energization of the equipment's thermal components, pressurized lines, rotating parts (i.e., scrapping baffles).  b) On or about July 14 through 16, 2025, in the Retort Grind Room, the employer failed to develop a hazardous energy control procedure for servicing activities on the Walker Stainless Equipment Company, Inc. jacketed mix tank (S/N: SP0-45869). Servicing activities included but were not limited to disassembly and sanitation of the equipment. Sanitation employees were not protected against hazards associated with the unexpected re-energization of the equipment's thermal components, pressurized lines, rotating parts (i.e., mixing blades, shaft).  c) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, employees engaged in disassembly and sanitation activities did not utilize a hazardous energy control procedure on Line A's Prodo-Pak packaging machine. Employees hands/arms were exposed to moving parts such as pinch points hazards associated with the piston feed assembly.  d) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, employees engaged in disassembly and sanitation activities did not utilize a hazardous energy control procedure on Line B's Prodo-Pak packaging machine. Employees hands/arms were exposed to moving parts such as pinch points hazards associated with the piston feed assembly.

Issued

Jan 7, 2026

Abate by

Jan 29, 2026

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

General-duty citation text

29 CFR  1910.147(c)(4)(ii): Procedures did not clearly and specifically outline the scope, purpose, authorization, rules, and techniques to be utilized for the control of hazardous energy, and the means to enforce compliance including, but not limited to, 29 CFR 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(A), (c)(4)(ii)(B), (c)(4)(ii)(C) and (c)(4)(ii)(D):  a) On or about July 24, 2025, the employer did not ensure that the energy control procedures addressed all required information for employees who were performing servicing operations on equipment such as but not limited to, the Pouch Cook Fill Room's Prodo-Pak packaging machine. Servicing operations included but were not limited to equipment teardown and sanitation activities. Noted deficiencies included, but may not be limited to, the following:  (1) Specific statement of the intended use of the procedure pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(A). The energy control procedure did not indicate the procedure's intended purpose or distinguished between "Supervisor Control Procedure," "Group Lock Box," or "Trainer Overlock" for the control of hazardous energy.   (2) Specific procedural steps for shutting down, isolating, blocking and securing the Prodo-Pak packaging machine to control hazardous energy pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(B). The procedure lacked specific instruction on the procedural steps for isolating the hazardous pneumatic energy source prior to performing servicing and maintenance activities on the equipment.   (3) Specific procedural steps for the placement, removal, and transfer of lockout devices or tagout devices and the responsibility for them pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(C). The procedure lacked specific instructions to the location and lockout or tagout device to be used on hazardous pneumatic and electrical energy sources that are not control circuit type devices. The procedure did not address lockout device placements for authorized personnel working under a group lockout system. The procedure lacked specific instructions for the removal of lockout devices.   (4) Specific requirements for testing a machine or equipment to determine and verify the effectiveness of lockout devices, tagout devices, and other measures pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(D). The procedure lacked specific procedural steps to verify that isolating and de-energization was accomplished, such as but not limited to attempting to restart the Prodo-Pak packaging machine by initiating a sequence or single action on specific panels, controls, switches, valves, or buttons; or visually inspect pneumatic pressure gauge to ensure dissipation of residual hazardous energy. The procedure lacked specific procedural steps authorized personnel working under a group lockout system would take to verify the effectiveness of isolation and de-energization via dissipation of relief valves, or sequence of controls to ensure potentially hazardous stored or residual energy was rendered safe.   b) On or about July 24, 2025, the employer did not ensure that the energy control procedures addressed all required information for employees who were performing servicing operations on equipment such as but not limited to, the Pouch Cook Fill Room's Koss Cooker machine. Servicing operations included but were not limited to, the removal of guards and sanitation activities performed by hand to the interior including the ribbon auger. Noted deficiencies included, but may not be limited to, the following:  (1) Specific statement of the intended use of the procedure pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(A). The energy control procedure did not indicate the procedure's purpose or distinguished between "Supervisor Control Procedure," "Group Lock Box," or "Trainer Overlock" for the control of hazardous energy.  (2) Specific procedural steps for shutting down, isolating, blocking and securing the Koss Cooker to control hazardous energy pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(B). The procedure lacked specific instruction on the location and procedural steps necessary for isolating hazardous steam, pneumatic and gravity energy sources prior to performing servicing and maintenance activities on the equipment.   (3) Specific procedural steps for the placement, removal and transfer of lockout devices or tagout devices and the responsibility for them pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(C). The procedure was not specific to the location and lockout device(s) to be used on hazardous steam, pneumatic and gravity energy sources that are not control circuit type devices. The procedure did not address lockout device placements for authorized personnel working under a group lockout system. The procedure lacked specific procedural steps for the removal of lockout devices.  (4) Specific requirements for testing the Koss Cooker to determine and verify the effectiveness of lockout devices, tagout devices, and other measures pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(D). The procedure lacked specific procedural steps to verify that isolating and de-energization was accomplished, such as but not limited to attempting to restart the Koss cooker machine by initiating a sequence or single action on panels, controls, switches, valves, or buttons; or visually inspect pneumatic pressure gauge to ensure dissipation of residual hazardous energy. The procedure lacked specific procedural steps authorized personnel working under a group lockout system would take to verify the effectiveness of isolation and de-energization via dissipation of relief valve, or sequence of controls to ensure potentially hazardous stored or residual energy was rendered safe.   c) On or about July 24, 2025, the employer did not ensure that the energy control procedures addressed all required information for employees who were performing servicing operations on equipment such as but not limited to, the Pouch Cook Fill Room's Koss Surge Hopper also known as Surge Tank #1. Servicing operations included removal of guards and sanitation activities performed by hand to the interior including the scraper and sweeper arms. Noted deficiencies included, but may not be limited to, the following:  (1) Specific statement of the intended use of the procedure pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(A). The energy control procedure did not indicate the procedure's intended purpose or distinguished between "Supervisor Control Procedure," "Group Lock Box," or "Trainer Overlock" for the control of hazardous energy.   (2) Specific procedural steps for the placement, removal, and transfer of lockout devices or tagout devices and the responsibility for the pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4(ii)(C). The procedure was not specific to the location of the hazardous electrical energy source for lockout device application. The procedure did not address lockout device placement for authorized personnel working under a group lockout system. The procedure lacked specific instructions for the removal of lockout devices.   (3) Specific procedural steps for testing the Koss Surge Hopper to determine and verify the effectiveness of lockout devices, tagout devices, and other measures pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(D). The procedure lacked specific steps to verify that isolation and de-energization was accomplished, such as but not limited to attempting to restart the Koss Surge Hopper by initiating a sequence or single action on panels, controls, switches, valves, or buttons. The procedure lacked specific procedural steps authorized personnel working under a group lockout system would verify the effectiveness of isolation and de-energization via dissipation of operating a sequence of controls to ensure potentially hazardous energy was rendered safe.   d) On or about July 24, 2025, the employer did not ensure that the energy control procedures addressed all required information for authorized personnel who were performing servicing activities on equipment such as, but not limited to, the Pouch Cook Fill Room's Gaulin Homogenizer machine. Servicing operations included disassembly of the piston pump assembly and sanitation activities. Noted deficiencies included, but may not be limited to, the following:  (1) Specific statement of the intended use of the procedure pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(A). The energy control procedure did not indicate the procedure's intended purpose or distinguished between "Supervisor Control Procedure," "Group Lock Box," or "Trainer Overlock" for the control of hazardous energy.   (2) Specific procedural steps for the placement, removal, and transfer of lockout devices or tagout devices and the responsibility for them pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(C). The procedure did not address lockout device placement for authorized personnel working under a group lockout system. The procedure lacked specific instruction for the removal of lockout devices.   (3) Specific requirements for testing a machine or equipment to determine and verify the effectiveness of lockout devices, tagout devices and other measures pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(D). The procedure lacked specific procedural steps to verify that isolating and de-energization was accomplished such as but not limited to initiating a sequence or single action on panels or controls. The procedure lacked specific procedural steps authorized personnel working under a group lockout system would verify the effectiveness of isolation and de-energization to ensure hazardous energy was rendered safe.   e) On or about July 14 through 16, 2025, the employer did not ensure that the energy control procedures addressed all required information for employees who were performing servicing operations on equipment such as but not limited to, the Retort Grind Room's Koss Cooker machine. Servicing operations included removal of guards and sanitation activities performed by hand to the interior including the ribbon auger. Noted deficiencies included, but may not be limited to, the following:  (1) Specific statement of the intended use of the procedure pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(A). The energy control procedure did not indicate the procedure's intended purpose or distinguished between "Supervisor Control Procedure," "Group Lock Box," or "Trainer Overlock" for the control of hazardous energy.   (2) Specific procedural steps for shutting down, isolating, blocking and securing the Koss Cooker to control hazardous energy pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(B). The procedure was not specific to the location of the hazardous electrical energy source. The procedure lacked specific procedural steps for the isolation and blockage of electrical, steam, pneumatic, and gravity hazardous energy sources prior to performing service and maintenance activities on equipment.  (3) Specific procedural steps for the placement, removal and transfer of lockout devices or tagout devices and the responsibility for them pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(C). The procedure lacked specific instructions to the location and lockout device(s) to be used on hazardous electrical, steam, pneumatic and gravity energy sources that are not control circuit type devices. The procedure did not address lockout device placement for authorized personnel working under a group lockout system. The procedure lacked specific instructions for the removal of lockout devices.  (4) Specific requirements for testing the Koss Cooker to determine and verify the effectiveness of lockout devices, tagout devices, and other measures pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(D). The procedure lacked specific procedural steps to verify that isolation and de-energization was accomplished, such as location and method to dissipate or bleed stored or residual hazardous steam and pneumatic energy sources. The procedure lacked specific steps authorized personnel under a group lockout system would verify the effectiveness of isolation and de-energization to ensure potentially hazardous stored or residual energy was rendered safe.   f) On or about July 14, through 16, 2025, the employer did not ensure that the energy control procedures addressed all required information for employees who were performing servicing operations on equipment such as but not limited to, the Retort Grind Cook Room's Koss Surge Hopper also known as Surge Tank #1. Servicing operations included removal of guards and sanitation activities performed by hand to the interior including the scraper and sweeper arms. Noted deficiencies included, but may not be limited to, the following:  (1) Specific statement of the intended use of the procedure pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(A). The energy control procedure did not indicate the procedure's intended purpose or distinguished between "Supervisor Control Procedure," "Group Lock Box," or "Trainer Overlock" for the control of hazardous energy.   (2)  Specific procedural steps for shutting down, isolating, blocking and securing the Koss Cooker to control hazardous energy pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(B). The procedure was not specific to the location and procedural steps for the isolation of the hazardous electrical energy source's local disconnect.  (3) Specific procedural steps for the placement, removal, and transfer of lockout devices or tagout devices and the responsibility for the pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4(ii)(C). The procedure was not specific to the location of the hazardous electrical energy source for lockout device application. The procedure did not address lockout device placement for authorized personnel working under a group lockout system. The procedure lacked specific instructions for the removal of lockout devices.   (4) Specific procedural steps for testing the Koss Surge Hopper to determine and verify the effectiveness of lockout devices, tagout devices, and other measures pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(D). The procedure lacked specific steps to verify that isolation and de-energization was accomplished, such as but not limited to attempting to restart the Koss Surge Hopper by initiating a sequence or single action on panels, controls, switches, valves, or buttons. The procedure lacked specific procedural steps authorized personnel working under a group lockout system would verify the effectiveness of isolation and de-energization to ensure potentially hazardous energy was rendered safe.   g) On or about July 14 through 16, 2025, the employer did not ensure that the energy control procedures addressed all required information for employees who were performing servicing operations on equipment such as but not limited to, the Pro/Fill 3000 filling machine located in the Retort Grind Room. Servicing operations included disassembly and sanitation activities performed by hand. Noted deficiencies included, but may not be limited to, the following:  (1) Specific statement of the intended use of the procedure pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(A). The energy control procedure did not indicate the procedure's intended purpose or distinguished between "Supervisor Control Procedure," "Group Lock Box," or "Trainer Overlock" for the control of hazardous energy.   (2) Specific procedural steps for shutting down, isolating, blocking and securing the Pro/Fill 3000 to control hazardous energy pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(B). The procedure was not specific to the location of panels, controls, switches, valves or buttons authorized personnel would utilize to achieve a normal shutdown status. The procedure lacked specific instruction as to the location of the electrical and pneumatic isolation devices.   (3) Specific procedural steps for the placement, removal and transfer of lockout devices or tagout devices and the responsibility for them pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(C). The procedure lacked specific instruction to the location and lockout or tagout device to be used on hazardous pneumatic and electrical energy sources that are not control circuit type devices. The procedure did not address lockout device placement for authorized personnel working under a group lockout system. The procedure lacked specific instruction for the removal of lockout devices.  (4) Specific requirements for testing the Pro/Fill 3000 filling machine to determine and verify the effectiveness of lockout devices, tagout devices, and other measures pursuant to 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(D). The procedure lacked specific steps to verify that the isolation and de-energization was accomplished, such as but not limited to, initiating a sequence or single action on panels, controls, switches, valves, or buttons; or visually inspect pneumatic pressure gauge to ensure dissipation of residual hazardous energy. The procedure lacked specific steps authorized personnel under a group lockout control would verify the effectiveness of isolation and de-energization rendering potentially hazardous stored or residual energy safe.

Issued

Jan 7, 2026

Abate by

Jan 29, 2026

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.147(d): The established procedure for the application of energy control (the energy control procedure) was not done in sequence as required by 29 CFR 1910.147(d)(1)-(6):  a) On or about July 14 through 16, 2025, in the Retort Grind Room, sanitation employees were exposed to machine hazards associated with moving parts, in-going nip points, and thermal hazards during sanitation activities of the Koss Cooker machine. The employer failed to implement energy control application steps as the machine was not shutdown or turned off to perform the sanitation work [per 1910.147(d)(2)]. As a result, the remaining applicable energy control elements, involving machine isolation [per 1910.147(d)(3)], Lockout/Tagout device application to electrical, pneumatic, steam isolation devices and blockage of gravity [per 1910.147(d)(4)], dissipation of residual energy [per 1910.147(d)(5)(i)], and verification of isolation [per 1910.147(d)(6)], were not implemented to protect employees from machine servicing hazards.   b) On or about July 14 through 16, 2025, in the Retort Grind Room, sanitation employees were exposed to hazards associated with moving parts while engaged in sanitation activities on the Koss Surge Hopper ("Surge Tank") machine. The employer failed to implement energy control application steps as the machine was not shutdown or turned off to perform the sanitation work [per 1910.147(d)(2)]. As a result, the remaining applicable energy control elements, involving machine isolation [per 1910.147(d)(3)], application of a Lockout/Tagout device onto the electrical local disconnect [per 1910.147(d)(4)], dissipation of residual energy [per 1910.147(d)(5)(i)], and verification of isolation [per 1910.147(d)(6)], were not implemented to protect employees from machine servicing hazards.  c) On or about July 14 through 16, 2025, in the Retort Grind Room, sanitation employees were exposed to machine hazards associated with moving parts and pinch points during disassembly and sanitation activities on the Gaulin Homogenizer machine. The employer failed to implement energy control application steps as the machine was not shutdown or turned off to perform the sanitation work [per 1910.147(d)(2)]. As a result, the remaining applicable energy control elements, involving machine isolation [per 1910.147(d)(3)], application of Lockout/Tagout device onto the electrical local disconnect [per 1910.147(d)(4)], dissipation of residual energy [per 1910.147(d)(5)(i)], and verification of isolation [per 1910.147(d)(6)], were not implemented to protect employees from machine servicing hazards.  d) On or about July 14 through 16, 2025, in the Retort Grind Room, sanitation employees were exposed to machine hazards associated with moving parts and pinch points during disassembly and sanitation on the Pro/Fill 3000 filler machine. The employer failed to implement energy control application steps as the machine was not shutdown or turned off to perform the sanitation work [per 1910.147(d)(2)]. As a result, the remaining applicable energy control elements, involving isolation of electrical and pneumatic energy sources [per 1910.147(d)(3)], application of Lockout/Tagout devices [per 1910.147(d)(4)], dissipation of residual energy [per 1910.147(d)(5)(i)], and verification of isolation [per 1910.147(d)(6)], were not implemented to protect employees from machine servicing hazards.   e) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, sanitation employees were exposed to machine hazards associated with moving parts, in-going nip points, and thermal hazards during sanitation activities on the Koss Cooker machine. The employer failed to implement energy control application steps as the machine's pneumatic energy source was not isolated nor was the lid blocked from the influence of gravity [per 1910.147(d)(3)]. As a result, the remaining applicable energy control elements involving the application of Lockout/Tagout devices were not applied to the pneumatic and steam isolating devices or blockage of gravity [per 1910.147(d)(4)], dissipation of residual energy [per 1910.147(d)(5)(i)], and verification of isolation [per 1910.147(d)(6)], were not implemented to protect employees from machine servicing hazards.  f) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, sanitation employees were exposed to hazards associated with moving parts while engaged in sanitation activities on the Koss Surge Hopper ("Surge Tank") machine. The employer failed to implement energy control application steps as the machine was not shut down or turned off to perform the sanitation work [per 1910.147(d)(2)]. As a result, the remaining applicable energy control elements, involving machine isolation [per 1910.147(d)(3)], application of Lockout/Tagout device [per 1910.147(d)(4)], dissipation of residual energy [per 1910.147(d)(5)(i)], and verification of isolation [per 1910.147(d)(6)], were not implemented to protect employees from machine servicing hazards.  g) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, sanitation employees were exposed to machine hazards associated with moving parts and pinch points during disassembly and sanitation activities of the Homogenizer machine. The employer failed to implement energy control application steps as the machine was not verified that isolation and de-energization has been accomplished prior to starting work [per 1910.147(d)(6)].  h) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, sanitation employees were exposed to machine hazards associated with moving parts such as pinch points hazards during disassembly of the piston feed assembly and sanitation on Line A's Prodo-Pak packaging machine. The employer failed to implement energy control application steps as the machine was not shutdown or turned off to perform the sanitation work [per 1910.147(d)(2)]. As a result, the remaining applicable energy control elements, involving isolation of electrical and pneumatic energy sources [per 1910.147(d)(3)], application of Lockout/Tagout devices [per 1910.147(d)(4)], dissipation of residual energy [per 1910.147(d)(5)(i)], and verification of isolation [per 1910.147(d)(6)], were not implemented to protect employees from machine servicing hazards.   i) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, sanitation employees were exposed to machine hazards associated with moving parts such as pinch points hazards during disassembly of the piston feed assembly and sanitation on Line B's Prodo-Pak packaging machine. The employer failed to implement energy control application steps as the machine was not shutdown or turned off to perform the sanitation work [per 1910.147(d)(2)]. As a result, the remaining applicable energy control elements, involving isolation of electrical and pneumatic energy sources [per 1910.147(d)(3)], application of Lockout/Tagout devices [per 1910.147(d)(4)], dissipation of residual energy [per 1910.147(d)(5)(i)], and verification of isolation [per 1910.147(d)(6)], were not implemented to protect employees from machine servicing hazards.

Issued

Jan 7, 2026

Abate by

Jan 29, 2026

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.147(f)(3)(i): A procedure was not utilized to afford the employees a level of protection equivalent to that provided by the implementation of a personal lockout or tagout device when servicing and/or maintenance was performed by a crew, craft, department or other group:  a) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, the employer failed to utilize a group lockout procedure that protected sanitation employees against hazards associated with the unexpected re-energization of moving parts, in-going nip points, and thermal hazards during sanitation activities on the Koss Cooker machine. Sanitation employee's hands and arms were exposed to getting caught by the auger while hand scrubbing the inside of the Koss cooker.   b) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, the employer failed to utilize a group lockout procedure that protected sanitation employees against hazards associated with the unexpected re-energization of moving parts during sanitation activities on the Koss Surge Hopper ("Surge Tank") machine. Sanitation employee's hands and arms were exposed to getting caught by the mixing blades during rinsing and hand scrubbing activities.   c) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, the employer failed to utilize a group lockout procedure that protected sanitation employees against hazards associated with the unexpected re-energization of moving parts such as the piston pump assembly during sanitation activities on the Gaulin Homogenizer. Sanitation employee's hands were exposed to a pinch point hazard by the piston pump assembly during disassembly and sanitation.  d) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, the employer failed to utilize a group lockout procedure that protected sanitation employees against hazards associated with the unexpected re-energization of moving parts such as piston feed assembly during disassembly during sanitation activities on Line A's Prodo-Pak packaging machine. Sanitation employee's hands were exposed to a pinch point hazard by the piston pump assembly during disassembly and sanitation.  e) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, the employer failed to utilize a group lockout procedure that protected sanitation employees against hazards associated with the unexpected re-energization of moving parts such as piston feed assembly during disassembly during sanitation activities on Line B's Prodo-Pak packaging machine. Sanitation employee's hands were exposed to a pinch point hazard by the piston pump assembly during disassembly and sanitation.

Issued

Jan 7, 2026

Abate by

Jan 29, 2026

Penalty

Initial $0 · Current $0

General-duty citation text

29 CFR 1910.147(f)(3)(ii)(D): Each authorized employee did not affix a personal lockout or tagout device to the group lockout device before working on the machine or equipment:  a) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, the employer failed to utilize a group lockout procedure that protected sanitation employees against hazards associated with the unexpected re-energization of moving parts, in-going nip points, and thermal hazards during sanitation activities on the Koss Cooker machine. Sanitation employee's hands and arms were exposed to getting caught by the auger while hand scrubbing the inside of the Koss cooker. Sanitation employees actively cleaning failed to affix a personal lockout device onto the hasp or lock box.   b) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, the employer failed to utilize a group lockout procedure that protected sanitation employees against hazards associated with the unexpected re-energization of moving parts during sanitation activities on the Koss Surge Hopper ("Surge Tank") machine. Sanitation employee's hands and arms were exposed to getting caught by the mixing blades during rinsing and hand scrubbing activities. Sanitation employees actively cleaning failed to affix a personal lockout device onto the hasp or lock box.  c) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, the employer failed to utilize a group lockout procedure that protected sanitation employees against hazards associated with the unexpected re-energization of moving parts such as the piston pump assembly during sanitation activities on the Gaulin Homogenizer. Sanitation employee's hands were exposed to a pinch point hazard by the piston pump assembly during disassembly and sanitation. Sanitation employees actively cleaning failed to affix a personal lockout device onto the hasp or lock box.  d) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, the employer failed to utilize a group lockout procedure that protected sanitation employees against hazards associated with the unexpected re-energization of moving parts such as piston feed assembly during disassembly during sanitation activities on Line A's Prodo-Pak packaging machine. Sanitation employee's hands were exposed to a pinch point hazard by the piston pump assembly during disassembly and sanitation. Sanitation employees actively cleaning failed to affix a personal lockout device onto the hasp or lock box.  e) On or about July 24, 2025, in the Pouch Cook Fill Room, the employer failed to utilize a group lockout procedure that protected sanitation employees against hazards associated with the unexpected re-energization of moving parts such as piston feed assembly during disassembly during sanitation activities on Line B's Prodo-Pak packaging machine. Sanitation employee's hands were exposed to a pinch point hazard by the piston pump assembly during disassembly and sanitation. Sanitation employees actively cleaning failed to affix a personal lockout device onto the hasp or lock box.